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CHRISTIAN    THEISM 


ITS  CLAIMS  AND  SANCTIONS 


D.  B.  PURINTON,  LL.D. 


VICB'PKESIDENT  AND    PROFESSOR   OF   METAPHYSICS    IN    WEST    VIRGINIA    UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK  &  LONDON 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 

5^l^e  J^mckerbotker  l^ress 

1889 


hJ 


Scnry-sr 

COPYRIGHT  BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 
1889 


Cbi  fmfcfterbocfter  prew 

Electrotyped  and  Printed  by 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 


PREFACE. 


Analysis  is  the  best  key  to  clear  and  easy  thought. 
Systems  of  truth,  like  machines,  are  often  so  complicated 
as  to  baffle  thought,  until  they  are  taken  to  pieces.  The- 
ism is  such  a  system.  This  fact  has  been  observed  in  the 
following  treatise.  Arguments  have  been  correlated  and 
each  assigned  to  its  proper  place.  Elements  in  each  argu- 
ment have  been  carefully  distinguished  and  separately  set 
out.  The  character  of  every  part,  and  its  relation  to  the 
whole,  have  been  invariably  indicated.  And  the  entire 
discussion  has  been  simplified,  as  far  as  possible. 

The  author  has  three  objects  in  view  : 

1.  To  construct  a  progressive  argument  which  shall  be, 
not  only  logical  in  its  methods  and  correct  in  its  general 
conclusions,  but  likewise  defensible  in  each  individual 
part  and  item  of  it. 

2.  To  free  the  subject,  as  far  as  may  be,  from  those  ob- 
scurities and  difficulties  of  which  students  in  Theism  are 
wont  to  complain. 

3.  To  present  the  subject — without  dodging  any  of  its 
profound  problems — in  such  clear  and  simple  manner  as 
to  commend  it  to  the  general  reader  who  is  willing  to 
think  as  he  reads. 

The  theist  ought  not  to  be  satisfied  with  few  readers, 
especially  when  the  atheist  is  writing  for  the  many. 
No  apology  is  needed  for  presenting  theistic  thought  in 


IV  PREFACE, 

a  new  form.  While  truth  is  changeless,  its  aspects  may 
vary.  Much  of  the  material  here  employed  is  the  common 
property  of  mankind.  Any  book  claiming  entire  origi- 
nality, on  a  subject  like  Theism,  must  foredoom  itself  to 
just  ridicule.  In  order  to  avoid  tedious  and  distracting 
citations  in  the  text,  references  are  made,  at  the  close  of 
each  chapter,  to  some  of  the  works  to  which  the  author  is 
indebted,  and  in  which  the  subject  of  the  chapter  is  more 
fully  discussed. 

And  yet  this  volume  is  neither  a  reprint  nor  a  compend. 
Old  thoughts  have  been  put  to  a  new  use,  and  new 
thoughts  added.  It  is  hoped  that  the  plan  of  treatment 
here  first  presented,  in  which  each  attribute  of  the  Deity 
is  to  be  established  by  a  separate  and  independent  argu- 
ment, will  commend  the  work  to  thoughtful  men,  and 
particularly  to  those  who  may  have  honestly  doubted  the 
validity  of  theistic  methods  hitherto  employed. 

This  form  of  the  theistic  argument  has  grown  up  out  of 
the  daily  demands  of  the  lecture-room,  and  the  author  is 
not  without  hope  that  it  may  be  found  useful  and  con- 
venient as  a  text-book  in  natural  theology. 

The  current  opinion  may  be  true,  that  authors  usually 
write  because  of  their  profound  conviction  that  the  world 
needs  their  thought,  and  is  waiting  for  it.  The  author  of 
this  Essay  has  written,  because  of  his  conviction  that  he 
needed  to  utter  his  thought.  Having  uttered  it,  he  is 
content.  If  thereby  he  may  be  the  means  of  contribu- 
ting, even  in  the  slightest  degree,  to  that  interest  which 
men  ought  to  feel  in  the  greatest  of  all  truths,  his  labor 
will  not  have  been  in  vain. 

• 
West  Virginia  University,  July,  1889. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

GENERAL   OUTLINE    OF    THE   SUBJECT. 

PAGE 

Section      I. — Christian  Theism  as  a  Fact i 

"        II. — Claims  of  Christian  Theism 3 

"       III. — Sanctions  of  Christian  Theism 13 

CHAPTER   I. 

INTELLIGENCE    IN    NATURE  ;     OR,    THE    EUTAXIOLOGICAL 
ARGUMENT. 

Section      I. — Difficulties  in  the  Proof 24 

II. — The  Eutaxiological  Syllogism 29 

"       III. — Objections 45 

CHAPTER   II. 

VOLITION    IN    NATURE  ;     OR,    THE    TELEOLOGICAL    ARGUMENT. 

Section      I. — Scope  of  the  Ailment 56 

II.— The  Teleological  Syllogism 67 

III. — Objections 92 

CHAPTER   III. 

THE    PERSONALITY    OF    GOD  ;     OR,    THE    INTUITIVE    ARGUMENT. 

Section      I. — Nature  of  the  Argument 109 

II. — Personality  of  God  and  of  Man 116 

III. — Anthropomorphism 128 


VI  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

THE   GOODNESS   OF    GOD  ;     OR,    THE    HISTORICAL   ARGUMENT. 

PAGE 

Section      I. — The  Problem  Stated 137 

II.— The  Facts 141 

"      III. — False  Answers — Ditheism  and  Pessimism     .         .  146 

"       IV. — The  Trae  Answer — Optimism 150 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE    UNITY    OF   GOD  ;     OR,    THE   MONISTIC    ARGUMENT. 

Section      I. — Scientific  Monotheism  .         .         ,         .         .         .  168 

"        II. — Philosophic  Monotheism       ......     174 

"      III. — Religious  Monotheism 178 


CHAPTER  VI. 

INFINITY   OF   GOD  ;    OR,    THE   CAUSAL   ARGUMENT. 

Section     I. — Nature  of  the  Infinite 195 

"        II. — The  Infinite  Being 200 

"      III.— Proof  of  God's  Infinity 209 

CHAPTER  VII. 

ANTI-THEISTIC    ERRORS. 

Section      I. — Materialism 223 

*'        II. — Pantheism 236 

"      III. — Positivism 246 

*'       IV. — Agnosticism 249 


CONTENTS.  VU 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

EVOLUTION    AND    CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

PAGE 

Section      I. — Is  Evolution  True  ? 257 

II.— Is  Evolution  Anti-Theistic 274 

CHAPTER   IX. 

IMMORTALITY. 

Section      I. — Presumptions  against  Immortality         ....     279 

II. — Arguments  from  the  Human  Side  .         .         .         .281 

•'      III. — Arguments  from  the  Divine  Side 292 


;UFI7BIISIT7] 
CHRISTIAN  THEISM. 


INTRODUCTION. 

GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  SUBJECT. 

SECTION  I. 

CHRISTIAN  THEISM  AS  A  FACT. 

CHRISTIANITY  is  not  the  effete  product  of  a  He- 
brew  myth.  It  is  a  momentous  fact  in  the  world, 
positive,  persistent,  and  fruitful.  It  has  a  history. 
Twenty  centuries  attest  its  permanence.  Like  any  other 
fact,  it  challenges  investigation.  In  its  origin,  character, 
and  continuance,  it  asks  to  be  accounted  for.  This  demand 
is  both  wise  and  reasonable.  It  must  be  met  honestly  and 
fairly,  both  by  its  friends  and  by  its  foes.  All  questions 
concerning  it,  whether  clear  and  palpable,  or  obscure  and 
difficult,  must  be  treated  with  patience,  modesty,  sincerity, 
love  of  truth,  and  intellectual  honesty. 

That  such  treatment  should  be  accorded  to  it,  is  evident 
from  the  nature  of  Christianity  as  a  mere  fact  in  the  world. 
It  is  widespread,  profound,  and  far-reaching.  It  domi- 
nates the  creeds,  touches  the  hearts,  and  colors  the  lives 
of  the  leading  races  of  men  now  upon  the  earth.  Nor 
is  this  all.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  Christianity  is  his- 
torically connected  with  the  development  and  progress  of 


2  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

the  race,  with  the  fairest  types  of  civilization  hitherto  at- 
tained. If  intelligent,  thoughtful  men  are  expected  to 
deal  carefully  and  patiently  with  the  simplest  facts  of 
science,  of  history,  or  of  practical  life,  how  much  greater 
the  necessity  of  dealing  thus  with  the  questions  of  Chris- 
tianity, a  fact  of  most  transcendent  importance,  past, 
present,  and  future. 

But  Christianity  is  not  a  mere  fact.  It  is  likewise  a 
system  of  doctrine  and  belief.  True,  it  is  a  fact,  histori- 
cal and  actual,  and  so  can  never  be  resolved  into  a  mysti- 
cal chain  of  mere  speculative  ideas.  And  yet  it  embraces 
ideas,  it  generates  thought.  It  includes  doctrines  concern- 
ing God,  man,  and  redemption  ;  concerning  the  origin  and 
destiny  of  creation,  and  the  true  purport  of  history ;  con- 
cerning human  duty,  the  nature  of  evil,  and  its  relation  to 
God,  man,  and  the  universe  ;  concerning  virtue,  holiness, 
and  immortality.  These  are  undeniably  among  the  most 
profound  and  important  questions  with  which  human  phi- 
losophy has  to  deal ;  and  yet  concerning  every  one  of  them, 
Christianity  sets  forth,  with  no  uncertain  sound,  its  own 
system  of  positive  truth.  As  such  it  invites  comparison 
with  any  and  all  other  systems,  and  will  fearlessly  abide 
the  result  thereof,  if  only  it  be  made  in  the  spirit  of  can- 
dor and  absolute  honesty.  Christianity  bears  its  own  bur- 
dens, and  asks  no  favors. 

Such  in  brief  is  the  nature  of  the  Christian  religion  as  a 
fact  and  a  system  of  doctrine  among  men.  The  more 
minute  statement  and  justification  of  its  individual  doc- 
trines belong  to  treatises  on  Ethics  and  Systematic  Theol- 
ogy, and  are  therefore  foreign  to  the  present  purpose. 
Christian  Theism  includes  but  two  subjects — (i)  The  being 
and  nature  of  God  and  (2)  His  revelation  of  truth  in  the 
Old  and  New  Testament  Scriptures. 


INTRODUCTION,  3 

SECTION  11. 
CLAIMS  OF  CHRISTIAN  THEISM. 

Christian  Theism  advances  immense  claims  upon  the 
intelligence  and  devotion  of  men.  What  these  claims  are 
in  themselves,  and  what  they  necessarily  involve,  must  be 
plainly  recognized  in  any  worthy  discussion  of  theistic  ques- 
tions.  It  will  be  well  to  consider  them  at  the  very  outset. 

I.    THEIR    NATURE. 

These  claims  are  characterized  by  certain  distinguishing 
traits,  the  chief  of  which  may  be  readily  pointed  out. 

(i)    They  are  Positive. 

Christian  Theism  makes  no  uncertain,  indefinite,  mean- 
ingless claims.  They  are  clear,  strong,  sure.  They  are 
enduring,  unchangeable.  Indeed  they  could  not  be 
otherwise,  since  they  refer  to  the  unchanging  principles 
of  eternal  truth.  The  requirements  of  a  government,  a 
social  compact,  a  political  party,  or  a  family  may  be  one 
thing  to-day  and  quite  another  to-morrow  ;  but  the  fluc- 
tuating, uncertain  aspects  of  human  progress  affect  not  the 
claims  of  God.  Based  upon  his  own  immutable  nature, 
they  change  not.  They  may  be  unknown,  misunderstood, 
distorted,  abused  ;  man's  recognition  of  them  may  be 
strangely  vacillating,  their  hold  upon  the  human  con- 
science may  vary  in  extent  and  in  power,  but  the  claims 
themselves  vary  not.  Theology  is  properly  a  progressive 
science,  but  nothing  can  ever  be  added  to  the  truths  of 
Theism.  While  God  is  God  and  man  is  man,  they  must 
remain  essentially  the  same. 

(2)    They  are  Bold. 

They  assert  themselves  in  open  day.  They  assume  no 
apologetic  tone.     They  ask  nobody's  pardon  for  existing 


4  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

or  Speaking.  They  cry  aloud,  and  spare  not.  They  mar- 
shal themselves  in  the  open  plain,  and  challenge  the 
whole  world  to  battle.  They  never  lower  their  flag,  nor 
reverse  their  arms.  The  character  of  the  "  Church  mili- 
tant "  has  become  proverbial.  Viewed  in  a  purely  histori- 
cal light,  the  circumstances  under  which  these  claims  were 
first  instituted  and  proclaimed  to  the  world  mark  them 
with  a  boldness  which  is  truly  phenomenal.  A  runaway 
slave,  an  obscure  and  poverty-stricken  carpenter's  son,  a 
handful  of  ignorant  fishermen  in  an  insignificant  provin- 
cial country — these  were  the  agents  through  whom  the 
claims  of  Christian  Theism  were  first  presented  to  the 
world.  Compare  these  outward  human  conditions  with 
the  Ten  Commandments  of  Moses,  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount,  and  the  many  calm,  intrepid,  masterful  words  of 
Jesus  and  the  Apostles,  and  the  boldness  of  their  utter- 
ances is  seen  in  no  uncertain  light.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, moreover,  that  this  boldness  is  entirely  indepen- 
dent of  all  circumstances.  When  Christianity  was  weak 
and  obscure,  and  hardly  beset  by  malignant  and  powerful 
foes,  its  claims  were  just  as  bold  and  regal  as  they  now 
are  when  it  stands  at  the  centre  of  civilization  and  num- 
bers its  followers  by  millions.  It  is  easy  enough  to  be 
brave  when  out  of  danger,  but  the  old  fable  of  the  wolf  and 
the  lamb  cannot  be  applied  to  the  claims  of  Christianity, 

(3)   They  are  Radical. 

They  go  to  the  bottom  of  things.  They  are  not  satis- 
fied with  surface  work.  They  lay  hold  upon  the  very 
roots  of  knowledge,  thought,  and  life.  Their  profundity 
is  equalled  only  by  their  importance.  Christianity  has,  in 
these  days,  been  constantly  termed  the  great  conservative 
force  of  civilization,  and  that  not  without  reason,  for  such, 


INTRODUCTION.  5; 

in  some  measure,  it  certainly  is.  Praise  and  censure  alike 
have  been  heaped  upon  it  in  its  conservative  capacity. 
And  yet  it  is  just  as  certainly  radical  in  character  and  ten- 
dency. It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  other  system 
ever  propounded  among  men  has  uprooted  so  many 
philosophies,  antagonized  so  many  beliefs,  revolutionized 
so  many  customs,  renovated  so  many  hearts,  recast  so 
many  lives.  In  its  own  expressive  language,  Christianity 
lays  the  axe  unto  the  root  of  the  trees. 

It  proposes  the  absolute  and  final  settlement  of  ques- 
tions involving  the  coolest  judgment,  the  clearest  reason, 
the  profoundest  research,  the  greatest  knowledge,  the 
wisest  forecast.  Some  of  its  questions,  indeed,  lie  on  the 
surface,  and  appeal  successfully  to  the  child  or  the  savage, 
but  these  by  no  means  exhaust  the  list.  There  are  others 
that  furnish  never  failing  food  for  thought  to  the  wisest 
sage,  the  most  radical  philosopher,  the  most  patient 
thinker. 

(4)   These  Claims  are  Uncompromising. 

Christianity  strikes  hands  with  no  one.  It  pools  no 
issues,  compounds  no  results.  As  it  asks  no  favors  of 
other  systems,  so  it  grants  none  to  them.  It  admits  no 
partners,  acknowledges  no  equals,  suffers  no  superiors. 
Other  religions  are  not  so  exacting. 

In  the  old  hymns  of  the  Rig- Veda,  for  example,  a 
curious  fact  may  be  observed  concerning  the  many  gods 
therein  revealed.  It  seems  that  there  is  no  jealousy  what- 
ever in  the  hearts  of  these  celestial  beings  ;  for  the  wor- 
shipper is  at  full  liberty  to  take  his  choice  among  them, 
and  then  to  ascribe  absolute  supremacy  to  any  one  of 
them  whom  his  fancy  may  lead  him  to  adore,  or  his  neces- 
sities constrain  him  to  propitiate.  Agni,  Indra,  Yama, 
and  Varuna  will  receive  these  empty  honors  by  turn,  with 


6  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

the  utmost  relish  and  the  sweetest  amiability.  Not  so 
with  Jehovah.  He  is  a  jealous  God.  He  will  have  all  or 
none.  He  makes  no  compromise,  admits  no  partnership, 
brooks  no  rivalry.  His  claims  are  absolute  and  uncondi- 
tional. He  never  yields  one  of  them.  He  seeks  the  con- 
quest of  the  world,  and  never  capitulates  on  any  terms 
short  of  complete  surrender. 

2.    THE    EXTENT    OF    CHRISTIAN    CLAIMS. 

Adequate  knowledge  concerning  any  thing  must  include 
not  only  its  nature,  but  likewise  the  extent  of  its  being. 
Very  much  may  depend  upon  tracing  its  form,  measuring 
its  magnitude,  exhausting  its  content.  Whether  a  thing 
be  large  or  small  is  often  the  most  suggestive  question 
concerning  it.  Its  character  may  be  good,  while  its  size 
is  fatally  infinitesimal.  The  value  of  a  coal  mine  depends 
upon  its  depth  quite  as  much  as  upon  the  analysis  of  its 
coal.  So  is  it  with  Christianity.  A  proper  estimate  of 
its  claims  must  take  into  account  their  extent  as  well  as 
their  nature.  It  needs  but  a  hasty  survey  of  them  to 
show  how  extensive  they  are. 

( I )   They  Extend  to  Every  Human  Being. 

The  Bible  claims  to  be  the  word  of  God  as  God  to  man 
as  man.  It  is  Heaven's  message  to  the  entire  race,  and 
nothing  less.  Whatever  may  be  true  of  its  first  utterances, 
its  last  word  knows  no  Jew,  no  Gentile,  no  Greek,  no  Bar- 
barian, no  bond,  no  free.  It  comes  to  all  men  alike,  places 
them  on  a  common  footing,  deals  with  them  impartially, 
prefers  its  claims  on  common  grounds,  announces  a  com- 
mon purpose,  pursues  it  by  common  methods,  inspires 
common  hopes,  leads  to  a  common  end. 

As  the  Vedic  gods  are  so  amiably  indifferent  in  regard 
to  matters  of  personal  supremacy  among  their  followers, 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

SO  are  they  likewise  as  to  the  number  of  followers  they 
shall  have.  Their  demands  in  this  line  are  not  at  all  ex- 
orbitant. They  seem  perfectly  satisfied  with  the  adora- 
tion of  a  single  race  or  nation.  This  is  true  also  of  all  the 
gods  alike.  Neither  Ahura,  nor  Dyaus  Pitar,  nor  Zeus, 
nor  Jupiter  ever  dreamed  of  asking  the  fealty  of  the  whole 
race  of  man.  But  precisely  this  Jehovah  does  demand. 
He  will  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  the  willing 
homage  of  all  men  of  every  nation,  clime,  and  tongue,  so 
long  as  men  shall  dwell  upon  the  earth.  The  claims  of 
the  Christian  religion  are  absolutely  world-wide. 

(2)   They  Extend  to  Every  Thought  and  Action. 

The  Christian  religion  is  not  a  garment  to  be  put  on 
and  off  at  pleasure.  It  is  not  a  masque  to  be  worn  on 
Sunday  and  discarded  during  the  week.  Undoubtedly 
such  use  has  often  been  made  of  it.  Not  a  few  of  its 
advocates  to-day  are  using  it  merely  as  a  convenience  or 
an  ornament.  But,  however  much  such  souls  may  need 
adorning,  and  however  beautiful  Christianity  may  be,  it  is 
not  designed  for  beauty  and  outward  ornament  alone. 
It  is  a  matter  of  fact  to  be  believed,  a  matter  of  precept 
to  be  obeyed,  a  matter  of  life  to  be  practised.  It  lays 
claim  to  the  whole  man,  takes  cognizance  of  every  act  of 
his  life.  It  rises  with  him  in  the  morning,  sits  with  him 
at  the  table,  goes  with  him  about  his  daily  business  or 
pleasure,  gathers  with  him  around  the  family  fireside, 
retires  with  him  to  his  bedchamber,  and  even  wanders 
with  him  through  the  misty  vales  of  dreamland.  Plato's 
ideal  ethics  may  require  little  more  than  a  nominal  belief, 
but  Christian  ethics  extend  to  the  minutest  details  of 
every-day  life. 

Nor  are  they  content  even  then.     They  probe  the  in- 


8  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

most  recesses  of  the  heart  and  pitilessly  drag  to  the  light 
the  very  thoughts  and  intents  thereof.  They  weigh  the 
motives,  analyze  the  choice,  characterize  the  purpose. 
They  ask  a  man,  not  only  what  he  does,  but  why  he  does 
it ;  not  only  how  he  appears,  but  what  he  is.  There  is 
no  particular  department  of  being  or  life  which  he  can 
set  apart  for  Christian  duties  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
rest.  Every  duty  is  a  Christian  duty.  So  must  every 
purpose,  thought,  and  act  be.  Whatever  other  gods 
may  require,  it  is  certain  that  the  God  of  the  Bible  pro- 
poses to  reign  not  only  over  all  men,  but  in  all  men.  He 
would  set  up  his  throne  in  the  human  heart,  and  rule 
without  a  rival  there. 

(3)   They  Extend  to  MatCs  Religious  Nature  Only. 

The  Bible  addresses  itself  to  man  as  a  religious  being. 
Were  he  not  such  a  being,  it  would  have  no  message  to 
him  whatever.  The  universality  of  its  claims,  as  just  set 
forth,  depends  upon  the  universality  of  the  religious 
principle  in  man.  Man  has  been  justly  styled  a  religious 
animal.  He  can  no  more  outgrow  or  escape  his  religious 
nature  than  he  can  his  appetite  or  his  digestion.  He  may 
change  his  religion,  as  he  does  his  food,  with  Protean 
rapidity,  but  religion  of  some  kind  he  must  have.  Men 
have  been  found  without  art,  science,  poetry,  history,, 
institutions,  governments;  but  nowhere  upon  the  earth 
has  any  race  of  men  ever  yet  been  found  utterly  devoid 
of  religion.  Proof  of  this  statement  will  be  given  here- 
after.   (Chap.V.) 

The  Bible  is  exclusively  a  religious  book.  It  is  not  a 
treatise  on  philosophy,  metaphysics,  science,  or  politics. 
It  gives  no  instruction  in  these  things.  While  its  moral 
precepts  in  their  guiding  force  are  universally  applicable. 


INTRODUCTION.  g 

still  it  is  not  a  text-book  of  human  wisdom.  While  it 
exalts  truth,  it  does  not  exhaust  it.  Let  it  always  be 
remembered  that  the  Bible  leaves  men  entirely  free  to 
seek  after  truth  in  fields  of  human  thought,  wherever  by 
honest  seeking  it  may  be  found.  Revelation  is  intended 
as  an  aid  to  man's  natural  powers,  and  not  a  substitute 
for  them.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  premium  upon  idleness  and 
mental  inanity.  It 'is  confined  strictly  to  the  domain  of 
religious  truth,  wherein  such  aid  is  imperatively  neces- 
sary. But  suppose  man  had  no  religious  nature.  Con- 
ceive him  just  as  he  is  physically  and  mentally,  with  the 
religious  element  left  out.  In  that  case,  there  could  be 
no  place  for  the  Bible  or  any  system  of  Christian  Theism. 
The  only  field  in  which  revelation  is  necessary  would  be 
utterly  beyond  his  comprehension.  This  principle  is  in 
no  wise  contradictory  to  that  of  the  preceding  topic  ;  for 
it  is  man's  religious  nature  that  lays  hold  of  his  entire 
being,  and  enforces  the  universal  claims  of  Christian 
Theism. 

3.       THINGS   INVOLVED    IN    THESE    CLAIMS. 

It  is  not  enough  to  consider  the  claims  of  Christian 
Theism  in  their  nature  and  their  extent.  What  they  in- 
volve must  be  noticed.  They  are  not  themselves  funda- 
mental. Indeed,  no  claim  of  any  kind  can  be  fundamen- 
tal. It  must  be  built  on  something,  must  have  some- 
thing beneath  it,  on  which  it  rests. 

Beneath  such  huge  claims  as  appear  in  the  Christian 
system  there  ought  to  be  a  base  of  adamant.  The 
strength  of  the  foundation  must  correspond  to  the  weight 
of  the  column  it  has  to  support.  This  basal  support  may 
not  always  be  visible.  It  may  be  hidden  beneath  the 
surface,  but  honest  digging  will  bring  it  to  light.  Thus 
it  is  with  the  claims  of  Christianity.     The  foundation 


lO  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

facts  are  not  always  displayed.  They  are  not  argued, 
perhaps  not  even  stated,  but  they  are  there,  nevertheless, 
and  are  assumed  as  though  beyond  question  or  dispute. 

(i)  Christianity  Involves  the  Existence  and  Character  of  God. 

It  is  true,  the  Scriptures  nowhere  elaborate  an  argu- 
ment to  prove  that  God  exists.  They  do  make  a  very 
uncomplimentary  remark  concerning  him  who  hath  said 
in  his  heart  "  There  is  no  God."  But  they  do  not  argue 
the  point  with  him.  They  manifestly  assume  the  exist- 
ence of  Deity  as  a  first  truth  to  be  universally  admitted, 
or  as  a  conviction  to  be  gained  without  the  aid  of  Revela- 
tion. They  begin  with  God  and  end  with  God.  He  is  the 
Alpha  and  the  Omega.  Neither  do  they  give  the  ration- 
ale of  his  nature.  They  do  attribute  to  him  illimitable 
and  incomprehensible  perfections.  They  affirm  his  in- 
finity in  wisdom,  power,  truth,  justice,  holiness,  and  love. 
They  dwell  largely  upon  those  attributes  of  Deity  which 
are  of  special  interest  to  helpless,  imperfect,  and  depen- 
dent creatures.  But  they  offer  no  sort  of  argument  as  to 
the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  Infinite,  or  as  to  the  compati- 
bility of  his  attributes.  These  things  are  also  manifestly 
taken  for  granted.  The  Scriptures  come  to  us  as  the 
utterances  of  a  self-existent  Deity  whose  being  and  all- 
sufficiency  are  everywhere  assumed. 

(2)   The  Knowableness  of  God. 

Knowledge  of  his  mere  existence  is  of  no  avail  to 
man.  Proofs  of  his  being  may  be  infallibly  conclusive, 
and  may  yet  leave  untouched  the  essential  doctrines  of 
the  Bible.  A  man  may  freely  admit  that  there  is  a  God, 
and  at  the  same  time  utterly  repudiate  the  entire  Chris- 
tian system.  The  number  of  men  who,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  do  this  thing,  is  historically  great,  and  is  probably 


INTRODUCTION.  II 

not  diminishing.  Matthew  Arnold  may  have  believed  in 
""  A  Power  not  ourselves  that  makes  for  righteousness  "  ; 
but  he  believed  not  in  the  Bible.  Herbert  Spencer  may 
talk  of  an  *'  Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy,  from  which  all 
things  procceed,"  but  Herbert  Spencer  has  no  use  for 
the  Bible.  The  god  of  his  philosophy  is  the  Unknown 
and  the  Unknowable.  However  he  may  be  able  to  rec- 
oncile these  terms,  he  certainly  means  by  them  that 
there  is  an  impassable  barrier  between  us  and  God,  that 
we  can  never  know  him,  and  that  therefore  the  sum  of 
all  Theology  possible  to  man  may  be  written  in  two 
words,  God  exists. 

Now  this  barrier  to  the  knowledge  of  God  may  reside 
in  God  himself,  or  in  man,  or  in  both.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  absolute  and  infinite  may  be  essentially  unutterable, 
incommunicable.  If  so,  an  absolute  and  infinite  God  can 
never  be  known.  He  dwells  forever  in  the  solemn  soli- 
tudes of  his  own  fathomless  being.  Man  is  shut  out  by 
an  impregnable  wall.  Every  avenue  is  barred  against 
him  by  all  the  power  of  infinitude  itself.  The  mightiest 
intellect  cannot  approach  unto  God,  and  the  fault  is  in 
God  himself.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  ignorance  of  God 
may  be  chargeable  to  man.  It  may  result  from  the 
nature  and  limitations  of  human  knowledge.  If  man's 
knowledge  depends  entirely  upon  laws  of  the  human 
understanding,  and  has  no  necessary  correspondence  to 
the  world  of  objective  reality,  then  he  can  never  be  sure 
of  any  thing,  excepting  only  the  aforesaid  laws  of  the 
human  understanding.  Whatever  necessary  beliefs  may 
be  drawn  from  the  Practical  Reason,  it  is  certain  that 
according  to  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  Hegel,  and  Fichte, 
no  man  can  ever  know  God.  In  either  case,  it  is  mani- 
fest that  no  revelation  of  God  to  man  could  ever  take 


12  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

place.     But  the  Bible  proceeds  upon  the  assumption  that 
God  can  be  known,  and  that  man  can  know  him. 

(3)    A  Veritable  Revelation. 

Christian  Theism  involves  the  assertion  that  God  has 
actually  made  a  revelation  to  man.  This  is  a  vital  point. 
God's  existence  and  capacity  to  be  known,  man's  exis- 
tence and  capacity  to  know  God,  are  all  meaningless 
terms  until  they  are  realized  and  united  in  an  act  of 
revelation.  Certain  Egyptian  hieroglyphics  may  be  de- 
cipherable, and  my  capacity  to  decipher  them  may  be 
unquestioned,  and  yet  I  may  remain  forever  in  ignorance, 
not  only  of  their  meaning,  but  even  of  their  very  exist- 
ence. If  God  has  not  actually  revealed  himself  to  man, 
then  Herbert  Spencer  is  right,  and  religious  agnosticism 
is  the  soundest  philosophy.  But  Christian  Theism  insists 
that  such  a  revelation  has  actually  been  made,  that  it  is  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  plain  historical  truth  susceptible  of  his- 
torical proof.  On  any  other  supposition,  the  repeated 
utterances  of  Christ  and  the  Apostles  are  either  impious 
blasphemy  or  ridiculous  nonsense. 

But  more  than  this.  It  is  claimed  that  this  revelation 
is  contained  entirely  in  the  canonical  books  of  the  Old 
and  New  Testament  Scriptures.  A  terrible  curse  is  pro- 
nounced upon  him  who  adds  thereto  or  takes  therefrom. 
The  canon  is  closed.  The  Bible  professes  to  hold  an  un- 
compromising and  indefeasible  monopoly  on  revealed 
truth.  Every  purchaser,  to  the  end  of  time,  must  come 
to  the  inexhaustible  treasure-house  of  the  Word,  and 
buy  for  himself  and  not  for  another.  Verily  God  has 
spoken  to  man,  or  the  whole  Christian  system  is  a  stupen- 
dous and  blasphemous  imposture. 


IN  TROD  UCTION,  1 3 

SECTION  III. 
SANCTIONS  OF  CHRISTIAN  THEISM. 

These  sanctions  are  authoritative  and  convincing. 
They  must  furnish  justification  and  enforcement  to  the 
claims  themselves.  If  they  are  adequate,  the  claims 
stand ;  if  inadequate,  the  claims  fall,  and  both  go  down 
together. 

A  commander  must  be  able  to  show  his  commission. 
Christian  Theism  proposes  to  command  the  whole  world, 
and  these  sanctions  are  its  commission.  Let  them  be 
carefully  examined. 

I.    THEY    ARE    ADDRESSED    TO    THE    REASON. 

Any  other  appeal  would  certainly  be  unworthy  and 
insufficient.  Man's  reason  is  at  once  his  highest  power, 
his  distinguishing  trait,  and  his  ultimate  guide.  It  is  his 
only  test  of  truth.  He  must  constantly  employ  it  in  the 
discovery  of  truth  and  the  detection  of  error.  Moreover, 
he  must  carefully  guard  against  misusing  it.  The  abuse 
of  reason  is  the  most  prolific  source  of  error  in  the  world. 
He  who  would  find  the  truth  must  seek  it  without  preju- 
dice, must  approach  it  in  a  spirit  of  absolute  impartiality, 
and  must  be  ready  to  follow  whithersoever  it  leads.  This 
is  always  difficult  to  do.  Peculiarly  so  is  it,  when  such 
vast  personal  interests  are  at  stake,  as  in  the  case  of 
Christian  Theism.  But  the  very  vastness  of  these  inter- 
ests makes  it  all  the  more  important  to  follow  the  dic- 
tates of  right  reason,  in  settling  the  momentous  questions 
of  religion.  What !  Shall  a  man  employ  his  reason  in 
deciding  the  trivial  and  momentary  affairs  of  ordinary 
life,  and  refuse  to  use  it  concerning  questions  of  charac- 
ter, duty,  and  destiny  ?     Shall  he  exhaust  his  highest 


14  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

powers  in  considering  the  physical  aspects  of  nature,  in 
studying  the  moons  of  Jupiter,  the  tail  of  a  comet,  or 
the  interstellar  ether,  and  doggedly  close  the  eyes  of  his 
understanding  against  those  things  which  make  for  his 
own  enduring  felicity  when  moons  and  stars  and  comets 
shall  have  faded  from  the  sky  ?  Surely  nothing  can  be 
more  unreasonable  than  such  an  employment  of  human 
reason. 

And  yet  it  has  been  repeatedly  and  boldly  asserted 
that  the  Christian  religion  discourages  the  use  of  reason, 
that  her  sanctions  forbid  it.  This  would  be  a  grave 
charge,  indeed,  if  it  were  true ;  but  it  is  not  true.  It  is  a 
baseless  slander  upon  Christianity.  *'  Come,  let  us  reason 
together,"  is  one  of  her  first  words.  And  the  sanctions 
of  the  whole  system  are  manifestly  addressed  to  the 
reason. 

(i)   They  do  not  Stand  on  Blind  Authority. 

It  is  not  denied  that  Bible  truth  stands  on  authority. 
It  does  so  stand.  But  that  authority  is  not  blind.  It 
submits  itself  to  reason.  And  here  the  functions  of  rea- 
son in  relation  to  truth  must  be  carefully  distinguished. 
They  are  twofold  :  first,  the  discovery  of  truth ;  and 
second,  the  test  of  truth.  Some  truths  can  be  discovered 
by  the  reason  alone,  some  cannot ;  but  all  alike  must  be 
brought  to  the  test  of  reason.  It  must  be  more  reason- 
able to  beheve  a  thing  than  to  reject  it,  or  else  its  appeal 
as  truth  is  nugatory. 

Christianity  claims  to  reveal  truth  upon  the  authority 
of  Deity  himself.  Now  this  procedure  is  reasonable 
enough,  provided  the  claim  to  Divine  authority  be  estab- 
lished. But  even  then,  it  is  not  at  all  complimentary  to 
the  powers  of  human  reason ;  for  it  plainly  implies  that 
the  truth  so  revealed  could  not  be  discovered  by  reason. 


IN  TROD  UCTION.  1 5 

It  is  therefore  quite  natural  that  the  pride  of  human 
reason  should  be  touched  thereby,  and  deeply  offended. 
If  the  philosopher,  by  the  unaided  use  of  his  own  powers 
of  speculation  and  research,  might  find  out  God  to  per- 
fection and  gain  a  knowledge  of  his  will,  he  would  'be 
justly  proud  of  such  an  achievement.  A  comfortable 
sense  of  proprietorship  in  the  truth  so  discovered  would 
doubtless  give  him  an  ardent  attachment  to  it. 

But  such  is  not  the  plan  of  the  Gospel.  The  man  of 
most  imperial  intellect  must  sit,  side  by  side,  with  the 
ignorant  and  the  lowly  at  the  feet  of  Jesus.  Humble 
and  dependent  as  a  little  child,  he  must  there  receive  the 
truth  of  God  from  the  King  of  truth  himself.  His  rea- 
son is  called  upon  to  discover  nothing  whatever.  It  is 
merely  expected  to  appropriate  and  test  that  truth  which 
is  already  discovered  and  proclaimed  unto  it.  This 
pleases  not  the  pride  of  human  reason,  and  the  man  of 
speculative  mind  turns  away  from  Gospel  truth  with 
proud  disdain.  Let  him  remember,  however,  that  in 
doing  so  he  rejects  reason  no  less  than  Revelation.  For 
the  sanctions  of  Revelation  make  their  appeal  at  the  bar 
of  his  reason,  and  without  prejudice  or  pride,  should  be 
tried  only  before  that  high  tribunal. 

(2)   They  do  not  Rest  upon  mere  Ecstatic  Fancy. 

One  extreme  in  religion  begets  another.  The  cold 
and  rigid  demands  of  reason  have  floated  us  into  the 
ice-bound  regions  of  rationalism.  Reaction  takes  place. 
The  counter-current  sets  in.  The  fervid  breath  of  ecsta- 
tic feeling  wafts  us  back  into  the  torrid  kingdom  of  fancy. 
We  are  all  aglow  and  wellnigh  stifled  with  the  heat. 
Yesterday  we  were  in  danger  of  death  by  freezing.  To- 
day we  are  about  to  ignite.     The  apostles  of  this  subtle 


1 6  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

and  sultry  faith  declare  to  us  that  they  are  gazing  on 
truth  direct,  that  like  seers  of  old  they  have  beatific 
visions,  that  they  are  caught  up  into  the  third  heaven, 
that  they  behold  things  divine  which  no  man  can  utter, 
and  that  one  moment  of  such  rapt  revelation  out-weighs 
a  lifetime  of  icy  logic  and  barren  speculation. 

Now  these  enthusiasts  are  doubtless  sincere  in  their 
beliefs,  and  there  may  be  in  them  a  grain  of  truth,  and 
to  some  minds  a  modicum  of  religious  assurance.  It 
may  be,  and  doubtless  is,  true  that  moments  of  spiritual 
exaltation  come  to  every  earnest  worshipper,  wherein  he 
feels  the  potent  charm  of  sovereign  truth  and  love  as  he 
never  felt  before.  And  yet,  the  sanctions  of  Christian 
Theism  are  in  no  sense  dependent  upon  such  moments 
of  religious  ecstasy.  When  based  upon  Christian  princi- 
ple, these  experiences  are  true  and  good ;  but  they  figure 
poorly  when  brought  as  witnesses  to  the  bar  of  reason. 
Christianity  needs  not  their  testimony. 

(3)   These  Sanctions  are  not  Matters  of  Habit  Simply. 

The  formation  of  proper  habits  is  undeniably  a  good 
thing.  It  is  not  to  be  discouraged,  nor  its  power  despised. 
It  should  be  freely  admitted  and  widely  utilized  in  reli- 
gion as  elsewhere.  And  this  is  equally  true  whether  it 
refers  to  the  individual  or  to  the  race. 

It  is  manifest,  however,  that  mere  habit  cannot  change 
the  moral  character  of  an  act.  If  the  act  be  right  in 
itself,  no  repetition  of  it  can  make  it  wrong.  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  the  act  be  wrong,  the  uninterrupted 
practice  of  ages  and  generations  of  men  can  never  make 
it  right.  The  same  is  true  of  a  belief,  and  preeminently 
so  of  any  form  of  religious  faith.  It  may  be  right  for 
me  to  believe  to-day  as  I  did  yesterday,  but  it  cannot  be 


IN  TROD  UCTION, 


17 


Tight  because  I  believed  it  yesterday.  It  may  be  right  for 
me  to  worship  the  God  of  my  fathers,  but  it  cannot  be 
simply  because  my  fathers  worshipped  him.  I  may 
have  two  excellent  reasons  for  venerating  my  ancestors: 
first,  because  they  were  my  ancestors  ;  and  second,  because 
of  the  good  qualities  they  may  have  personally  possessed. 
But  my  veneration  for  them  can  never  justify  me  in 
imbibing  an  error  or  practising  a  delusion  ;  even  they 
may  have  done  both.  Nay,  more.  It  cannot  excuse  me 
from  investigating  for  myself  any  truth  which  they  may 
have  believed  or  practised. 

The  Christian  religion,  recognizing  this  just  principle, 
calls  upon  no  man  to  accept  its  truth  because  his  father 
did,  or  because  it  may  have  been  the  habit  of  his  ances- 
tors. He  who  joins  a  church  because  his  father  belonged 
to  it,  professes  a  creed  because  it  is  popular,  or  pins  his 
religious  faith  to  a  priestly  robe,  is  to  be  pitied  or 
despised.  Certainly  he  is  not  the  most  intelligent  expo- 
nent of  the  Christian  faith. 

2.    CHRISTIAN    SANCTIONS     ARE     COMMENSURATE    WITH    CHRIS- 
TIAN   CLAIMS. 

They  are  justly  expected  to  cover  the  same  ground. 
Any  thing  less  than  this  would  vitiate  the  entire  system. 
A  man  must  not  claim  to  be  a  major-general  and  show 
the  commission  of  a  lieutenant.  Christianity  must  not 
lay  claim  to  the  entire  field  of  religious  thought  and 
action,  under  the  authority  of  sanctions  that  cover  only 
a  part  of  that  field.  The  building  must  not  be  broader 
than  its  foundation.  As  the  Christian  structure  is  world- 
wide, so  is  the  measure  of  its  foundation. 
(i)  Its  Extent. 

Christianity  presses  home  its  claims  upon  every  mem- 
ber of  the  human  race ;  but  its  accompanying  sanctions 


1 8  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

are  likewise  universal.  The  proofs  of  Christian  truth  are 
indeed  varied  and  diversified.  In  its  quiver  there  is  some 
arrow  that  can  reach  every  man's  heart.  There  is  judi- 
cial and  metaphysical  evidence  for  the  philosopher, 
inductive  and  deductive  evidence  for  the  logician,  his- 
torical evidence  for  the  antiquarian,  linguistic  evidence 
for  the  philologist,  personal  testimony  for  the  man  of 
affairs ;  and  there  are  intuitive  and  experimental  proofs 
for  all  men  alike,  high  or  low,  rich  or  poor,  learned  or 
ignorant,  busy  or  idle. 

Christianity  is  cosmopolitan.  Other  religions  flourish 
in  certain  latitudes  and  among  certain  races.  This  one 
alone  flourishes  equally  among  men  of  every  race  or 
tongue  or  clime.  Now  this  universal  adaptation  is  found 
not  only  in  the  claims  of  Christianity,  but  also  in  the 
provisions  by  which  their  authority  is  maintained.  It 
has  sanctions  that  bring  conviction  to  the  mind  of  every 
rational  human  being,  no  matter  what  language  he  may 
speak,  or  beneath  what  sky  he  may  dwell. 

(2)   The  Scope  of  Christian  Authority. 

By  scope  of  authority  is  meant  the  subjects  to  which  it 
applies,  concerning  which  it  speaks.  Manifestly  there 
are  many  important  fields  in  the  domain  of  possible 
truth  in  which  Christian  Theism  utters  no  voice.  Con- 
cerning such  truth,  of  course,  she  needs  show  no  creden- 
tials. She  confines  her  utterances  to  two  subjects  alone. 
God  and  the  Bible,  are  the  burden  of  Christian  Theism. 
For  the  proofs  concerning  them,  both  internal  and  ex- 
ternal, both  physical  and  moral,  both  historical  and 
inferential,  she  is  responsible.  And,  furthermore,  she  asks 
not  to  be  relieved  of  this  responsibility.  She  is  willing 
to  be  judged  by  her  ability  to  establish  the  being  of  God 


INTRODUCTION. 


19 


and  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible.  Those  "  mawkish  and 
invertebrate  systems"  of  misty  sentimentality,  which 
tender-footed  theologians  in  these  days  are  attempting 
to  construct,  under  the  modest  title  of  "  Advanced  Chris- 
tianity," and  which  utterly  ignore  the  inspiration  of  the 
Divine  Word,  are  abhorrent  to  every  principle  of  Chris- 
tian Theism.  The  possibility  of  the  supernatural  is  a 
vital  hypothesis  in  the  Christian  system.  Without  it, 
the  system  is  contradictory  and  self-destructive.  Chris- 
tianity, like  the  ancient  temple  of  Dagon,  rests  on  two 
pillars.  These  pillars  are  God  and  the  Bible.  If  either 
of  them  shall  ever  be  torn  down  by  the  Samsons  of  infi- 
delity, the  whole  temple  will  lie  in  ruins.  If  we  would 
measure  its  strength,  we  must  examine  these  massive 
columns.  This  is  the  scope  of  Christian  Theism.  It  has 
just  two  themes :  first.  Theism^  or  evidences  concerning 
the  being  and  nature  of  God ;  second,  RevelatioHy  or  evi- 
dences concerning  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible. 

(3)    The  Matter  of  Certainty. 

The  sanctions  of  Christianity  are  commensurate  with 
its  claims,  in  clearness  and  certainty.  As  there  is  no 
uncertain  sound  about  the  one,  so  there  must  be  none 
about  the  other.  As  men  are  left  in  no  manner  of 
doubt  concerning  the  imperative  character  of  Scriptural 
precepts,  so  must  they  be  cleared  of  all  reasonable  doubt 
concerning  Scriptural  authority.  The  language  of  the 
Bible  is  not  simply  advisory,  it  is  uniformly  authoritative. 
Thus  saith  the  Lord.  That  the  Scriptures  do  speak  by 
the  authority  of  the  Almighty  God,  it  shall  be  the  pur- 
pose of  the  second  volume  of  this  work  to  prove.  In 
this  divine  authority  lies  the  chief  value  of  the  Bible. 
Many  of  its  doctrines  and   precepts  might   possibly  be 


20  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

discoverable  by  laborious  and  patient  processes  of  human 
reason,  but  when  thus  discovered  they  would  be  of  little 
avail.  They  would  fail  to  command  the  homage  of  men. 
The  very  method  of  their  approach  would  be  against 
them.  They  would  come  to  us  with  the  tottering  step 
of  infancy,  rather  than  the  firm,  elastic  tread  of  mature 
age.  They  would  speak  the  hesitating  language  of  doubt 
and  disagreement,  rather  than  the  commanding  words  of 
unquestionable  certainty.  They  might  engage  attention, 
but  could  never  command  obedience.  They  might  rein- 
force the  intellect,  but  not  the  heart.  The  will,  the  con- 
science, and  the  moral  powers,  which  are  in  greatest  need 
of  reinforcement,  would  be  left  untouched.  Man  always 
knows  better  than  he  does.  He  needs  more  knowledge,  to 
be  sure,  but  by  far  his  greatest  need  is  a  constant,  clear,  and 
commanding  monitor  to  awaken  the  conscience,  arouse 
the  affections,  and  dispose  the  will  toward  that  which  is 
true  and  good.  Such  a  monitor  the  Holy  Scriptures  fur- 
nish to  every  man  who  accepts  their  authority.  If  they 
did  nothing  else  than  this,  they  would  even  then  be  of 
priceless  value. 

3.     THE    SANCTIONS    OF    CHRISTIAN    THEISM    ARE     SUI     GENERIS. 

A  brilliant  German  writer  once  said  of  his  mother- 
tongue  :  '■'■  It  is  separate,  unmixed,  and  only  like  itself." 
So  may  it  be  said  in  a  higher  sense  of  Christianity  ;  it  is 
only  like  itself.  But  these  words  must  not  be  pressed 
too  far,  in  either  case.  It  is  certainly  not  meant  that  the 
German  language  has  absolutely  nothing  in  common  with 
other  tongues,  for  that  would  be  contrary  to  fact,  and  in 
defiance  of  the  universal  laws  of  philology  and  linguistic 
growth.  Neither  is  it  meant  that  Christianity  has  noth- 
ing whatever  of  fact,  truth,  or  purpose  in  common  with 


IN  TROD  UCTION,  2  r 

other  systems  of  religion.  Many  of  its  doctrines  may 
indeed  be  found  elsewhere.  It  is  meant,  however,  that 
the  sanctions  of  Christianity  are  unlike  all  others,  both 
in  importance  and  in   method. 

(i)  In  Importance. 

If  Christianity  be  true  at  all,  it  is  eternally  and  tran-^ 
scendently  true.  It  is  incomparably  the  most  momen- 
tous system  of  truth  ever  addressed  to  men.  It  takes 
hold  on  two  worlds.  It  unites  origin,  duty,  and  destiny. 
It  declares  all  other  religious  systems  essentially  and 
eternally  false.  It  declares  God  to  be  true,  though  all 
men  be  found  to  be  liars.  It  assumes,  upon  principles  of 
its  own,  to  fix  all  men  in  a  state  of  immortal  felicity  or 
of  endless  woe.  Now  the  sanctions  of  such  a  system  as 
this  must  be  of  supreme  and  universal  importance. 

If  I  am  a  Brahmin,  it  matters  little  to  me  whether 
Christianity  or  Islamism  shall  prove  true,  for  my  religion 
will  admit  either.  I  can  witness  with  equal  composure 
the  ascendency  of  the  crescent  or  of  the  cross.  If  I  am 
a  Pagan,  I  can  receive  with  entire  unconcern  the  most 
convincing  proofs  of  any  religion  whatsoever ;  for  I  al- 
ready believe  in  lords  many  and  gods  many.  But  if  I 
am  a  Christian  I  can  do  no  such  thing.  The  establish- 
ment of  any  other  system  is  the  ruin  of  my  own.  Jeho- 
vah-God is  either  the  All-Father,  or  else  the  most  stupen- 
dous myth  in  the  universe.  This  is  the  question  of  all 
questions.     Its  proofs  are  of  unparalleled  importance. 

(2)  In  Method. 
The  sanctions  of  Christian  truth  are  necessarily  unlike 
all  others  in  their  method  of  approach  to  the  human  un- 
derstanding.    This  is  peculiarly  the  case  with  the  under- 
lying doctrines  of  Theism.     The  question  of  the  being 


22  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

of  God  is  unlike  all  others.  Its  proofs  ought  to  be  unlike 
all  other  proofs.  No  man  need  ever  expect  to  demon- 
strate God,  for  it  cannot  be  done.  Men  have  often  tried 
it,  and  as  often  failed.  Even  Bishop  Butler,  in  his  early 
days,  came  near  ruining  himself  in  the  vain  attempt. 
Atheists  have  often  taunted  theists  with  these  chronic 
failures.  They  say:  "If  your  God  actually  exists,  why 
do  you  not  demonstrate  it  ?  "  At  this  challenge  thought- 
less theists  have  grown  pale  with  alarm,  and  equally 
thoughtless  atheists  have  exulted  with  delight.  Both 
are  wrong.  These  failures  are  by  no  means  alarming ; 
they  are  positively  encouraging.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
rigorous  deductive  demonstration  of  God's  being  would 
be  fatal  to  Theism.  The  error  consists  in  admitting  the 
rationality  of  the  atheist's  demand  to  demonstrate  God. 
Let  us  look  into  this  matter  a  little  more  deeply  and 
see  just  what  it  is  that  the  atheist  asks  of  us.  What  is  a 
strict  deductive  demonstration,  anyhow  ?  It  is  simply 
the  employment  of  two  related  propositions  in  such  a 
way  as  to  bring  to  view  the  truth  they  contain.  It  sim- 
ply unfolds  what  they  already  enfold.  What  then  is  its 
effect  ?  It  simply  classifies  the  object  or  objects  denoted 
by  a  certain  term  (as  Caesar)  among  the  objects  denoted 
by  a  certain  other  and  general  term  (as  mortal).  Now 
we  begin  to  see  what  the  atheist  wants.  He  modestly 
asks  us  to  classify  God  !  And  because  we  very  properly 
decline  to  do  so,  he  looks  extremely  wise,  and  declares 
it  as  his  candid  opinion  that  we  have  no  God.  He  seems 
not  to  realize  that  the  God  of  Christian  Theism  cannot 
be  classified ;  and  this  for  the  obvious  reason  that  he  is 
the  one  only  God,  and  there  is  no  other  being  like  him 
in  existence.  If  we  were  polytheists,  we  might  submit 
our  gods  to  the  rules  of  logical  deduction.  But  we  can- 
not demonstrate  Jehovah  without  degrading  him. 


IN  TROD  UCTION. 


23 


Let  there  be  no  misunderstanding  of  this  statement. 
In  avoiding  one  palpable  error,  let  us  not  fall  into  an- 
other. It  must  not  be  inferred  that  no  proofs  of  God's 
existence  are  to  be  required.  Such  a  demand  is  reason- 
able and  will  be  promptly  met.  Theism  has  many  lines 
of  cumulative  argument,  which  it  shall  be  the  chief  pur- 
pose of  the  following  pages  to  present.  What  we  insist 
upon  at  the  outset  is,  that  no  single  direct  argument  in 
syllogistic  form  shall  be  either  demanded  or  admitted. 
The  very  nature  of  the  truth  to  be  established  forbids  it. 


^  OP  THR^ 


U^I7EIISIT7) 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTELLIGENCE    IN    NATURE;    OR,    THE    EU- 
TAXIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 

SECTION  I. 

DIFFICULTIES  IN  THE  PROOF. 

IN  constructing  a  cumulative  argument  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  Christian  Theism,  the  two  subjects  which 
it  includes  must  be  separately  and  successively  treated. 
These,  as  already  stated,  are  Theism  and  Revelation. 
The  subjects  themselves  will  determine  the  proper  order 
of  their  treatment.  They  are  closely  and  logically  re- 
lated. It  is  manifest  that  if  there  be  no  God,  there  can 
be  no  Revelation.  If  the  being  or  nature  of  God  be 
doubtful  or  unknown,  to  the  same  extent  will  the  genu- 
ineness of  Revelation  be  doubtful  or  unknown.  The 
first  truth  must  therefore  be  proved  before  attempting 
the  second.  Theism  must  be  established  on  a  firm  foot-^ 
ing  before  revealed  Theism  can  be  touched 

Herein  a  serious  difficulty  presents  itself.  In  these 
days  of  Inductive  Philosophy,  men  are  accustomed  ta 
proceed  from  the  particular  to  the  general,  to  reason 
from  facts  to  laws.  Naturally  easy  to  the  mind,  this  pro- 
cess has  the  added  facility  of  habit  and  the  commanding 
prestige  of  success.  In  the  case  of  Theism,  however, 
this  process  must  be  reversed,  and  the  proof  of  the  gen- 

24 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  2$ 

eral  truth  must  be  given  first.  But,  by  the  very  nature 
of  the  case,  a  general  truth  is  more  difficult  of  proof 
than  a  particular  fact.  Facts  stand  on  simple  testi- 
mony, general  truths  do  not.  Facts  are  palpable, 
obtrusive  ;  general  truths  are  not.  Facts  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness and  the  senses;  general  truths  appeal  to  the 
understanding,  the  reason,  the  judgment,  the  intuitive 
powers.  To  all  men  the  first  appeal  is  intelligible  and 
powerful.  To  most  men  the  second  is  surrounded  with 
a  degree  of  difficulty  or  obscurity,  and  requires  no 
little  effort.  Now  Revelation  is  a  matter  of  fact ;  the 
being  of  God  is  an  eternal  truth,  but  not  a  fact.  If  I 
could  assume  the  great  fact  of  Revelation,  and  proceed 
therefrom  to  argue  the  being  and  character  of  God,  my 
way  would  be  easy,  my  task  light.  Such  a  course,  how- 
ever, would  be  illogical  in  the  extreme — a  most  flagrant 
petitio  principii.  In  purely  theistic  studies  the  Bible 
must  be  resolutely  closed,  and  no  aid  therefrom  be  either 
asked  or  admitted.  This  principle  is  so  plain  that  it 
need  not  be  mentioned,  were  it  not  for  the  undeniable 
fact  that  Natural  Theists  have  repeatedly  overlooked  it. 
Another  and  more  serious  difficulty  confronts  us.  It 
arises  from  the  nature  of  the  truth  to  be  established. 
The  more  general  a  truth  is,  the  more  difficult  is  its 
proof.  The  wider  a  law  is,  the  longer  men  are  in  find- 
ing it  out.  The  history  of  every  branch  of  human 
knowledge  bears  out  this  statement.  Numerous  illustra- 
tions of  its  truth  in  th^  growth  of  chemistry,  geology, 
astronomy,  and  biology,  will  readily  occur  to  any  one 
acquainted  with  the  history  of  these  sciences.  But  the 
being  of  God  is  the  most  general  truth  possible  or  con- 
ceivable. If  it  is  true  at  all,  it  is  the  truth  of  truths,  the 
law  of  laws,  the  all-embracing,  all-penetrating,  omnipo- 


26  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

tent  truth  of  the  universe.  It  is  deeper  than  the  lowest 
depths,  higher  than  the  loftiest  heights,  broader  than  the 
widest  breadths,  impassable,  immeasurable,  eternal.  The 
very  statement  of  such  a  truth  exhausts  the  widest  reach 
of  mind,  baffles  the  firmest  hold  of  thought,  transcends 
the  utmost  bound  of  language. 

Surely  its  proof  is  in  no  sense  a  light  undertaking. 
It  can  never  be  accomplished  by  purely  categorical 
methods.  The  atheist  must  not  circumscribe  us  in  our 
arguments.  When  he  calls  for  proof,  as  theists  we  agree. 
When  he  proposes  to  limit  us  to  a  single  argument,  we 
protest.  Truth  limited  to  a  particular  field  may,  and 
doubtless  does,  have  its  own  appropriate  method  of 
proof,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  But  the  truth  of 
Theism  is  absolutely  unlimited,  and  must  not  be  re- 
stricted to  any  particular  kind  of  proof.  Any  kind  of 
argumentation  which  addresses  itself  with  convincing 
force  to  a  normally  constituted  human  being  must  be 
freely  admitted.  There  will  be  occasion  in  this  work  to 
employ  arguments,  inductive,  deductive,  intuitional,  his- 
torical, and  causal.  The  liberty  to  do  so  is  claimed  not 
as  a  privilege,  but  as  a  rights  based  upon  the  nature  of 
the  task  to  be  accomplished.  If  any  man  should  deny  the 
reasonableness  of  this  claim,  such  denial  must  argue, 
either  intellectual  dishonesty  on  his  part,  or  else  such  an 
abnormal  view  of  reason  as  renders  all  reasoning  with 
him  impossible.  In  either  case,  theistic  proofs  can  have 
no  access  to  his  understanding,  and  there  is  nothing  in 
these  pages  for  him. 

I  am  persuaded,  however,  that  no  thoughtful  man  will 
question  the  propriety  of  employing  different  methods 
of  proof  in  Theism.  The  necessity  for  it  is  by  no  means 
alarming.     The  absence  of  such  necessity  would,  on  the 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  2/ 

contrary,  give  just  cause  for  alarm.  The  man  who  thinks 
he  has  proved  God  by  a  single  syllogism,  would  better 
look  well  to  his  syllogism.  The  circumstance  is  unpleas- 
antly suspicious,  to  say  the  least  of  it.  To  make  light 
work  of  a  difficult  task,  is  usually  to  slight  it. 

More  than  two  centuries  ago,  Henry  More,  a  learned 
English  divine,  claimed  to  have  **  demonstrated  that 
there  is  a  God,"  and  declared  that  he  had  abstained  from 
reading  any  treatises  on  this  subject,  that  he  might  the 
more  undisturbedly  write  the  easy  emanations  of  his 
own  mind.  But,  as  might  have  been  expected,  both  the 
demonstration  and  the  ''  easy  emanations  "  have  long 
since  ceased  to  be  quoted  by  the  intelligent  theist, 
unless  it  be  as  matters  of  history,  or  subjects  of  just 
derision.  The  fact  is,  Natural  Theology  has  suffered  im- 
mensely from  just  such  men.  William  Derham  is  by  no 
means  the  only  writer  on  this  difficult  subject  who 
seems  to  have  considered  "  the  observations  so  obvious  " 
as  to  need  little  thought  or  research.  Neither  is  he  the 
only  writer  who,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  has  vainly 
deceived  himself  into  the  belief  that  he  was  demonstra- 
ting God's  existence,  while,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  was 
merely  amusing  himself  and  nauseating  his  readers  by 
the  repetition  of  stale  platitudes  and  meaningless  com- 
monplaces concerning  the  greatness  of  God's  wisdom 
and  power,  and  the  benignity  of  his  providence.  Against 
all  such  friends  of  Theism,  we  may  justly  adopt  the 
French  proverb  and  exclaim  "  Good  Lord,  deliver  us." 

Natural  theologists  are  specially  liable  to  this  error, 
and  should  be  specially  on  their  guard  against  it.  We 
cannot  reach  God  at  a  single  leap,  nor  rend  his  veil  at  a 
single  stroke.  We  must  be  content  to  take  a  step  at  a 
time  and  look  well  to  our  footing.     We  must  empty  our 


28  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

minds  of  the  all-pervasive  conviction  of  God's  existence, 
and  set  out  on  our  theistic  pathway  as  terra  incognita. 

The  first  step  will  lead  to  an  Intelligence  in  the  uni- 
verse. To  take  this  step  will  be  the  sole  attempt  of  the 
present  chapter.  If  the  existence  of  such  Intelligence 
shall  be  established,  even  that  will  not  prove  the  existence 
of  a  God ;  but  it  will  give  us  one  element  of  God,  and 
that  by  no  means  an  inconsiderable  one. 

This,  then,  is  the  present  task — to  prove  Intelligence 
in  nature.  For  this  purpose  I  employ  the  principle  of 
Eutaxiology.  This  term,  derived  from  the  Greek  words 
Bv,  raB,ii,  and  Xoyo'i,  and  meaning  well  arranged,  is  used 
to  name  that  branch  of  Theism  which  treats  of  order  and 
harmony  in  nature. 

It  has  often  been  falsely  identified  with  Teleology, 
which  treats  of  purpose  or  end  in  nature.  The  two  sub- 
jects, while  closely  allied,  are  nevertheless  logically  dis- 
tinct, and  will  be  discussed  separately.  It  is  manifest 
that  order  may  be  seen  where  no  purpose  whatever  is  dis- 
coverable. Such  order  furnishes  a  legitimate  argument 
in  Eutaxiology,  but  none  whatever  in  Teleology.  Un- 
mindful of  this  distinction,  the  old  Teleologists  made 
ludicrous  blunders  in  attempting  to  show  the  purpose  of 
every  orderly  result  in  nature.  The  purpose  of  the  starry 
heavens,  for  example,  may  be  extremely  uncertain,  but 
their  order  and  beauty  are  clear  enough.  We  see  order 
everywhere  in  nature.  Order  implies  a  pre-conceived 
plan  to  which  the  numberless  phenomena  in  question 
have  been  made  to  conform.  But  plan  implies  intelli- 
gence. Order  and  harmony  are,  therefore,  marks  of  intel- 
ligence.  This  is  the  fundamental  principle  in  Eutaxiology. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  animal  kingdom  for  an  illustration. 
It  is  readily  found  in  the  doctrine  of  morphology,  or 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NA  TURE.  29 

typical  forms.  Among  vertebrate  animals,  for  instance, 
the  prevailing  type  of  a  limb  is,  that  there  be  first  a  single 
bone,  then  two  bones  placed  side  by  side,  then  small  con- 
necting bones,  then  five  bones  side  by  side,  and,  lastly, 
five  digits.  Many  animals  differing  from  one  another 
immensely  in  other  respects  persist  in  retaining  this  iden- 
tical type  of  limb.  In  fact,  it  is  admitted  to  be  a  persis- 
tent idea  which  is  capable  of  moulding  the  hand  of  a 
man,  the  wing  of  a  bat,  the  paw  of  a  lion — a  veritable 
plan  in  nature,  requiring  intelligence  for  its  conception 
and  execution.  Eutaxiology  contains  these  two  elements 
therefore:  (i)  The  fact  of  order  in  nature  ;  (2)  a  previous 
plan  necessary  to  the  production  of  that  order. 


SECTION  II. 
THE   EUTAXIOLOGICAL  SYLLOGISM. 

The  importance  of  syllogistic  forms  is  vastly  overesti- 
mated. They  are  not  necessary  either  to  the  discovery 
of  truth,  or  even  to  the  process  of  reasoning.  Reason  is 
a  universal  gift  of  man.  Its  proper  use  does  not  depend 
upon  strict  logical  forms.  In  the  study  of  nature  logical 
and  correct  conclusions  often  flash  upon  the  mind  with  a 
spontaneous  and  convincing  force  which  is  quite  indepen- 
dent of  formal  logic.  One  needs  but  look  to  the  starry 
heavens  for  an  illustration  of  this  truth.  The  harmony 
and  beauty  written  there  are  read  in  no  syllogistic  light. 
They  appeal  to  every  man.  "Their  line  is  gone  out 
through  all  the  earth,  and  their  words  to  the  end  of  the 
world."  In  the  silent  majesty  of  their  nightly  course 
they  tell  the  story  of  a  Creative  Intelligence.  The  lesson 
they  impress  is  simple  and  universal.     The  conclusion 


30  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

they  enforce  is  irresistible.     And  yet  it  depends  not  on 
the  refinements  of  logical  form.     Logic  is  useful,  how- 
ever, as  a  protection  against  error.     It  corrects  us  when 
wrong  and  assures  us  when  right.     To  satisfy  the  most 
exacting  critic,  therefore,  the  Eutaxiological  argument 
will  be  put  into  strict  syllogistic  form.     Here  it  is : 
Major  Premise. 
Order  and  harmony  are  marks  of  intelligence. 
Minor  Premise. 
Nature  displays  order  and  harmony. 

Conclusion. 
Nature  displays  marks  of  intelligence. 
There  is  no  logical  fault  in  this  argument.     If  the  premi- 
ses are  true  the  conclusion  must  follow  inevitably.     Let 
these  premises  be  carefully  examined. 

I.      THE    MAJOR    PREMISE. 

By  this  proposition  it  is  meant  that  order  and  harmony 
are  invariably  conjoined  with  intelligence.  If  this  be 
true,  and  order  and  harmony  are  found  in  nature,  then 
the  existence  of  intelligence  in  nature  is  proved  beyond 
all  peradventure.  In  discussing  this  premise  its  meaning 
must  first  be  determined. 

(i)     lis   Truth  Discriminated. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  by  inteUigence  in  nature 
I  make  no  reference  whatever  to  the  voluntary  actions  of 
men  and  of  animals.  Of  course  they  are  a  part  of  nature, 
and  order  in  their  action  is  a  mark  of  intelligence ;  but 
this  intelligence  is  undisputed,  and  so  need  not  be  dwelt 
upon  in  the  present  discussion. 

Neither  does  this  proposition  mean  that  intelligence 
never   produces  disorderly  results.     In  other  words,  it 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  3 1 

does  not  claim  that  intelligence  is  invariably  conjoined 
with  order,  but  that  order  is  invariably  conjoined  with 
intelligence.  Just  as  organism  is  not  always  conjoined 
with  life,  but  life  is  always  conjoined  with  organism.  In 
the  case  of  order  and  intelligence,  both  these  propositions 
may  be  true,  but  the  latter  only  is  vital  to  the  argument. 
It  may  be  true  that  intelligence  is  always  orderly,  but  con- 
cerning  that  truth  Eutaxiology  is  supremely  indifferent. 

Neither  is  it  asserted  that  order  and  intelligence  are 
joined  together  as  cause  and  effect.  This  may,  indeed,  be 
the  law  that  binds  them  ;  intelligence  may  be  the  cause 
and  order  the  effect.  But  this  is  not  the  particular  truth 
on  which  the  mind  dwells  in  the  present  argument.  In 
fact,  it  is  not  in  the  least  necessary  to  it.  What  the  par- 
ticular nature  of  the  relation  between  order  and  intelli- 
gence may  be,  is  a  matter  of  indifference  so  long  as  I 
know  that  the  relation  itself  is  invariable.  To  recur  to 
the  former  illustration,  I  need  not  enquire  whether  or  not 
animal  life  is  a  mere  product  of  organism.  I  know  that  it 
never  exists  without  organism,  and  that  is  sufficient.  In 
like  manner,  if  order  is  always  and  everywhere  a  mark  of 
intelligence  I  need  not  trouble  myself  about  the  nature 
of  this  fact.  If  the  two  are  inseparabley  bound  together, 
I  need  not  demand  a  chemical  analysis  of  the  material 
from  which  have  been  forged  the  links  of  the  binding 
chain. 

(2)  Its  Truth  Established. 

Having  freed  this  major  premise  from  some  possible 
misunderstandings,  I  now  proceed  to  the  direct  establish- 
ment of  its  truth.  Is  order  an  invariable  mark  of  intelli- 
gence ?  To  some  the  truth  of  this  statement  may  seem 
self-evident.  A  careful  analysis  will,  I  think,  show  that  it 
is  not.     I  arrive  at  this  truth  by  a  process  of  induction,, 


32  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

the  steps  of  which  are  somewhat  as  follows :  I  am  con- 
tinually conscious  of  orderly  results  as  the  products  of  the 
action  of  my  own  intelligence.  This  is  the  habit  of  my  life 
from  earliest  infancy.  Moreover,  I  have  likewise  observed 
similar  results  flowing  from  the  action  of  other  intelli- 
gences. My  fellow-men  are  constantly  furnishing  ex- 
amples of  order  as  a  mark  of  intelligence.  Orderly  results, 
to  some  degree,  are  likewise  produced  by  the  lower  ani- 
mals. Here  I  have  three  classes  of  facts,  the  first  produced 
by  myself,  the  second  by  my  fellow-men,  the  third  by 
animals. 

Now  these  facts  are  alike  in  that  they  are  all  orderly. 
They  all  exhibit  this  same  distinguishing  feature.  But  the 
first  I  know  to  be  necessarily  connected  with  my  own 
intelligence.  The  second  are  performed  by  beings  like 
myself,  to  whom  I  find  it  logically  impossible  to  deny 
intelligence,  and  are  just  such  results  as,  if  done  by  my- 
self, would  show  intelligence.  I  therefore  infer  by  a  men- 
tal necessity  that  they  are  marks  of  intelligence  in  my 
fellow-men.  And  this  inference  is  not  at  all  contingent. 
I  am  as  certain  of  it  as  of  my  own  existence.  The  third 
are  performed  by  beings  not  like  myself,  it  is  true,  but 
still  possessed  of  a  degree  of  intelligence,  of  whose  exist- 
ence there  are  manifold  and  independent  proofs.  The 
orderly  results  themselves  are  in  perfect  accordance  with 
this  degree  of  animal  intelligence.  The  two  are  insepara- 
bly bound  together,  and  the  one  is  the  mark  of  the  other. 
And  so  it  turns  out  that  these  three  classes  of  orderly 
results  are  all  infallible  marks  of  intelligence. 

Let  it  now  be  remembered  that  these  three  classes 
comprehend  all  the  orderly  results  with  whose  origin  I  am 
acquainted.  But  the  fact  of  order  is  by  no  means  so 
•circumscribed.     It  pervades  all  nature.     It  is  seen  alike 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NA  TURE.  33 

in  leaf,  and  flower,  and  shell,  in  forest,  and  mountain,  and 
ocean,  in  earth,  and  air,  and  sky.  Now  this  widespread 
order  in  nature  is  the  thing  to  be  accounted  for.  What  is 
its  origin  ?  I  reply  at  once  and  without  hesitation,  that  it 
is  the  action  of  a  pervasive  and  marvellous  intelligence.  I 
reach  this  result  by  the  legitimate  and  well-known  process 
of  induction.  What  has  been  found  invariably  true  of  all 
known  cases  of  order-making  I  carry  over  to  the  unknown 
and  logically  infer  to  be  likewise  true  of  all  cases  whatso- 
ever. This  is  but  a  simple  act  of  sound  induction,  as  every 
logician  will  attest. 

And  there  is  no  manner  of  doubt  about  it.  I  know 
that  order  is  an  invariable  mark  of  intelligence,  just  as 
certainly  as  I  know  that  every  man  is  a  vertebrate,  and 
that  the  law  of  gravitation  is  universal.  So  sure  am  I  of 
this  truth  that  it  is  perfectly  satisfying  in  every  possible 
case  of  order,  actual  or  conceivable. 

Suppose  some  Galileo  of  the  nifteteenth  century  should 
construct  a  telescope  so  marvellously  superior  in  both 
magnifying  and  illuminating  power  as  to  render  visible 
the  minutest  objects  on  the  surface  of  the  moon.  Sup- 
pose that,  by  the  use  of  this  instrument,  a  system  of 
accurate  pentagonal  figures  should  be  discovered,  whose 
sides  were  formed  of  successive  triangles,  equal,  equi- 
angular, and  equi-distant.  Would  any  sane  man  doubt 
for  a  moment  that  some  intelligence  had  at  some  time 
been  at  worl^on  the  surface  of  the  moon?  If  the  same 
figures  had  been  found  on  the  surface  of  the  earth, 
whether  upon  mountain  summit,  or  upon  ocean  beach,  he 
would  doubtless  attribute  them  to  man.  This  is  perfectly 
natural.  It  obviously  results  from  the  fact  that  man  is 
the  only  being  of  mundane  existence,  whose  intelligence 
is  adequate  to  account  for  the  facts.     But  he  could  never 


34  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

think  of  attributing  the  telescopic  fact  of  order  just  sup- 
posed to  human  intelligence,  from  the  equally  obvious 
consideration  that  man's  lunar  existence  is  impossible. 
So  that  the  induction  in  question  is  manifestly  far  wider 
than  the  human  race.  It  out-measures  the  earth,  scales 
the  heavens,  reaches  the  utmost  limits  of  the  known  uni- 
verse, and  proclaims  the  existence  of  superhuman  intel- 
ligence wherever  order  and  harmony  are  found.  The 
truth  that  order  is  a  sure  mark  of  intelligence  is  certainly 
as  clear  an  induction  as  man  is  capable  of  making  in  any 
field  of  thought  whatever. 

2.       THE    MINOR    PREMISE. 

"  Nature  displays  order  and  harmony."  This  will  be 
remembered  as  the  second  proposition  in  the  eutaxio- 
logical  syllogism.  It  only  remains  to  make  good  this 
statement,  in  order  to  establish  the  argument  beyond 
question. 

The  careful  reader  need  not  be  reminded  that  this 
argument  takes  no  account  of  those  types  of  intelligence 
to  be  found  in  the  voluntary  actions  of  animals  and  of 
man.  The  thing  to  be  established  is  the  existence  in 
nature  of  an  intelligence  utterly  beyond  these  special 
types,  and  independent  of  them.  In  proving,  therefore, 
the  display  of  order  and  harmony  in  nature,  all  reference 
to  such  cases  thereof  as  may  imply  the  intelligence  of 
man  or  of  animals,  must  be  avoided. 

It  is  obvious  that,  setting  these  aside,  the  proof  of  a 
single  case  of  order  in  nature  is  sufificient  to  establish  the 
proposition  in  question.  As  I  desire,  however,  not  only 
to  prove  the  existence  of  intelligence  in  nature,  but  also 
to  show  something  of  its  all-pervasive,  all-abounding 
character,  I  shall  not  stop  with  a  single  example.     It  will 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  35 

be  Wise  to  enlarge  somewhat  on  this  point,  for  another 
reason.  If  there  be  intelligence  anywhere  in  nature,  it  is 
quite  reasonable,  though  not  necessary,  to  expect  it  every- 
where. If  nature  is,  in  any  sense,  the  great  workshop  of 
intelligence,  then  surely  some  tokens  of  the  workman  will 
be  scattered  throughout  the  main  building,  and  not  con- 
fined to  some  obscure  corner  of  an  insignificant  annex. 
The  eutaxiologist  may,  indeed,  not  be  able  to  recognize 
them  all,  but  the  longer  he  searches,  the  more  will  he  find. 
The  researches  of  modern  science  have  already  furnished 
an  interesting  and  instructive  list  of  these  tokens.  Every 
department  of  nature  is  full  of  them.  It  would  be  tedious, 
as  well  as  useless,  to  burden  these  pages  with  a  detailed 
statement  of  them  all.  Only  a  few  representative  types 
need  be  examined. 

(i)  In  Inorganic  Matter. 

The  science  of  chemistry  abounds  in  examples  of  order. 
They  are  both  numerical  and  formal.  Every  molecule  of 
matter  of  every  possible  variety  is  a  definite  mass  of 
atoms  built  together  with  the  most  exact  arithmetical 
and  geometrical  relations.  The  most  accurate  structures 
built  by  the  hand  of  man  cannot  compare  with  these 
products  of  nature  in  the  numerical  and  formal  exactness 
with  which  their  elements  are  combined.  There  is  vastly 
more  order  in  the  construction  of  a  molecule  than  of  a 
mansion. 

Chemical  symbols  are  nothing  more  than  the  expres- 
sions of  the  kind,  number,  and  connection  of  atomic 
elements  in  these  molecular  structures.  Moreover,  these 
atomic  blocks  in  the  molecule  do  not  combine  invariably 
and  indifferently,  as  so  many  bricks  in  a  wall.  Atoms  of 
different   elements   possess  a  different  number  of  com- 


36  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

bining  sides.  Hydrogen,  for  instance,  has  but  one,  and  is. 
said  to  be  univalent,  oxygen  has  two,  and  is  bivalent ; 
carbon  four,  and  is  quadrivalent.  Indeed,  these  atoms 
seem  like  stones  designed  by  the  architect  for  an  exterior 
or  interior  place  in  the  building,  and  having  their  faces 
cut  accordingly. 

Again,  in  their  gaseous  form  all  elements  show  a  re- 
markable numerical  order  in  their  relative  determinate 
weights  and  volumes  in  all  compounds,  involving  numbers 
which  are  multiples  of  the  atomic  weights  of  the  respec- 
tive elements.  These  relations  are  not  merely  proxi- 
mate, but  are  strictly  exact. 

The  well  known  nitrogen  series  has  been  cited  as  a 
notable  example  of  these  structures.  Witness  the  mul- 
tiples of  fourteen  and  sixteen  running  through  the 
series : 

Nitrogen  by  weight.  Oxygen  by  weight. 

Nitrous  oxide 28  16 

Nitric  oxide 14  16 

Nitrous  trioxide 28  48 

Nitric  peroxide 14  32 

Nitric  pentoxide 28  80 

Could  any  more  exact  numerical  order  be  well  con» 
ceived  ?  It  must  bfe  remembered,  moreover,  that  this 
order  is  not  an  exceptional  thing.  It  runs  through  the 
entire  foundation  on  which  the  physical  structure  of 
things  is  built.  The  whole  physical  universe  is  but  an 
aggregation  of  such  orderly  chemical  structures.  To 
the  chemist  there  are  tokens  of  order  all  through  the 
workshop. 

Crystallography  furnishes  striking  examples  of  order 
and  mathematical  relations.  They  are  to  be  observed  in 
the  edges,  angles,  surfaces  and  solids  of  crystalline  forms. 
Snowflakes  crystallize  in  a  variety  of  radial  forms,  based 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NA  TURE,  37 

in  every  case  upon  a  constructive  angle  of  60°.  The  fila- 
ments of  sal-ammoniac  in  solution,  preserve  an  angle  of 
45°  or  90°.  The  physicist  finds  no  less  than  six  different 
systems  of  crystals,  characterized  by  the  number,  direc- 
tion, and  relative  length  of  their  axes.  There  is  an  exact 
symmetry  of  surfaces  and  angles  in  them  all.  We  are 
told,  moreover,  that  the  position  of  the  planes  is  mathe- 
matically related  to  the  relative  lengths  of  the  axes. 

Geometry,  as  well  as  arithmetic,  is  at  work  in  the  realm 
of  inorganic  matter,  producing  orderly  results,  both  nu- 
merous and  marvellous. 

(2)  Order  in  the   Vegetable  Kingdom. 

The  prevalence  of  order  among  plants  is  evident  from 
their  very  classification  into  families,  genera,  and  species. 
Nearly  all  these  classes  of  plants  are  based  upon  ele- 
ments of  order  and  symmetry  in  the  individual  plants 
themselves.  The  very  possibility  of  scientific  classifica- 
tion is  a  convincing  evidence  of  widespread  order  in 
the  vegetable  world.  Surely  there  is  no  inherent  physi- 
cal necessity  whereby  great  families  of  plants  should  be 
forced  into  one  invariable  type.  Hap-hazard  forms  and 
violations  of  order  would  accord  quite  as  well  with  the 
necessary  demands  of  vegetable  life.  But  not  so.  Na- 
ture is  everywhere  full  of  plan,  order.  An  examination 
of  vegetable  life  discloses  this  truth  on  every  side. 

The  first  thing  that  strikes  us  is  number.  Whole  fam- 
ilies of  plants  seem  to  be  carefully  constructed  on  a  nu- 
merical relation  of  parts.  The  Liliacae,  for  instance,  are 
based  on  the  number  three.  And  so  of  other  orders. 
But  this  relation  is  manifestly  not  at  all  necessary.  It  is 
an  evidence  of  plan,  but  not  of  necessity. 

Phyllotaxy  abounds  in  curious  and  interesting  cases  of 


38  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

numerical  order.  Leaves  on  a  stem,  flowers  about  a 
disc,  are  usually  attached  in  the  form  of  spirals.  These 
spirals  vary  in  the  relative  movements  of  generatrix  and 
pole,  for  the  different  orders  of  plants.  They  are  named 
and  distinguished  by  the  number  of  circuits  around  the 
stem  as  compared  with  the  number  of  leaves  contained 
in  those  circuits.  These  give  a  series  of  ratios ;  one  half 
representing  one  circuit  and  two  leaves  ;  one  third,  one 
circuit  and  three  leaves ;  two  fifths,  two  circuits  and  five 
leaves  ;  three  eights,  three  circuits  and  eight  leaves. 

Scientists  have  called  attention  to  two  curious  circum- 
stances concerning  this  series  of  fractions.  The  first  is, 
that  each  succeeding  fraction  is  formed  by  the  addition 
of  the  numerators  and  denominators  of  the  two  preced- 
ing ones  ;  and  the  second,  that  they  represent  the  ratios 
of  the  times  of  revolution  of  the  planets  about  the  sun, 
when  expressed  in  days.  "  The  period  of  Uranus  is  half 
that  of  Neptune,  the  period  of  Saturn  is  one  third  that 
of  Uranus,  the  period  of  Jupiter  two  fifths  that  of  Sa- 
turn." As  an  explanation  of  this  law  of  phyllotaxy,  it 
has  been  claimed  that  these  particular  arrangements  of 
leaves  about  the  stem  are  simply  for  the  purpose  of  se- 
curing the  best  possible  exposure  to  the  sunlight.  The 
explanation  fails  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the 
best  possible  exposure  to  sunlight  cannot  be  shown  to  be 
a  fact  thus  secured.  The  very  nature  of  the  law  forbids 
it.  If  three  eighths,  for  instance,  represents  the  most 
economical  arrangement  about  one  perpendicular,  cylin- 
drical stem,  then  it  is  manifestly  impossible  that  one  half 
or  two  fifths  should  represent  precisely  the  same  thing  in 
the  case  of  another  stem  equally  perpendicular  and 
cylindrical.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  not  purpose  that 
is  to  be  explained,  but  order ^  plan  of  structure.  If, 
therefore,  it  be  shown  that  order  in   a  given   case   may 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE,  39 

be  utilized  for  any  purpose  whatever,  that  demonstra- 
tion can  neither  remove  the  fact  of  order,  nor  account 
for  it  without  intelligence. 

Another  remarkable  field  of  orderly  results  in  the 
vegetable  kingdom  is  found  in  its  exquisite  symmetry 
and  beauty  of  form,  arrangement,  and  color.  All  this 
beauty,  of  which  nature  is  so  full,  results  from  symmetry 
of  form  and  proportion,  and  delicate  combinations  of 
color.  And  this  is  true  both  of  a  landscape  as  a  whole, 
and  of  the  separate  objects  of  which  it  is  composed.  It 
is  likewise  true  in  general  of  all  objects  alike  in  the  vege- 
table kingdom,  whether  large  or  small.  The  stately  sym- 
metry of  the  oak,  the  poplar,  and  the  pine  may  not  be 
discoverable  in  any  mere  details  of  form,  but  it  is  none 
the  less  surely  and  strikingly  visible  to  every  lover  of 
nature.  Then  there  is  the  more  delicate  symmetry  of 
leaf  and  stem,  and  flower  and  disc.  There  is  scarcely  a 
leaf  in  the  forest,  whose  exquisite  symmetry  of  outline 
and  delicate  shadings  of  color  do  not  surpass  the  skill  of 
human  art.  Mark  the  most  admirable  symmetry  dis- 
played in  the  petals,  stamens,  and  anthers  of  flowers. 
Observe  also  their  orderly  and  delicate  use  of  colors. 
Flowers  never  display  irregular  and  unsightly  patches  of 
white  and  red  and  blue  and  gold,  in  promiscuous  mix- 
ture— a  hideous  daub.  They  are  always  mingled  in  deli- 
cate outline  and  systematic  order. 

No  man  can  make  a  careful  study  of  plants  and  flowers 
without  being  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  order,  symmetry, 
and  beauty  that  pervades  them  everywhere. 

(3)  Order  in  the  Animal  Kingdom. 

Forms  of  order  and  symmetry  among  animals  are  found 
to  be  much  more  complex  and  complicated  than  those 
heretofore  discussed.     This  is  not  at  all  surprising.     As 


40  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

we  rise  to  higher  types  of  being  we  must  expect  to  meet 
combinations  more  complex  in  every  respect.  Take  an 
illustration.  Biologists  tell  us  that  albumen  in  some 
form  is  the  physical  basis  of  all  animal  life.  Now  a 
molecule  of  water  consists  of  three  atoms,  while  that  of 
albumen  contains  2,316  atoms.  Who  can  wonder  that,  if 
cases  of  order  should  occur  in  albuminous  forms,  they 
should  become  somewhat  complicated?  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  order  and  symmetry  do  exist  in  most  pervasive  and 
comprehensive  forms,  in  nearly  every  species  of  animals. 
These  symmetries  are  very  various  and  very  noticeable. 
They  extend  to  both  the  exterior  and  the  interior  struc- 
ture. Indeed,  they  are  so  universal  as  to  be  termed 
typical  forms,  which  are  supposed  by  many  to  domi- 
nate the  structures  of  the  various  species.  The  very 
names  of  the  sub-kingdoms  refer  directly  to  these  typi- 
cal forms.  MoUusca  and  radiata,  for  instance,  have  a 
circular  symmetry,  while  that  of  vertebrata  is  clearly 
bilateral.  There  is  again  the  greatest  conceivable  vari- 
ety in  these  sub-kingdoms.  But  one  thing  seems  to 
remain  constant,  and  that  is  the  simple  idea  of  order 
and  appropriate  symmetry.  Animate  nature  has  been 
aptly  likened  to  the  work  of  an  architect  who  is  build- 
ing every  imaginable  variety  of  houses,  but  all  under  the 
guiding  principles  of  a  given  style  of  general  architect- 
ure. 

Again,  the  element  of  color  in  animate  nature  is  so 
employed  as  to  display  striking  forms  of  order  and  sym- 
metry. The  markings  of  insects,  fishes,  beasts,  and  birds 
are  not  disorderly,  but  are  fashioned  for  the  most  part 
into  forms  of  regularity  and  beauty. 

Now  these  forms  and  colors  of  the  several  types  are 
all  undoubted  cases  of  order  in  nature.     It  will  not  do  to 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  4 1 

say  that  they  are  simple  physical  necessities.  Variations 
from  symmetrical  forms  are  sufficiently  numerous  and  suf- 
ficiently pronounced  to  dispel  any  reasonable  suspicion  of 
necessity,  in  symmetrical  structures,  wherever  they  may 
be  found.  Neither  do  this  symmetry  and  beauty  arise 
from  mere  considerations  of  utility  in  service.  There 
are  many  instances  of  both  wherein  no  useful  function 
can  possibly  be  discovered.  Take  the  exterior  symme- 
try and  beauty  of  the  human  form,  for  example.  There 
is  no  particular  physiological  necessity  or  advantage  in 
that.  On  the  contrary,  the  most  vital  physiological 
functions  are  performed  by  organs  that  are  by  no  means 
symmetrically  disposed  in  the  body.  The  heart,  lungs, 
liver,  and  stomach  are  all  such.  The  fact  is,  that  the 
internal  symmetry  of  the  human  structure  is  not  at  all 
complete.  Wherein,  then,  lies  the  necessity  that  the 
exterior  should  be  so  assiduously  rounded  out  into  forms 
symmetrical  and  beautiful  ?  But  so  it  is  ;  and  the  fact, 
whether  it  proves  any  thing  else  or  not,  does  certainly 
show  a  clear  case  of  plan  and  order  in  the  structure  of 
the  human  frame. 

The  human  hand  has  often  been  cited  as  an  instrument 
of  design  and  utility.  But  it  is  also  one  of  exquisite  sym- 
metry and  beauty.  Observe  its  wonderful  delicacy  of 
outline,  flexibility  of  parts,  dexterity  of  motion,  expres- 
siveness of  posture.  Who  can  say  that  nature  exhibits 
no  plan  or  order  in  its  unique  structure? 

The  human  face  is  also  a  thing  of  marvellous  symmetry 
and  beauty.  In  its  structure,  nature  seems  to  have 
reached  the  very  summit  of  her  skill  as  an  order-worker. 
Who  can  behold  an  innocent,  intelligent  human  face  with- 
out emotions  of  the  deepest  admiration  ? 

I  cannot  better  close  this  topic  than   in  the  eloquent 


42  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

words  of  another,  to  whom  I  am  already  indebted  for 
much  of  this  part  of  the  argument  herein  condensed. 
He  says :  *'  The  human  face — furnished  with  its  vigor- 
ous senses  reaching  to  the  stars,  in  turn  looking  out  of 
the  depths  of  space  and  the  silence  of  eternity ;  its  fea- 
tures, the  seat  of  versatile  thought,  the  medium  through 
which  the  soul  is  flashing  all  the  changeable  lights  of 
emotion ;  the  voice,  meanwhile,  uttering,  like  a  chorus  in 
articulate  sound,  the  burden  of  this  passion — [the  human 
face]  is  that  hand-breadth  of  surface  in  which  two  worlds 
touch  each  other  and  blend  at  the  zenith  of  beauty." 

(4)  Order  in  the  Cosmos. 

The  term  "  Cosmos  "  has  been  shamefully  abused.  It 
has  been  unceremoneously  dragged  into  any  use  which  the 
necessity,  convenience,  or  fancy  of  philosophers  might 
dictate.  Sometimes  it  stands  for  the  world,  sometimes 
for  the  earth  ;  sometimes  it  includes  the  whole  universe, 
sometimes  the  physical  creation  or  only  a  portion  thereof. 
In  these  pages  it  will  be  used  in  its  broadest  sense  to  in- 
clude the  whole  created  universe.  In  this  sense,  strictly 
considered,  the  present  topic,  "  Order  in  the  Cosmos  " 
would  evidently  include  all  possible  order.  It  is  de- 
signed, however,  to  mention  only  a  very  few  instances 
which  are  of  such  a  nature  that  they  could  not  properly 
be  ranked  among  the  chemical,  botanical,  or  biological 
examples  just  given. 

And  here  I  am  confronted  at  once  with  the  law  of 
gravitation — the  most  general  conception  hitherto  at- 
tained in  the  physical  universe.  It  would  seem  like  a 
hazardous  undertaking,  indeed,  to  attempt  the  extraction 
of  individual  instances  of  order  from  a  principle  so  wide- 
spread and  absolutely  universal.  A  little  examination, 
however,  shows  it  to  be  just  the  contrary. 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE,  43 

The  very  fundamental  law  of  its  action  is  an  admirable 
embodiment  of  order.  Every  particle  of  matter  in  the 
universe  attracts  every  other  particle,  directly  as  its  mass, 
and  inversely  as  the  square  of  its  distance.  Now  let  us 
see  just  what  is  involved  in  this  well-known  law,  so  often 
and  so  carelessly  quoted.  A  forcible  writer  has  set  forth 
its  meaning  somewhat  as  follows  : 

It  means  that  every  molecule  of  matter  is  tugging 
away  at  every  other  without  interruption  and  without 
weariness.  It  means  that  every  little  fellow  knows  just 
how  to  tug,  in  what  direction,  and  how  hard.  It  means 
that  each  is  an  accurate  mathematician,  for  he  must  work 
according  to  inverse  ratios,  and  that  of  the  second  power. 
If  one  little  atom  on  the  surface  of  Sirius  should,  by 
mistake,  conduct  the  attraction  business  of  his  office  on 
the  ratio  of  cubes  instead  of  squares,  it  would  eventually 
disrupt  the  universe.  It  means  that  every  worker  must 
be  an  accurate  observer  with  both  microscopic  and  tele- 
scopic powers  of  vision,  and  likewise  a  brilliant  clairvoy- 
ant of  marvellous  range.  For  he  must  know  the  exact 
distance  and  direction  of  every  atom  in  creation ;  else 
how  can  he  determine  with  what  strength  and  at  what 
angle  to  pull  at  him  ?  It  means  that  he  carries  a  "  ready 
reckoner"  of  most  incredible  capacity;  else  how  can  he 
figure  out  with  unerring  accuracy,  the  proper  ratios  of 
countless  millions  of  atoms,  each  of  whose  distances  is 
constantly  varying  at  every  conceivable  instant  of  time, 
and  always  arrive  at  the  desired  results  with  such  simul- 
taneous celerity  as  to  enable  him  to  conduct  his  attrac- 
tion business  absolutely  without  interruption  and  without 
mistake  ?  If,  through  carelessness,  incapacity,  or  stupid- 
ity, one  single  atom  should  miss  his  reckoning  for  a  sin- 
gle instant,  the   disastrous  consequences   of  his  indiscre- 


44  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

tion  would  permeate  the  entire  creation.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  no  such  mistake  or  delay  is  ever  made. 

And  is  there  no  order  here  ?  Verily  there  is,  and  that, 
too,  of  the  most  intricate  character.  This  one  law  of  gravi- 
tation— so  simple  and  yet  so  intricate — makes  of  the 
whole  physical  universe  one  vast  system  of  orderly  exist- 
ence and  harmonious  activity — a  far-reaching  plan,  which 
implies  constructive  intelligence  of  immense  capacity  and 
boundless  sweep. 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  special  applications  of  this  law 
are  likewise  along  the  line  of  harmony  and  order.  It  is, 
indeed,  a  very  wonder-worker  of  celestial  harmonies.  It 
stands  like  a  mighty  giant  in  the  sky.  With  its  two  arms 
of  power,  centripetal  and  centrifugal,  it  hurls  innumerable 
and  massive  worlds  through  the  mazy  depths  of  unmeas- 
ured space,  and  at  the  same  time  binds  them  to  the  inva- 
riable symmetry  of  their  orbital  movements.  The  order 
and  precision  with  which  planets  and  stars  and  suns  hold 
on  their  mysterious  way  through  the  sky,  are  due  to 
special  applications  of  this  law.  This  statement  cannot 
be  better  illustrated  than  by  reference  to  Kepler's  famous 
laws  of  planetary  motion:  (i)  Planets  describe  elliptical 
orbits.  (2)  The  radius  vector  of  any  planet  describes 
equal  areas  in  equal  times.  (3)  The  ratio  between  the 
squares  of  the  periods  of  revolution  of  any  two  planets  is 
always  equal  to  the  ratio  between  the  cubes  of  their  mean 
distances  from  the  sun.  These  three  laws  disclose  the 
most  exact  mathematical  order,  both  discrete  and  contin- 
uous. But  upon  these  three  laws  hang  almost  the  entire 
science  of  astronomy.  And  they  themselves  are  based  in 
turn  upon  the  wider  law  of  gravitation.  Even  gravitation 
itself  may  yet  be  found  to  be  only  the  application  of  a 
wider,  deeper  law,  which  the  mind  of  man  has  not  yet 
compassed. 


INTELLIGENCE   IN  NATURE.  45 

And  these  are  but  a  few  of  the  stately  symmetries  of 
the  starry  heavens.  What  a  world  of  beauty  and  har- 
mony and  order  they  present  in  their  nightly  sweep  to 
him  who  has  eyes  to  see  it !  And  is  there  no  pre-conceived 
plan,  no  constructive  intelligence  in  all  this  ?  Well  might 
Napoleon,  in  answer  to  the  speculations  of  the  French 
atheists,  point  to  the  star-set  sky  and  exclaim  :  *'  But  who 
made  all  these  ?  "  It  was  a  sound  argument  in  Eutaxiology. 

3.     THE    CONCLUSION. 

If  the  preceding  considerations  have  established  the 
truth  of  the  premises  in  the  eutaxiological  syllogism,  then 
the  conclusion  must  follow  as  a  logical  necessity.  If 
order  and  harmony  are  marks  of  intelligence,  and  nature 
displays  order  and  harmony,  then  it  is  certainly  true  that 
nature  displays  marks  of  intelligence.  There  is  no  illicit 
process  here  of  any  conceivable  kind  whatever.  But  if 
nature  shows  marks  of  intelligence,  then  either  there  is 
now  intelligence  at  work  in  nature,  or  there  has  been  at 
some  previous  time,  or  both.  In  either  case,  the  existence 
of  intelligence,  other  than  that  of  man  and  the  lower  ani- 
mals, is  infallibly  proved.  And  just  this  is  all  that  Eutax- 
iology proposes  to  do.     Her  task  is  accomplished. 

SECTION  III. 

OBJECTIONS. 

It  would  certainly  seem  that  no  additional  word  need 
be  uttered  in  defence  of  this  straightforward  argument  in 
Eutaxiology  which  has  just  been  set  forth.  But,  as  ever, 
the  objector  is  abroad  in  the  land.  He  has  formulated 
sundry  and  diverse  objections  against  the  doctrine  taught 
herein,  which  it  is  proper  to  notice  as  briefly  as  the  nature 
and  the  number  of  these  strictures  will  admit. 


46  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

I.     CONCERNING    LAW. 

The  philosophers  who  make  this  objection  have  a  most 
exalted  idea  of  law,  particularly  of  natural  law.  They  con- 
sider it  wellnigh  omnipotent — capable  of  doing  and  ac- 
counting for  every  thing.  In  short,  they  deify  law.  They 
evidently  forget  that  natural  law,  so-called,  is  nothing  but 
an  expression  for  the  uniform  activities  of  nature,  and  can 
account  for  nothing  whatever.  When  we  speak  of ''  the 
reign  of  law,"  we  use  words  figuratively,  for  a  law  of 
nature  is  a  thing  of  method,  and  not  at  all  of  origin  or 
cause.  The  very  existence  of  law  implies  a  law-maker ; 
and  so,  instead  of  explaining  events  occurring  under  it,, 
must  needs  be  explained  itself. 

But  the  objection  of  these  champions  of  natural  law 
runs  thus  :  "  What  you  call  order  in  nature  is  nothing  in 
the  world  but  the  operation  of  law.  There  is  no  order  in 
it,  no  pre-conceived  plan,'*  no  constructive  intelligence 
back  of  it.     It  is  all  the  result  of  mere  laws  of  matter." 

Now  this  is  evidently  an  attempt  to  explain  the  orderly- 
results  in  the  universe  on  purely  physical  principles.  Its 
purpose  is  to  explain  away  all  intelligence  from  nature. 
These  theorists,  having  denied  to  mind  its  proper  work  in 
orderly  results,  assign  that  work  to  purely  physical  and 
organic  activities.  This  forlorn  undertaking  may  be  hon- 
est enough,  but  it  cannot  be  credited  with  much  penetra- 
tion. Mark  the  inconsistency  and  essential  weakness  of 
the  thing.  In  explaining  the  course  of  these  organic 
processes  on  which  these  theorists  stake  so  much,  there  is 
not  a  man  in  the  list  who  does  not  constitute  them,, 
directly  or  indirectly,  into  seats  of  **  unconscious  or  supra- 
conscious  intelligence"  of  some  kind  or  other.  Now 
intelligence  is  manifestly  intelligence,  whether  conscious 
or  otherwise.     But  let  these  gentlemen  tell  us  what  sort 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  47 

of  thing  this  "  unconscious  intelligence  "  of  theirs  may  be. 
We  are  justly  anxious  to  know,  for  it  certainly  plays  a 
leading  part  in  their  philosophy.  It  is  not  matter.  It 
can,  therefore,  do  nothing  by  virtue  of  physical  properties. 
It  is  not  mind,  for  that  word  is  utterly  repudiated.  The 
very  existence  of  a  species  of  absolutely  and  eternally 
unconscious  intelligence,  is  an  impossible  conception. 
But  let  its  existence  be  magnanimously  granted.  What 
could  it  do  in  bringing  to  pass  the  orderly  results  of 
nature  ?  I  have  shown  that  these  results  involve  number 
and  form.  What  does  unconscious  intelligence  know 
about  form  ?  They  likewise  involve  complicated  mathe- 
matical relations.  What  can  unconscious  intelligence  do 
in  mathematics  ?  They  likewise  involve  the  independent 
and  co-etaneous  action  of  vast  numbers  of  material  objects 
at  immense  distances  asunder.  What  can  unconscious 
intelligence  do  toward  marshalling  into  orderly  and  effec- 
tive movement  the  confused  and  scattered  battalions  of 
such  a  heterogeneous  host  ?  The  battle-field  is  far  too  vast, 
the  soldiery  too  numerous,  for  this  unconscious,  comatose 
commander.  And  yet  these  gentlemen  naively  assure  us. 
that  he  is  adequate  to  the  task ;  for,  say  they,  there  is  no 
other  in  the  field,  and  the  cosmical  army  is  actually  mov- 
ing in  orderly  and  triumphant  array. 

The  fact  is  that  this  unconscious  intelligence  is  a  won- 
derful affair.  It  accomplishes  most  wonderful  results. 
Indeed,  it  must  be  infinitely  superior  to  conscious  intelli- 
gence. Human  mind  is  conscious  intelligence  in  its 
typical  form.  Surely  no  one  will  deny  this,  if  he  believes 
in  intelligence  at  all.  But  human  mind  could  never  do 
an  infinitesimal  part  of  the  work  so  confidently  assigned 
to  this  unconscious  intelligence  in  nature.  Consciousness 
must  then  be  a  bad  element  in  mind — a  regular  burden  to- 


48  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

the  intellect,  a  clog  to  its  operations !  Let  us  be  rid  of 
the  burden  at  any  cost.  Let  the  scales  of  consciousness 
drop  at  once  from  our  mental  vision.  Let  us  adopt  the 
prayer  of  Buddha,  and  ask  to  deposit  our  worn-out  con- 
sciousness in  some  humble  corner  of  the  opalescent  realms 
of  Nirvana ! 

Seriously,  that  kind  of  unconscious  intelligence  which 
these  philosophers  are  constrained  to  postulate  is  quite 
good  enough  for  the  eutaxiologist.  It  is  fully  equal  to 
any  thing  in  that  line  which  his  argument  establishes. 
True,  he  regrets  their  unfortunate  and  improper  use  of 
the  term  '*  unconscious,"  and  would  earnestly  suggest 
that  they  leave  it  off  altogether.  But  he  is  not  disposed 
to  quarrel  about  a  word. 

2.    CONCERNING    CAUSATION. 

The  attempt  has  been  made  to  involve  Eutaxiology  in 
the  disputes  concerning  cause  and  effect.  It  is  put  thus : 
**  Order  is  considered  a  mark  of  intelligence  by  an  infer- 
ence from  the  law  '  Every  event  has  a  cause.'  But  this 
law  itself  is  in  dispute  as  to  its  origin.  One  philosopher 
says  it  is  an  intuition,  another  deems  it  an  induction, 
while  a  third  views  it  as  a  simple  matter  of  association. 
The  whole  thing  is  adrift  in  uncertainty.  Eutaxiology  is 
therefore  a  mere  matter  of  unsettled  opinion." 

Now  concerning  this  objection,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  the  causal  principle  is  in  some  sense  involved  in  all 
reasoning  whatsoever.  This  is  no  new  idea.  Leibnitz 
•considered  it  one  of  the  primary  laws  of  logical  thought, 
and  stated  it  thus :  ' '  Nothing  happens  without  a  reason 
why  it  should  be  so  rather  than  otherwise."  By  others 
it  has  been  styled  the  Law  of  Sufificient  Reason. 

Eutaxiology  is   certainly  a   sample  of   the   reasoning 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE. 


49 


process,  and  must,  therefore,  have  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion lying  somewhere  beneath  it.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  causal  principle  (be  its  origin  what  it  may) 
is  practically  so  universally  recognized  as  never  to  be 
brought  into  question.  No  logistic  syllogism  is  ever 
questioned  as  to  its  validity,  by  virtue  of  its  relation  to 
the  proposition :  Every  event  has  a  cause.  All  we  ask  is : 
*'Are  the  premises  true?  Is  the  logic  sound?"  This 
practical  truth  has  been  forcibly  illustrated  by  reference 
to  a  criminal  trial  at  court.  Suppose  that  a  prisoner  is  at 
the  bar  on  trial  for  murder.  The  prosecution  proves  in- 
contestably  that  the  victim  died  by  a  mortal  wound,  that 
he  and  the  prisoner  were  closeted  together  at  the  time  of 
the  murder,  that  they  were  alone,  that  the  prisoner  had 
every  motive  for  killing,  that  immediately  after  the  sad 
•event,  a  concealed  weapon,  covered  with  blood,  was  found 
upon  the  person  of  the  prisoner,  that  the  victim  had  no 
weapon  whatever,  that  upon  careful  examination  the  blood- 
spots  were  found  to  contain  minute  discs  of  that  form  and 
size  which  invariably  betoken  human  blood.  The  defence 
admits  all  these  facts,  but  he  insists  that  there  is  some 
•difference  among  philosophers  about  the  law  of  sufficient 
causation.  The  death  of  the  victim  did  occur,  but,  then, 
it  may  possibly  have  had  no  cause  whatever.  These 
spots  are  undoubtedly  on  the  prisoner's  weapon,  but  they 
might  have  come  there  by  mere  chance.  Opinions  differ. 
Will  you  take  an  innocent  man's  life,  on  a  simple  matter 
of  opinion  ? 

How  long  would  such  a  defence  hang  a  jury  of  intelli- 
gent men  ? 

But  suppose  he  argues  further  about  the  blood-discs; 
says  it  is  uncertain  whether  these  peculiar  forms  are  a 
result  of  the  constitution  of  human  blood,  or  the  consti- 


50  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

tution  of  human  blood  is  a  result  of  these  peculiar  forms^ 
It  is  a  matter  of  entire  indifference  with  the  jury  as  to 
which  is  cause  and  which  effect,  or  indeed  as  to  whether 
there  be  any  cause  and  effect  in  the  case.  That  is  not 
the  question.  The  only  pertinent  question  is,  *'  Do  these 
peculiar  discs  invariably  betoken  human  blood  ?  "  With 
that  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  case  is  perfectly 
clear  and  certain. 

Just  so  with  the  eutaxiologist.  He  cares  nothing  at 
all  about  causation  in  orderly  results.  He  only  asks 
"Does  order  always  betoken  intelligence?"  And  the 
proof  that  it  does  puts  the  case  of  intelligence  in  nature 
beyond  all  possible  question. 

3.    CONCERNING    NECESSITY. 

This  objection  states  that  the  order  of  nature  flows- 
necessarily  from  the  properties  of  matter ;  and  as  matter 
itself  is  eternal,  and  therefore  all  its  properties  are  eternal, 
the  order  of  nature  is  adequately  accounted  for  without 
inteUigence. 

Both  of  the  statements  involved  in  this  objection  are 
decidedly  questionable.  Chalmers,  for  instance,  denies 
the  first,  and  insists  that  the  wonderful  order-making  in 
nature  results,  not  from  necessary  properties  of  matter, 
but  from  what  he  styles  arbitrary  collocations  thereof. 
He  takes  the  solar  system  as  an  illustration.  Gravitatioa 
is  conceded  to  be  an  out-flow  of  the  necessary  properties 
of  matter.  But  gravitation  can  destroy  systems  and 
worlds  as  well  as  preserve  them.  The  question  as  to 
which  result  shall  take  place  in  a  given  system,  depends 
quite  as  much  upon  certain  peculiar  conditions  thereof 
as  upon  the  general  law  of  gravitation.  The  integrity  of 
the  solar  system,  for  example,  depends  upon  five  con- 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE,  5  I 

•ditions  of  planetary  movement :  (i)  smallness  of  the  orbi- 
tal inclinations,  (2)  slightness  of  orbital  eccentricities, 
{3)  motions  all  in  the  same  direction,  (4)  the  incommen- 
surable character  of  the  periods  of  revolution,  and  (5)  the 
relative  vastness  of  the  central  sun.  Now  all  these  con- 
ditions are  apparently  arbitrary.  There  is  no  known 
property  of  matter  which  could  possibly  have  prevented 
any  one  of  them  from  being  otherwise  than  it  is.  But 
the  slightest  change  in  any  one  of  them  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  destroy  the  stability  of  the  entire  solar  system. 
Hence  it  has  been  justly  argued  that  the  evidence  of 
intelligence  in  nature  is  to  be  found  in  these  arbitrary 
collocations,  even  though  matter  should  be  proved  to  be 
eternal. 

But  the  eternity  of  matter  is  not  proved.  It  may  be 
that  what  Chalmers  deems  arbitrary  collocations  of  mat- 
ter may  yet  turn  up  as  the  results  of  necessary  properties 
of  matter — the  action  of  physical  laws  as  yet  undiscerned. 
What  then  ?  Would  these  orderly  results  become  any  the 
less  evident  marks  of  intelligence  ?  Have  we  not  already 
seen  that  this  very  law  of  gravitation  is  full  of  such 
marks  ?  It  makes  no  sort  of  difference  when  these  prin- 
ciples were  implanted  in  physical  nature,  nor  how  long 
they  shall  remain  there  ;  if  so  be  they  are  only  there,  they 
are  certain  marks  of  intelligence.  If  they  were  there 
from  the  beginning,  it  only  goes  to  show  that  intelligence 
was  there  from  the  beginning.  And  such  a  conclusion 
would  work  no  damage  whatever  to  the  present  argument. 
Kant  has  truly  said,  that  if  matter  has  such  properties 
that  it  must  produce  a  beautiful  and  orderly  world,  then 
an  intelligent  being  must  have  created  matter  and  en- 
dowed it  with  these  properties. 

Eutaxiology  agrees,  and  insists  that  if  order  is  a  neces- 


52  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

sary  out-flow  of  matter,  it  is  thereby  none  the  less  certain* 
that  "■  this  goodly  frame  of  things  "  must  have  proceeded 
from  an  intelligent  author. 

4.    CONCERNING    UNIVERSALITY. 

It  is  objected  further  that  the  very  abundance  of  order 
in  nature  is  fatal  to  Eutaxiology.  Those  who  bring  this 
objection  take  a  view  of  the  subject  quite  the  opposite  of 
the  preceding.  They  are  eager  to  admit  that  order  exists 
everywhere.  They  even  insist  upon  it.  They  assert  that 
order  pervades  every  corner  and  cranny  of  creation  ;  that 
from  molecule  to  mountain,  from  atom  to  star,  its  sway  is 
absolutely  universal.  "  Now  it  is  evident,"  they  argue, 
'*  that  a  universal  thing  cannot  be  the  mark  of  any  thing 
whatever,  for  a  mark  of  any  thing  is  simply  a  sign  by 
which  we  recognize  it  and  distinguish  it  from  all  other 
things.  But  a  universal  sign  cannot  distinguish  one  thing 
from  another,  for  the  good  and  sufficient  reason  that  it 
pertains  to  all  things  alike.  If  order  is  unlimited,  it  can 
be  a  mark  of  nothing,  unless  it  be  of  mere  existence." 

Now  this  argument  is  specious,  indeed.  At  first  sight 
it  looks  sound  and  strong.  But  the  trouble  seems  to  be 
that  it  is  too  strong.  It  proves  entirely  too  much.  It 
destroys  all  distinction  between  mind  and  matter.  It 
denies  human  intelligence.  If  it  means  any  thing,  it 
means  that  there  can  be  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
mind  anywhere.  It  puts  out  God  and  man  at  one  breath. 
There  is  no  God,  and  man  is  but  a  form  of  matter.  Or- 
derly results  from  human  intelligence  are  a  myth,  for 
there  is  no  evidence  that  there  is  any  human  intelligence. 
Consciousness  is  a  lie,  memory  a  fraud,  experience  a  delu- 
sion, reason  a  cheat.  For  by  all  these  am  I  certified  that 
certain  orderly  results  are  the  outflow  and  token  of  my 
own  intelligence. 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE.  53; 

Any  theory  which  necessarily  leads  to  such  wholesale 
philosophical  iconoclasm  must  be  wrong  somewhere.  Let 
it  be  granted  that  the  first  statements  in  the  argument 
are  true.  Let  us  suppose  that  order  is  universal ;  that 
only  proves  the  universality  of  intelligence.  The  sign  is 
co-extensive  with  the  thing  signified.  But  what  of  that  ? 
A  universal  thing  ought  to  have  universal  tokens.  If 
intelligence  does  pervade  matter  everywhere,  it  is  on  that 
account  none  the  less  intelligence.  The  mere  multiplica- 
tion of  a  thing  cannot  change  its  nature.  Neither  is. 
matter  any  the  less  matter.  The  co-existence  of  the  two 
in  nature  presents  no  new  philosophical  diflficulty,  for  they 
are  admitted  to  co-exist  in  man. 

The  eutaxiologist  starts  out  to  prove  the  existence  of 
intelligence  in  nature.  If  in  so  doing  he  arrives  at  the 
universality  of  that  intelligence,  he  is  not  at  all  alarmed 
thereby.  On  the  contrary,  he  is  decidedly  pleased  with 
such  a  conclusion.  Moreover,  he  is  not  arguing  for  human 
intelligence.  Its  existence  is  universally  conceded.  And 
so  this  ponderous  objection  falls  harmless  at  his  feet. 

5.    CONCERNING    PURPOSE  OR  END. 

The  preceding  objections  all  smack  of  atheism.  This 
one  comes  from  the  theist.  He  complains  that  Eutaxi- 
ology  utterly  ignores  the  principle  of  adaptation  and 
design  ;  that  it  antagonizes  the  methods  of  Teleology — 
the  world-renowned  and  historic  champion  of  Theism — 
and  insolently  usurps  its  proper  ground.  If  true,  this, 
would  certainly  be  a  serious  charge.  And  it  really  is  a 
serious  matter,  because  it  is  the  criticism  of  a  friend.  One 
may  expect  to  be  misunderstood  and  misrepresented  by 
enemies,  but  not  by  a  friend  or  brother.  Now  the  eutax- 
iologist and  the  teleologist  are  natural  brothers  in  phi- 


54  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

iosophy.  They  are  fellow-soldiers  fighting  on  the  same 
side  of  a  great  issue.  They  cannot  afford  to  disagree. 
And  they  need  not.  The  simple  fact  is  that  the  teleolo- 
gist  is  mistaken  as  to  the  purpose  of  his  theistic  brother. 
And  so,  without  meaning  to  be  unjust,  he  has  made 
charges  that  are  totally  false. 

(i)  As  to  Ignoring  Adaptation. 

Eutaxiology  does  not  ignore  this  broad  principle  in 
nature.  It  freely  admits  it.  True,  it  is  not  used,  simply 
because  it  is  not  needed.  Plan  may  imply  adaptation  to 
an  end,  but  that  adaptation  need  not  be  shown  in  order 
to  prove  intelligence  in  plan.  The  fact  of  order  is  enough 
for  that.  And  so  adaptation  is  left  in  the  domain  of 
Teleology,  where  it  rightfully  belongs.  Because  two  sol- 
diers fight  in  the  same  cause  is  no  reason  why  they  must 
use  exactly  the  same  weapons. 

(2)  As  to  the  Matter  of  Antagonism. 

There  is  none  whatever.  There  can  be  no  possible  war 
between  plan  and  purpose.  And  this  tells  the  exact  rela- 
tion between  Eutaxiology  and  Teleology.  Indeed,  these 
branches  of  Theism  may  be  briefly  and  fittingly  described 
as  Plans  and  Purposes  in  Nature.  They  are  in  perfect 
"harmony.  Their  methods  may  be  different,  but  they  are 
certainly  not  belligerent.  In  fact,  they  dwell  together  in 
unity.  Every  plan  pre-supposes  a  purpose,  and  every  pur- 
pose executes  a  plan. 

(3)  As  to  the  Charge  of  Usurpation. 

It  likewise  is  false.  Teleology  has  hitherto  assumed 
the  burden  of  proving  the  existence  of  God.  That  is  an 
herculean  task.  Eutaxiology  does  not  attempt  it  at  all. 
it  does  propose  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  intelli- 


INTELLIGENCE  IN  NATURE,  55 

gence  in  nature.  With  this  simple  task  it  is  satisfied ; 
with  this  single  step  it  stops.  And  yet  this  is  no  light 
task,  no  insignificant  step  toward  the  proof  of  God.  It 
will  be  of  great  service  to  Teleology  in  the  larger  work 
yet  to  be  accomplished.  With  this  intent  the  truth  estab- 
lished by  Eutaxiology  is  cordially  proffered.  Let  it  be 
cordially  received,  and  let  these  two  stand  together  as 
co-workers  in  the  greatest  and  best  of  all  causes. 

REFERENCES. 

Hick's  "  Critique  of  Design-Arguments." 
Bascom's  "  Natural  Theology." 
Bowne's  "  Studies  in  Theism." 
Cooke's  "  Religion  and  Chemistry." 


CHAPTER  II. 

VOLITION  IN  NATURE  ;  OR,  THE  TELEOLOGI« 
CAL  ARGUMENT. 

SECTION  I. 

SCOPE  OF   THE  ARGUMENT. 

A  CONSTRUCTIVE  work  presupposes  a  plan.  The 
architect  matures  his  plans  and  specifications 
before  a  hammer  is  lifted  or  a  stone  moved.  And  so  of 
every  builder.  The  plan  must  be  definite  and  consistent 
or  the  structure  will  fail  of  perfection.  This  principle  is 
universal.  It  is  just  as  binding  in  the  mental  world  as  in 
the  physical. 

Now  an  argument  is  a  mental  structure.  It  has  parts, 
relations,  and  purposes.  It  must,  therefore,  have  a  plan 
— a  type  of  construction.  And  this  plan  must  be  strictly 
in  accordance  with  the  scope  of  the  argument. 

Teleology,  as  the  term  implies,  treats  of  purpose,  de- 
sign, or  end  in  nature.  It  is  pre-eminently  argumentative  ; 
it  seeks  to  prove  something.  Following  this  law  of  men- 
tal structures,  it  has  a  definite  plan — a  scope  of  being. 
Unfortunately  the  true  scope  of  the  teleological  argument 
has  been  so  persistently  obscured,  misunderstood,  or  over- 
looked that  it  must  be  set  forth  somewhat  in  detail  before 
attempting  the  construction  of  the  argument  itself. 

I.       WHAT    IT    ATTEMPTS. 

This  topic  will  be  discussed  most  clearly  by  subdividing 
and  considering  it  historically,  negatively,  and  positively. 

56 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE. 


57 


(i)      What  has  been  Heretofore  Attempted. 

Teleology  is  an  old  science.  Its  field  and  purpose  have 
long  been  well  known.  As  was  intimated  in  the  last 
chapter,  it  proposes  to  prove  the  existence  and  goodness 
of  God.  This  has  been  its  burden  for  centuries.  Volume 
after  volume  has  been  written  in  support  of  this  purpose. 
Arguments  have  been  constructed,  inferences  drawn,  and 
exclamations  made  in  view  of  the  greatness  of  the  under- 
taking, and  the  more  or  less  comfortable  assurance  of  its 
successful  accomplishment.  Teleologists  are  for  the  most 
part  accustomed  to  hunt  through  nature  and  collect  there- 
from a  formidable  array  of  facts  wherein  there  is  more  or 
less  evidence  of  purpose  or  design.  They  expatiate  on 
these  facts,  bring  out  vividly  their  elements  of  special  and 
wonderful  adaptation  to  the  purposes  for  which  they  are 
designed,  and  finally  close  the  argument  with  a  glowing 
panegyric  on  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God. 

Concerning  this  teleological  history,  three  observations 
may  be  made.  First,  this  practice  is  not  universal.  There 
are  here  and  there  exceptions  to  it.  Second,  it  is  mani- 
festly proper  and  useful  to  bring  out  these  facts  in  nature, 
and  to  adore  the  Goodness  and  Wisdom  to  which  they 
point.  Third,  it  is  not  so  manifestly  proper  and  useful 
to  attempt,  in  a  single  argument,  to  prove  the  existence, 
the  wisdom,  and  the  goodness  of  God. 

It  is  very  possible  that  teleologists  have  hitherto  been 
attempting  too  much.  Many  of  them  have  undeniably 
fallen  into  logical  and  philosophical  indiscretions  which 
their  enemies  have  not  been  slow  to  utilize  against  them. 
In  their  eager  and  commendable  desire  to  see  God,  they 
have  taken  too  long  steps,  and  have  consequently  made 
ugly  slips  here  and  there.  They  are  beginning  to  see 
this  mistake  and  to  correct  it.     The  teleological  watch- 


58  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

word  of  to-day  is  a  word  of  caution  and  patience.  Let 
us  not,  either  in  worship  or  in  philosophy,  rush  into  the 
presence  of  God  per  saltern. 

(2)    What  Should  Not  be  Attempted. 

The  line  of  thought  under  this  head  has  already  been 
indicated.  If  the  principles  heretofore  stated  are  correct, 
it  is  clear  that  the  teleologist  should  not  attempt  the 
direct  demonstration  of  God.  To  satisfy  the  Christian 
Theist  this  demonstration  must  include  intelligence,  voli- 
tion, personality,  goodness,  unity,  and  infinity.  Other 
elements  there  are,  indeed,  which  are  associated  with 
these  in  our  idea  of  the  Deity,  but  these  at  least  are  fun- 
damental and  essential.  It  would  certainly  seem  that 
any  attempt  to  prove  them  all  by  a  single  argument  must 
be  foredoomed  to  failure.  In  my  use  of  the  principle  of 
Teleology  I  shall  not  attempt  so  much.  The  existence 
of  all  these  elements  in  the  Deity  must,  iadeed,  be  estab- 
lished. Nothing  less  than  that  can  satisfy  Christian 
Theism,  whose  justification  is  here  undertaken.  But  I 
prefer  to  divide  the  task,  take  a  step  at  a  time,  make  sure 
footing,  and  proceed  cautiously  in  easy  stages.  One  step 
has  already  been  taken,  and  Teleology  will  take  another. 
Eutaxiology  has  established  one  element  of  God ;  Tele- 
ology is  relied  upon  to  establish  one  more  and  that  is  all. 
Other  proofs  will  readily  be  found  for  other  elements,  and 
this  historic  pack-horse  of  Theism  will  not  henceforth  be 
weighted  with  the  whole  burden. 

(3)     What  May  Properly  be  Attempted. 
Teleology  is  expected  to  prove  something.     It  is  agreed 
on  all  hands  that  this  expectation  is  just.     The  only  dif- 
ference of  opinion  is  as  to  what  and  how  much  shall  be 
attempted  or  required.     The  history  of  philosophy  has 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE,  59 

no  more  curious  page  than  that  on  which  this  question  is 
brought  to  solution.  Teleologists  have  been  strangely  at 
variance  concerning  it.  Shall  Teleology  be  used  to  prove 
the  being  of  God?  Or,  assuming  his  existence,  shall  it 
proceed  to  demonstrate  his  wisdom  and  goodness?  Or 
can  it  suffice  to  establish  all  the  attributes  of  Deity? 
Theoretically  these  various  methods  have  had  their  re- 
spective advocates,  but  practically  these  distinctions  have 
been  almost  universally  ignored,  and  the  entire  load  of 
theistic  proofs  has  been  jumbled  together  and  thrown  onto 
the  patient  back  of  Teleology.  This  is  a  mistake,  and 
has  wrought  great  damage  to  Theism.  But  how  much 
ought  to  be  attempt^ed  in  the  teleological  argument  ?  The 
old  teleologist  said  six  things  ;  I  say  one.  Volition  is 
the  one  single  element  of  Deity  which  I  shall  attempt  to 
prove  by  the  use  of  this  argument.  And  certainly  this  is 
the  most  natural  and  proper  thing  to  attempt.  To  be 
convinced  of  this  fact,  the  reader  has  only  to  notice  two 
things :  First,  that  the  key-note  of  Teleology  is  purpose 
or  design,  and  secondly,  that  volition  is  the  formation  of 
purpose.  A  volition  is  simply  that  mental  act  of  which 
a  purpose  is  the  proper  product.  Now,  if  Teleology  deals 
with  purpose  in  nature,  and  if  purpose  and  volition  are 
inseparably  connected  as  act  and  product,  it  is  surely  within 
the  rightful  province  of  Teleology  to  prove  the  existence 
of  volition  in  nature.  This  one  task  will  be  committed 
to  it. 

2.   WHAT  TELEOLOGY  EMPLOYS. 

The  principle  employed  in  Teleology  is  that  of  design 
or  purpose.  It  has  frequently  been  termed  the  principle 
of  final  causes.  This  expression  is  unfortunate  for  two 
reasons.  First,  it  falsely  identifies  design  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  efficient  cause.     The  distinction  between  the  two 


6o  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

cannot  be  readily  maintained.  If  by  efficient  cause  we 
mean  all  those  things  without  which  certain  subsequent 
and  correspondent  phenomena  cannot  take  place,  then  it 
is  evident  that  final  causes  must  be  included  among  them. 
But  if  we  mean  something  else  and  less  than  this,  and 
still  hold  on  to  final  cause,  there  is  absolutely  no  place  to 
draw  the  line  of  limitation  about  efficient  causation.  Phil- 
osophers have  recognized  this  difficulty.  Even  M.  Janet, 
from  whose  masterly  work  entitled  *'  Final  Causes  "  I  have 
drawn  a  considerable  part  of  the  present  argument,  fails 
to  distinguish  on  this  point.  He  says :  "■  No  one  denies 
that  the  final  cause  may  be  reduced  to  the  efficient  cause 
and  it  matters  not  whether  this  cause  is  called 
final  or  efficient."  And  yet  if  any  one  should  ask  this 
able  writer  to  change  the  title  of  his  book  to  "  Efficient 
Causes,"  he  would  justly  object  to  such  a  flagrant  mis- 
nomer. If  no  distinction  is  to  be  made  and  strictly  main- 
tained, it  were  vastly  better  not  to  attempt  any.  Secondly^ 
a  more  serious  objection  is  that  design,  purpose,  end  is 
not  cause  at  all.  A  cause  is  that  which  has  power  to  pro- 
duce inevitably  the  particular  phenomenon  which  is  its 
proper  effect.  Ends  have  no  such  power  at  all.  They 
are  simply  motives  presented  to  the  will.  If  the  will  be 
free,  it  can  choose  these  motives  or  set  them  aside.  And 
this  must  be  true  of  all  free  will,  whether  in  God  or  man. 
God  doubtless  acts  in  view  of  motives.  These  motives 
have  reference  to  ends  to  be  accomplished.  And  yet 
these  motives  or  ends  are  not  the  cause  of  God's  action. 
He  is  under  no  anterior  necessity  to  follow  them.  For, 
if  so,  he  is  not  God  at  all.  Volition,  or  the  determination 
of  the  divine  will,  is  undoubtedly  the  cause  of  all  things. 
But  without  that,  mere  design,  or  purpose  even,  would 
have  remained  unproductive  forever. 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  6 1 

For  these  reasons,  I  shall  avoid  the  term  final  causes 
altogether,  and  shall  hope  to  escape  some  of  the  errors  at 
least,  into  which  its  use  has  betrayed  the  wisest  philoso- 
phers. 

With  this  necessary  caveat  in  mind,  let  us  now  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  the  principle  which  we  call  design,  pur- 
pose, or  end.  Is  it  a  first  principle,  of  k  priori  origin? 
Contrary  to  many  philosophers,  I  am  constrained  to  reply 
in  the  negative.  It  will  be  remembered  that  first  princi- 
ples of  thought  must  possess  three  elements,  originality, 
universality,  and  necessity.  But  design  does  not  seem  to 
possess  all  these  elements.  It  evidently  lacks  universality. 
This  fact  is  made  evident  by  comparing  the  two  principles 
of  Causation  and  Design. 

It  is  a  necessary  and  universal  law  of  the  mind  that 
whenever  a  phenomenon  appears  to  us,  we  suppose  for  it 
some  pre-existent  condition  or  phenomenon  which  we 
term  its  cause.  And  this  we  are  obliged  to  do  in  all  cases 
whatsoever — it  matters  not  what  the  nature  of  the  phe- 
nomenon may  be.  But  it  is  not  so  in  the  case  of  Design. 
Very  many  of  the  phenomena  which  present  themselves 
to  us  seem  to  be  without  any  end  :  or  at  least  do  not  either 
impress  us  with  such  an  idea  or  impel  us  to  seek  it.  There 
are  others,  again,  in  which  this  idea  is  produced  with 
definite  clearness  and  irresistible  force.  It  is  plain,  then, 
that  while  causation  is  a  universal  principle,  design  is  not. 
And  yet  we  constantly  apply  the  principle  of  design,  and 
that  with  quite  as  much  ease  and  certainty,  as  are  attached 
to  causation.  Let  us  illustrate.  Two  carriages  collide  on 
a  thronged  thoroughfare.  It  was  a  mere  coincidence  and 
nothing  more.  Two  ships  are  befogged  and  collide  at  sea. 
That,  too,  is  a  coincidence.  But  suppose  the  same  ship 
strikes  your  vessel  broadside  at  every  port  you  enter  for 


62  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

a  dozen  successive  voyages,  without  interruption.  That 
is  no  coincidence.     It  is  intentional,  and  you  know  it. 

You  go  out  on  a  clear  night  in  August  and  witness  a 
brilliant  display  of  shooting  stars.  Again  in  November 
the  same  phenomenon  is  observed.  Next  year  the  same 
pyrotechnics  of  the  sky  are  repeated,  at  exactly  the  same 
periods  of  the  year,  and  so  on  for  a  score  of  years.  Now 
you  are  not  satisfied  that  this  uniform  repetition  is  a  mere 
coincidence.     There  must  be  some  reason  for  it. 

The  very  fact  of  coincidence  itself  is  what  needs  ex- 
planation. There  is  doubtless  a  physical  cause  for  each 
individual  shower  of  stars.  But  this  is  not  all.  The 
pecuHar  and  persistent  order  in  the  phenomena  addresses 
the  mind  as  a  thing  utterly  distinct  from  the  individual 
phenomena  themselves,  and  demands  explanation. 

Wandering  over  a  desert,  you  find  half  buried  in  the 
sand  an  antique  statue,  of  beautiful  form  and  exquisite 
proportions,  and  you  justly  conclude  that  the  chisel  of  the 
sculptor  has  been  there. 

Beneath  fallen  leaves  in  a  vast  and  trackless  forest,  you 
discover  an  accurately  chiselled  implement  of  stone,  evi- 
dently shaped  for  cutting.  Upon  further  search,  you  find 
many  more  of  the  same  pattern  and  in  the  same  vicinity. 
Their  existence  there  in  such  numbers  must  be  accounted 
for.  They  certainly  never  grew  there.  Somebody  must 
have  made  them.  This  is  your  firm  conviction,  and  no 
man  can  eradicate  it.  Nor  is  this  all.  They  must  have 
been  made  with  a  purpose ;  and  this  fact  is  just  as  sure  as 
the  other. 

Now  journey  to  a  volcanic  region,  and  see  the  terrible 
volleys  of  fire  and  smoke  and  molten  matter  as  they  pour 
forth  over  the  burning  mountain-side.  You  are  very  sure 
that  this  impressive  phenomenon  before  you  has  an  ade- 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  63 

quate  cause,  whether  you  know  the  nature  of  that  cause 
or  not.  But  it  brings  to  your  mind  no  idea  whatever  of 
necessary  purpose  or  design.  One  phenomenon  carries 
with  it  an  unalterable  conviction  of  design,  while  another 
vastly  greater  and  more  impressive  in  character,  gives  not 
even  a  hint  of  it.  Whence  arises  this  difference  ?  If  de- 
sign be  a  universal  principle,  how  could  any  such  difference 
ever  exist  ?  And  further,  granting  that  it  is  not  universal, 
by  what  necessity  or  by  what  warrant  do  we  invariably 
recognize  end  or  design  in  the  one  phenomenon,  and  not  in 
the  other?     These  questions  demand  a  careful  response. 

A  phenomenon  may  have  two  possible  relations,  and 
only  two.  It  may  be  related  to  the  past,  or  to  the  future, 
or  to  both.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  every  phenomenon 
does,  in  some  sense,  carry  both  these  relations ;  but,  in 
many  cases,  the  necessity  thereof  is  not  at  all  apparent. 
That  volcanic  action,  for  example,  is  necessarily  connected 
with  the  past,  and  certain  future  events  will  likewise  flow 
from  it ;  but  this  latter  fact  is  by  no  means  apparent  in 
the  action  itself,  nor  essential  to  it.  The  attempt  of 
teleologists  to  show  that  volcanoes  are  designed  to  pre- 
vent earthquakes,  is  exceedingly  weak  and  flimsy.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  formation  of  those  stone  implements 
found  in  the  forest,  looks  both  ways ;  backward  to  its 
cause,  and  forward  to  its  purpose.  And  the  latter  relation 
is  just  as  essential  to  their  existence  as  is  the  former. 

Every  event  must  have  a  cause,  and  must  therefore  look 
to  the  past.  But  it  is  not  correspondently  true  that  every 
event  must  have  a  purpose,  and  must  therefore  look  to  the 
future.  A  fiery  horse  becomes  unmanageable  and  runs 
away  on  the  street.  At  that  very  moment,  an  absent- 
minded  philosopher,  lost  in  deep  reverie,  crosses  the 
street.     A  collision  ensues  which  results   in  the  sudden 


64  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

death  of  the  philosopher.  That  is  an  important  event.  It 
certainly  had  an  adequate  cause,  but  who  can  see  any 
purpose  in  it  ? 

The  fact  seems  to  be  that  wherever  we  recognize  pur- 
pose or  end  in  action,  it  comes  to  us  as  an  induction,  and 
not  as  a  first  principle.  If  this  be  true,  it  will  account  for 
the  clearness  and  force  of  this  conviction  in  some  cases, 
and  its  entire  absence  in  others.  That  it  is  true  will 
be  shown  in  subsequent  sections  of  this  chapter.  For 
the  present  it  will  suffice  to  determine  and  describe  those 
cases  in  which  this  induction  will  always  be  applicable. 

It  may  be  said  in  general  that  whenever  phenomena 
concur  in  orderly  repetition  or  agreement,  the  human 
mind  requires  an  explanation,  not  only  of  the  individual 
phenomena,  but  likewise  of  their  order  or  concurrence. 
This  requirement  calls  for  two  principles,  the  first  of  which 
is  mechanical^  the  second  teleological. 

Janet  puts  them  thus : 

"  First  principle. — When  a  certain  coincidence  of  phe- 
nomena is  remarked  constantly,  it  does  not  suffice  to  at- 
tach each  phenomenon  in  particular  to  its  antecedent 
causes  ;  it  is  necessary  also  to  give  a  precise  reason  for  the 
coincidence  itself. 

*'  Second  principle. — When  a  certain  coincidence  of  phe- 
nomena is  determined,  not  only  by  its  relation  to  the 
past,  but  also  by  its  relation  to  the  future,  we  will  not 
have  done  justice  to  the  principle  of  causality  if,  in  sup- 
posing a  cause  for  this  coincidence,  we  neglect  to  explain, 
besides,  its  precise  relation  to  the  future  phenomenon." 

The  author's  use  of  "  the  principle  of  causality  "  may 
be  objected  to ;  but  it  is  not  at  all  vital  in  the  statement 
here  made,  which  is  otherwise  a  clear  and  forcible  ex- 
pression of   the  principles   involved   in    concurrent   phe- 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE,  65 

Tiomcna.  The  meteoric  showers  illustrate  the  first  prin- 
ciple ;  the  marble  statue  and  the  stone  hatchets  illustrate 
the  second. 

This  principle  of  purpose  or  design  in  concurrent  phe- 
nomena constitutes  the  subject  matter  out  of  which  the 
teleological  argument  is  constructed.  It  determines  the 
scope  of  Teleology  as  to  what  is  employed  therein. 

3.    WHOM    TELEOLOGY    ADDRESSES. 

Our  examination  of  the  scope  of  Teleology  will  not  be 
complete  without  enquiring  into  the  range  of  its  applica- 
tion. A  system  may  be  very  broad  in  meaning,  compre- 
hensive in  elements,  far-reaching  in  method,  universal  in 
relation,  and  at  the  same  time  very  limited  in  its  applica- 
tion. Just  so  with  an  argument.  Its  subject  matter  may 
be  extensive,  its  foundation  broad,  and  yet  may  address 
itself  to  very  few  persons.  It  may  be  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  transcend  the  comprehension  of  ordinary  men. 

Such  is  not  the  case  with  Teleology.  It  comes  to  every 
man  of  every  age  and  every  race.  It  brings  its  argument 
with  commanding  force  to  every  human  mind.  It  is  not 
the  exclusive  property  of  the  astute  philosopher,  the 
analytical  thinker,  the  learned  savant.  All  men  recognize 
a  plain  case  of  design  with  equal  ease  and  certainty. 
And  nature,  moreover,  is  full  of  such  cases.  Who  does 
not  know  that  eyes  were  made  to  see  with,  ears  to  hear 
with,  tongues  to  talk  with,  hands  to  grasp  with,  feet  to 
walk  with  ?  No  labored  argument  is  necessary  to  con- 
vince the  plainest  man  that  there  is  design  in  these  pro- 
visions of  nature.  The  conviction  comes  to  him  with 
spontaneous,  irresistible  force.  He  cannot  doubt  it  if  he 
would,  and  would  not  if  he  could.  He  may  not  know 
the  technical  language  of  the  schools  in  which  the  argu- 


66  CHRISTIAN   THEISM 

ment  is  formally  expressed,  nor  even  the  name  of  the- 
process;  but  he  realizes  the  result  just  the  same,  and  that, 
too,  with  intense  vividness  and  certainty. 

Teleology  has  always  been  popular  with  the  masses.  In 
this  respect  it  stands  in  decided  contrast  with  Eutaxiology. 
This  latter  system,  based  upon  order,  symmetry,  and  har- 
mony in  nature,  addresses  itself  with  peculiar  force  to  the 
scientist,  the  scholar. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  nearly  all  the  striking  ex- 
amples of  order  heretofore  advanced,  are  furnished  by  the 
researches  of  modern  science.  There  are  a  few  cases,  it 
is  true,  that  are  independent  of  all  scientific  research,  and 
are,  therefore,  applicable  to  all  men  alike.  Such,  for  in- 
stance, is  the  nightly  array  of  the  starry  heavens.  These 
cases,  however,  are  exceptional.  The  great  bulk  of  the 
evidence  in  Eutaxiology  depends  upon  the  work  of  the 
learned  scientist.  But  by  that  very  fact  such  evidence 
must  lose  much  of  its  force  when  presented  to  an  untu- 
tored mind.  Take,  for  example,  the  doctrine  of  typical 
forms.  It  is  one  of  the  strongholds  of  Eutaxiology.  But 
the  idea  it  depends  upon  is  quite  a  complicated  and  meta- 
physical one.  It  is  with  great  difficulty  that  the  utterly 
unlettered  man  can  grasp  the  general  notion  of  a  precon- 
ceived typical  skeleton  or  crystal-bearing  matrix  which 
runs  through  some  vast  portion  of  nature,  and  dominates 
the  growth  of  organisms  or  of  structural  forms  therein. 

Dr.  McCosh  is  undoubtedly  right  when  he  states  that 
the  ancients  attended  to  the  principles  of  order  as  well  as 
of  adaptation.  And  yet  the  ancients  had  no  science  of 
Eutaxiology.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  surprise,  for  they 
could  not  have  developed  such  a  science.  With  their  lim- 
ited and  erroneous  conceptions  of  nature  it  was  impossi- 
ble.    The  strongest  points  in  the  argument  are  of  modern 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURK.  6y 

origin.  And  many  more  will  doubtless  be  discovered  in 
the  future.  Eutaxiology  has  much  to  hope  from  the 
exercise  of  that  spirit  of  universal  investigation  which 
employs  itself  in  tracing  the  action  of  general  laws  and 
uniformities  in  nature. 

Teleology,  on  the  other  hand,  is  measurably  indepen- 
dent of  this  spirit.  Its  proofs  are  not  recondite  and  crit- 
ical. It  is  based  upon  facts,  rather  than  law.  Its  mes- 
sage is  to  all.  It  speaks  the  language  of  the  common 
people.  And  this  is  right.  In  the  rich  storehouse  of 
Theism  there  ought  to  be  supplies  for  all.  Let  each  take 
his  own,  and  all  may  be  satisfied. 


SECTION  11. 
THE  TELEOLOGICAL  SYLLOGISM. 

The  argument  in  Teleology  is  capable  of  being  put  into 
logical  form.  It  can  be  framed  into  a  syllogism.  All 
that  was  said  in  the  last  chapter  concerning  syllogistic 
forms  applies  here  with  equal  force.  A  vast  majority  of 
the  writers  on  this  subject  have  hitherto  massed  their 
facts  and  hurled  them  in  solid  phalanx  against  the  enemy, 
without  the  least  regard  for  logical  form.  It  must  be 
admitted,  moreover,  that  many  of  those  that  have  made 
use  of  the  syllogism  have  fallen  into  serious  logical  falla- 
cies. For  instance,  *'  design  implies  a  designer."  This 
favorite  teleological  premise  is  a  mere  truism — the  second 
term  is  involved  in  the  first,  and  nothing  can  be  proved 
by  it. 

My  purpose  in  this  discussion  is  critical  as  well  as  argu- 
mentative. I  want  to  produce  conviction,  it  is  true,  but 
am  even  more  desirous  to   test  the  correctness  of  that 


68  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

conviction.  I  shall  argue  design  in  nature,  and  shall  pre- 
sent convincing  evidence  of  its  existence  therein  ;  but 
above  all  I  shall  attempt  to  test  the  validity  of  this  time- 
honored  argument  and  to  show  its  exact  bearing  upon 
the  question  of  Theism.  For  this  purpose  the  syllogism 
is  the  most  natural  and  valuable  instrument.  The  teleo- 
logical  argument  may  be  formulated  thus  : 
Major  Premise. 

Rational  and  useful  results  produced  by  the  concur- 
rence of  suitable  causes,  imply  volition. 
Minor  Premise. 

Rational  and  useful  results  so  produced  exist  in  nature. 
Conclusion. 

The  existence  of  nature  implies  volition. 

This  argument  is  straightforward  and  logical.  I  shall 
endeavor  to  establish  the  truth  of  the  premises  and  there- 
by prove  the  conclusion. 

I.    THE    MAJOR    PREMISE. 

Like  the  major  premise  in  Eutaxiology,  this  also  is  an 
induction.  Let  us  carefully  examine  the  circumstances 
under  which  it  is  made. 

In  the  investigation  of  nature,  we  observe  certain  effects 
which  are  rational  and  useful  in  their  character.  We  ob- 
serve, moreover,  that  these  effects  are  produced  by  a  con- 
currence of  causes  in  themselves  distinct,  separate,  and 
independent  of  one  another.  Each  cause  can  be  traced 
to  its  proper  effect,  and  the  combination  of  these  individ- 
ual effects  can  be  seen  to  constitute  the  rational  result 
observed.  But  no  one  of  these  causes,  acting  alone, 
could  ever  have  produced  this  result.  Nay,  more  ;  the 
combination  of  any  number  of  them  could  not  have  ac- 
complished it.     The  abstraction  of  a  single  one  of  the 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  69 

numerous  causes  whose  con-joint  action  produced  the 
given  result,  would  have  proved  fatal  to  its  character  as 
rational  and  useful.  Now  the  question  arises :  How  came 
these  particular  efficient  causes  to  conspire  for  the  pro- 
duction of  such  a  result  ?  Out  of  the  myriads  of  possible 
combinations,  who  made  such  wise  selection  of  these 
exact  causes,  and  these  only,  that  are  suitable  to  this 
rational  and  useful  end  ?  The  same  strangely  fortunate 
concurrence  of  causes  is  repeated  in  nature  again  and 
again,  a  hundred,  a  thousand,  a  million  times.  How 
comes  this  inveterate  habit  of  nature?  Out  of  what 
necessity  does  it  spring  ?  This  is  the  problem.  The 
perfect  analysis  of  any  or  all  the  concurring  causes  does 
not  solve  it.  There  is  something  behind  them,  some 
constructive  power  which  brings  them  together.  A  good 
illustration  of  this  power  is  drawn  by  a  recent  writer  from 
the  constructive  energy  of  man. 

Yonder  stands  a  beautiful  mansion.  Physical  causes 
conspired  to  produce  it.  Every  brick  has  a  certain  chemi- 
cal constitution  and  history.  The  mortar  and  plaster  have 
been  comminuted  by  adequate  physical  causes.  Every 
beam  has  been  formed  in  strict  accordance  with  the  laws 
of  vegetable  growth,  and  brought  to  its  present  shape  by 
the  attrition  of  physical  implements.  The  exact  position 
of  every  single  element  in  the  structure,  from  foundation 
stone  to  turret,  can  be  accounted  for  by  purely  physical 
causes.  And  yet,  when  you  have  gone  the  rounds  and 
exhausted  the  entire  list  of  physical  causes,  you  have 
scarcely  begun  to  account  for  the  building.  Behind  them 
all,  and  over  them  all,  there  was  a  great  constructive  en- 
ergy which  selected,  combined,  and  guided  them  all  to  the 
production  of  this  rational  and  useful  result.  That  energy 
resided  in  the  mind  of  the  architect.      Just  so  it  is  in  na~ 


70  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

ture.  A  rational  result  is  produced  by  the  concurrence  of 
adequate  and  suitable  causes.  This  concurrence  is  the 
thing  to  be  explained.  The  individual  causes  themselves 
cannot  account  for  it,  for  each  of  them  is  exhausted  in  the 
production  of  its  own  appropriate  effect.  It  will  not  do 
to  suppose  another  physical  cause  like  unto  them,  for  its 
•effect  would  be  purely  physical  also.  That  would  be  like 
an  attempt  to  explain  the  building  by  supposing  an  addi- 
tional bricklayer  or  carpenter  or  hodcarrier,  instead  of  the 
plan  and  purpose  of  the  architect.  There  is  one  explana- 
tion and  only  one  that  can  satisfy  the  mind.  It  is  taken 
for  granted  that  these  various  causes  were  made  to  concur 
in  order  to  produce  a  given  result.  The  combination  had 
a  purpose  in  it,  and  that  purpose  looked  to  the  future 
event.  It  was  clearly  a  case  of  design.  No  other  as- 
sumption accounts  for  it  ;  this  one  does  perfectly.  And 
this  explanation  is  entirely  natural  and  spontaneous  on 
our  part.  It  costs  us  no  effort  whatever.  The  conviction 
of  design  is  brought  home  to  us  by  the  very  presence  of 
the  objects  themselves.  "  We  see  a  thought  realized  in 
nature,  and  so  recognize  in  it  a  forethought." 

And  men  have  always  done  thus.  The  design-argu- 
ment has  impressed  the  philosopher  and  the  peasant 
alike.  Socrates,  Aristotle,  Cicero,  Galen,  Newton,  and 
Paley  have  enforced  it.  A  statue,  a  watch,  an  engine,  a 
building,  have  been  successively  drawn  into  this  service. 
But,  however  it  may  be  illustrated,  there  is  no  manner  of 
■doubt  that  the  observation  of  adaptation  in  nature  in- 
spires all  men  of  all  ages  with  the  conviction  that  a 
designing  mind  conceived  and  executed  that  adaptation. 
This  is  the  fact ;  but  what  is  its  origin,  and  what  its  mean- 
ing ?     How  comes  this  universal  conviction  ? 

I  answer  by  referring  to  my  major  premise  :     Rational 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE.  yi 

and  useful  results  produced  by  the  concurrence  of  suitable 
causes,  imply  volition.  If  this  be  true,  and  if  these  cases 
of  adaptation  are  such  results  so  produced,  then  will  this 
universal  conviction  of  mankind  be  amply  explained  and 
justified.     Let  us  see  as  to  the  truth  of  the  premise. 

As  already  stated,  this  proposition  is  an  evident  induc- 
tion. Every  sound  induction  must  proceed  originally 
from  matters  of  personal  experience.  Observation,  testi- 
mony, analogy,  and  the  like,  are  surely  admissible,  but  our 
own  experience  must  furnish  the  original  starting-point. 
Otherwise,  while  the  induction  itself  may  be  logically  cor- 
rect, we  can  have  no  absolute  assurance  that  the  supposed 
facts  upon  which  it  is  based  may  not  be  erroneous  from 
top  to  bottom.  A  material  fallacy  will  invalidate  the 
conclusion,  in  spite  of  all  logic. 

But  this  teleological  induction  is  based  upon  personal 
experience.  Every  man  is  daily  conscious  of  forming 
purposes  and  executing  them  in  both  physical  and  mental 
acts.  The  purpose  gives  character,  direction,  and  limita- 
tion to  the  acts  performed.  But  the  purpose  itself  implies 
an  act  of  volition,  in  order  to  be  executed.  In  other 
words  volition  is  the  mental  act,  and  purpose  is  the 
psychical  product  of  that  act.  Purposes  never  grow 
spontaneously.  They  must  be  formed  by  the  mind  ;  and 
the  act  by  which  they  are  formed  is  termed  volition.  It 
is  evident,  then,  that  the  existence  of  purpose  or  design 
presupposes  volition. 

Take  a  simple  illustration.  I  have  just  written  and 
posted  a  letter.  But  I  had  a  purpose  in  view  when  I  did 
it — yes,  even  before  I  began  to  prepare  to  write.  I 
wanted  some  information  from  a  friend  at  a  distance,  and 
I  wrote  for  it.  This  purpose  determined  every  act,  physi- 
cal or  mental,  by  which  the  communication  was  produced 


72  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

and  mailed.  But  for  this  purpose,  the  acts  would  not 
have  been  performed.  It  must  be  noticed,  moreover,  that 
all  these  acts  were  selected  and  correlated  by  a  thing  yet 
in  the  future.  When  each  was  performed  it  had,  of 
course,  its  appropriate  cause  in  the  past.  But  we  might 
search  forever  among  these  efficient  causes  and  not  find 
any  explanation  of  the  letter.  The  concurrence  and  cor- 
relation of  such  causes,  and  such  only  as  were  suitable  to- 
produce  this  particular  rational  and  useful  result,  while  as 
yet  the  result  was  itself  in  the  unknown  future — these  are 
the  things  to  be  explained.  The  causes  did  not  correlate 
themselves.  The  constructed  result  did  not  correlate 
them  surely,  for  at  that  time  it  did  not  exist.  There  was 
just  one  thing  that  could  do  this  constructive  work,  and 
that  was  the  idea  of  the  future  result  which  existed  in  my 
mind  before  a  single  cause  began  to  co-operate  toward  its 
production.  That  it  actually  did  the  work,  is  a  matter  of 
personal  consciousness  with  me.  I  know  that  I  wrote  that 
letter,  that  I  did  it  for  a  purpose,  that  I  correlated  certain 
causes  suitable  to  carry  out  that  purpose,  and  that  I  my- 
self formed  that  purpose  by  a  direct  act  of  volition  of  my 
own.  Here,  then,  is  one  rational  and  useful  result  produced 
by  a  concurrence  of  suitable  causes,  which  does  imply  vo- 
lition. And  I  am  as  sure  of  it  as  of  any  thing  in  existence. 
But  this  is  not  all.  My  experience  is  filled  with  just  such 
products.  I  am  conscious  of  producing  them  every  day 
of  my  life.  The  great  majority  of  my  conscious  acts  are 
of  this  character.  Furthermore,  I  see  other  men  acting 
just  as  I  do.  You  write  a  letter.  You  aver  that  you  had  a 
purpose  in  writing.  The  letter  itself  is  admirably  adapted 
to  accomplish  the  very  purpose  had  in  view  at  the  time 
of  writing.  It  is  just  such  as  I  would  have  written  for 
that  purpose.     The  whole   affair  has   the   unmistakable 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE. 


73 


marks  of  design.  I  am  compelled  to  believe  that  this 
letter  is  the  outcome  of  purpose,  just  the  same  as  my  own. 
Here,  then,  is  another  rational  and  useful  result,  produced 
by  the  concurrence  of  suitable  causes,  which  implies  voli- 
tion. This  result  is  entirely  beyond  my  own  experience, 
and  yet  I  recognize  volition  in  it.  It  is  the  same  truth  as 
before. 

Thus,  in  the  acts  of  ourselves  and  of  all  men,  we  are 
furnished  with  constant  and  innumerable  examples  of  the 
truth  of  the  major  premise  under  discussion.  And  there 
is  not  a  solitar)^  exception.  Every  such  rational  and  use- 
ful product,  accomplished  by  means  of  human  activity,  is 
found  invariably  to  imply  volition.  There  is  no  question 
about  it. 

But  is  this  truth  applicable  to  the  activities  of  nature 
likewise  ?  This  is  the  central  question  on  which  the  teleo- 
logical  induction  turns.  An  affirmative  answer  carries 
with  it  the  establishment  of  this  premise  upon  an  im- 
pregnable foundation. 

The  industry  of  man  is  undeniably  based  upon  purpose, 
design.  It  uniformly  has  an  end  in  view.  This  much  we 
know.  The  industry  of  nature  is  not  known  to  us  person- 
ally, as  regards  its  origin  or  purpose.  Now  every  case  of 
human  purpose  is  a  case  of  adaptation.  And,  conversely, 
every  case  of  adaptation  in  human  activity,  is  a  case  of 
purpose.  But  when  we  see  nature  doing  just  such  things 
as  we  do  with  a  purpose,  and  cannot  do  at  all  without  a 
purpose,  we  generalize  the  known  law  and  say  that  nature 
acts  with  a  purpose.  This  is  an  ordinary  inductive  infer- 
ence, and  nothing  more.  In  every  known  case  of  adapta- 
tion we  have  found  purpose,  and  hence  volition.  Here  is 
a  new  case  in  which  adaptation  is  evident.  It  must  be 
like  all  the  rest,  and  therefore  implies  volition. 


74  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

Two  difficulties  have  sometimes  been  put  in  the  way  of 
this  induction. 

First  difficulty. — It  is  claimed  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  that  nature  acts  in  the  production  of  her  works  as 
man  acts  in  the  production  of  his.  The  fields  of  activity- 
are  so  utterly  unlike  that  we  cannot  compare  them ;  and 
so  we  are  not  warranted  in  passing  from  the  industry  of 
man  to  that  of  nature-. 

If  this  objection  means  any  thing,  it  means  that  man  and 
nature  are  terms  in  complete  opposition  to  each  other, 
and  absolutely  without  analogy ;  that  there  is  no  passing 
from  the  world  of  mind  to  the  world  of  nature ;  that  the 
two  are  mutually  independent,  and  have  nothing  whatever 
in  common,  and  that,  therefore,  we  cannot  attribute  the 
mode  of  action  found  to  exist  in  the  one  to  the  industry 
of  the  other. 

But  the  statement  thus  developed  is  manifestly  false. 
Man  is  not  at  all  opposed  to  nature.  Neither  is  he  out  of 
analogy  or  independent  of  nature.  On  the  contrary,  he 
himself,  in  his  physical  being,  is  a  part  of  nature.  His 
organism  is  fitted  up  in  her  laboratory,  and  daily  supported 
from  her  alembics.  He  freely  accepts  her  chemical  and 
physical  laws,  and  works  under  them.  His  body  is  cer- 
tainly subject  to  her  laws  of  animal  and  vegetable  life. 
His  soul,  whatever  be  its  origin  and  character,  is  certainly 
not  independent  of  his  body.  His  powers  of  perception, 
memory,  imagination,  and  even  reason  itself,  are  neces- 
sarily connected  with  the  realm  of  matter  about  him. 
Neither  is  his  industry  independent  of  nature.  He  works 
within  nature,  uses  her  materials,  employs  her  forces,  sub- 
mits to  her  laws,  modifies  or  enlarges  her  results.  More- 
over, it  is  only  by  knowing  and  obeying  her  laws  that  he 
can  reap  any  benefit  from  his  own  industry.      The  two 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE,  75 

industries  are  therefore  not  in  opposition,  but  in  strict  and 
close  analogy  with  each  other.  They  are  two  species 
under  the  same  genus,  and  we  have  a  perfect  right  to  pass 
from  the  one  to  the  other  in  a  purely  inductive  inference. 
There  is  really  nothing  in  the  way  of  this  process,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  a  strong  antecedent  presumption  in  its  favor. 

Second  difficulty, — Another  obstruction  has  been  placed 
farther  back  in  the  pathway  of  our  induction.  It  is  stated 
that  even  man's  industry  is  not  always  dependent  upon 
volition ;  that  we  do  many  things  daily  without  any  defi- 
nite intention  ;  and  that  acts  produced  automatically  from 
habit  or  otherwise,  without  any  reference  to  an  end,  are 
easily  mistaken  for  intentional  acts.  As  an  illustration  of 
this  difficulty,  M.  Janet  cites  the  case  from  an  old  curate 
who  had  become  insane,  and  used  to  recite  with  the  utmost 
eloquence  the  famous  exordium  of  Father  Bridaine.  It 
was  impossible  for  strangers  who  heard  him  to  suspect 
that  he  was  not  speaking  intelligently,  and  with  the 
definite  purpose  of  moving  his  auditors.  And  yet  the 
poor  old  man  was  an  utter  imbecile,  in  the  last  stages  of 
senile  dementia,  unable  to  utter  two  consecutive  words 
with  intelligent  purpose. 

The  obstructionist,  reinforced  by  a  goodly  array  of 
such  instances,  proceeds  to  argue  that  what  we  so  often 
mistake  in  man,  we  may  mistake  altogether  in  nature ; 
and  so  it  may  turn  out,  after  all,  that  there  is  no  intention- 
ality  or  volition  in  nature  whatever.  "Your  induction," 
says  he,  "  is  a  little  premature." 

In  dealing  with  this  difficulty,  I  frankly  admit  the  facts 
upon  which  it  is  based.  It  is  true,  in  the  first  place,  that 
we  do  often  perform  acts  without  any  intention  whatever, 
and  in  the  second  place  that  we  may  be  misled  by  our 
fellowmen  as  to  the  intentionality  of  their  acts.    But  these 


76  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

facts  have  no  bearing  at  all  upon  the  present  induction. 
They  are  true  enough,  indeed,  but  absolutely  irrelevant. 

I  do  not  claim  that  all  human  acts  are  intentional.  They 
are  not.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  many  of  them  are  instinc- 
tive. I  am  talking  about  a  certain  class  of  human  acts, 
namely:  such  as  produce  rational  and  useful  results  by  the 
concurrence  of  suitable  causes.  Of  these  acts,  and  these 
only,  the  proposition  in  question  affirms  that  they  imply 
volition.  Of  any  and  all  other  possible  acts,  human  or 
non-human,  it  has  nothing  to  say.  They  concern  it  not  in 
the  least.  So  long  as  there  are  such  human  acts  as  I  have 
described,  the  premise  is  safe.  There  can  be  no  manner 
of  doubt  that  there  are  such.  I  know,  for  instance,  that 
no  man  can  build  a  mansion  by  dropping  bricks  into  a 
hole,  or  compose  a  poem  by  pulling  letters  out  of  a  box, 
or  construct  a  geometrical  figure  by  throwing  dice  over  a 
plane.  There  are  some  human  achievements  that  are  im- 
possible without  pre-existing  intention,  and  everybody 
knows  it.  More  than  this.  We  can  all  recognize  this 
element  of  intentionality  in  the  things  themselves.  It 
matters  not  whether  we  see  them  done,  or  even  know  who 
did  them. 

Just  so  it  is  in  nature.  I  find  activities  there  which 
bear  the  same  undeniable  marks  of  intentionality.  There 
may  be  other  activities  there  which  do  not  bear  such 
marks ;  but  that  matters  nothing.  I  need  not  prove  that 
all  nature  is  one  unbroken  complex  of  intentionality. 
That  may  be  true,  or  may  not ;  and  if  true,  it  may  be  be- 
yond my  powers  of  demonstration.  There  may  even  be 
doubtful  cases  which  give  some  false  show  of  intentional- 
ity, and  deceive  me  thereby.  But  all  these  possibilities 
combined  can  raise  no  presumption  whatever  against  the 
induction  here  made.      If  there   are  any   unmistakable 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURK,  7/ 

cases  of  design  in  nature,  that  is  sufficient.  So  long  as 
eyes  are  made  to  see  with,  for  example,  I  need  seek  no 
farther  in  nature.  The  object  of  my  search  is  found,  the 
induction  established. 

Before  leaving  the  major  premise  it  will  be  well  to 
notice  the  exact  extent  and  value  of  the  induction  upon 
which  it  rests.  The  steps  of  the  inference  are  simply 
these.  I  know  that  certain  products  of  my  own  activity 
are  intentional ;  I  infer,  by  a  mental  necessity,  that  similar 
products  arising  from  the  activity  of  my  fellow-men  are 
likewise  intentional ;  I  characterize,  identify,  and  general- 
ize these  products,  and  infer  that  all  products  whatsoever 
of  the  same  class,  wherever  found  or  however  produced, 
are  also  necessarily  and  invariably  intentional.  If,  then, 
such  products  exist  in  nature,  they  give  indisputable  evi- 
dence of  design  or  intention  in  nature.  That  there  are 
such  products,  it  is  the  special  province  of  the  second 
premise  in  Teleology  to  show. 
( 

2.    THE    MINOR    PREMISE. 

This  proposition,  stated  in  full,  is  as  follows :  Rational 
and  useful  results  produced  by  the  concurrence  of  suitable 
causes  exist  in  nature.  It  will  be  seen  that  this  statement 
includes  five  things : 

(i)  There  must  be  results. 

(2)  These  results  must  be  rational  and  useful. 

(3)  They  must  be  produced  by  the  concurrence  of 
causes. 

(4)  These  causes  must,  of  course,  be  suitable. 

(5)  The  results  must  exist  in  nature. 

In  other  v/ords,  I  reject  from  this  proof  every  result 
that  is  not  rational  and  useful ;  every  result,  whether 
rational  or  otherwise,  that  is  produced  by  a  single  cause  ; 


78  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

and  every  result,  whether  rational  and  concurrent  or 
otherwise,  which  is  not  produced  by  the  direct  operations 
of  nature.  When  all  these  have  been  rejected,  however, 
there  are  myriads  left  which  naturally  and  properly  fall 
under  the  teleological  syllogism.  I  shall  select  from  them 
a  very  few  only  which  may  serve  as  examples  of  this  truth,, 
and  fix  our  thoughts  upon  it. 

And  here  I  find  myself  encumbered  with  an  embarrass- 
ment of  riches ;  insomuch  that  I  scarcely  know  how  to 
proceed  in  the  employment  of  them.  Whole  volumes 
might  well  be  written  in  the  enforcement  of  the  proposi- 
tion under  consideration.  Indeed,  whole  volumes  have 
been  so  written.  Under  the  popular  title  of  "  Adapta- 
tions in  Nature,"  the  bulk  of  teleological  literature  for 
two  hundred  years  has  expended  itself  upon  this  very 
theme.  It  is  certainly  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  to 
re-array  this  immense  host  of  facts  which  show  adaptation 
in  nature  ;  they  already  stand  out  in  bold  relief  in  many 
able  treatises  heretofore  written  on  this  subject.  I  shall 
content  myself  with  the  selection  and  presentation  of  a 
very  few  which  may  be  taken  as  types  of  all  the  others. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  facts  a  single  remark  must  be 
made  concerning  the  use  of  the  term  adaptation.  It  will 
be  employed  to  denote  in  brief  that  fitness  which  results 
from  the  co-ordination  of  suitable  causes  to  produce  a 
certain  rational  end,  or  accomplish  a  certain  purpose.  I 
shall  speak  freely  of  adaptations  in  nature,  in  the  sense 
just  explained,  and  for  thfe  sole  purpose  of  avoiding  a 
tedious  circumlocution. 

Another  preliminary  remark  must  be  made.  In  animate 
nature  there  are  striking  adaptations  of  two  kinds,  func- 
tions and  instincts.  In  the  former  the  structure  of  the 
organ  is  most  prominent ;  in  the  latter,  the  co-ordinate 
action  of  organs. 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  79 

(i)  Functions. 

By  adaptation  of  functions  is  meant  the  fitness  of  an 
organ  to  perform  its  appropriate  function.  The  structure 
of  the  eye  for  purposes  of  vision  furnishes  a  most  striking- 
example  of  functional  adaptation.  It  is  very  old.  Many 
men  have  already  used  it.  Indeed  it  has  with  some  justice 
been  called  the  classical  argument  in  this  line.  But  I 
shall  not  avoid  it  on  that  account.  It  is  not  in  the  least 
enfeebled  by  age.  Nor  is  it  obsolete.  Like  the  rising 
sun  and  the  revolving  seasons,  it  keeps  itself  in  perennial 
freshness  and  vigor.  So  long  as  eyes  are  made  to  see 
with  the  argument  will  hold.  When  Adam  first  beheld 
with  rapture  the  glory  and  beauty  of  this  fair  creation, 
fresh  and  pure  from  the  hands  of  the  Almighty,  he  illus- 
trated the  utility  and  rationality  of  vision.  From  that 
day  to  this  the  argument  holds  its  grasp  with  undimin- 
ished force,  and  I  am  persuaded  it  will  continue  to  do  so 
till  the  last  man  shall  stand  upon  the  earth. 

Vision  is  manifestly  a  useful  end  to  be  achieved.  In  its 
accomplishment  nature  has  before  her  a  complicated 
problem.  Let  us  notice  some  of  the  conditions  necessary 
to  its  solution. 

First. — There  must  be  light.  There  must  be  some  ade- 
quate means  of  communication,  rapid  and  facile,  between 
the  organ  and  the  object  of  vision.  The  exact  nature  of 
this  medium  is  still  unknown  to  science ;  but  its  reflecting 
and  refracting  properties  are  known,  and  are  found  to  be 
indispensable  to  the  act  of  vision.  In  an  atmosphere  of 
inky  blackness,  ten  thousand  eyes  would  avail  nothing. 

Secondly. — There  must  be  a  nerve  sensitive  to  this  lights 
This  neural  sensitiveness  is  no  slight  or  unmeaning  affair. 
There  are  in  the  body  many  nerves  of  exquisite  delicacy, 
but  without  this  power.     How  long,  for  instance,  would 


So  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

it  take  the  rays  of  a  tropical  sun,  shining  in  his  meridian 
splendor  upon  the  palm  of  a  man's  hand  or  the  tip  of  his 
tongue,  to  produce  a  well-authenticated  case  of  vision  ? 
And  yet  these  members  are  not  at  all  wanting  in  delicacy 
■of  nerve-power.  The  fact  is  that  the  optic  nerve  must  be 
specially  fitted  for  its  special  business. 

Thirdly. — There  must  be  an  optical  apparatus.  This  is 
necessary  in  order  that  the  contact  between  the  light  and 
the  nerve  may  be  properly  regulated.  Without  it,  light, 
indeed,  could  be  distinguished  from  darkness,  but  no  dis- 
tinct vision  of  individual  objects  would  be  possible.  This 
impossibility  results  from  the  diffusive  property  of  light. 
Rays  of  light  from  a  luminous  body  radiate  in  every  pos- 
sible direction,  unless  an  opaque  obstacle  be  in  their  way. 
So  that  a  single  luminous  point  will  lighten  an  exposed 
surface  of  any  extent.  Let  this  surface  be  the  retina,  and 
every  single  point  thereon  will  receive  light  from  every 
single  point  of  the  luminous  object.  A  dazzling  flood  of 
light  might  ensue,  but  distinct  vision  could  not.  In  order 
for  vision,  it  is  necessary  that  rays  of  light  from  individual 
points  of  the  visible  object  shall  affect  corresponding 
individual  points,  like  placed  on  the  retina.  For  this 
purpose  all  other  rays,  whether  direct  or  reflected,  must 
be  shut  off.  This  requirement  presents  a  difficult  me- 
chanical problem.  Nature  has  solved  it  in  two  ways : 
first,  by  isolation,  and  second,  by  convergence.  The  first 
method  is  seen  in  the  composite  eyes  of  insects  and  crus- 
taceans. It  **  consists  in  placing  before  the  retina,  and 
perpendicularly  to  it,  an  innumerable  quantity  of  trans- 
parent cones,  which  allow  to  reach  the  nervous  membrane 
only  the  light  following  the  direction  of  their  axes,  and 
absorb  by  means  of  the  pigment  with  which  their  walls 
are  lined,  all  that  strikes  them  obliquely."    The  marvellous 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  8l 

geometrical  adjustment  necessar}^  to  the  success  of  this 
method  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  some  I5,CXX)  or 
20,000  cones  are  employed  in  a  single  eye.  Nature  must 
indeed  be  a  skillful  artist. 

But  the  most  exquisite  perfection  of  skill  is  required  in 
the  second  method,  which  is  called  convergence.  This  is 
employed  in  the  well-known  organ  commonly  called  the 
eye,  which  is  found  in  all  vertebrate  animals,  as  well  as  in 
some  others.  It  is  needless  and  would  be  tedious  to  go 
into  all  the  minute  details  of  its  wonderful  mechanism.  It 
is,  in  general,  a  sort  of  enclosed  box — a  camera  obscura, 
somewhat  like  the  photographer's  instrument  bearing 
that  name.  Observe  its  remarkable  character.  It  is  not 
a  Pandora's  box,  but  it  is  equally  wonderful.  Its  neces- 
sary elements  are  most  curiously  and  skillfully  combined. 

(i)  There  is  the  sclerotic,  a  solid  membrane  which 
forms  the  globe  of  the  eye. 

(2)  There  is  the  cornea,  a  transparent  point  in  the  scler- 
otic, which  admits  the  rays  of  light. 

(3)  There  are  converging  media,  the  vitreous  humor,  the 
aqueous  humor,  and  the  crystalline  lens,  which  serve  to 
focalize  the  luminous  rays. 

(4)  There  is  the  retina,  or  extension  of  the  optic  nerve, 
to  receive  the  image  of  the  object  to  be  seen. 

(5)  All  these  elements  are  accurately  adjusted  to  each 
other  in  the  axis  of  the  eye. 

(6)  The  pupil  is  adjustable  to  the  dimensions  required 
for  admitting  or  shutting  out  the  light. 

(7)  The  optical  focus  is  adjustable  to  a  longer  or  shorter 
distance. 

(8)  The  direction  of  this  focus  is  readily  changeable. 

(9)  The  whole  adjustment  is  absolutely  achromatic,  it 
corrects  the  aberration  of  light. 


82  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

(lo)  The  entire  apparatus  is  protected  and  lubricated 
by  means  of  external  conformations — the  eye-lids,  eye- 
lashes, and  overjutting  brows. 

Now  here  is  an  instrument  of  admirable  delicacy, 
accuracy,  and  power.  Its  construction  is  both  rational 
and  useful  in  the  extreme.  It  is  made  by  the  concurrence 
of  a  multitude  of  different  causes,  some  within  the  organ 
and  some  without  it,  some  apparently  connected  in  origin, 
and  some  of  origin  separated  by  millions  of  miles  ;  but  all 
suitable,  and,  so  far  as  we  can  discover,  necessary  to  the 
coordinated  result  of  vision.  Can  any  thing  be  plainer 
than  that  these  causes  have  been  made  to  concur  in  order 
to  produce  the  given  result?  In  other  words,  there  is 
adaptation  in  it.  Eyes  are  made  to  see  with,  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  about  it.  As  a  mere  work  of  art,  the  eye 
is  a  marvel  of  beauty  and  perfection.  As  a  useful  instru- 
ment, it  is  none  the  less  so. 

Two  objections  have  been  raised  against  it  as  a  useful 
structure.  It  is  said,  in  the  first  place,  to  be  imperfect, 
weak,  and  inaccurate.  It  is  urged  that  an  ordinary  tele- 
scope is  superior  to  the  eye  in  these  respects. 

This  objector  would  do  well  to  remember  two  things. 

First.  That  the  range  of  the  eye  is  far  superior  to  that 
of  the  telescope — it  can  take  in  objects  near  and  far,  great 
and  small,  at  every  conceivable  angle,  and  that,  too,  with- 
out any  artificial  variation  or  readjustment  of  eye-pieces. 

Second.  That  its  capacity  is  immeasurably  superior  to 
that  of  the  telescope.  It  can  see.  Who  ever  yet  put  a 
little  telescope  into  the  head  of  a  blind  man,  and  caused 
him  to  see  thereby  ?  Man  has  sought  out  many  ingenious 
and  useful  inventions,  but  nature  is  still  ahead. 

The  second  objection  strikes,  not  so  much  at  the  func- 
tion, as  at  the  very  structure,  of  the  instrument  itself.     It 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  83 

is  claimed  that  there  are  useless  and  unnecessary  parts. 
At  least  the  crystalline  humor  is  said  to  be  of  this  charac- 
ter. The  proof  of  this  statement  is  supposed  to  be  found 
in  the  fact  that  those  blind  from  cataract,  can,  after  its 
removal,  see  without  the  crystalline  medium.  Now  there 
is  no  doubt  about  this  fact ;  but  the  inference  drawn  from 
it  is  a  clear  non  sequitur.  Men  do  not  and  cannot  see  as 
well  without  the  crystalline  lens  as  with  it.  I  may  be 
able  to  feed  myself  comfortably  with  one  hand  ;  but  that 
ft  no  manner  of  reason  why  I  should  be  restricted  to  the 
use  of  one  hand  in  the  gustatory  process. 

And,  besides,  there  may  be  other  reasons  for  the  com- 
bination of  these  three  humors  in  the  eye.  There  are, 
indeed.  The  crystalline  humor,  for  instance,  has  recently 
been  found  to  have  two  other  functions.  One  pertains 
to  the  difference  of  density  between  the  aqueous  humor 
and  the  medium  through  which  the  light  comes  to  the 
eye.  It  is  evident  that  the  less  this  difference  is,  the 
greater  ought  the  convexity  of  the  lens  to  be.  A  man 
sees  in  the  air  ;  a  fish  in  the  water  ;  an  amphibian  in  either. 
The  fish  must  have  the  greater  convexity  of  lens,  and  he 
has  it.  The  amphibian  must  have  a  readjustment  of 
lens,  and  he  has  it.  Is  there  any  principle  of  hydrostatics 
by  which  the  pressure  of  the  water  could  cause  this  dis- 
placement of  lens  ?  Nay,  verily.  It  is  the  crystalline 
humor  that  admits  the  needful  result. 

But  again,  it  has  another  distinctively  useful  function. 
The  ability  of  the  eye  to  change  at  will  the  focus  of  dis- 
tinct vision,  has  long  puzzled  physicists.  Place  a  minute 
but  brilliant  object  at  a  distance  of  ten  inches  from  the 
eye.  It  is  in  the  focus  of  distinct  vision.  Now  remove  it 
to  a  distance  of  twenty,  or  even  thirty  inches,  and  it  is 
still  in  that  focus.     This  instantaneous  change  of  focus 


84  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

has  hitherto  defied  the  principles  of  optics.  It  has  re- 
cently been  traced,  however,  to  the  crystalline  humor, 
which  is  capable,  it  seems,  in  response  to  the  will,  of 
changing  at  once  its  degree  of  convexity.  These  changes 
of  curvature  have  been  accurately  measured  to  the  thou- 
sandth of  an  inch,  and  found  to  correspond  exactly  with 
the  requirements  of  the  changed  focus.  The  laws  of 
optics  are  justified,  and  the  crystalline  humor  has  abun^ 
dantly  established  its  right  to  exist.  Meanwhile  a  new 
and  most  striking  case  of  forethought  in  the  eye  has  been 
distlosed  This  old  classical  argument,  it  seems,  is  not 
yet  exhausted.  The  teleologist  tenders  his  thanks  to  the 
objector  for  calling  attention  to  these  most  interesting 
facts. 

I  have  dwelt  somewhat  at  length  upon  the  organ  of 
vision,  because  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  bring  out  the 
striking  and  unmistakable  marks  of  adaptation  to  be 
found  in  it.  It  would  be  an  easy  and  pleasing  task  to 
point  out  equally  numerous  and  convincing  proofs  of 
design  in  the  other  organs  of  the  human  body.  For  the 
sake  of  brevity,  however,  I  forbear ;  and  content  myself 
with  the  mere  mention  of  a  very  few. 

(i)  The  organ  of  hearing,  and  its  nice  adjustment  to^ 
the  sound  vibrations  of  different  media,  as  air  and  water. 

(2)  The  shape  of  the  teeth,  so  well  fitted  for  cutting, 
tearing,  and  grinding ;  their  order,  strength  of  base,  and 
method  of  insertion,  so  admirably  conformed  to  their 
respective  use ;  and  the  peculiar  enamel  which  so  com- 
pletely covers  and  protects  them. 

(3)  The  epiglottis — that  draw-bridge  of  the  trachea, 
which  automatically  shuts  and  opens  to  keep  out  the 
food  and  let  in  the  air. 

(4)  Those  curious  valves  of  the  veins,  which  led  Harvey 


\ 

I 


VOLITION-  IN  NATURE,  85 

to  his  famous  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood. 
In  the  veins  and  chyle-ducts  they  open  toward  the  heart, 
while  in  the  arteries  the  reverse  of  this  is  true. 

(5)  The  structure  of  the  heart ;  its  division  into  two 
large  apartments  and  subdivision  into  two  smaller  ones ; 
and  its  valves  and  concentric  muscles,  all  adapted  to  the 
delicate  and  vital  function  of  the  organ  as  a  whole. 

(6)  The  respiratory  apparatus,  joining  the  blood-bearing 
vessels  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  air-bearing  vessels  on  the 
other,  and  making,  in  each  pulmonary  cell,  the  necessary 
exchange  of  oxygen  and  carbon. 

(7)  The  organs  of  locomotion,  varying  greatly  to  meet 
the  diverse  necessities  of  walking,  flying,  creeping,  or 
swimming,  but  all  describing  arcs  of  progressive  motion 
by  some  parts  of  the  body. 

(8)  The  human  voice,  that  marvel  of  beauty,  variety, 
flexibility,  compass,  and  strength  ;  that  delicate  exponent 
of  thought,  emotion,  character,  and  purpose,  so  immeas- 
urably superior  to  all  other  instruments  of  sound. 

(9)  The  sexual  organs  developed  in  different  animals,  by  a 
plain  prevision  of  nature,  and  carefully  adjusted  to  the  ne- 
cessities of  reproduction  and  the  preservation  of  the  species. 

(10)  The  wonderful  and  admirable  harmony  of  the 
entire  organism.  The  adaptation  of  each  organ,  not  only 
to  its  own  individual  function,  but  to  all  the  other  parts, 
is  such  as  to  bind  all  into  one  definite  and  integral  unity 
of  organism  and  function.  No  part  is  wanting,  none  is 
superfluous.  The  whole  system  is  both  symmetrical  and 
useful — a  thing  of  incomparable  beauty  and  utility. 

The  adaptations  of  functions  are  certainly  both  numer- 
ous and  striking.  There  is  in  nature  another  distinct 
field  of  adaptations  scarcely  less  fruitful,  which  must  be 
hastily  surveyed. 


S6  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

(2)  Instincts. 

Instinctive  actions  differ  from  those  that  are  rational  in 
two  important  respects  ;  they  are  not  learned  by  experi- 
ence or  by  imitating  others ;  they  are  always  performed 
in  the  same  way,  without  choice,  change,  or  improvement, 
from  an  unthinking  impulse  rather  than  an  intelligent 
prevision  either  of  methods  or  of  results.  Eminent 
naturalists  tell  us  that  the  effects  of  instinct  '*  may  some- 
times be  modified  by  experience,  but  they  never  depend 
on  it." 

"  Hardly  are  all  the  parts  of  the  young  bee  dried, 
hardly  are  its  wings  in  a  state  to  be  moved,  when  it 
knows  all  it  will  have  to  do  during  the  rest  of  its  life."  It 
immediately  sets  out  in  search  of  honey-bearing  flowers, 
leaving  the  common  habitation,  loading  itself,  and  return- 
ing alone  without  guidance  or  experience.  It  invariably 
finds  its  way  back  home  again  with  the  same  unerring 
precision  from  the  first  trip  as  from  the  hundredth.  A 
young  child  may  stray  away  from  home  and  be  lost — 
a,  young  bee,  never.  More  than  this.  It  begins  its  work, 
not  from  the  impulse  of  its  own  necessities,  but  rather 
for  the  common  good.  Maraldi  states  that  he  has  seen 
bees  return  to  the  hive  loaded  with  two  large  balls  of  wax 
on  the  same  day  that  they  were  born.  He  also  says  that 
young  wasps  go  at  once  in  search  of  food,  which  they 
bring  back  and  divide  among  the  grubs. 

It  is  very  evident  that  these  acts  are  for  the  future 
good  of  the  individual  and  the  species,  and  that  they  are 
performed  spontaneously  from  innate  capacities,  and  not 
from  imitation,  calculation,  or  habit.  These  innate  capaci- 
ties are  received  from  nature,  and  show  a  high  degree  of 
art,  design,  purpose.  If  a  human  inventor  should  succeed 
in  making  a  machine  capable  of  performing  automatically 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE.  8/ 

the  ordinary  acts  of  the  humblest  insect,  his  name  and  fame 
would  be  immortalized.     Edison  would  quit  the  field. 

A  careful  analysis  and  description  of  the  various 
instincts  of  animals  would  be  appropriate  and  instructive 
at  this  point.  For  the  sake  of  brevity,  however,  I  con- 
tent myself  with  inserting  an  abridgement  of  the  sum- 
mary given  by  Janet.     It  is  somewhat  as  follows: 

(i)  Instincts  of  Individual  Preservation. 

(a)  Inclination  to  take  food  of  certain  kinds  and  in 
certain  amounts.  This  often  changes  instantaneously 
with  the  necessities  of  the  animal.  Certain  insects,  for 
instance,  are  carnivorous  in  their  larvae  state,  but  in  their 
after  development  become  herbivorous. 

{d)  Means  by  which  carnivorous  animals  obtain  their 
prey.  The  ant-eater  digs  a  funnel-shaped  hole  in  the 
sand  and  hides  his  trap  at  the  bottom.  The  spider  makes 
a  snare  of  his  web.  The  fish  throws  water  drops  on  the 
insects  he  intends  to  devour. 

(c)  The  well-known  instinct  of  accumulation  for  future 
need.  The  squirrel  lays  by  stares  of  nuts  for  winter,  and 
carefully  deposits  them  in  a  place  of  safety.  The  ant  is 
no  less  provident.  The  lagomys  pica,  of  Siberia,  cuts  and 
cures  hay,  and  stacks  it  away  in  mows  for  winter  use. 

{d)  Instincts  of  construction.  The  rabbit,  the  mole, 
and  the  beaver  furnish  notable  illustrations.  Some  spiders 
construct  their  habitation  by  digging  a  well  in  the  clay, 
plastering  it  up,  and  closing  the  entrance  by  a  door  hung 
on  veritable  hinges,  and  furnished  with  internal  fastenings. 
The  classical  illustration  of  this  instinct,  however,  is  found 
among  the  bees.  It  relates  to  the  structure  of  their  cells, 
and  involves  the  principles  of  the  higher  mathematics. 
The  problem  is,  to  construct  a  cell  with  such  a  basal  angle 

^^  OF  THB^, 


88  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

as  to  give  the  greatest  economy  of  space  with  the  least 
expense  of  work  and  material.  Every  mathematician 
will  recognize  this  at  once  as  the  famous  problem  of 
Maxima  and  Minima  in  Calculus.  Maclaurin  solved  it, 
measured  his  angle  and  found,  to  his  surprise,  that  the 
bees  had  been  there  before  him.  We  cannot  refrain  from 
enquiring,  "  Who  taught  the  bees  Calculus?" 

(2)  Instincts  for  the  Preservation  of  the  Species. 

{a)  Precautions  in  laying  eggs.  These  are  observed 
most  strikingly  in  animals  that  never  see  their  young,  and 
therefore  could  not  possibly  know  either  by  experience  or 
by  reason,  the  early  needs  of  their  offspring.  And  yet 
the  mother  provides  food  for  them,  and  that,  too,  often 
contrary  to  her  own  taste  and  need. 

The  necrophores,  for  example,  bury  the  body  of  a  mole 
and  deposit  eggs  therein,  so  that  the  young  may  find  at 
once  a  habitation  and  a  larder.  The  pompiles  live  on 
flowers ;  but  their  larvae  are  carnivorous ;  and  so  the 
mother  anticipates  their  wants,  by  depositing  her  eggs 
beside  the  bodies  of  spiders,  caterpillars,  etc. 

{b)  Nest  building.  The  saya,  or  bullfinch  of  India, 
makes  its  nest  bottle-shaped  and  suspends  it  invariably  to 
such  slender,  flexible  branches  that  apes  and  squirrels  can- 
not reach  it.  The  sylvia  sutoria,  or  tom-tit,  sews  leaves 
together  with  grass,  and  lines  the  nest  with  cotton.  The 
crested  grebe  incubates  on  a  miniature  raft,  constructed 
for  the  purpose.  If  danger  impends,  she  puts  her  feet 
out  for  oars,  and  paddles  her  floating  island  to  a  place  of 
safety. 

{c)  Park  building.  This  is  exhibited  by  the  species  of 
partridge  called  chlamyderes.  They  construct  a  grove 
some  four  feet    in   diameter,  beautifully   laid    out   with 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  89 

hedges,  trees,  shaded  promenades,  and  well  rounded  cause- 
ways. The  whole  park  is  then  ornamented  with  shining 
shells,  gaudy  feathers,  knives,  watches,  rings— any  thing, 
in  short,  that  these  aesthetic  birds  can  steal  within  their 
immediate  neighborhood.  The  newly-mated  couple  there- 
upon take  possession  for  the  season. 

(3)  Social  Ifistincts. 

{a)  Temporary  societies.  Such  are  the  hunting  expe- 
ditions of  hyenas  and  wolves,  the  migratory  companies  of 
swallows,  locusts,  and  herrings,  and  the  occasional  pleasure 
parties  of  some  animals  who  assemble  to  bathe  or  play  in 
some  favorite  stream.  In  all  these  cases,  the  company 
breaks  up,  after  the  special  purpose  of  the  gathering  has 
been  accomplished. 

{&)  Permanent  societies.  Among  these  may  be  men- 
tioned the  often  quoted  colonies  of  beavers,  bees,  ants, 
etc.  In  some  of  these  communities,  the  body-politic  is 
accurately  organized,  and  the  principles  of  political  and 
social  science  seem  to  be  strictly  observed. 

Now  all  these  instincts  (and  they  are  but  a  few  of  the 
many  cases  hitherto  observed  by  naturalists)  are  plain 
tokens  of  adaptation  or  design  in  nature.  Nobody  pre- 
tends for  a  moment  that  the  skill  and  forethought  dis- 
played in  them  are  evidences  of  prevision,  intelligence, 
and  reason  in  the  animals  themselves.  Their  source  is 
evidently  farther  back,  in  the  constitutions  of  the  animals. 
Instincts  are  implanted,  but  it  required  the  design  of 
some  marvellous  intelligence  to  construct  and  implant 
them.  Their  operations  are  results.  These  results  are 
eminently  rational  and  useful.  This  rationality  does  not 
reside  in  the  animals  that  perform  the  operations.  Na- 
ture is  therefore  responsible  for  it.     But  this  is  exactly 


go  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

what  is  meant  by  the  minor  premise  in  the  teleological 
syllogism. 

Thus  far,  the  proofs  of  this  proposition  have  been 
drawn  exclusively  from  animated  nature.  It  must  not  be 
supposed,  however,  that  no  proofs  exist  in  other  depart- 
ments of  nature.  They  do,  in  fact,  exist  everywhere. 
Chemistry  and  physics  are  full  of  them.  The  prevalence 
of  oxygen  and  its  affinities,  the  relation  of  heat  to  chem- 
ical changes,  the  relative  specific  gravity  of  certain  gases, 
the  constitution  and  the  qualities  of  atmospheric  air,  the 
functions  of  water  in  organic  and  inorganic  nature,  the 
laws  of  climatology,  the  action  of  the  tides,  and  the  suc- 
cession of  the  seasons — these  will  readily  occur  as  familiar 
examples.  But  I  must  not  dwell  upon  them  ;  and  indeed 
I  need  not.  The  proof  is  already  strong  enough.  It  is 
useless  to  introduce  further  testimony,  when  the  case  is 
already  abundantly  established.  Surely  enough  has  been 
said  to  show  that  rational  and  useful  results  produced  by 
the  concurrence  of  suitable  causes,  do  exist  in  nature. 
And  this  is  all  that  the  minor  premise  in  Teleology 
asserts. 

3.     THE    CONCLUSION. 

The  legitimate  conclusion  drawn  from  this  teleological 
syllogism  is,  that  volition  is  implied  in  nature.  This  has 
been  clearly  established.  Rational  and  useful  results  pro- 
duced by  the  concurrence  of  suitable  causes,  do  always 
and  everywhere  imply  volition.  Such  results  so  pro- 
duced do  exist  in  nature.  The  conclusion  therefore 
follows  by   necessity. 

But  much  more  than  this  has  been  incidentally  reached. 
We  have  found  that  the  adaptations  of  nature  are  general, 
widespread  and  far-reaching.  The  purpose,  the  volition 
which  exists  in  nature  must,  therefore,  be  equally  wide- 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE,  9I 

spread  and  general.  Indeed  there  is  good  reason  to  infer 
that  it  is  universal.  And  this  statement  is  not  in  the  least 
contradictory  of  that  made  heretofore  (page  61)  on  this 
subject.  Then  design  was  being  discussed  subjectively^  as 
a  principle  of  human  thought.  Now  we  are  consider- 
ing it  objectively,  as  an  existing  fact  in  nature.  Manifestly, 
it  may  be  universal  in  the  latter  sense  and  not  in  the 
former.  The  principle  of  design  is  one  thing,  the  law  of 
design  quite  another.  It  is  freely  admitted  that  there  are 
many  operations  of  nature  in  which  we  can  see  no  purpose 
whatever.  That  proves  that  the  idea  of  design  is  not 
intuitive.  But  it  by  no  means  proves  the  absence  of 
design  in  those  particular  operations  of  nature.  Mani- 
festly, it  may  be  there,  and  we  may  not  see  it.  The  mar- 
vellous revelations  of  modern  science  have  disclosed  to 
our  view  long  vistas  of  purpose  of  which  the  ancients 
were  ignorant.  And  they  will  doubtless  open  wider  and 
still  wider  views  of  purpose  to  future  generations.  Our 
posterity  may  some  time  be  able  to  establish  beyond  any 
peradventure  what  we  already  rationally  infer ;  namely, 
that  nature  is  but  one  vast  system  of  design  and  adapta- 
tion. 

Herein  may  be  noticed  a  striking  parallelism  between 
Eutaxiology  and  Teleology.  I  have  already  remarked  that 
the  former  is  a  growing  science,  that  it  advances  with  the 
discovery  of  truth  and  the  spread  of  knowledge  in  the 
world.  So  likewise  is  it  with  Teleology.  While  its  general 
argument  is  patent  and  free  to  all,  it  is  being  constantly 
reinforced  by  fresh  and  striking  illustrations  furnished  by 
every  advanced  step  in  the  discovery  of  natural  truth. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I  have  not  yet  arrived  at  the 
proof  of  Deity.  But  two  important  steps  toward  it  have 
been  taken.     I   have   shown   the  existence   in  nature  of 


92  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

wide-spread  intelligence  and  volitional  power.  These  are 
certainly  necessary  attributes  of  the  Deity.  Their  proof 
is  all  that  I  attempt  in  presenting  what  are  called  the  two 
design  arguments,  or  physico-teleology.  Other  elements 
there  are,  and  other  arguments  to  prove  them.  But  be- 
fore proceeding  to  prove  them,  a  little  time  must  be  taken 
to  notice  certain  serious  and  fundamental  objections 
which  have  been  urged  against  all  teleologic  arguments 
in  general. 

SECTION   III. 

OBJECTIONS. 

Teleology  has  been  the  battle-field  of  Theism  for  ages. 
Every  inch  of  ground  has  been  disputed,  every  step  of 
progress  contested,  and  every  conceivable  weapon  of  war- 
fare used  against  it.  Nor  is  the  battle  ended.  The 
enemy  is  still  in  sight.  An  occasional  shot  is  still  heard, 
and  a  hostile  theory  explodes  at  our  feet.  These  missiles 
are  altogether  harmless,  however  formidable  they  may 
seem.  To  be  assured  of  this  fact,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
examine  a  few  of  them  which  at  first  sight  may  appear 
most  dangerous.     They  are  such  only  in  appearance. 

I.       CHANCE    COMBINATIONS. 

One  of  the  alternatives  of  design  in  nature  is  chance. 
If  there  be  no  purpose  in  things,  they  must  have  happened 
as  they  are.  That  they  did  happen,  has  been  maintained 
by  many  philosophers,  both  ancient  and  modern.  Promi- 
nent among  them  may  be  mentioned  Aristotle,  Spinoza, 
and  Lucretius,  representing  the  Epicurean  philosophers  in 
his  treatise,  "  De  Rerum  Natura."  Briefly  stated,  their 
theory  runs  thus: 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  93 

**The  universe,  as  we  see  it,  is  the  outcome  of  the  for- 
tuitous concourse  of  primeval  atoms.  These  atoms,  being 
in  a  state  of  ceaseless  inter-motion,  would  perform  an 
endless  variety  of  chance-combinations.  These  combina- 
tions would  continue  in  ceaseless  round,  until  finally  all 
possible  combinations  would  have  been  exhausted.  This 
would  certainly  be  a  long  process  ;  but  then,  these  atoms 
have  had  all  eternity  to  experiment  in.  And  time  and 
chance  are  well  matched  ;  for  both  are  exhaustless.  Now 
the  present  orderly  combination  of  atoms,  out  of  which 
the  worlds  are  built,  is  manifestly  one  of  these  possible 
combinations,  for  its  actual  existence  proves  its  possibility. 
But,  having  once  fallen  into  these  orderly  forms,  they 
abide  there  by  reason  of  their  own  inherent  laws.  Hence 
we  have  an  explanation  of  the  orderly  results  and  seem- 
ing contrivances  of  nature,  without  any  postulate  of 
design  whatever." 

Now  this  chance  theory  breaks  down  at  several  points. 

(i)  It  presupposes  the  eternity  of  matter — a  very  vio- 
lent supposition. 

(2)  It  fails  to  account  for  the  initial  atomic  motion. 
Motion  requires  a  cause. 

(3)  It  gives  no  evidence  of  this  multiplicity  of  abortive 
attempts  after  the  Cosmos.  If  they  had  existed,  some 
trace  of  them  ought  to  be  discoverable. 

(4)  It  utterly  fails  to  account  for  those  inherent  atomic 
laws,  by  whose  marvellous  constructive  agency  it  is  claimed 
that  the  order  of  the  world  is  maintained. 

(5)  If  it  could  account  for  these  laws,  it  would  only  be 
to  show  a  manifest  case  of  design,  and  not  of  chance. 
For  these  atoms  are  evidently  adapted  to  the  present 
orderly  combination,  and  not  to  the  former  chaotic  ones. 

(6)  It  begs   the    question   altogether.     It   stupidly  as- 


94  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

sumes  that  the  present  orderly  combination  is  a  possible 
chance-combination^  which  is  the  very  thing  in  dispute. 
This  assumption  is  a  most  unpardonable  sin  against  the 
laws  of  logic.  '  The  mere  existence  of  the  world  does  not 
at  all  prove  its  fortuitous  origin.  Westminster  Abbey 
exists.  It  is  therefore  possible  ;  but  not  possible  without 
the  antecedent  plan  of  an  architect.  No  fortuitous  throw- 
ing of  stones  into  a  pile  could  ever  have  produced  it.  So 
is  the  order  of  the  universe  possible ;  but  not  without  an 
intelligent  Author. 

A  theory,  whose  only  explanation  of  things  needs  more 
explaining  than  the  things  themselves,  is  not  a  very  for- 
midable weapon  with  which  to  attack  the  citadel  of 
teleological  truth. 

2.       MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY. 

The  objection  to  Teleology  founded  on  the  principle  of 
mechanism,  is  somewhat  akin  to  the  former,  but  is  of  very 
much  later  origin. 

It  is  an  attempt  to  explain  the  universe  on  the  principle 
of  efficient  causes.  It  seeks  to  trace  every  thing  to  its 
physical  antecedents  and  rest  it  there.  Its  present  popu- 
larity is  doubtless  due,  in  large  measure,  to  this  intensely 
physical  aspect  in  which  it  holds  all  things. 

It  claims  that  this  universe  is  but  one  huge  stream  of 
causes  and  effects ;  that  each  follows  its  predecessor  by 
unvarying  law  and  of  necessity ;  that  in  such  a  system 
there  is  no  room  for  volition,  purpose,  or  adaptation  ;  and 
that  the  outflow  of  things  in  nature  is  consequently  the 
necessary  mechanism  of  law,  and  not  the  constructive 
design  of  intelligence. 

This  antagonism  between  the  physical  scientist  and  the 
Ideologist  results  largely  from  the  difference  of  stand- 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  95 

« 
point  from  which  they  view  things.  The  former  is  look- 
ing backward  and  calls  for  law ;  the  latter  is  looking 
forward  and  inquires  after  a  purpose.  One  sees  in  nature 
the  outcome  of  causes  pushed  forward  from  behind ;  the 
other,  the  execution  of  plans  led  forward  from  before. 
Now  both  these  views  of  nature,  when  taken  together  and 
unified,  are  correct.  But  either  taken  alone  is  misleading. 
Here,  as  everywhere,  a  half-truth  is  little  better  than  a  lie. 
And  so  the  mechanist,  seeing  but  one  side  of  the  truth, 
puts  forth  his  theory  as  essentially  opposed  to  Teleology, 
and  destructive  thereof.  Let  us  state  his  doctrine  fully 
and  fairly. 

The  apostle  of  mechanism  says  :  *'  What  all  philosophers 
desire,  is  an  explanation  of  phenomena.  This  must  be 
found  by  a  study  of  the  phenomena  themselves.  Study- 
ing the  facts  of  nature,  I  find  them  all  the  results  of 
physical  causes.  This  is  so  of  necessity ;  for  all  nature  is 
one  unbroken  7texus  of  causes  and  effects.  To-day  pro- 
ceeds from  yesterday ;  yesterday  from  the  day  before ; 
and  so  on  back  to  eternity.  Not  to  the  beginning,  for 
there  never  was  a  beginning.  Something  must  be  postu- 
lated as  always  existing.  I  find  that  eternal  something  in 
nature  and  natural  law.  Nature  changes  in  form,  it  is 
true,  but  not  in  force  or  essence.  It  is  a  revolving  chain 
whose  links  may  vary  in  length  and  depth,  but  not  in 
essential  strength.  Cut  this  cosmical  chain  in  the  far 
distant  nebular  period,  and  you  will  find  the  promise  and 
potency  of  all  things  as  they  now  exist.  How  they  came  to^ 
assume  such  orderly  forms  cannot  be  known.  But  the  calcu- 
lation of  chances  must  not  be  urged  against  it.  Chance  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  actual  and  the  necessary.  It  is 
only  over  the  future  and  the  contingent  that  she  has  any 
power.     But  the  stream  of  things  flows  in  its  necessary 


96  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

channel,  and  has  always  done  so.  There  is  no  other  pos- 
sible channel,  and  so  chance  has  nothing  to  say. 

"Moreover,  there  is  nothing  wonderful  in  this  particular 
•combination  of  elements  which  we  see  in  nature.  It  is  by 
no  means  the  best  possible  combination,  as  you  teleolo- 
gists  are  wont  to  declare.  Nature  is  very  imperfect  and 
intractable  after  all.  It  is  neither  the  worst  nor  the  best 
that  can  be  imagined ;  a  pretty  fair  average  only,  and 
needs  neither  chance  nor  design  to  explain  it." 

Against  this  ingenious  and  specious  statement  of  doc- 
trine, there  are  four  fatal  objections,  (i)  It  explains 
nothing.  (2)  It  contradicts  experience.  (3)  It  is  unscien- 
tific.    (4)  It  is  nugatory. 

(i)  //  Explains  Nothing. 

The  mechanical  theory  of  nature  depends  upon  four 
subsidiary  theories ;  the  nebular  hypothesis,  the  per- 
sistence of  force,  spontaneous  generation,  and  the  devel- 
opment of  animal  species.  It  can  explain  the  course  of 
things  only  by  establishing  these  theories.  But  neither 
of  them  has  yet  been  established.  Take  the  nebular 
hypothesis,  for  example. 

In  stating  this  famous  hypothesis,  a  reasonable  famil- 
iarity with  it  on  the  part  of  the  reader  must  be  assumed. 
In  its  elements  it  admits  of  very  simple  statement.  Given, 
the  space  now  occupied  by  the  solar  system,  filled  with 
homogeneous,  attenuated  nebulous  matter  of  any  form, 
with  an  initial  motion,  and  the  present  solar  system  is 
claimed  to  be  built  up,  as  a  necessary  result.  This  diffuse 
matter  contracted  upon  itself.  In  accordance  with  the 
astronomical  law  that  radii  vectores  always  describe  equal 
areas  in  equal  times,  it  began  to  revolve  more  rapidly  as 
<:ontraction  proceeded.     Finally  the  centrifugal  force  at 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE.  97 

the  equator  of  motion  became  so  great  as  to  throw  off 
rings  of  matter,  out  of  which  planets  were  successively 
formed,  with  their  revolutions,  rotary  motions,  and  satel- 
lites all  determined  and  preserved  by  immutable  laws  of 
celestial  mechanics.  In  like  manner  all  other  cosmical 
systems  are  formed. 

Now  this  theory  seems  beautifully  simple.  But  unfor- 
tunately it  fails  altogether  to  account  for  the  facts,  or 
even  to  agree  with  them. 

\st.  It  does  not  account  for  nebulous  matter. — The  atoms 
of  which  it  is  composed  are  endowed  with  gravitation, 
molecular  motions,  and  chemical  affinities.  These  are 
marvellously  potent  and  constructive  in  their  work.  Mech- 
anism allows  no  intelligence  in  them,  but  yet  they  are 
extremely  intelligent.  No  God  made  them.  That  postu- 
late is  unscientific  and  absurd.  And  yet  they  are  little 
gods  in  themselves,  with  capacities  vastly  beyond  human 
intelligence.  Is  there  more  absurdity  in  believing  in  one 
great  God  than  in  a  million  little  ones?  Teleology  cer- 
tainly has  the  advantage  over  mechanism  at  this  point. 

2d.  That  initial  motion  must  be  explaifted. — Who  started 
it,  and  when?  If  these  nebulous  atoms  were  once  for  a 
single  moment  in  all  past  eternity,  in  a  state  of  rest,  they 
Avould  have  remained  so  forever.  But  if  they  were  always 
in  motion,  the  possibility  of  an  initial  motion  is  excluded. 
What  then  becomes  of  those  immutable  laws  of  celestial 
mechanics?  Either  horn  of  this  dilemma  makes  uncom- 
fortable riding  for  the  mechanist. 

^d.  The  formation  of  concentric  rings  is  troublesome. — As 
the  mass  contracts,  the  atoms  are  brought  together,  and 
their  mutual  attractions  are  thereby  strengthened.  But 
the  same  cause  increases  the  centrifugal  force  by  increas- 
ing the  rate  of  rotation.     It  is  shown  mathematically  that 


98  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

a  contraction  of  one-half  must  increase  this  latter  force 
eight  times,  while  it  increases  the  former  only  four  times. 
No  matter,  therefore,  what  their  relative  strength  at  first 
might  have  been,  the  time  must  come  when  the  centri- 
fugal would  surpass  the  centripetal.  At  that  time  and 
ever  thereafter  matter  would  be  left  behind  at  the  equator 
of  motion,  and  would  form  an  equatorial  sheet,  and  not  a 
series  of  concentric  rings,  at  immense  distances  from  each 
other.  Prof.  Newcomb,  realizing  this  and  other  difficult 
ties,  says :  "  The  nebular  hypothesis  is  not  a  perfectly  es- 
tabHshed  scientific  theory,"  and  thinks  it  impossible  ''  to 
show  how  a  ring  of  vapor  surrounding  the  sun  could  con- 
dense into  a  single  planet  encircled  by  satellites." 

^th.  Orbital  periods  of  the  planets  are  equally  troublesome. 
— The  sun  rotates  in  twenty-five  days.  Apply  to  its  angular 
velocity  the  law  of  equal  areas  heretofore  mentioned,  cal- 
culate its  rotation  when  it  filled  the  earth's  orbit,  and  you 
get  over  2,2(X)  years.  This  ought  to  be  the  earth's  period 
of  revolution,  instead  of  one  year,  as  it  actually  is.  So  in 
the  case  of  Neptune.  Instead  of  165  years,  its  period 
ought  to  be  nearly  3,C)C)0,CXX)  years.  Here  are  fearful  dis- 
crepancies between  theory  and  fact.  These  unruly  planets 
are  most  recklessly  ahead  of  time.  They  must  certainly 
fly  the  track  and  wreck  the  whole  celestial  train.  Mars 
seems  to  understand  the  danger ;  for  he  is  busily  en- 
gaged putting  on  the  brakes.  He  has  actually  so  slacked 
his  motion  as  to  rotate  more  slowly  than  his  satellites  re- 
volve. PhoboSy  his  inner  moon,  revolves  in  eight  hours. 
Mars  ought  therefore  to  rotate  in  less  than  fifty  minutes. 
Instead  of  that  he  actually  rotates  in  about  twenty-five 
hours.  Here  is  an  immense  discrepancy  on  the  other  side 
of  the  ledger. 

The  satellites  of  Neptune  seem  to  have  left  the  nebular 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  99 

track  entirely.  For  they  actually  revolve  at  an  immense 
angle  and  in  the  opposite  direction  from  what  they  ought. 

Now  all  these  facts  thrown  directly  across  the  track  of 
the  nebular  hypothesis  are  suflficient — not  to  mention 
others — to  show  its  inability  to  dispense  with  intelligence 
and  design  in  the  formation  of  the  solar  system.  How 
then  can  it  be  expected  to  explain  the  formation  of  num- 
berless out-lying  cosmical  systems?  Whether  it  be  true 
or  not  is  no  question  for  the  teleologist.  Two  things  seem 
certain.  First,  it  is  not  established.  On  the  contrary,  it 
IS  falling  into  disfavor  with  mathematical  astronomers. 
The  hypothesis  of  fneteoric  agglomeratio7i  threatens  to  take 
its  place.  Second,  if  it  were  established,  it  can,  by  the 
nature  of  the  case,  do  nothing  whatever  toward  explain- 
ing the  universe. 

And  this  is  the  case  with  all  the  theories  on  which 
mechanism  depends.  They  are  equally  tentative  and 
opaque.     They  explain  nothing. 

(2)  Mechanism  Contradicts  Experience. 

It  does  this  in  two  ways. 

\st.  By  dejiyiyig  the  existeyice  of  human  purpose. — Man  is 
a  part  of  nature.  Mechanism  assumes  that  all  nature  is 
the  simple  unfolding  of  effects  from  physical  causes. 
That  includes  man,  with  his  so-called  mind  and  spirit. 
But,  if  there  is  no  purpose  in  nebulosity,  then,  according 
to  this  theory,  there  can  be  no  purpose  in  human  will, 
which  is  nothing  but  star-dust  in  another  form.  But  the 
existence  of  human  purpose  is  a  matter  of  daily  expe- 
rience with  every  man.  Mechanism  denies  it,  and  pulls 
itself  down  in  the  very  denial. 

2d.  By  ignoring  the  function  of  human  purpose. — Every 
such    purpose  is   executed   by  the    employment  of   sec- 


lOO  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

ondary  causes.  These  causes  are  necessary  to  it.  We 
very  well  know  that  we  employ  the  principle  of  physical 
causation  to  carry  out  our  purposes  every  day.  But 
mechanism  assumes  antagonism  between  this  principle 
and  that  of  design.  We  know  by  experience  that  no 
such  antagonism  exists. 

The  question  is  not  between  design  and  mechanism  in 
nature,  as  though  the  admission  of  the  one  excludes  the 
other.  That  alternative  may  stare  the  mechanist  in  the 
face ;  but  it  never  troubles  the  teleologist.  He  freely 
admits  mechanism  in  his  system.  He  has  steady  use  for 
it.  He  puts  it  to  work  executing  in  orderly  and  rational 
manner  the  designs  of  an  intelligent  Creator.  In  this 
light  all  the  facts  of  nature  become  luminous  indeed. 
Mechanism  exists,  to  be  sure.  So  does  intelligence.  One 
is  neither  a  substitute  for  the  other,  nor  an  enemy  of  it. 
It  is  simply  a  method  of  execution.  Human  intelligence 
carries  out  purposes  by  means  of  physical  causes  under 
natural  law.  So  does  Divine  intelligence.  All  is  per- 
fectly clear  and  consistent.  But  mechanism,  denying  this 
plain  principle,  ignores  the  function  of  human  purpose, 
contradicts  human  experience,  and  at  the  same  time 
plunges  itself  into  inextricable  difficulties. 

(3)  Mechanism  is  Unscientific. 

This  is  a  serious  charge.  If  it  came  the  other  way,  it 
might  not  seem  so  bad.  Mechanism  claims  to  be  the 
quintessence  of  science  itself,  and  is  quite  accustomed  to 
charge  Teleology  with  unscientific  methods.  He  who  sees 
in  nature  any  evidences  of  intelligent  design,  expects  to 
be  ornamented  with  such  complimentary  titles  as  "  bun- 
dle of  prejudices,"  "  relic  of  barbarism,"  "  exploded  super- 
naturalism,"  and  the  like.     But  this  charge  is  serious  in- 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  10 1 

deed,  if  established  against  mechanism.  It  is  as  if  one 
should  prove  a  clergyman  unclerical,  a  physician  unskil- 
ful, a  mathematician  unmathematical,  an  artist  inartistic. 
The  charge  can  be  established,  however.  Mechanism  is 
unscientific. 

\st.  By  contradictitig  experience.  —  All  science  claims 
to  be  based  on  experience.  What  has  been  experienced 
is  certain,  and  the  scientist  rejects  all  else  as  baseless 
theory.  But  he  must  not  contradict  experience,  and 
claim  to  be  scientific. 

2d.  By  transcending  all  experience. — It  basely  attempts 
to  pit  the  atomic  theory  as  a  fact  against  Theism  as 
a  theory.  The  ability  to  do  this  requires  either  great 
obtuseness  of  head  or  great  perversity  of  heart.  To  say 
the  very  least  of  it,  the  existence  of  an  atom  is  not  a  whit 
more  scientifically  certain  than  the  existence  of  a  God. 
The  whole  fabric  rests  on  pure  speculation. 

3^.  By  assuming  that  yiothiyig  exists  but  atoms. — Their 
own  existence  is  mere  assumption.  When  they  propose 
to  monopolize  all  possible  reality,  it  becomes  downright 
effrontery,  which  no  science  can  tolerate. 

^h.  By  necessitating  a  hiatus  betweefi  man  and  na- 
ture^ and  makifig  all  scie?ice  itnpossible.  —  We  study 
animals  by  means  of  their  sensitiveness,  instinct,  and 
intelligence.  These  things  we  learn  only  from  their 
respective  actions.  But  mechanism  steps  in  and  says 
these  actions  are  merely  automatic,  the  result  of  organ- 
ism and  unconscious  neural  tremors.  They  seem  as 
if  intelligent  and  responsive,  but  in  truth  they  are  not. 
All  is  pure  physical  automatism.  The  same  argument 
holds  even  as  regards  our  fellow  men.  For  really  we 
know  nothing  of  them  except  from  certain  actions  and 
appearances.     So  it  turns  out,  according  to  mechanism,. 


I02  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

that  these  extensive  classifications  of  men  and  animals  we 
have  been  making  are  huge  delusions.  And  so  of  all 
so-called  science  and  knowledge.  The  assumptions  of 
mechanism,  carried  to  their  logical  result,  undermine 
scientific  principles  completely,  and  render  all  science 
impossible. 

(4)  Mechanism  is  Nugatory. 

It  avails  nothing.  Resting  solely  upon  physical  causa- 
tion, it  demands  the  eternity  of  matter  and  the  persistence 
of  force.  This  eternity  of  matter  and  energy  includes 
every  thing  now  in  existence,  or  that  ever  will  exist. 
Energy  may  be  kinetic  or  potential,  but  the  only  possible 
change  is  in  form  and  combination.  Moreover,  these 
changes  are  but  the  necessary  and  inviolable  results  of 
inherent  properties  of  matter,  existing  and  working  in  it 
from  all  eternity. 

They  are  as  they  are,  because  they  must  be.  Mechan- 
ism started  out  to  explain  and  justify  phenomena.  She 
closes  up  with  the  astounding  and  luminous  assertion 
that  they  necessarily  are.  That  is  like  explaining  a  rain- 
storm, by  saying  it  rains.  It  is  mere  stultification.  At 
the  best,  it  is  but  an  unmeaning  truism.  Mechanism  sets 
out  to  solve  a  problem,  and  leaves  it  ten-fold  darker  than 
before.  How  striking  the  contrast  between  this  phenom- 
enal darkness  and  the  clear  light  of  design  in  the  teleo- 
logical  argument.  The  eternity  of  matter  must  be  as- 
sumed in  order  to  make  the  truth  of  mechanism  possible. 
But  this  assumption  is  itself  impossible.  Material 
phenomena  are  cyclical,  not  eternal.  Cosmical  forces 
are  in  a  condition  of  unrest.  They  constantly  tend  to 
equilibration.  When  equilibrated  they  will  cease  to  act. 
The  existing  order  of  things  cannot  be  eternal.  It  had  a 
beginning  and  must  have  an  end.     The  cosmos  has  its 


VOLITION  IN  NA  TURE.  IO3 

own  cycle,  beyond  which  it  cannot  go.  All  physical 
science  teaches  this  truth.  The  hypothesis  that  matter  is 
doomed  to  an  eternal  alternation  of  chaotic  and  cosmic 
cycles  is  highly  imaginative,  immensely  improbable,  and 
unsupported  by  even  a  shadow  of  truth.  Moreover,  it 
has  against  it  the  fact  that  eternity  and  mutability  are 
contradictory  ideas.  Matter  as  known  by  its  phenomena 
— and  it  cannot  be  otherwise  known — is  essentially 
mutable.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  eternal.  The  material 
universe  must,  then,  depend  for  its  origin  upon  an  un- 
caused Cause  which  is  immaterial,  immutable,  and  eternal. 
But  this  hypothesis  leaves  no  room  for  mechanism. 

3.    IMMANENT    DESIGN. 

This  objection  lies  not  against  design  itself,  whose  ex- 
istence it  plainly  implies,  but  rather  against  intelligence 
in  design.     It  runs  thus: 

"  In  nature  the  efficient  cause  reaches  its  end  without 
ever  going  out  of  itself.  But  in  the  works  of  man  the 
very  contrary  of  this  is  true.  The  end  is  realized  in  one 
object,  while  the  efficient  cause  resides  in  a  distinct  and 
separate  object.  Nature  works  from  within,  and  appar- 
ently without  intelligent  purpose.  Man  works  from  with- 
out and  evidently  with  purpose.  The  forces  of  nature 
act  after  the  manner  of  instinct  rather  than  of  intelligence. 
Hence  the  analogy  between  frhe  works  of  man  and  of 
nature  will  not  hold.  At  the  utmost,  the  latter  can  show 
nothing  more  than  a  sort  of  blind  intelligence." 

Hegel,  who  emphasizes  this  doctrine,  insists  that  we 
need  not  conceive  the  final  cause  in  nature  as  having 
consciousness,  and  realizing  its  ends  as  a  result  of  choice, 
foresight,  and  voluntary  activity. 

In  replying  to  this  statemant,  it  is  freely  admitted  that 


I04  CHRISTIAN  THEISM, 

the  forces  of  nature  act  blindly.  No  one  supposes  for  a 
moment  that  gravitation  knows  what  it  is  doing ;  that 
oxygen  seeks  carbon  with  the  express  purpose  of  forming 
a  certain  chemical  compound  ;  that  crystals  of  snow  take 
their  places  as  the  result  of  a  personal  mathematical  calcu- 
lation, or  that  lightning  strikes  a  building  with  the  malevo- 
lent design  of  destroying  human  life.  These  forces  are 
undoubtedly  blind,  incapable  of  foreseeing  an  end,  or 
choosing  means  appropriate  thereto.  But  for  that  very 
reason  we  are  obliged  to  postulate  a  conscious  and  fore- 
seeing wisdom  of  which  they  are  the  mere  instruments. 
To  say  they  have  a  blind  intelligence  in  them  will  not  do. 
It  is  an  absolute  contradiction  in  terms.  It  is  using 
words  without  thought.  The  fact  is,  the  intelligence 
resides  not  in  these  forces  at  all,  but  in  the  intelligent 
Author  of  nature  back  of  them. 

We  are  forced  to  trace  it  thither.  Whenever  we  see 
a  purpose  realized,  we  attribute  it  to  intelligence,  no 
matter  whether  the  agency  of  its  execution  acts  from 
within  or  from  without. 

The  execution  of  a  purpose  as  seen  in  the  movements 
of  a  steam-engine,  implies  intelligence,  whether  that  in- 
telligence resides  in  the  iron  or  the  coal  or  the  water  or 
the  steam,  or  in  all  or  neither  of  these  combined.  If  I 
accomplish  a  purpose  with  this  valuable  machine,  it  is  no 
more  and  no  less  an  intelligent  purpose  than  if  I  had  per- 
formed it  with  my  own  hands. 

Thus  it  is  with  purposes  in  nature.  They  imply  intel- 
ligent volition.  Their  source  is  immanent  in  nature,  but 
it  is  not  therefore  identical  with  nature.  And  so  their 
immanence  has  no  bearing  whatever  upon  the  question  of 
their  intelligence. 

But  we  must  not  go  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  this 


# 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE.  105 

"  blind  immanence  "  theory,  and  say  that  "  marks  of  design 
are  marks  of  incessant  intervention  of  the  first  cause." 

Intelligent  design  does  not  imply  intervention.  Arr 
astronomical  clock  is  a  thing  of  design,  and  yet  the  de- 
signer need  not  be  constantly  tinkering  with  it.  An 
incendiary  puts  the  torch  to  an  inflammable  building, 
on  a  windy  night,  and  burns  up  half  a  city ;  and  yet  he 
need  not  be  incessantly  stirring  up  the  fires  in  order  to 
accomplish  his  fiendish  purpose.  A  benevolent  citizen 
gives  a  million  dollars  for  the  establishment  and  suste- 
nance of  a  university,  and  when  he  is  laid  away  to  rest, 
multitudes  of  ambitious  youth  receive  the  benefits  of  his 
noble  design,  and  that  without  any  intervention  from  him 
whatever.  Design  does  not  necessitate  interference  at 
all.  And  so  Teleology  is  not  in  the  least  concerned  about 
the  question  of  the  Divine  interference  in  the  course  of 
nature.  There  may  be  other  and  cogent  reasons  for  be- 
lieving in  these  interventions  of  Deity,  but  the  principle 
of  design  does  not  call  for  them,  and  this  is  not  the  place 
to  vindicate  them. 

4.    ABUSE    OF    TELEOLOGY. 

Objections  heretofore  mentioned  come  from  the  ene- 
mies of  design.  This  one  is  attributable  to  its  friends. 
It  arises  in  general  from  the  vain  attempt  to  find  design 
in  every  thing.  This  leads  men  to  think  they  see  design 
where  none  exists  ;  or,  what  is  equally  fallacious,  they 
attribute  a  false  design  instead  of  the  true  one.  This> 
tendency  brings  on  another  error,  namely,  the  explana- 
tion of  things  by  sole  reference  to  their  design,  to  the 
exclusion  of  their  efficient  causes.  This  is  extremely  un- 
philosophical,  and  yet  it  must  be  admitted  that  teieo- 
logists  have  done  it  time  and  again. 


J06  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

Now,  we  must  be  consistent.  We  have  justly  con- 
demned the  mechanist  for  excluding  design  in  favor  of 
mechanism  ;  we  must,  with  like  vigor,  condemn  our 
friends  if  they  exclude  causation  in  favor  of  design.  It 
is  doubtless  absurd  also  to  suppose  that  the  letters  of  the 
alphabet  came  together  by  chance^  and  formed  the  "  Iliad  " 
or  ''  Paradise  Lost."  But  these  ante-theistic  follies  will 
nevertheless  justify  the  teleologist  in  going  to  the  opposite 
-extreme  of  folly.  What  this  extreme  is  will  be  best  illus- 
trated by  inserting  a  few  well-known  historical  examples. 

Euler  opposed  lightning-rods  on  the  ground  that  light- 
ning is  intended  as  a  Divine  punishment  for  our  sins, 
which  it  would  be  impious  in  us  to  attempt  to  escape. 

When  Jenner  made  his  great  discovery  of  the  principle 
of  vaccination,  Dr.  Rowley,  a  pious  English  physician, 
declared  it  to  be  *'  an  audacious  and  sacrilegious  violation 
of  our  holy  religion.  These  vaccinators  appear  to  defy 
Heaven  itself  and  the  very  will  of  God." 

When  winnowing  machines  were  introduced  into  Scot- 
land, certain  pious  people  opposed  them  and  stigmatized 
their  product  as  the  devil's  wind,  because  they  sacrile- 
giously usurped  the  work  of  Deity,  whose  prerogative 
alone  it  is  to  raise  the  wind. 

F^nelon  insists  that  the  moon  is  made  to  give  light  in 
the  absence  of  the  sun,  in  which  case  Providence  seems 
to  have  partially  failed  in  his  beneficent  design  by  reason 
of  his  ignorance  of  the  higher  mathematics. 

Bernardin  de  Saint-Pierre  delivers  himself  thus : 
"  Wherever  fleas  are,  they  jump  on  white  colors.  This 
instinct  has  been  given  them  that  we  may  the  more  easily 
catch  them.  The  melon  has  been  divided  into  sections 
by  nature,  for  family  eating ;  the  pumpkin,  being  larger, 
can  be  eaten  with  one's  neighbors." 


VOLITION  IN  NATURE,  lO/ 

Buckland  confronts  the  problem  of  the  wolf's  devouring 
the  lamb,  and  solves  it  thus  :  *'  We  have  here  a  proof  of 
the  goodness  of  Providence,  for  thereby  it  escapes  sick- 
ness and  old  age." 

In  view  of  such  puerilities,  it  is  no  wonder  that  Vol- 
taire sarcastically  adds  :  **  Noses  are  made  to  bear  specta- 
cles ;  let  us  therefore  wear  spectacles."  These  citations, 
along  with  others,  are  given  by  M.  Janet  to  illustrate  the 
abuse  of  Teleology.  They  are  amusing  in  the  extreme, 
but  when  put  forth  in  solemn  earnest  in  works  on  Tele- 
ology they  strike  us  as  sacrilegious  apologies  for  Provi- 
dence. Janet  well  says  that  they  make  more  atheists 
than  believers. 

Let  it  be  remembered,  however,  that  Teleology  is  not 
responsible  for  these  absurdities.  Its  argument  does  not 
imply  them,  its  method  does  not  employ  them,  its  conclu- 
sion does  not  involve  them. 

Because  design  does  not  exist  in  every  case,  is  no  reason 
why  it  may  not  exist  in  any  case.  The  fact  that  men  in 
their  ignorant  haste,  have  made  serious  or  ludicrous  blun- 
ders in  tracing  or  identifying  certain  designs,  raises  no 
argument,  nor  even  a  presumption  against  the  principle 
of  design  itself.  It  simply  shows  its  liability  to  abuse. 
But  what  good  and  true  principle  is  there,  that  is  not  so 
liable  ? 

Be  it  further  remembered  that  the  teleologist  is  under 
no  obligation  to  prove  the  universality  of  design  in  nature. 
On  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  God,  and  that  he  has 
made  the  universe,  man  ought  not  to  be  expected  to 
grasp  all  the  designs  of  the  Infinite  intelligence,  in  his 
constructive  work.  If  he  could,  his  ability  to  do  so  would 
form  a  strong  presumption  against  the  infinity  of  God.  It 
is  clear,  therefore,  that  his  inability  to  do  so  cannot  make 


I08  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

in  the  least  against  the  hypothesis  of  a  Deity.  Neither 
can  it  raise  an  argument  against  design.  On  the  contrary, 
it  harmonizes  perfectly  with  the  principle  of  teleology. 

There  is  no  argument  against  design  that  can  bear  the 
test  of  logical  scrutiny.  Teleology,  as  an  argument  for 
volition  in  nature,  repulses  every  foe,  of  ancient  or  modern 
attack,  and  placidly  holds  the  field. 

REFERENCES. 

Ueberweg's  "  History  of  Philosophy." 
Janet's  "  Final  Causes." 
Bascom's  "  Natural  Theology." 
Bowne's  "  Studies  in  Theism." 
Newcomb's  "  Popular  Astronomy." 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD;  OR,  THE  INTUI- 
TIONAL  ARGUMENT. 

SECTION  I. 

NATURE  OF  THE  ARGUMENT. 

THE  arguments  hitherto  employed,  have  been  induc- 
tive and  syllogistic.  By  means  of  them,  we  have 
proved  the  existence  in  the  universe  of  a  widespread  in- 
telligence and  volition.  The  next  step  in  the  logic  of 
Theism,  is  to  prove  a  corresponding  personality  in  the  uni- 
verse. It  must  be  shown  that  this  intelligence  and  this 
volition  belong  to  a  person,  an  integral  being.  For  this 
purpose,  an  entirely  different  kind  of  argument  will  be 
used.  The  personality  of  God  comes  to  us  by  intuition, 
and  not  by  the  inductive  process  heretofore  employed  in 
this  work.  No  one  need  be  surprised  at  this  change 
of  method.  It  is  just  what  might  be  expected,  and  is  in 
full  accordance  with  the  principle  of  Theistic  proof,  as 
heretofore  laid  down  (page  26). 

It  will  be  well  to  preface  this  intuitional  argument  with 
a  brief  reference  to  the  essential  nature  of  intuition  as  a 
power  of  the  human  mind.  Clearness  and  force  will 
thereby  be  gained.  The  best  thinkers  on  this  subject 
have  recognized  certain  general  principles  and  definitions 
which  may  be  epitomized  as  follows  : 

109 


no  CHRISTIAN   THEISM,. 

I.    DEFINITIONS. 

(i)  Intuition  is  used  in  three  senses,  to  designate  a  men- 
tal  power,  a  mental  act,  or  a  mental  product. 

(2)  As  a  power  it  is  innate,  as  an  act,  it  is  immediate,  as 
a  product  it  is  primitive  and  self-evident  knowledge. 

(3)  As  power,  act,  or  product,  intuition  is  distinguished 
as  presentative,  and  rational. 

(4)  Presentative  intuition  is  of  two  kinds,  external  and 
internal. 

(5)  External  presentative  intuition,  or  sense-perception  is 
that  intuitive  knowledge  of  material  objects  which  is  gained 
by  the  senses. 

(6)  Internal  presentative  intuition,  or  self-consciousnesSy 
is  the  mind's  intuitive  knowledge  of  itself  and  of  its  own 
states  and  operations. 

(7)  Rational  intuition  is  the  direct,  self-evident  knowU 
edge  of  a  necessary  truth  or  principle. 

(8)  That  necessary  truth  may  be  subjective  or  objec- 
tive ;  it  may  be  an  intuition  of  knowledge  or  an  intuition 
of  being. 

(9)  Intuition  as  a  product,  is  knowledge.  It  is  primary 
and  immediate  ;  but  it  is  knowledge,  no  less  than  are  sec- 
ondary and  mediate  kinds  of  knowledge. 

(10)  Rational  intuition  is  more  important  in  our  philos- 
ophy than  presentative  intuition.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  knowledge  gained  by  perception  and  con- 
sciousness, is  immediate  and  self-evident  knowledge  ;  and 
that,  therefore,  any  objections  raised  against  rational 
intuition,  on  such  grounds,  must  be  of  equal  force  against 
perception  and  consciousness. 

(11)  Presentative  intuition  deals  with  individual  objects 
and  gives  material  for  thought ;  while  rational  intuition 
deals  with  general  principles  and  regulates  thought.    They 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD,  III 

are  counterparts  of  each  other ;  and  both  are  necessary  to 
the  best  products  of  each. 

2.    NEGATIVE    PROPOSITIONS. 

To  understand  the  better  what  intuition  is,  it  will  be 
useful  to  consider  what  it  is  not ;  first  to  distinguish  it 
carefully  from  other  acts  and  products  that  are  liable  to 
be  confounded  with  it,  and  then  to  state  its  positive  ele- 
ments. Dr.  McCosh  employs  this  method,  with  results 
substantially  as  follows : 

(i)  Rational  Intuition  is  not  Innate  Image-making  or  Repre- 
sentation. 

What  a  man  has  seen,  he  can  picture  to  his  memory 
afterwards.  Products  of  other  senses  may,  with  greater 
or  less  vividness,  be  recalled  in  like  manner.  New  images, 
in  endless  variety  of  forms,  may  be  constructed  by  the 
imagination.  There  exists  in  the  mind  multitudes  of 
elements  ready  for  facile  use  by  this  plastic  and  fanciful 
power.  But  these  elements  are  all  products  of  experience. 
Rational  intuition  creates  no  mental  images. 

(2)  Intuition  Furnishes  no  Innate  Concepts. 
Concepts  are  not  innate.  They  are  derived.  Of  course, 
they  cannot  be  pictured.  I  can  picture  a  rose,  a  lily — a 
hundred  lilies — but  I  cannot  picture  a  general  notion  of 
a  rose  or  lily.  That  general  notion  can  be  formed  in  the 
mind,  to  be  sure ;  but  it  must  be  formed  by  a  process, 
from  materials  of  experience.  The  mind  is  not  furnished 
with  original  concepts.  The  newly  born  infant,  for  ex- 
ample, knows  nothing,  in  their  abstract  forms  at  least,  of 
such  ideas  as  personal  identity,  time,  space,  cause  and 
effect,  infinity,  and  the  like.  Neither  has  it  the  concepts 
of  the  simplest  objects  in  time  and  space. 


112  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

(3)  Intuition  does  not  Impose  upon  Objects  any  a  Priori  Mental 

Forms. 

This  statement  will  be  recognized  at  once  as  antagonistic 
to  the  doctrine  made  famous  by  Kant  in  his  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason^  and  somewhat  extensively  adopted  by  philoso- 
phers since  then. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enlarge  upon  that  doctrine.  It 
is  sufficient  for  the  present,  to  remark  that  any  declaration 
to  the  effect  that  the  mind  in  the  act  of  cognition  gives 
to  the  object  cognized  what  is  not  in  that  object  already, 
is  to  be  condemned  as  unnatural,  unwarrantable,  and 
dangerous  doctrine.  Forms  of  sense,  categories  of  under- 
standing, and  ideas  of  pure  reason  may  be  admitted  as 
necessary  to  knowledge. 

Whether  the  manifold  of  sense  is  united  into  knowledge 
in  the  way  Kant  declares,  may  be  a  question.  But  one 
thing  is  certain.  Intuitive  powers  do  not  impose  forms  on 
things.  They  simply  act  as  instruments  by  which  we  may 
•discover  what  is  in  those  things.  They  cognize,  but  do 
not  create. 

•(4)  Rational  Intuitions  are  not  Always  Formally  Recognized  as 
laws  of  Mental  Activity. 

They  do  indeed  constitute  the  fundamental  regulative 
principles  under  which  the  faculties  of  the  mind  act.  Of 
individual  mental  acts,  so  regulated,  we  are  directly  con- 
scious. But  we  need  not  always  construe  to  conscious- 
ness the  principles  underlying  these  acts.  Our  conscious- 
ness of  memory,  judgment,  imagination,  or  any  other 
original  faculty  of  mind,  comes  through  the  acts  it  per- 
forms. So  it  is  with  the  original  principles  of  intuition. 
Take  the  principle  of  cause  and  effect,  for  example. 
When  we  see  a  peculiar  and  unexpected  effect,  we  know 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  113 

it  had  a  cause,  and  seek  to  identify  it.  But  the  general 
principle  of  causation  may  never  enter  our  minds,  although 
the  search  be  ever  so  earnest  and  protracted.  We  tacitly 
recognize  it  by  working  under  it. 

3.    POSITIVE    PROPOSITIONS. 

( I )  Intuitive  Principles  do  Exist  in  the  Mind. 

This  statement  cannot  be  elaborated  here.  It  means, 
however,  that  the  mind  must  have  in  it  some  native  ele- 
ments to  start  with ;  that  these  elements  must  have  laws 
and  properties ;  that  the  mind  can  form  original  percep- 
tions, and  discover  necessary  and  universal  truth  ;  that  all 
experience  would  be  impossible  without  native  laws  and 
principles ;  and  that  the  data  of  reason  itself  are  not  pro- 
ducts of  reasoning,  but  are  principles  which  must  be  as- 
sumed as  intuitively  evident,  without  any  process  of  proof. 

(2)  Intuitions  are  Immediate. 

They  come  to  us  at  once,  and  not  as  the  result  of  a  men- 
tal process.  They  may,  in  a  certain  sense,  depend  upon 
such  a  process.  But  it  forms  only  the  occasion  of  the  in- 
tuition, not  its  method  or  essence.  Sense-perception  may 
be  taken  to  illustrate  this  relation.  I  see  a  book,  and  per- 
ceive at  once  that  it  occupies  space.  I  see  a  brutal 
wretch  pitch  upon  a  cripple  and  demolish  him.  I  con- 
demn the  act,  say  it  is  wrong,  and  will  see  it  adequately 
punished,  if  possible.  Now,  the  space  relation,  and  the  in- 
iquity, in  these  respective  cases,  are  not  products  of  sense- 
perception  at  all.  It  gives  their  occasion,  but  not  their 
cause.  Neither  are  they  products  of  reason.  They  arise 
spontaneously,  necessarily,  and  immediately,  without  the 
intervention  of  any  process   whatever.     So  of  all  intui- 


114  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

tions.     They  are  direct  acts  of  the  mind,  and  not  me- 
diate processes. 

(3)  Intuitions  Depend  upon  Objects, 

The  very  nature  of  intuition  presupposes  objects.  By 
this  power  we  discover  immediately  some  quality  or 
some  relation  of  an  object.  Were  there  no  objects, 
there  could  be  no  qualities  or  relations  to  discover.  In 
the  utter  mental  absence. of  an  object,  the  intuitive  per- 
ception concerning  it  becomes  meaningless.  Of  course, 
an  object  of  sense-perception  may  be  absent,  and  even 
destroyed  ;  but  memory  must  furnish  a  mental  transcript 
of  it  for  the  service  of  intuition.  Intuition,  as  the  term 
implies,  is  a  looking  into  ;  and  without  any  thing  to 
look  into,  is  quite  as  absurd  as  vision  without  any  thing 
to  see. 

(4)  Intuitions  are  Primarily  Directed  to  Individual  Objects. 

I  first  contemplate  a  certain  body  as  occupying  space, 
and  afterward  arrive  at  the  idea  of  space  in  general. 
I  observe  a  given  event  as  taking  place  in  time,  and 
pass  from  that  to  the  idea  of  time  in  general.  Cer- 
tain actions  strike  me  as  being  good,  and  certain  others  as 
not  being  good  ;  and  thereupon  the  abstract  idea  of 
moral  goodness  arises  in  my  mind.  So  it  is  in  the  history 
of  every  child.  His  first  intuitions  pertain  to  objects  of 
individual  experience. 

(5)  Rational  Intuitions  are  Involuntary. 

They  do  not  depend  upon  the  action  of  the  will. 
Like  respiration,  digestion,  and  circulation  in  the  physi- 
cal economy,  they  go  on  without  any  voluntary  deter- 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  II5 

mination  whatever.  They  fill  every  moment  of  our 
conscious  existence,  whether  we  take  notice  of  them 
or  not.  They  are  simple  laws  of  mental  activity,  en- 
acted in  the  mind,  but  not  by  the  mind.  By  acts  of 
volition  we  may  study  them,  examine  their  character, 
and  trace  their  results,  just  as  we  proceed  in  other 
cases  by  the  method  of  induction.  But  we  can  neither 
command  their  exercise  nor  forbid  it.  We  cannot  go 
to  work  purposely  to  establish  an  intuition,  as  we  do  an 
argument  or  mediate  judgment.  Neither  can  we  shut 
off  its  light,  as  we  can  that  of  the  sun,  by  simply  closing 
the  eyes. 

(6)  Criteria  of  Intuitions. 

There  are  certain  marks  or  tests  by  which  intuitive 
truths  may  be  invariably  known.  These  are  three  in 
number.  1st,  Self-evidence.  2d,  Originality  or  Neces- 
sity.    3d,  Universality. 

Self-evident  truth  is  such  as  carries  its  own  conviction, 
and  cannot  be  proved  by  any  process  whatever.  It  needs 
no  proof  and  admits  none.  Necessary  truth  is  such  as 
must  be  believed.  It  cannot  be  doubted.  Its  denial 
leads  to  self-contradiction  or  absurdity. 

Universal  truth  is  that  which  is  believed  by  all  men 
everywhere  in  their  normal  state.  It  may  not  be  clearly 
recognized  by  the  infant  or  the  savage,  but  that  fact  makes 
nothing  against  its  originality  or  its  universality.  The 
oak  must  not  be  judged  by  the  acorn. 

These,  then,  are  the  certain  marks  of  intuition.  Any 
truth  possessing  them  must  be  intuitional.  It  cannot  be 
analyzed,  derived,  or  arrived  at  in  any  other  way. 

I  shall  hope  to  show  in  the  following  section  that  per- 
sonality in  God  and  in  man  is  such  a  truth. 


Il6  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

SECTION  II. 
PERSONALITY  OF  GOD  AND  OF  MAN. 

Christian  Theism  insists  that  God  is  a  person.  He  is 
not  merely  a  Cause  or  even  a  Power ;  he  is  a  Personal 
Being.  He  has  power,  he  originates  causes,  but  these  are 
his  attributes  and  acts,  not  himself. 

Now  this  doctrine  of  Theism  agrees  perfectly  with 
rational  intuition.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  absolute  personal 
being  comes  to  us  invariably  in  that  way.  Rational  in^ 
tuition  does  not  give  the  knowledge  of  individual  reali- 
ties, but  it  does  give  the  necessary  relations  and  general 
principles  under  which  those  realities  exist.  It  does  not 
give  the  idea  of  being,  for  that  is  included  in  self-con- 
sciousness, but  it  does  assure  us  that  absolute,  uncaused 
being  must  exist.  It  does  not  give  us  our  own  person- 
ality, for  that  likewise  is  involved  in  self-consciousness, 
but  it  does  give  us  that  absolute  personality  which  is  the 
necessary  source  of  our  own. 

True,  we  can  form  no  exhaustive  conception  of  the 
personality  of  God,  but  an  image  of  it  can  be  recognized 
in  human  personality.  This  image  falls  short  of  adequacy 
because  it  is  subject  to  limitations.  And  yet,  though  it 
be  finite  intelligence,  it  helps  us  to  understand  that  which 
is  not  finite.  There  is  a  sort  of  parallelism  which  is  sug- 
gestive and  useful. 

I.    ELEMENTS   IN   COMMON. 

The  personality  of  God  and  of  man  have  some  ele- 
ments in  common.  Religious  history,  the  world  over, 
attests  the  truth  of  this  statement.  Beliefs  in  these  two 
personalities  have  always  gone  hand  in  hand.  It  seems 
impossible   that   one   should    stand  or  fall  without  the 


THE   PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  II7 

Other.  Wherever  one  is  weak  or  indistinct,  the  other  is 
correspondingly  so.  Take  the  Eastern  systems  of  pan- 
theistic belief,  for  example.  The  Brahmin  believes  in 
300,000,000  gods.  The  Divine  personality  is  badly  used 
used  up  in  such  a  crowd.  But  this  same  Brahmin  has  a 
very  weak  hold  on  his  own  personality.  This  is  evident 
from  his  easy  belief  in  the  doctrines  of  transmigration 
and  final  absorption  in  Nirvana.  He  sluggishly  contem- 
plates his  own  soul  as  an  evanescent  bubble  on  the  ocean 
of  infinite  being,  destined  to  burst  in  a  moment,  and  disap- 
pear forever. 

A  more  recent  illustration  of  the  same  tendency  is 
furnished  by  atheistic  and  deistic  philosophers  of  modern 
times.  Those  who  postulate  uncreated  matter,  Eternal 
Energy  of  the  Unknowable,  instead  of  a  Personal  God, 
do  thereby  invariably  impair  the  personality  of  man. 
Atheism  and  Pantheism  sweep  different  arcs  of  the  circle, 
but  they  meet  at  last  at  the  same  point  of  blank  imper- 
sonality. If  God  is  not  a  personal  spirit,  neither  is  man 
a  personal  spirit.  And  if  man  is  not  a  personal  spirit,  we 
have  no  sufficient  evidence  that  God  is  such.  Huxley 
may  properly  view  individual  life  as  the  mere  display  of 
the  necessary  properties  of  organic  matter,  and  Harrison 
may  go  on  worshipping  the  **  Great  Human  Being  "  as 
the  only  possible  God,  and  the  author  and  minister  of  all 
law.  Some  such  errors  as  these  must  result  from  reject- 
ing the  evident  truth  that  man's  idea  of  a  personal  God 
arises  intuitively  out  of  his  perception  of  his  own  per- 
sonal attributes.  The  inseparable  character  of  these  two 
beliefs  depends  upon  the  two  essential  characteristics  of 
personality,  which  are  self-consciousness  and  self-determina-- 
tion.  These  two  elements  belong  alike  to  every  spiritual 
being,  whether  God,  angel,  or  man. 


Il8  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

2.    SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Perception  involves  a  percipient  being,  I  am  conscious 
of  certain  fluctuating  states  of  thought,  feeling,  and  voli- 
tion. But  this  is  not  all.  I  am  conscious  of  myself  as 
the  identical  and  enduring  subject  of  these  changing 
states.  Now  this  knowledge  of  self  is  individual  knowl- 
edge. It  is  not  therefore  the  product  of  rational  intui- 
tion, which  gives  general  knowledge  only.  It  is  simply  a 
primitive  deliverance  of  consciousness,  without  which  all 
other  knowledge  is  impossible. 

Prof.  Bowne  "  objects  that  consciousness  does  not  tell 
us  how  we  are  made."  True,  but  it  does  tell  us  that  we 
are  made  ;  and  the  mere  fact  of  a  personal  ego  is  the  only 
question  here.  He  further  intimates  that  the  ego  is  rather 
the  ''  necessary  condition  of  all  consciousness."  But  how 
are  we  assured  of  the  existence  of  this  condition  ?  It 
comes  not  by  perception,  judgment,  or  reason.  There  is 
nothing  back  of  consciousness  to  give  it.  We  never  go 
through  a  process  of  any  kind,  to  convince  ourselves  of 
our  own  being.  The  conviction  is  a  direct  product  of 
<:onsciousness.  Moreover,  like  all  other  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  irresistible — an  indubitable  conviction 
of  reality. 

I  may  possibly  persuade  myself  into  a  doubt  of  external 
objects  ;  but  my  own  existence  I  can  never  doubt.  The 
existence  of  the  pen  in  my  hand  and  the  paper  before  me, 
may  be  questioned.  I  may  doubt,  but  I  cannot  possibly 
divest  myself  of  the  certainty  that  I  am  doubting.  Doubt 
implies  a  doubter  as  surely  as  belief  implies  a  believer. 
The  fact  is,  that  every  conscious  mental  act  involves  the 
personality  of  the  ego.  Take  the  case  of  memory.  I  can 
think  back  thirty  years  to  the  scenes  of  my  childhood.  I 
recall  with  a  smile  the  vague  and  grotesque  ideas  of  those 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD,  1 19 

early  days  of  my  life.  Many  things  that  then  seemed 
real,  I  have  since  learned  were  only  phenomenal.  But 
I  know  that  I  who  now  write  these  words,  am  the  being 
I  was  when  I  had  those  mistaken  thoughts  thirty  years 
ago.  And  I  know  that  thirty  years  hence  I  will  still  be 
the  same  being.  Through  the  whole  cycle  of  my  con- 
scious being,  I  do  not  and  cannot  part  with  myself.  The 
conviction  of  my  own  personality  never  leaves  me.  Phi- 
losophers may  dispute  about  it  as  long  as  they  like,  but  I 
know  that  I  am  myself. 

Herbert  Spencer  considers  it  an  illusion  to  suppose 
*'  that  at  each  moment  the  ego  is  something  more  than 
the  aggregate  of  feelings  and  ideas,  actual  and  nascent, 
which  then  exists."  Hume  says  that  when  he  enters  inti- 
mately into  what  he  calls  himself,  he  finds  "  nothing  but  a 
bundle  or  collection  of  different  perceptions  which  succeed 
each  other."  Mill  speaks  of  mind  as  "  nothing  but  a  series 
of  our  sensations  and  internal  feelings."  Prof.  Clifford  de- 
clares :  '*  The  perceiving  self  is  reduced  to  the  whole  ag- 
gregate of  feelings  linked  together  and  succeeding  one 
another  in  a  certain  manner."  Huxley  insists  "  that  we 
know  nothing  more  of  the  mind  than  that  it  is  a  series  of 
perceptions." 

Now  all  such  views  as  these  are  contrary  to  the  facts  of 
universal  consciousness.  They  must,  therefore,  be  rejected 
as  unphilosophical  and  untrue.  If  man  cannot  believe 
consciousness  of  his  own  personality,  he  cannot  believe 
any  thing.     All  truth  and  knowledge  are  at  an  end. 

But  this  self-consciousness  in  man  implies  a  self-con- 
scious God.  It  arises  from  certain  mental  states  of  knowl- 
edge, feeling,  or  volition.  But  these  mental  states  depend 
upon  the  outer  world.  Without  the  non-ego^  self-conscious- 
ness might  be  potential,  but  could  never  become  actual ; 


I20  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

it  would  remain  an  empty  faculty.  The  thing  itself  exists 
in  man ;  but  its  basis  or  ground  of  exercise  is  not  in  man ; 
it  inheres  in  some  external  object.  Now  what  is  its 
source  ?  It  cannot  be  in  nature.  It  is  true,  in  the  forci- 
ble words  of  another,  that  "  Nature  cannot  give  what  she 
does  not  herself  possess.  She  cannot  give  birth  to  that 
which  is  toto  genere  different  from  her.  Only  like  can  pro- 
duce like.  Nature  can  take  no  such  leap.  A  new  begin- 
ning on  a  plane  above  nature,  it  is  beyond  the  power  of 
nature  to  make.  Self-consciousness  can  only  be  explained 
by  self-consciousness  in  its  author  and  source.  It  can 
have  its  ground  in  nothing  that  is  itself  void  of  conscious- 
ness. Only  that  personal  Power  which  is  exalted  above 
nature,  the  creative  principle  to  which  every  beginning  is 
due,  can  account  for  self-consciousness  in  man.  It  pre- 
supposes an  original,  and  unconditioned  because  original, 
self-consciousness.  This  spark  of  a  divine  fire  is  deposited 
in  nature ;  it  is  in  it,  but  not  of  it.  Thus  the  conscious- 
ness of  God  enters  inseparably  into  the  consciousness  of 
self,  as  its  hidden  background.  The  descent  into  our 
inmost  being,  is  at  the  same  time  an  ascent  to  God." 

Our  conviction  of  a  self-conscious  God  is  involved  in 
the  consciousness  of  our  own  personal  being.  It  is  given 
to  us  by  rational  intuition  as  the  necessary  condition 
of  self-consciousness.  The  reality  of  a  conscious  self,  im- 
plies the  reality  of  a  conscious  God.  This  conviction  of 
God  is  not  always  equally  clear  and  strong.  It  is  doubt- 
less obscured  by  the  presence  of  moral  evil  in  the  soul. 
But  it  is  there,  nevertheless  ;  and  responds  to  every  mani- 
festation of  God  in  nature  and  providence  and  grace. 

3.    SELF-DETERMINATION. 

This  is  the  second  necessary  element  of  personality.  It 
is  implied,  indeed,  in  self-consciousness.     Self-action  de- 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  121 

pends  upon  volition.  If  I  were  always  the  passive  prey  of 
objective  impressions  with  no  possible  experience  of  self- 
initiated  action,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  I  could  ever 
attain  consciousness  of  my  selfdom.  The  two  ideas  are 
dependent  upon  each  other. 

Fatalism  is  the  alternative  of  self-determination.  Men 
have  ingeniously  obscured  it,  and  vainly  striven  to  evade 
it,  but  at  bottom,  this  is  the  sole  issue. 

Do  I  originate  my  own  voluntary  acts?  Or  are  they 
the  necessary  result  of  some  antecedent  cause,  within  or 
without  the  mind  ?  This  is  the  question  to  be  decided  in 
self-determination.  It  touches  upon  a  metaphysical  prob- 
lem, whose  elaborate  discussion  would  manifestly  not  be 
proper  in  this  place.  It  is  mentioned  only  in  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  the  argument  in  hand. 

That  I  do  originate  my  voluntary  acts,  is  a  primary 
datum  of  consciousness.  The  only  way  I  know  they  are 
voluntary,  is  by  recognizing  them  as  self-originated  and 
self-determined.  This  conviction  is  not  a  negative  affair, 
resulting  from  my  ignorance  of  certain  pre-determining 
agencies  which  are  at  work  without  my  knowledge  and 
back  of  my  will.  Acts  of  will  are  objects  of  consciousness, 
just  as  much  as  acts  of  perception,  memory,  or  reason.  If 
the  so-called  acts  of  volition  are  mere  illusions,  so  likewise 
are  all  other  acts  of  the  mind.  I  can  initiate  action  or 
refrain  from  it,  by  an  efficiency  within  me  which  is  neither 
irresistibly  controlled  by  motives,  nor  yet  determined  by 
an  irresistible  proneness  inherent  in  the  mind  itself.  And 
this  is  the  universal  conviction  of  mankind. 

Philosophers,  indeed,  have  theoretically  ignored  this 
conviction.  This  course  must  be  expected  on  the  part  of 
those  who  deny  self-consciousness.  The  two  theories  are 
invariably  linked  together. 

Herbert  Spencer  says  :  "  That  every  one  is  at  liberty  to 


122  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

do  what  he  desires  to  do,  supposing  there  are  no  external 
hindrances,"  constitutes  personal  freedom.  It  will  be  ob- 
served that  this  freedom  does  not  include  the  control  of 
our  desires,  and  is  therefore  not  freedom  at  all.  He 
further  states  that  psychical  changes  conform  to  law, 
and  that  therefore,  "there  cannot  be  any  such  thing  as 
free-will." 

Spinoza,  after  avowing  similar  fatalistic  sentiments,  re- 
marks that  "  in  the  state  of  nature  there  is  nothing  done 
that  can  be  properly  characterized  as  just  or  unjust — 
faults,  offences,  crimes,  cannot  be  conceived."  He  adds, 
quite  naturally :  "  Repentance  is  not  a  virtue,  or  does 
not  arise  from  reason  ;  but  he  who  repents  of  any  deed  he 
has  done,  is  twice  miserable  or.  impotent." 

Mill  persuades  himself  that  his  philosophy  is  not  fatal- 
istic, but  necessarian.  Its  goal  is  fatalism,  however.  He 
thinks  men  must  do  as  they  do ;  and  yet  punishment  is 
right,  both  for  the  restraint  of  the  evil-doer  and  the  pro- 
tection of  society.  On  this  point  he  says :  "  It  is  just  to 
punish,  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  for  this  purpose,  exactly 
as  it  is  just  to  put  a  wild  beast  to  death,  for  the  same 
object." 

In  a  like  manner,  Prof.  Bowne  cites  Prof.  Tyndall  as 
arguing  this  social  problem  with  the  robber  and  ravisher, 
somewhat  as  follows :  ''  You  offend,  because  you  cannot 
help  offending,  to  the  public  detriment.  We  punish  you, 
because  we  cannot  help  punishing,  for  the  public  good. 
The  public  safety  is  a  matter  of  more  importance  than  the 
very  limited  chance  of  your  moral  renovation.  We  enter- 
tain no  malice  or  hatred  against  you,  but  simply  with  a 
view  to  our  safety  and  purification,  we  are  determined 
that  you,  and  such  as  you,  shall  not  enjoy  liberty  of  evil 
action  in  our  midst."     And  with  that  word,  the  amiable 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  123 

professor  gracefully  chops  ofiF  his  head.  What  a  beautiful 
and  lucid  theory  of  justice  this  is  !  No  one  is  to  blame  for 
any  thing,  according  to  the  learned  professor.  Public 
utility  is  the  only  standard  of  morals. 

Now,  suppose  the  "  robbers  and  ravishers  "  should  mul- 
tiply in  the  land  ;  suppose  that,  by  fiendish  methods  and 
the  use  of  fiendish  weapons,  they  should  obtain  temporary 
control  of  society  ;  suppose  they  should  say  to  Prof.  Tyn- 
dall,  and  to  all  other  virtuous  citizens :  "  We  entertain  no 
manner  of  malice  against  you ;  but  the  fact  is,  the  ex- 
ample of  your  abstemious  and  fanatical  life  is  damaging 
to  our  principles  and  practices  ;  your  presence  is  the  con- 
stant occasion  of  uncomplimentary  and  annoying  com- 
parisons ;  and  simply  with  a  view  to  our  own  comfort,  we 
are  determined  that  you  shall  no  longer  live  in  our  midst." 
Is  it  not  clear  that  the  professor's  ethics  would  justify  the 
villains  in  taking  off  every  virtuous  head  in  the  land? 
Nay,  would  not  his  ethics  positively  require  them  to  do 
it?  The  result  might  seem  to  be  a  catastrophe  and  an 
iniquity  ;  but,  according  to  fatalism,  it  can  be  neither.  We 
have  been  too  hasty,  in  accusing  the  professor  of  erecting 
public  utility  into  the  sole  standard  of  public  morals. 
There  is,  in  truth,  no  such  standard  possible.  Of  course 
not,  for  there  is  no  such  thing  as  morality.  That  word 
has  vanished.  The  distinction  of  right  and  wrong  is 
utterly  abolished.  And  what  boots  it  now,  whether  Tyn- 
dall  &  Co.,  or  Robin  Hood  &  Co.,  shall  rule  in  English 
society,  or  in  English  philosophy  ?  Guilt  and  innocence, 
praise  and  blame,  justice  and  injustice,  virtue  and  vice, 
gratitude  and  resentment,  reward  and  punishment,  hope 
and  fear,  are  all  blotted  out.  The  very  basal  beliefs  and 
principles  of  human  thought  and  human  living,  are  for- 
ever gone.     They,  too,  have  vanished  in  the  light  of  this 


124  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

fatalistic  philosophy.  But  we  need  not  lament  them  ;  for 
man  himself  is  reduced  to  a  mere  automaton,  and  what 
sort  of  use  has  an  automaton  for  principles  and  beliefs? 
As  well  might  we  ask  for  the  beliefs  of  a  blizzard,  or  the 
morals  of  a  mowing  machine.  The  professor  is  entirely 
too  timid  when  he  takes  pains  to  disclaim  all  malice  and 
hatred  in  beheading  the  free-booter.  That,  surely,  is  a 
needless  precaution.  These  sentiments,  so  virtuously  and 
strenuously  disclaimed,  are  just  as  virtuous  as  any  other, 
and  the  head  comes  off  with  equal  promptness  and  pre- 
cision, in  either  case.  Where,  then,  is  the  difference? 
The  professor  must  throw  off  the  old-time  prejudices  and 
boldly  face  the  results  of  his  theory.  And  what  moral 
distinctions  can  there  be  in  the  limited  vocabulary  of  this 
■destructive  philosophy?  But  these  contradictory  and 
.absurd  results  are  the  logical  out-come  of  fatalism,  and 
indeed,  of  every  denial  of  man's  self-determination.  The 
trouble  is  with  the  philosophy.  It  is  essentially  untrue, 
and  unsound  from  top  to  bottom.  It  is  a  gigantic  error, 
and  issues  in  gigantic  follies. 

The  plain  truth  is  that  man  is  free  and  self-determined. 
But  this  self-determination,  as  already  stated,  is  the  sec- 
ond essential  element  of  personality.  Man  is  a  free  per- 
sonal spirit.  No  absurdity  whatever  results  from  the 
admission  of  this  proposition.  It  accords  perfectly  with 
the  plain  common-sense  and  the  universal  experience  of 
mankind.  But  its  denial  is  beset  on  all  sides,  with  all 
manner  of  adsurdities.  Philosophers  should  remember 
that  no  philosophy  is  safe  which  combats  common-sense 
and  universal  experience. 

Ignoring  this  wholesome  precept,  extremists  have  suc- 
ceeded in  the  erection  and  adoption  of  theories  which  blot 
God  out  of  the  universe.  But  this  is  by  no  means  all  they 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD,  1 25 

have  done.  At  the  same  stroke,  they  have  blotted  man 
out  likewise.  They  have  destroyed  his  personality ;  they 
have  reduced  the  pronoun  "  I  "  to  a  collective  noun  de- 
noting *'  aggregations  of  related  sensations  "  ;  they  have 
abolished  mind,  and  replaced  it  by  physical  organism 
and  transmitted  neural  tremors ;  they  have  stifled  the 
rational  hopes  of  life,  and  obliterated  freedom,  virtue, 
merit,  reward,  gratitude,  justice,  and  morality  from  the 
vocabulary  of  truth ;  they  have  undermined  the  founda- 
tions of  philosophy  itself,  by  breaking  down  all  distinc- 
tions between  right  and  wrong,  virtue  and  vice,  truth  and 
error;  they  have  robbed  man  of  himself  and  his  God  to- 
gether, and  have  made  life  not  worth  living,  truth  not 
worth  seeking,  God  not  worth  worshipping.  The  moral 
catastrophe  is  cosmical,  universal.  Grim  fate  rules  the 
world  ;  and  hope  goes  out  in  helpless  despair. 

But  fortunately  this  murderous  philosophy,  in  destroy- 
ing all  things  else,  has  likewise  destroyed  itself.  In  its 
self-destruction,  we  find  a  self-corrective.  The  voice  of  its 
own  logic  breaks  the  horrid  nightmare,  and  we  behold  the 
harmless  phantasm  of  an  ugly  fatalistic  dream. 

It  is  clear  that  self-consciousness  and  self-determination, 
the  two  essential  elements  of  personality,  do  belong  to 
man.  They  are  intuitively  perceived,  upon  the  occasion 
of  voluntary,  rational  acts.  The  capacity  for  such  acts 
furnishes  unquestionable  evidence  of  personality.  But 
this  personality  is  not  original ;  it  is  derived.  Yesterday 
it  was  not ;  to-day  it  is.  Moreover,  it  is  limited  and  im- 
perfect. It  must  have  its  source  in  an  underived,  original 
personality,  whom  we  are  pleased  to  call  God.  His  is  the 
only  unlimited  and  perfect  personality.  The  being  of  an 
underived  personal  spirit  is  as  certain  as  the  being  of  de- 
rived personal  spirits.     It  is  the  universal  conviction  of 


120  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

rational  intuition,  as  Lotze  has  well  expressed  it,  that  the 
realm  of  highest  reality  is  restricted  to  the  living,  personal 
spirit  of  God  and  the  world  of  personal  spirits,  which  he 
has  created.  I  find  within  me  an  inexpugnable  con- 
viction that  my  being  is  derived,  not  from  a  law,  or  a 
process,  or  a  physical  cause,  but  from  a  personal  beings 
conscious,  intelligent,  vohtional,  and  underived. 

Now  this  conviction  is  purely  intuitional.  As  such,  it 
is  independent  of  the  principles  of  induction,  deduction, 
or  causation.  This  truth  is  clearly  shown  in  the  religious 
history  of  the  world.  Men  always  learn  to  pray  before 
they  learn  to  reason.  Belief  in  God  is  spontaneous  ;  a 
thing  of  immediate  cognition  and  involuntary  emotion. 
It  comes  not  at  the  end  of  a  long  chain  of  speculative  in- 
quiries concerning  the  nature  and  causes  of  things.  It 
comes  rather  with  an  intuition  of  being,  an  instinct  of 
worship,  an  emotion  of  love  and  awe,  that  are  quite  inde- 
pendent of  pure  reasoning  processes.  Kant  has  called  it 
the  practical  reason  ;  but  the  truth  seems  to  be  that  belief 
in  God  flashes  upon  the  mind  at  once,  without  any  process 
of  argument  whatever. 

This  view  is  not  inconsistent  with  what  has  heretofore 
been  said  concerning  the  careful  and  varied  arguments 
necessary  to  the  demonstration  of  Deity.  The  truth  here 
asserted  is,  that  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  an  underived 
personal  spirit  involves  no  process.  But  this  is  not  say- 
ing that  a  satisfactory  demonstration  to  others  of  the  be- 
ing and  attributes  of  the  Deity,  may  not  require  several 
steps  of  argumentation. 

This  consideration  brings  us  to  a  review  of  the  argu- 
ments thus  far  developed.  By  the  inductive  processes  of 
Eutaxiology  and  Teleology,  we  have  demonstrated  the 
existence  of  intelligence  and  volition  in  nature.     These 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  12/ 

demonstrations  are  independent  of  each  other.  But  that 
does  not  prove  that  the  things  demonstrated  must  be 
mutually  independent.  Plan  shows  intelligence,  purpose 
shows  volition.  Now,  if  plan  and  purpose  are  found  in  the 
same  thing  (as  they  undoubtedly  are,  in  the  structure  of 
the  hand  and  eye,  for  example)  then  intelligence  and  voli- 
tion are  found  united  there.  This  much  has  been  learned 
from  a  study  of  nature. 

But  in  the  present  chapter  we  have  left  nature,  and 
turned  our  gaze  inward  upon  ourselves.  We  have  found 
within  us  the  self-evident,  necessary,  and  universal  convic- 
tion of  an  original,  superhuman  personal  spirit  without  us. 
This  spirit,  of  course,  is  recognized  as  self-conscious  and 
free. 

Now  this  conviction  is  independent  of  the  former  argu- 
ments from  nature.  It  is  on  another  line  altogether.  It 
would  remain  in  full  force,  if  material  nature  were  de- 
stroyed. The  question  therefore  arises  :  Are  the  products 
of  these  independent  inquiries,  independent  also,  or  are 
they  identical  ?  In  other  words,  is  the  Personal  Spirit 
whom  we  recognize  as  the  source  of  human  spirits,  identi- 
cal with  the  intelligence  and  volition  found  in  nature  ? 

This  is  by  no  means  an  idle  question.  Lucretius  and 
the  Epicureans  answered  it  in  the  negative.  They  be- 
lieved in  the  existence  of  personal  gods,  but  held  that 
they  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  constitution  and  phe- 
nomena of  nature.  I  unhesitatingly  answer  in  the  affirm- 
ative.    The  following  truths  necessitate  this  reply : 

(i)  Intelligence  and  volition  must  be  united.  They 
cannot  exist  apart.  The  one  depends  upon  the  other, 
and  is  inconceivable  without  it. 

(2)  Intelligence  and  volition  are  essential  to  personality. 
That  personal  being  without  us  must  therefore  have  them.. 


128  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

(3)  The  union  of  these  two  elements  constitutes  person- 
ality.    Nature,  then,  indicates  a  personal  being. 

(4)  Our  own  derived  personality  is  inseparably  bound 
to  nature  by  means  of  a  physical  body  which  is  itself  a 
part  of  nature. 

(5)  Therefore  that  Personal  Being  who  is  the  source  of 
our  conscious  personality,  must  be  one  and  the  same  Be- 
ing whose  intelligence  and  volition  are  displayed  in  the 
material  universe  about  us. 

Thus  far  I  have  arrived  at  the  proof  of  the  existence  of 
■a  superhuman  Personal  Intelligence.  This  is  not  yet  the 
God  of  Christian  Theism.  For  convenience  I  shall  call 
him  God ;  but  it  is  freely  conceded  that  certain  additional 
characteristics  in  the  nature  of  this  Being,  must  be  proved, 
before  he  can  be  termed  God,  in  the  strictest  sense.  This 
proof  will  be  submitted  in  the  following  chapters.  But 
before  proceeding,  it  will  be  well  to  notice  the  subject  of 
Anthropomorphism,  which  is  closely  allied  to  the  theme 
now  in  hand. 

SECTION  III. 
ANTHROPOMORPHISM. 

This  term  signifies  the  representation  of  God  in  human 
form,  or  as  possessed  of  human  attributes.  The  history  of 
religion  shows  a  strong  and  almost  universal  tendency  in 
this  direction.  As  we  trace  religious  history  back  to  the 
infancy  of  the  race,  or  of  the  individual  worshipper,  we 
find  this  anthropomorphic  idea  stronger,  bolder,  and 
grosser  in  character.  The  ideas  of  God  entertained  by 
the  average  child  of  five  years  and  by  the  average  man  of 
fifty,  differ  widely  in  many  respects ;  but  perhaps  in  no 
other  so  much  as  in  this  one  we  are  now  considering. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  129 

Childhood  is  wont  to  picture  God  as  a  being  of  parts  and 
physical  proportions.  John  Fiske  is  by  no  means  the 
only  man  who,  when  a  boy,  imagined  the  Deity  as  a  great 
big  man,  with  long,  white  beard  and  penetrating  eye, 
standing  at  the  zenith  of  the  heavens,  looking  ceaselessly 
down  upon  the  earth,  and  recording  with  omniscient  accu- 
racy in  a  ponderous  ledger,  every  peccadillo  of  every  boy 
and  girl  in  all  the  world.  Some  such  experience  is  com- 
mon. We  can  all  remember  childish  attempts  at  prac- 
tical theology,  not  a  whit  less  grotesque  than  this. 

And  what  is  true  of  men  personally  seems,  to  some 
extent  at  least,  to  be  true  of  the  whole  race.  The  present 
idea  of  God  has,  as  a  rule,  been  reached  by  a  process  of 
growth.  This  growth  has  been  mainly  along  two  lines, 
which  may  be  distinguished  as  the  anthropomorphic  and 
the  cosmical.  The  former  is  historically  connected  with  an- 
cestor-worship and  hero-worship  :  the  latter,  with  nature- 
worship.  The  Chinese,  Romans,  and  Zulus  illustrate  the 
former  phase  ;  while  the  Greeks  and  Hindus  are  exam- 
ples of  the  latter. 

Now  when  Christian  Theism  came  in  contact  with  these 
pagan  ideas  it  became  variously  modified  and  corrupted 
by  them.  The  Christian  Fathers,  so-called,  were  radically 
divided  in  this  regard.  Origen  and  Athanasius,  for  ex- 
ample, were  cosmical  in  their  views  ;  while  Augustine  was 
decidedly  anthropomorphic.  And  the  views  of  the  com- 
mon people,  in  the  middle  ages,  as  well  as  in  the  early 
days  of  Christianity,  were  often  gross  and  grotesque  in 
the  extreme.  Were  it  not  so,  the  puerile  representations  of 
the  mediaeval  miracle-plays  could  never  have  been  possible, 
not  to  say,  popular.  Fiske  mentions  one  of  them,  wherein 
the   crucifixion    is   portrayed.     An    angel,  who  has   just 


130  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

witnessed  the  catastrophe,  rushes  excitedly  into  heaven 
crying:  "Wake  up,  Almighty  Father!  Here  are  those 
beggarly  Jews  killing  your  son,  and  you  asleep  here  like  a 
drunkard !  "  The  Father  arouses  himself,  rubs  his  eyes, 
and  drowsily  replies,  "  Devil  take  me,  if  I  knew  a  thing 
about  it !  " 

Now  this  irreverent  and  blasphemous  representation 
of  the  Deity  was  not  intended  to  convey  the  slightest 
irreverence.  On  the  contrary,  this  play  was  among  the 
few  which  were  approved  by  the  church,  on  account  of 
the  salutary  influence  they  were  supposed  to  exercise 
upon  the  laity  and  the  people  at  large. 

In  view  of  such  facts  as  these — and  there  are  many 
such — it  is  vain  to  deny  or  ignore  Anthropomorphism. 
It  is  a  conspicuous  fact  in  religious  history.  Atheists  are 
disposed  to  rejoice  over  it,  and  some  theists  have  grown 
pale  with  fear  and  trembling.  Much  feeble  philosophy 
has  been  expended  on  both  sides  of  the  line,  in  order  to 
prove  or  to  disprove  the  fatal  consequences  to  Theism, 
which  have  been  supposed  to  lurk  beneath  this  anthropo- 
morphic tendency  of  man's  religious  nature.  But  it  is 
evident  that  both  parties  to  the  dispute  are  unwarrantably 
excited.  The  struggle  is  by  no  means  a  desperate  one. 
In  truth,  there  is  not  the  slightest  ground  for  any  struggle 
at  all.  Let  it  be  freely  admitted  that  our  idea  of  God  is 
anthropomorphic.  What  of  that  ?  How  else  ought  it  to 
be  ?  How  else,  forsooth,  could  it  be  ?  How  can  religious 
truth  grow  in  the  human  mind,  except  by  conformity  to 
the  laws  of  the  human  mind  ?  How,  indeed,  can  the  Di- 
vine Spirit  be  cognized,  except  by  reference  to  the  human 
spirit,  and  under  the  proper  similitudes  thereof?  Knowl- 
edge of  God  is  knowledge,  and  must  observe  the  universal 
laws  of  knowledge.     There  is  no  other  possible  medium 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD,  131 

through  which  men  ever  have  attained  or  ever  will  attain 
any  intelligent  idea  of  Deity.  Even  the  nature-gods  of 
the  Greeks  and  Hindus  had  a  distinctively  anthropomor- 
phic element  in  them.  And  so  must  it  always  be.  If 
there  is  absolutely  nothing  in  common  between  God  and 
man,  no  knowledge  of  God  could  ever  be  possible  to  man. 
In  revealing  this  common  relation,  either  man  must  be 
raised  to  the  Infinite,  or  the  Infinite  must  condescend  to 
man.  The  former  is  manifestly  impossible.  If  the  latter 
is  graciously  done,  certainly  no  theist  need  be  alarmed  or 
need  apologize  for  the  Infinite  condescension. 

Concerning  this  whole  subject,  two  general  remarks  are 
to  be  made. 

I.      ANTHROPOMORPHISM    HAS    A    TRUTH    IN    IT. 

In  believing  in  God,  we  must  ascribe  to  him  the  highest 
possible  perfection.  But  personality  in  man  is  the  most 
exalted  fact  of  which  we  know,  outside  of  the  Deity.  If 
God  is  impersonal,  he  is  inferior  to  man,  no  matter  how 
mighty  his  cosmical  power  may  be.  God  must,  there- 
fore, be  like  man  in  his  personality.  He  is  a  Spirit,  and 
must  have  qualities  similar  to  those  we  find  in  our  own 
spiritual  natures.  Or  rather  we  feel — and  we  cannot  rid 
ourselves  of  the  feeling — that  God  has  made  us  somewhat 
like  himself.  He  has  put  somewhat  of  his  own  nature 
upon  us.  Rational  intuition  agrees  with  the  sublime  doc- 
trine of  Moses,  that  man  is  made  in  the  image  of  God. 
Intuitive  truth  calls  for  the  sanction  of  a  spiritual  God. 
It  must  be  that  the  cognition  of  right  and  wrong,  for  ex- 
ample, which  he  has  made  so  vital  in  us,  exists  in  him 
likewise.  If  he  has  made  us  to  follow  the  good  and 
eschew  the  evil,  it  must  be  because  he  himself  approves 
the  one  and  hates  the  other.     Human  reason  calls  for  a 


132  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

God  who  is  the  Perfect  Reason,  and  the  source  of  all 
rationality,  wherever  and  however  it  may  be  displayed. 
Human  conscience  calls  for  a  God  who  is  the  Perfect 
Righteousness,  whence  emanates  all  that  is  holy  and  good 
throughout  the  universe.  The  human  heart  calls  for  a 
God  who  is  Perfect  Love,  who  pities  the  distressed,  com- 
forts the  sorrowing,  forgives  the  erring,  and  desires  the 
holiness  and  happiness  of  his  intelligent  creatures.  But 
such  a  God  as  this  must  have  something  in  common  with 
man — some  adequate  ground  of  knowledge,  sympathy, 
and  communion.  And  this  is  the  rational  basis  of  An- 
thropomorphism. Surely  there  is  nothing  in  it  that  is,  in 
the  smallest  degree,  damaging  to  Theism. 

God  is  not  degraded  by  supposing  a  possible  com- 
munion with  man.  Man's  highest  elements  are  not 
necessarily  imperfections.  Their  imperfection  in  man  re- 
sults from  the  being  of  man,  and  not  at  all  from  any 
thing  inherent  in  the  elements  themselves.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  consciousness,  volition,  personality, 
feeling,  love,  justice,  veracity,  and  moral  purity  are  in 
themselves  of  the  nature  of  frailties.  Man  is  not  rendered 
frail  by  possessing  them,  but  they  are  rendered  frail  by 
existing  in  man.  They  may  all  exist  in  God  in  illimitable 
perfection.  To  predicate  the  perfection  of  such  attributes 
in  the  Divine  Being,  is  not  to  degrade  him,  but  to  exalt 
him  to  the  highest  place  of  moral  excellence  which  human 
thought  is  capable  of  reaching.  It  is  to  make  him  a  Per- 
fect Person — infinitely  superior  to  the  cold,  impersonal 
Deities  reached  by  the  speculations  of  philosophy.  It  is 
to  give  him  power  over  the  hearts  and  consciences  of 
men,  to  win  them  into  paths  of  true  virtue,  to  turn  their 
feet  from  the  slippery  ways  of  vice,  and  to  comfort  their 
hearts  in  the  hour  of  darkness  and  death.     Deism  can  fur- 


THE   PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  13^ 

nish  no  such  power.  Max  Miiller  rightly  says :  "A  mere 
philosophical  system,  however  true,  can  never  take  the 
place  of  religious  faith."  It  is  not  a  mighty  abstraction, 
nor  an  impersonal  force,  nor  a  compend  of  principles  that 
we  believe  and  love  and  trust  and  serve.  It  is  a  Personal 
God,  who  is  perfect  in  purpose,  motive,  and  affection,  as 
well  as  in  intellect  and  principle.  Such  a  Being,  and  such 
alone,  could  be  the  adequate  source  of  all  that  we  see  in 
the  world  without  us,  and  in  the  soul  within  us. 

2.    ANTHROPOMORPHISM    IS    LIABLE    TO    TWO    ERRORS. 

This  is  not  strange.  Error  is  always  mixed  with  truth  ; 
and  some  truth  is  nearly  always  mixed  with  error.  Where 
is  the  system,  or  domain,  or  theme  of  human  thought  that 
can  claim  entire  exemption  from  error?  If  such  a  system 
were  let  down  from  Heaven  to-day,  to-morrow  it  would 
be  misinterpreted  and  corrupted  by  human  thought. 
There  is  nothing  perfect  under  the  sun.  The  history  of 
Anthropomorphism  is  not  at  all  exceptional  in  this  regard. 
In  attempting  to  construe  to  their  minds  and  hearts  the 
Divine  Personality,  men  have  often  fallen  into  two  gross 
errors." 

(i)  They  Have  Supposed  God  to  Possess  Every  Attribute  of  Man, 

This  tendency  is  quite  natural  and  quite  prevalent.  The 
irreverent  ridiculousness  of  the  old  miracle-plays,  to  which 
reference  has  been  made,  undoubtedly  resulted  from  this 
error.  And  the  world  has  not  outgrown  it  yet.  The 
book  of  Mormon  represents  God  as  having  the  figure  of 
a  man,  and  as  being  of  definite,  measurable  proportions. 
No  small  part  of  the  popularity  of  that  monstrous  system 
is  due  to  this  grossness  of  representation.  It  brings  down 
Deity  to  the  easy  comprehension  of  ignorant  and  indolent 


134  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

minds.  And  some  such  gross  ideas  of  God,  it  is  to  be 
feared,  exist  in  the  minds  of  many  nominal  Christians. 
John  Fiske  justly  remarks  :  **  If  we  could  cross-question 
all  the  men  and  women  we  know,  we  should  probably  find 
that,  even  in  this  enlightened  age,  the  conceptions  of 
Deity  current  throughout  the  civilized  world  contain 
much  that  is  in  the  crudest  sense  anthropomorphic." 
Many  of  us  have  never  developed  the  embryonic  Theism 
of  our  childhood. 

But  it  need  not  be  so.  It  is  a  natural  development 
abnormally  arrested.  Because  God  has  some  attributes 
in  common  with  man,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  has  them 
all.  We  do  not  reason  thus  concerning  one  another. 
Every  man  is  like  every  other  man  indeed ;  but  he  is  just 
as  truly  unlike  every  other.  So  in  a  deeper  sense  must 
we  suppose  God  to  be  unlike  all  men.  If,  like  man,  he 
have  intelligence,  it  does  not  follow  that,  like  him,  he  has 
also  bodily  organism.  If  he  have  an  emotional  nature 
capable  of  ineffable  happiness,  we  need  not  therefore  con- 
ceive him  like  man  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  ludicrous. 
Because  a  hearty  laugh  is  proper  in  man,  the  counterpart 
of  it  need  not  be  postulated  in  the  nature  of  God.  He 
may  have  what  is  highest  in  man,  without  having  what  is 
lowest. 

(2)  Men  Have  Limited  God  to  Human  Attributes. 

They  have  sluggishly  supposed  that  God  has  no  quali- 
ties except  those  possessed  by  man.  This  likewise  is  a 
gross  error.  No  thinking  man  supposes  for  a  moment 
that  God  possesses  any  attributes  whatever  in  the  exact 
way  in  which  he  himself  possesses  them.  They  differ  in 
degree,  being  finite  in  one  case  and  infinite  in  the  other ; 
they  differ  in  origin,  being  derived  in  one  case  and 
original  in  the  other  ;  they  differ  in  scope  and  method  of 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD.  1 35 

operation  ;  and  they  may  differ  in  many  other  respects. 
Take  the  matter  of  consciousness  as  an  illustration  of  this 
possibility.  Man's  activity  gives  him  the  power,  or,  at 
least,  the  occasion,  of  self-consciousness  ;  but  it  would  be 
a  great  blunder  to  prescribe  the  same  condition  to  God's 
self-consciousness.  Man's  knowledge  of  the  ego  depends 
upon  the  existence  of  the  non-ego,  either  material  or 
mental.     But  God  is  subject  to  no  such  dependence. 

If  then  we  must  admit  that  even  those  Divine  attributes 
which  are  held  in  common  with  man  are  necessarily  unlike 
the  human,  what  sheer  folly  is  it  to  deny  to  Deity  the 
possession  of  any  attributes  beyond  those  which  we 
possess  !  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose,  and  unreasonable 
to  deny,  that  God  has  perfections  differing,  both  in  degree 
and  in  kind,  from  those  possessed  by  his  human  creatures. 
He  may  have  put  some  of  himself  into  man,  but  it  is  not 
at  all  likely  that  he  exhausted  himself. 

The  crude  anthropomorphist  will  doubtless  ask  the 
theist  to  name,  describe,  or  locate  these  supra-human 
elements  in  the  Divine  nature.  This  demand  is  unreason- 
able. It  cannot  be  met.  But  this  confession  does  not 
militate  against  the  existence  of  these  elements.  It  only 
shows  them  to  be  in  reality  supra-human.  Having  never 
fallen  under  our  experience,  and  being  without  the  limited 
circle  of  our  intuition,  we  cannot  even  so  much  as  con- 
ceive of  them,  and  still  less  can  we  describe  or  identify 
them.  But  this  inability,  again,  is  not  against  their  ex- 
istence, but  the  rather  in  favor  of  it.  There  is  rationality 
no  less  than  inspiration  in  the  scriptural  statement : 
^'  Thou  art  a  God  that  hidest  thyself."  There  is  a 
befitting  majesty  of  mystery  about  that  Divine  Being 
whom  we  can  never  find  out  unto  perfection.  What 
innumerable  and  ineffable  perfections  may  dwell  in  the 


136  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

nature  of  God,  it  is  not  for  man  to  say  or  think.  But  to 
deny  their  existence  is  to  act  the  part  of  the  immodest 
and  the  irreverent. 

With  the  proper  elimination  of  the  errors  just  described, 
there  is  in  Anthropomorphism  nothing  whatever  that  is 
either  illogical  or  damaging  to  the  cause  of  Theism.  It  is 
simply  the  necessary  and  suitable  form  in  which  we  con- 
strue to  ourselves  the  personality  of  God.  We  have  seen 
that  the  personality  of  God  is  an  intuitive  truth,  that  as 
such  it  is  self-evident,  necessary,  and  universal,  and  that  it 
involves  the  personality  of  man,  the  foundations  of  truth, 
and  the  most  intimate  beliefs  and  hopes  of  life.  If  we 
give  it  up,  all  is  lost.  There  is  nothing  left  us,  in  the 
bitter  irony  of  fate,  but  to  lift  imploring  hands  to  the 
"  Inscrutable  Unknown,"  and,  as  Harrison  sarcastically 
puts  its,  to  pray  "  O,  X",  love  us,  help  us,  make  us  one 
with  thee  !  " 

But  we  need  not  give  it  up.  Neither  logic,  nor  true 
science,  nor  sound  philosophy  requires  it.  We  may  still 
rest  our  hearts  and  our  hopes  in  the  arms  of  a  personal, 
conscious,  intelligent,  living,  loving  God. 

REFERENCES. 

McCosh's  "  Intuitions  of  the  Mind," 

Fisher's  "  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief." 

Fiske's  "  The  Idea  of  God." 

Count  d'Alviella's  "  Evolution  of  Religious  Thought." 

Max  Miiller's  "  Science  of  Religion." 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD;   OR,  THE   HISTORI- 
CAL ARGUMENT. 

SECTION  I. 

THE  PROBLEM   STATED. 

PREVIOUS  arguments  have  established  the  exist- 
ence, in  the  universe,  of  a  supra-human  Being,  in- 
telligent, volitional,  personal.  For  convenience,  I  have 
called  him  God ;  but  he  is  not  yet  shown,  by  any  means, 
to  be  the  God  of  Christian  Theism.  He  might  possess 
all  these  elements,  and  be  a  demon  as  well  as  a  God.  Be- 
fore deciding  this  momentous  question,  his  moral  charac- 
ter must,  in  some  sense,  be  ascertained.  Is  he  a  wise, 
holy,  just,  and  good  Being;  or  is  he  a  cunning,  malevo- 
lent monster?  Is  the  universe  the  outcome  of  beneficent 
wisdom  ;  or  is  it  merely  a  crazy  freak  of  fiendish  passion  ? 
Is  Righteousness  enthroned  therein  ;  or  does  Diabolism 
bear  perpetual  sway?  This  question  is  vital  to  the 
Christian  system.  If  God  exists  at  all,  he  must  be  com- 
plete in  wisdom  and  in  power.  And,  if  he  is  so  complete, 
he  must  likewise  be  perfect  in  moral  goodness.  Any  lack 
of  goodness  carries  with  it  a  corresponding  lack  of  wis- 
dom. A  malevolent  being  may  be  cunning,  crafty ;  but 
cannot  be  truly  wise.  Perfect  wisdom  and  power  cannot 
be  rationally  accepted  apart  from  perfect  goodness.  The 
separation  of  these  elements  is  mentally  incongruous  and 

137 


138  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

morally  repugnant.  Their  logical  connection  has  been 
universally  recognized.  Rousseau,  in  vindicating  the  good- 
ness of  God  against  the  supposed  evil  of  an  earthquake, 
puts  the  matter  thus :  "  All  these  questions  are  reducible 
to  that  of  the  existence  of  God.  If  God  exists,  he  is  per- 
fect ;  if  perfect,  he  is  wise,  powerful ;  if  wise  and  power- 
ful, my  soul  is  immortal ;  if  my  soul  is  immortal,  thirty 
years  are  nothing  to  me,  and  are  perhaps  necessary  to  the 
welfare  of  the  universe." 

In  all  theistic  study,  therefore,  evidence  of  the  goodness 
of  God  is  no  less  important  than  that  already  adduced  in 
favor  of  his  being  and  personality.  Search  for  such  evi- 
dence will  lead  us  somewhat  into  history.  It  will  be 
needful  to  take  a  look  at  the  past ;  and  to  observe  the 
historic  trend  of  things.  This  argument  has  therefore 
been  properly  termed  historical.  It  will  not  be  confined 
to  history,  however ;  the  discussion  must  necessarily  have 
some  range  and  diversity. 

Before  arguing  the  question  in  detail,  it  is  well  to  notice 
some  preliminary  points  concerning  the  general  nature  of 
the  problem  to  be  solved,  and  our  own  fitness  to  reach  a 
satisfactory  solution  of  it. 

I.     THE    PROBLEM    IS    A    MOST    COMPREHENSIVE    ONE. 

It  is  comprehensive  in  time.  It  concerns  the  past,  pres- 
ent, and  future.  We  must  not  decide  against  God's  good- 
ness without  taking  in  the  endless  reach  of  duration  and 
being.  It  is  vast  in  extent.  It  includes  all  the  manifold 
of  being.  It  sweeps  the  universe  and  the  two  eternities. 
It  is  vast,  likewise,  in  purpose.  If  God  be  truly  good,  he 
loves  goodness  in  all  his  created  intelligencies,  no  less 
than  in  himself.  He  therefore  desires  their  voluntary  and 
loving  attachment  to  the  eternal  principles  of  righteous- 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  1 39 

ness  and  truth.  His  perfect  goodness  can  be  satisfied 
with  nothing  less  than  their  moral  perfection.  His  moral 
government  seeks  that  perfection,  and  must  be  judged 
after  the  standard  of  this  high  purpose.  Any  other 
ground  of  judgment  is  manifestly  unjust. 

2.  THE  PROBLEM  IS  STILL  UNDEVELOPED. 

The  moral  system  of  the  world  is  in  its  infancy.  The 
sovereignty  of  brute  force  has  largely  passed  away.  In- 
telligence now  rules  the  civilized  world.  But  righteous- 
ness has  scarcely  yet  begun  to  take  the  sceptre  from  the 
hand  of  pure  intelligence.  The  world  is  yet  young. 
Character,  and  even  intelligence  itself,  are  still  in  their 
period  of  tutelage.  An  immense  sweep  of  growth  is  be- 
fore them.  What  they  shall  be,  when  Righteousness  shall 
bear  undisputed  sway  in  the  earth,  doth  not  yet  appear. 
The  era  of  the  universal  sovereignty  of  moral  ideas  is 
just  beginning  to  dawn  upon  the  earth.  We  cannot  now 
judge  of  the  day  it  shall  usher  in ;  for  we  stand  in  the  un- 
certain twilight  of  its  first  morning  hour.  The  proper 
discipline  of  the  world  is  a  vast  and  promising  work ;  so 
much  so,  indeed,  that  its  accomplishment  may  include  and 
justify  the  entire  system  of  things  which  we  see  developing 
mysteriously  before  us.  And  so  we  ought  not  to  pro- 
nounce judgment  against  it,  even  though  there  be  in  it 
as  yet  things  which  seem  to  us  dark  and  unfavorable.  It 
is  not  time  to  render  the  verdict ;  the  evidence  is  not  all 
in.  The  possibilities  of  matured  and  disciplined  manhood 
must  not  be  measured  by  the  foibles  and  failures  of  un- 
tutored youth. 

3.  THE  PROBLEM  TRANSCENDS  OUR  CAPACITY. 

At  the  best,  we  are  poor  judges  of  moral  discipline. 
The  wisest  parents  often  make  fatal  mistakes  in  training 


I40  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

their  children.  Instructors  of  youth,  by  profession,  are 
scarcely  less  blundering.  We  set  before  us  a  desirable 
point  in  youthful  attainment,  and  we  push  on  with  all 
possible  speed  to  reach  it.  But  we  take  such  hasty  and 
ill-judged  steps  as  to  miss  entirely  the  goal  of  our  lauda- 
ble hopes.  Moral  discipline  is  a  thing  of  slow  degrees  and 
short  stages ;  it  must  not  be  crowded.  Moral  growth  can- 
not be  forced.  Hot-bed  plants  are  never  sturdy.  Theo- 
retically, we  admit  these  facts  ;  but  in  practice  we  strange- 
ly forget  them.  Many  a  devoted  parent  has  ruined  his 
child  by  bringing  him  up  in  a  moral  hot-bed. 

Now,  if  we  fail  so  conspicuously  in  our  little  matters  of 
individual  discipline,  modesty  would  suggest  extreme 
caution,  on  our  part,  in  criticising  God's  plan  for  the 
moral  discipline  of  the  whole  world.  Mere  kindness  of 
heart,  even  in  human  discipline,  is  almost  sure  to  fail  of 
its  purpose.  Wisdom,  sternness,  and  even  hardship,  must 
frequently  be  called  in,  to  insure  success.  The  simple 
presence  of  hardship  in  the  world  is  no  argument,  there- 
fore, against  the  goodness  of  God.  We  know  not  how 
much  of  its  sturdy  discipline  may  be  requisite  to  establish 
a  free  moral  intelligence  in  a  state  of  voluntary  moral 
perfection. 

4.    THE    PROBLEM    CONCERNS    US    PERSONALLY. 

It  SO  happens  that  this  discipline  weighs  heavily  upon 
us  ourselves.  It  often  touches  us  at  the  tenderest  and 
weakest  points  of  our  being.  We  reluctantly  endure  its 
hardships,  and  would  escape  them  if  we  could.  Pangs  of 
sufTering,  disappointment,  and  regret  come  to  ourselves 
and  our  friends  ;  and,  quite  naturally,  we  question  the 
necessity  and  the  propriety  of  all  these  things.  We 
would  be   quite   willing  and   even  ambitious   to   attain 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  141 

moral  growth  in  some  other  way,  but  we  do  not  relish  it 
in  this  particular  way.  It  is  too  hard  and  unsavory. 
And  then  it  is  not  complimentary  to  us  personally.  It 
wounds  our  pride  to  admit  that  we  are  so  very  far  from 
moral  perfection  as  to  employ  extreme  rigors  in  the 
pruning  of  our  vices  and  the  strengthening  of  our  virtues. 
Only  terrible  diseases  justify  heroic  treatment.  And  so 
we  are  tempted  to  reject  the  whole  system  as  a  thing  of 
unnecessary  hardship  and  cruelty. 

We  will  do  well  to  bear  in  mind,  however,  that  parties 
to  the  suit  are  plainly  disqualified  from  passing  unbiased 
judgment  upon  the  decision  of  the  Court. 

With  these  facts  in  view,  no  man  ought  to  expect  a 
perfectly  clear  and  solid  solution  of  this  difficult  prob- 
lem. When  he  has  done  his  best  on  it,  there  will  doubt- 
less be  some  points  of  darkness  and  mystery  still  left. 
But  this  should  not  deter  the  theist  from  undertaking  the 
problem  and  facing  the  facts  in  the  case. 


SECTION   II. 
THE  FACTS. 

There  are  many  facts  in  the  world  that  point  distinct- 
ively toward  the  goodness  of  God,  but  there  are  likewise 
many  others  that  point  the  other  way.  At  least  they 
occupy  debatable  ground.  Their  proper  interpretation  is 
a  matter  of  some  difficulty  and  doubt.  That  is  to  say, 
the  facts  and  phenomena  of  the  universe  may  be  divided 
into  two  classes,  the  former  of  which  shall  contain  all 
such  as  are  manifestly  benevolent  in  character,  while  the 
latter  includes  any  that  may  be  reasonably  considered  of 
doubtful  significance. 


142  CHRISTIAN  THEISM, 

For  the  sake  of  brevity,  the  former  class  will  be  entirely 
omitted  from  the  present  discussion.  A  sufficient  reason 
for  this  omission  will  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  good- 
ness of  God  is  established  in  the  general  behef  of  man- 
kind, and  that  therefore  the  onus  probandi  is  upon  the 
man  who  denies  it.  Liebnitz  recognized  this  principle 
when,  without  attempting  a  perfect  explanation  of  the 
phenomena,  he  said  :  "  We  have  explained  enough  when 
we  have  shown  that  there  are  cases  where  some  disorder 
in  a  part  is  necessary  to  the  production  of  the  greatest 
order  in  the  whole."  That  is,  he  takes  it  for  granted 
that  the  production  of  the  greatest  order  in  the  whole  is  the 
object  of  creation,  and  thus  practically  throws  the  bur- 
den of  proof  upon  him  who  denies  the  goodness  of  God. 
This  is  logical  and  right.  Such  facts  as  are  relied  upon  to 
furnish  proof  against  God's  goodness,  must  be  examined,, 
but  the  discussion  need  not  be  burdened  with  a  detailed 
recital  of  the  facts  on  the  other  side.  Facts  supposed  to 
make  against  the  goodness  of  God  are  usually  presented 
in  three  groups,  the  Physical,  Social,  and  Moral. 

I.    PHYSICAL    FACTS. 

There  are  certain  purely  physical  facts  in  the  world 
that  seem  to  be  malevolent.  We  are  told — and  we  can- 
not dispute  it — that  the  general  aspects  of  nature  are 
often  stern  and  severe.  Her  laws  are  irrevocable  and 
apparently  merciless.  Men  and  animals  often  derive  but 
a  meagre  support  from  her  unwilling  soil.  Storms,, 
cyclones,  and  thunder-bolts  sweep  over  the  land  and 
decimate  its  inhabitants.  The  sea  rises  in  its  anger,  and,, 
without  a  moment's  warning,  engulfs  hundreds  of  souls 
and  millions  of  money  entrusted  to  its  treacherous  waters. 
Miasma  rises  from  a  swamp  and  depopulates  a  whole 
city.     Summer  drought  and  winter  frost  vie  with  each 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  I43 

other  in  the  work  of  destruction  and  death.  One  man 
dies  of  sunstroke  ;  another  is  found  stiff  and  stark  in  a 
blizzard. 

The  volcano  buries  a  helpless  city  in  sudden  ruin  and 
death.  Even  Mother  Earth  shakes  beneath  us,  and  the 
strongest  human  structures  crumble  and  disappear.  The 
very  air  we  breathe,  and  water  we  drink,  are  laden  with 
the  seeds  of  destruction  and  death,  no  less  than  the 
necessary  supplies  of  life.  Human  existence  is  one  pro- 
longed struggle  with  the  elements  and  the  environment. 
Nature  must  be  conquered.  She  yields  but  slowly,  she 
struggles  persistently,  and  so  the  perennial  tussle  goes  on. 
Physical  suffering  in  the  world  is  immense.  Neither  men' 
nor  the  lower  animals  can  escape  it.  A  painless  life  is 
the  rare  exception.  Even  animals  themselves  seem  bent 
on  injuring  and  destroying  one  another.  Claws,  fangs,, 
poisonous  stings,  and,  indeed,  all  manner  of  implements, 
of  torture  and  death  are  general,  familiar,  and  popular  in 
the  operations  of  the  animal  creation.  Carnivora  and 
parasites  have  found  their  way  into  every  part  of  the 
animal  kingdom.  The  lesson  of  physical  pain  is  written 
in  ghastly  lines  on  earth  and  air  and  sea  and  sky. 

2.    SOCIAL    FACTS. 

Those  who  deny  the  goodness  of  God  have  likewise 
presented  numerous  facts  of  Sociology  which  seem  to 
strengthen  their  denial.  They  insist  that  the  relations 
between  man  and  man  are  far  from  being  perfect.  So-^ 
ciety  is  indefinitely  stratified,  and  the  lower  orders  are 
continually  suffering  from  the  inequalities  of  their  lot; 
Caste  with  iron  heel  treads  down  the  masses  to  the 
earth.  The  great  struggling  multitude  are  in  perpetual 
unrest.  They  are  neither  willing  to  endure  their  fate  nor 
able  to  overcome  it.  Ambition  and  despair  sweep  alter- 
nately across  their  path  and  make  them  doubly  miserable- 


144  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

And  then  there  are  the  gross  injustices  of  life.  One 
man  sows,  and  another  reaps.  One  toils,  and  another 
robs  him  of  his  just  reward.  The  shrewd  villain  impover- 
ishes the  honest  citizen,  the  tongue  of  the  slanderer 
destroys  the  fair  name  of  the  virtuous,  and  the  artful 
seducer  corrupts  the  heart  of  the  unsuspecting  and  the 
innocent.  The  strong  oppress  the  weak.  Abounding 
wealth  turns  naked  poverty  unclothed  and  unfed  from  its 
door.  Successful  vice  sits  enthroned  at  the  centre  of 
many  a  social  circle,  and  stares  with  brazen  face  at  the 
retreating  form  of  defeated  virtue.  The  fortunate  classes 
treat  with  ill-disguised  contempt  their  less  fortunate 
neighbors.  Poverty  pinches  the  poor,  and  the  helpless 
cry  of  squalor,  oppression,  and  despair  goes  up  from 
every  land. 

Then  comes  war,  the  final  stage  of  social  distress. 
Men  are  made  savage  and  brutal.  The  arts  of  peace  are 
forsaken,  and  the  instruments  of  death  brought  forth. 
Fraternal  love  is  forgotten,  and  blood  is  sweet  to  every 
taste.  Treasures  are  wasted  and  lives  poured  out  like  a 
Hood.  For  some  real  or  fancied  wrong,  thousands  of  men 
are  drawn  up  in  stately  array  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
butchering  one  another.  And  when  at  length  the  strug- 
gle is  ended,  one  side  is  found  crushed  by  defeat,  the 
other  brutalized  by  victory,  and  both  demonized  by  unre- 
lenting hate. 

This  dark  picture  is  no  mere  fancy.  The  history  of  the 
world  is  a  history  of  war.     There  is  blood  on  every  page. 

3.    MORAL    FACTS. 

The  facts  just  enumerated  would  seem  discouraging, 
indeed  ;    and  yet  they  are  only  surface  facts  after  all. 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  1 45 

They  do  not  penetrate  to  the  heart  of  things.  The  centre 
of  the  disease  is  further  down.  Moral  evil  is  the  deep- 
seated  sore  of  the  ages.  Sin  is  the  unsolved  problem  of 
the  universe.  Its  sway  is  universal.  It  has  passed  upon 
all  men.  ''  The  slime  of  the  serpent  is  upon  every  head  ; 
its  loathsome  coil  in  every  heart."  The  consciousness  of 
sin  is  as  broad  as  the  human  race  and  as  long  as  time 
itself.  But  whence  came  it  ?  and  why  ?  These  questions 
have  never  been  finally  answered.  Men  have  always 
grappled  with  them  and  philosophized  upon  them  with 
great  freedom,  indeed,  but  with  little  success. 

And  then  the  transmission  of  moral  evil  constitutes 
another  dark  problem.  Sin  reproduces  itself.  The  law  of 
heredity  comes  in  and  hands  it  down  from  father  to  son. 
One  generation  sins,  and  a  thousand  generations  inherit 
the  wretched  patrimony.  The  glutton,  the  drunkard,  and 
the  debauchee  entail  upon  their  remotest  offspring  the 
fatal  effects  of  their  loathsome  vices.  In  the  fulness  of 
time,  each  succeeding  generation  must  take  up  the  burden 
of  a  father's  sins,  either  to  fall  beneath  it,  in  physical  and 
moral  weakness,  into  an  untimely  grave,  or  transmit  it, 
enlarged  and  intensified,  to  the  still  more  unfortunate 
heir  that  shall  come  after  him.  And  so  the  dreadful 
entail  goes  on  from  one  generation  to  another  till  the 
end  of  time.  This  perpetual  subjection  of  human  hearts 
to  the  powers  of  evil,  and  this  involuntary  entailment  of 
hereditary  sin,  are  the  bottom  problems  for  Beneficence 
to  solve.  I  have  presented  them  in  the  strongest  light 
possible,  and  in  the  very  words  of  the  pessimist,  in  order 
that  the  difficulties  involved  may  be  fairly  seen  and 
squarely  met.  There  is  no  evasion  in  theistic  thought. 
If  God  be  infinitely  good,  why  are  things  thus  ? 


146  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

SECTION  III. 
FALSE  ANSWERS. 

This  question  of  the  ages  must  be  approached  in  a  spirit 
of  modesty  and  self-distrust.  One  cannot  hope  to  succeed 
wherein  others  have  uniformly  failed.  What  has  puzzled 
earnest  thinkers  hitherto  will  doubtless  remain  a  puzzle 
hereafter.  The  last  word  on  the  origin  and  justification 
of  moral  evil  in  the  universe  has  not  been  written.  Prob- 
ably it  will  not  be  written  till  the  light  of  a  clearer  day 
shall  dawn  upon  human  vision.  And  yet  the  problem 
comes  legitimately  across  the  pathway  of  our  theistic 
studies,  and  it  would  be  sheer  cowardice  not  to  attack  it. 

The  many  solutions  hitherto  attempted,  as  well  as  those 
that  may  follow,  can  be  gathered  into  three  general 
groups ;  namely,  Ditheism^  Pessimism^  and  Optimism.  For 
convenience  of  discussion,  this  classification  will  be  adopt- 
ed, and  the  various  theories  will  be  examined  in  the  order 
indicated.  Ditheism  and  Pessimism  will  be  found  weak 
and  unsatisfactory.  Optimism  stands  on  the  firmest 
footing. 

I.    DITHEISM. 

By  this  term  is  meant  the  belief  in  two  divine  beings, 
one  good  and  the  other  evil.  It  is  the  dualism  of  gods. 
This  doctrine  is  no  uncommon  thing  in  the  early  history 
of  religions.  It  seems,  indeed,  to  be  the  first  solution 
men  have  attempted  concerning  the  problem  of  sin. 
Pressed  by  its  cogent  facts  and  direful  consequences,  they 
have  been  forced  to  ascribe  its  origin  to  the  will  of  an  evil 
spirit  of  vast  power  and  relentless  cruelty.  But  the  num- 
berless benefactions  of  nature  have,  by  a  mental  necessity, 
been  already  ascribed  to  a  good  spirit  from  whom  all  the 
blessings  of  life  are  supposed  to  emanate.     Hence  arises 


THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  147 

a  dualism  of  antagonistic  deities.  To  these  two  rival 
deities  is  attributed  that  essential  and  eternal  warfare 
between  good  and  evil  which  all  men  recognize  and  seek 
to  explain.  One  god  is  beneficent,  mild,  and  loving ;  the 
other  is  cruel,  hateful,  malignant.  One  seeks  the  perpet- 
ual happiness  of  man  ;  the  other  his  misery  and  destruc- 
tion. There  is  hostility  between  them,  and  eternal  war  is 
waged.  The  progress  of  the  conflict  is  portrayed  in  many 
early  religions. 

In  the  Zend-Avesta  we  find  Ormazd  and  Ahriman,  the 
good  and  evil  spirits,  perpetually  striving  for  the  mastery 
of  the  world.  In  the  Vedic  religion  the  same  antagonism 
is  asserted  between  Brahma  and  Rudra,  the  creator  and  the 
destroyer.  In  the  pantheon  of  Scandinavia  it  is  Odin  and 
Loke  ;  in  ancient  Egyptian  mythology  it  is  Osiris  and 
Typhon.  As  late  as  the  third  century  of  the  Christian 
era  this  dualism  was  revived  by  Mani,  who  insisted  upon 
the  coordination  and  independence  of  the  good  and  the 
evil  spirit.  Even  Augustine  and  other  Christian  Fathers, 
for  a  time,  taught  the  same  doctrine. 

In  every  case  there  are  two  great  contending  powers ; 
the  one  benign,  the  other  malevolent.  It  is  the  Good 
Spirit  and  his  angels  fighting  against  the  Evil  Spirit  and 
his  angels,  and  struggling  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
universe.  This  is  the  warfare  of  the  ages  supposed  to  be 
carried  on  throughout  all  nature,  as  well  as  in  the  hearts 
and  lives  of  men.  It  is  the  duty  of  all  men  to  ally  them- 
selves to  the  Good  Spirit ;  and  it  is  their  privilege,  by 
personal  good  deeds,  to  advance  his  righteous  cause. 

This  dualism,  in  some  form,  is  likewise  taught  by  many 
philosophers.  Empedocles  represented  Love  and  Hate 
as  opposing  forces  working  with  the  elements  of  nature. 
Love  at  length  succeeds  in  bringing  light  and  beauty  out 


148  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

of  darkness  and  death.  Pythagoras  taught  that  intelligent 
spirits  are  good  and  free ;  that  there  is  a  divine  soul  of 
things,  but  matter  is  a  perpetual  and  hurtful  incubus 
upon  it ;  and  that  the  human  soul  is  in  itself  a  harmony, 
but  rendered  discordant  by  its  imprisonment  in  the  body. 
In  our  day,  J.  S.  Mill  presents  a  view  of  Theodicy  which  is 
little  less  than  a  revival  of  Pythagorean  dualism. 

Now  this  ditheistic  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil  is 
essentially  childish  and  crude.  The  coeternity  of  two 
fighting  deities  is  an  impossible  conception.  Arguments 
for  the  Unity  of  God,  which  will  be  set  forth  in  the  next 
chapter,  and  which  need  not  here  be  anticipated,  will 
amply  refute  this  doctrine.  It  is  enough  for  the  present 
to  say  that  it  is  a  passing  mode  of  undeveloped  thought, 
which  uniformly  recedes  before  the  light  of  advancing 
civilization. 

2.     PESSIMISM. 

The  pessimist  attempts  to  explain  evil  by  making  it 
dominant,  supreme.  He  turns  his  back  to  the  light,  and 
says  there  is  no  light ;  shuts  his  eyes  to  the  good,  and  de- 
clares all  is  evil ;  bars  his  soul  against  all  hope,  and  revels 
in  despair.  He  believes  the  universe  is  under  the  supreme 
control  of  evil,  and  is  getting  worse  and  worse.  He  re- 
gards the  struggle  of  right  against  wrong  as  hopelessly 
unequal,  and  is  quite  disposed  to  give  it  up  entirely. 
With  Buddha,  he  declares  existence  to  be  an  evil,  and 
longs  to  be  rid  of  it.  Or,  with  Schopenhauer,  he  believes 
the  world  is  not  the  best,  but  the  worst,  of  all  possible 
worlds.  Or,  with  Hartmann,  while  admitting  that  the 
existing  world  is  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds,  he  never- 
theless regards  it  as  a  failure,  and  thinks  it  would  be  far 
better  if  no  world  had  ever  been  made.  As  the  world 
exists,  he  sees  it  full  of  pain  and  cruelty.     All  nature  is  a 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD,  1 49 

scene  of  universal  and  prolonged  misery.  If  there  be  a 
God  at  all,  the  pessimist  declares  him  to  be  a  malevolent 
monster  who  takes  fiendish  delight  in  wantonly  torturing 
the  creatures  he  has  made.  If  he  were  not  a  monster,  he 
would  stop  all  this  horrid  pain  and  agony  of  life.  A 
clever  stroke  of  logic  is  brought  in  to  clinch  this  pessi- 
mistic nail.  Epicurus  and  Lactantius  used  it.  And  to 
this  day,  pessimists  seem  never  to  tire  of  using  it.  They 
say :  "  If  God  is  almighty,  he  is  able  to  destroy  evil ;  if 
he  is  good,  he  is  disposed  to  destroy  it.  But,  inasmuch 
as  he  does  not  destroy  evil,  he  is  either  not  almighty  or 
not  good."  Taking  the  second  alternative,  the  pessimist 
declares  God  to  be  a  malicious  demon. 

To  prove  his  view,  he  cites  the  numerous  ills  and  pains 
of  life.  His  tongue  is  dipped  in  poison,  and  is  voluble  of 
evils.  Carnivorous  animals,  parasites,  human  suffering, 
the  severities  of  nature,  moral  evil  and  inherited  sin,  con- 
stitute his  staple  and  well-worn  arguments.  With  a  depth 
of  pathos  equalled  only  by  the  height  of  his  indignation, 
he  rings  the  changes  on  the  dark  list  of  calamities,  iniqui- 
ties, and  griefs.  Some  fair  average  samples  of  the  list 
have  already  been  borrowed  from  him  and  written  down 
in  the  second  section  of  this  chapter. 

As  a  conclusion  of  his  whole  argument,  he  says: 
"  Scarcely  is  a  happy  life  worth  living,  and  few,  indeed, 
find  that  life."  And  there  is  a  sort  of  sullen  satisfaction 
in  the  very  ghastliness  of  his  words.  He  can  rejoice  in 
one  advantage  of  his  philosophy,  at  least.  It  releases  him 
and  absolves  his  conscience  from  all  struggle  with  the 
powers  of  evil  in  his  own  soul.  If  evil  sits  supreme  upon 
the  throne  of  the  universe,  it  is  worse  than  vanity,  and  a 
double  folly,  to  strive  against  it  in  the  weak  and  broken 
citadel  of  his  own  heart.     And  so  he  gives  over  the  strug- 


I50  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

gle,  throws  down  his  arms,  and  surrenders  at  discretion  to 
the  domination  of  imperious  appetite  and  passion.  Hence- 
forth he  may  lead  an  ignoble  and  vicious  life ;  but  he 
easily  persuades  himself  that  it  must  be  so,  since  evil  is 
supreme  in  the  world,  and  indolently  throws  upon  God  the 
responsibility  of  his  own  misdeeds. 

But  the  pessimist's  philosophy  is  one-sided  and  weak. 
It  attempts  to  solve  the  dark  problem  of  evil;  but  the 
solution  reached  is  darker  by  far  than  the  problem  to  be 
solved.  Indeed,  it  is  no  solution  at  all.  It  is  the  rather  a 
cowardly  retreat  from  the  difficulties  that  confront  us. 
There  is  a  better,  braver  course. 


SECTION  IV. 

THE  TRUE  ANSWER— OPTIMISM. 

The  optimist  takes  a  broad  and  comprehensive  view  of 
the  question  of  morality  in  the  universe.  He  believes 
that,  on  the  whole,  all  things  in  nature  are  ordered  for  the 
best ;  that  God  is  just  and  wise  and  good  ;  and  that  these 
attributes  of  Deity  are  increasingly  manifested  to  man,  as 
the  ages  go  by.  But  he  by  no  means  ignores  the  existence 
of  physical  and  moral  evil  in  the  world,  nor  the  wide- 
spread and  desolating  effects  thereof  upon  the  lives  and 
destinies  of  men.  He  freely  admits  both,  and  seeks  to 
reconcile  them  with  the  goodness  of  God.  This  attempt 
his  philosophy  compels  him  to  make.  He  sees  the  good- 
ness of  God  written  everywhere,  and  cannot  question  it. 
He  likewise  recognizes  the  presence  of  evil  in  the  world, 
and  cannot  question  that.  Both  exist,  and  must,  there- 
fore, coexist.  But  how  are  they  to  be  reconciled  ?  Here- 
in is  the  difficult  problem.     The  ditheist  evades  it  at  the 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD,  151 

expense  of  God's  unity,  and  the  pessimist  evades  it  at  the 
expense  of  God's  goodness.  The  optimist  is  left  to  grap- 
ple with  it  unaided  and  alone. 

I.     AS    TO    PHYSICAL   EVIL. 

Suffering  is  an  obtrusive  fact  in  the  world,  vast  in 
amount  and  severe  in  character.  And  yet,  it  is  habitually 
and  grossly  over-estimated.  We  waste  a  great  amount  of 
pity,  for  example,  in  view  of  the  suffering  of  animals.  The 
carnivora  undoubtedly  inflict  some  pain  ;  but  it  is  proba- 
bly not  a  tithe  of  what  we  are  accustomed  to  think  it. 
The  victims  of  their  rapacity  are  merely  physical  beings. 
As  such  they  are  capable  of  physical  delights  and  suffer- 
ings, and  nothing  more.  They  have  no  view  of  the  future. 
The  tenacity  of  life,  the  dread  of  death,  and  the  agonizing 
uncertainty  of  the  future  so  natural  to  man,  are,  in  their 
case,  comparatively  nothing.  Consciousness  means  noth- 
ing, in  strictly  organic  life.  Even  sensitiveness  is  greatly 
reduced.  Every  thing  is  less  acute  than  in  the  higher 
organism  of  man.  The  head  of  a  dragon-fly  will  continue 
to  eat  after  it  is  severed  from  the  body.  A  worm  may  be 
bisected,  and  still  get  along  with  apparent  comfort.  It 
cannot  be  that  there  is  much  pain  in  these  operations. 
Judged  by  our  own  sufferings  in  such  a  case,  it  would  be 
vastly  exaggerated.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  we  can  better 
understand  that  "  law  of  merciless  and  incessant  destruc- 
tion "  among  animals,  as  the  pessimist  is  pleased  to  term 
it.  Look  at  the  case.  An  animal  has  filled  up  his  plenum 
of  physical  life  and  pleasure.  He  must  die  in  some  way. 
He  meets  his  death  by  violence;  a  few  well-directed 
blows  at  the  nervous  centres ;  a  brief  struggle,  in  which 
the  excitement  of  the  contest  deadens  the  pain  of  the 
wounds ;  and  all  is  quickly  over.     A  moment  ago  he  en- 


152  CHRISTIAN  THEISM. 

joyed  the  fulness  of  animal  life ;  now  it  is  gone,  and  that 
is  all.  If  we  lay  mere  sentiment  aside,  we  can  see  that 
this  method  of  death  is  no  worse  than  that  slow  decay  and 
protracted  pain  which  must  otherwise  turn  into  a  pro- 
longed burden,  a  life  whose  only  value  is  found  in  its 
capacity  for  physical  pleasure.  It  would  seem,  at  leasts 
that  this  famous  carnivorous  argument  against  the  good- 
ness of  God  must  be  greatly  minimized.  It  is  certainly 
true  that  health  and  pleasure  are  predominant  among  un- 
domesticated  animals,  and  that  nature  inflicts  far  less  pain 
upon  them  than  man  does  upon  those  that  serve  him. 

But  this  is  not  all.  We  likewise  over-estimate  human 
suffering.  We  thrust  ourselves  under  other  men's  bur- 
dens. We  judge  of  them  by  their  supposed  weight  upon  our 
own  shoulders.  In  so  doing  we  ignore  those  external  and 
internal  adaptations  of  life  which  are  constantly  at  work 
reducing  the  severities  of  human  experience.  This  is  a 
great  mistake.  The  truth  is  that  man's  versatility  is  with- 
out limit ;  he  can  become  accustomed  to  almost  any  thing. 
Life  uniformly  and  readily  adjusts  itself  to  its  envii*on- 
ment.  Every  man's  burden  is  fitted  to  his  back,  and  his 
back  to  his  burden.  If  I  wantonly  trade  burdens  with 
another  man,  I  destroy  the  adjustment,  and  get  to  myself 
an  intolerable  load  which  to  him  may  have  been  as  noth- 
ing. Nay,  it  may  have  been  light  as  air,  pleasant  as  sun- 
shine, sweet  as  honey.  The  learned  savant  passes  by  the 
hut  of  the  peasant  and  greatly  pities  him  in  his  state  of 
lowliness,  ignorance,  and  physical  toil.  But  his  sympathy 
is  wasted.  For  that  same  peasant  is  merry  at  heart  and 
free  from  care.  He  goes  singing  at  his  work,  and  only 
wonders  how  any  sane  man  can  deliberately  shut  himself 
up  and  waste  his  life  over  dull  and  musty  books.  Such  a 
life  to  him  would  be  worse  than  the  prison  or  the  rack. 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  1 53 

One  man's  happiness  may  be  on  a  lower  plane  than 
another's,  but  it  is  happiness  nevertheless.  It  would  be 
a  great  mistake  to  label  it  misery  simply  because  it  fails 
to  conform  to  our  particular  pattern  of  happiness.  But 
this  very  mistake  we  are  constantly  making. 

These  considerations  will  serve  to  reduce  the  physical 
suffering  of  the  world  to  a  point  far  below  our  ordinary 
estimates.  The  fact  of  suffering  still  remains,  however, 
and  calls  for  explanation.  The  following  suggestions  are 
offered  in  answer  to  this  demand. 

(i)  Suffering  is  Exceptional  in  the  World. 
In  the  aggregate  it  may  be  very  great,  but  proportion- 
ately it  is  extremely  small.  Most  animals  are  compara- 
tively free  from  pain.  And  even  man,  with  all  the  aches 
and  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to,  is  not  subject  to  much  phys- 
ical suffering.  Pain  asserts  itself,  and  is  more  clamorous 
than  pleasure  ;  but,  after  all,  it  occurs  but  seldom.  If  the 
average  number  of  moments  of  pain  that  each  man  now 
living  has  suffered  during  the  past  year  were  accurately 
ascertained,  and  the  average  of  pleasurable  moments  like- 
wise computed,  and  then  if  these  respective  averages  were 
multiplied  by  the  whole  number  of  men,  and  their  ratio 
taken,  it  would  be  found  that  the  pain  of  the  world  is  but 
a  very  small /^r  cent,  of  its  pleasures.  To  the  most  of  us 
there  come  ten  days  of  health  to  one  of  disease — a 
month  of  physical  pleasure  to  an  hour  of  physical  pain. 
Health  is  the  rule  ;  suffering  the  exception. 

(2)  Suffering  Ministers  to  Life  and  Safety. 

Pain  is  a  monitor.  It  discloses  dangers  of  body  and 
of  mind,  and  incites  us  to  avoid  them  in  the  interest  of 
health  and  happiness.  If  its  monitions  are  heeded  they 
are  neither  severe  nor  frequent.     The  first  indigestion  is 


154  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

not  dyspepsia,  nor  the  first  cough  consumption.  But  if 
they  are  neglected,  what  rational  being  can  complain  of 
their  frequent  repetition  or  of  their  increased  severity  ? 
Suffering  makes  the  experience  of  fools  a  dear  school,  and 
of  course  the  greater  the  folly  is  the  greater  the  suffering 
must  be. 

(3)  Suffering  is  a  Penalty  of  Law, 

Law  must  have  penalties,  and  must  be  inexorable. 
But  a  penalty  which  involves  no  suffering  is  not  a  pen- 
alty. If  men  will  violate  law,  they  must  suffer  the  conse- 
quences. If  obedience  to  physical  law  brings  physical 
pleasure,  disobedience  must  bring  physical  pain.  The 
laws  themselves  are  beneficent  and  good  ;  so  far  as  we 
can  see,  they  are  necessary  even.  But  they  are  not  coer- 
sive  ;  men  may  yield  to  them,  work  under  them,  and  live 
by  them,  or  they  may  totally  ignore  them  to  their  own 
misery  and  destruction.  For  these  painful  results  the 
laws  themselves  are  not  at  all  responsible. 

(4)  Suffering  is  Incident  to  Mental  Growth. 

Growth  in  knowledge  and  intellectual  power  is  not  in 
itself  a  painful  process.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  positively 
pleasurable.  But,  nevertheless,  it  is  subject  to  conditions 
and  limitations.  These  are  necessary  and  must  be  ob- 
served. A  man  must  not  pursue  useful  knowledge  even, 
in  any  manner  and  to  any  extent  whatever,  and  it  is  often 
the  mission  of  pain  to  remind  him  of  this  fact.  A  nerv- 
ous headache  is  an  uncomfortable  affair,  but  it  has  saved 
many  an  ambitious  youth  from  suicide  by  an  over-dose  of 
truth. 

And  then  the  very  conditions  of  pleasure  and  pain  fur- 
nish every  man  with  a  practical  problem  whose  proper 
solution  brings  intellectual  rewards  as  well  as  physical. 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  1 55 

(5)  Suffering  Increases  Happiness. 

This  statement  is  no  less  true  than  paradoxical.  One 
moment  of  pain  emphasizes  a  whole  day  of  physical 
health,  whose  pleasure  would  otherwise  scarcely  be  no- 
ticed. Indeed,  it  has  become  proverbial  that  men  do  not 
value  the  joy  of  health  until  an  occasional  pang  of  disease 
reminds  them  of  its  worth.  Monotony  is  burdensome  to 
most  men,  and  contrast  heightens  all  enjoyments.  Pain 
exists  for  pleasure's  sake,  and  there  seems  to  be  just  about 
enough  of  it  to  disclose  at  their  best  the  general  joys  of 
life. 

(6)  Suffering  Leads  to  Righteousness. 

Correct  and  upright  living  in  a  world  of  fierce  tempta- 
tions and  angry  passions  is  attained  only  by  struggle  and 
severity.  Pain  of  body  often  purifies  the  soul.  The 
problem  of  the  existence  of  moral  evil  in  the  soul  will  be 
discussed  hereafter.  But  certain  it  is  that  physical  pain 
often  becomes  the  means  of  its  removal.  Inasmuch  as 
pain  does  this,  it  is  a  blessing,  and  not  a  curse  ; — a  thing 
of  love,  and  not  of  hate.  It  leads  men  upward  to  en- 
larged and  noble  living.  If  the  human  race  were  robbed 
of  its  inheritance  of  noble  lives  made  heroic  through  suf- 
fering, it  would  be  morally  poor  indeed. 

(7)  Suffering  is  Largely  Unnecessary. 

The  aggregate  of  suffering  actually  endured  in  the 
world  at  any  given  time  is  greatly  in  excess  of  what  it 
need  be.  It  could  be  readily  reduced.  Man  could  dimin- 
ish it  if  he  would.  By  far  the  severest  sufferings  in  the 
world  are  matters  of  voluntary  infliction  by  man  himself. 
Human  heedlessness,  cruelty,  and  vice  are  chargeable 
with  nine  tenths  of  the  pains  of  life.  Man  is  vastly  more 
savage  than  nature.     He  has  no  right  to  complain  of  the 


156  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

existence  of  suffering  in  the  world  until,  instead  of  wan- 
tonly multiplying  it,  he  has  done  his  utmost  to  remove  it. 

2.    AS    TO    SOCIAL    EVIL. 

The  optimist  admits  the  existence  of  social  evils  in  the 
world.  Wherever  man  exists,  society  is  found  ;  where- 
ever  society  exists,  social  evils  abound.  This  has  always 
been  so  ;  and  while  man  is  an  imperfect  being,  it  will 
continue  to  be  so.  All  that  the  pessimist  has  said  con- 
cerning social  inequalities,  caste,  oppression,  injustice, 
tyranny,  anarchy,  revolution,  and  war,  is  literally  true. 
But  his  inference  from  these  facts  is  not  true. 

There  are  two  remarks  to  be  made  in  explanation  of 
social  evils  : 

(i)  They  are  the  direct  results  of  human  depravity — 
the  natural  outflow  of  sin.  They  are  simply  moral  evils 
in  a  social  setting.  The  discussion  of  the  next  topic  will 
therefore  apply  with  equal  force  to  them. 

(2)  They  are  self-corrective.  A  glance  at  the  pages  of 
history  discloses  this  fact.  Oppression  breeds  anarchy, 
anarchy  breeds  war,  war  brings  on  revolution,  revolution 
advances  liberty  and  destroys  oppression.  So  universal 
and  proverbial  is  this  tendency,  that  it  has  given  us  the 
historical  aphorism,  "  Revolutions  never  go  backwards." 
War  is  always  fruitful  of  good,  as  well  as  of  evil ;  and  the 
good  preponderates.  The  bloodier  the  war  is,  the  greater 
the  good  that  flows  from  it.  The  great  battles  of  the 
world  have  marked  the  epochs  of  its  progress.  This 
must  be  so  ;  for  the  deeper  the  disease  may  be  in  the 
body  politic,  the  keener  must  be  the  lance  that  probes  it. 

Social  evils  are  slowly  correcting  each  other.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  process  one  extreme  continually  begets  an- 
other.    The  pendulum  of    progress  has  still    a  mighty 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD,  157 

sweep,  but  it  is  steadily  approaching  the  centre  of  the 
arc,  and  is  drawing  men  with  it. 

3.    AS    TO    MORAL    EVIL. 

As  already  intimated,  moral  evil  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
problem  that  the  optimist  would  fain  solve.  Sin  is  the 
dark  fact  of  the  universe.  In  approaching  its  discussion, 
I  make  two  stages. 

(i)  Suppose  its  Origin  to  be  Explained. 

Let  it  be  granted,  for  the  present,  that  moral  evil  exists, 
and  that  its  origin  in  the  universe  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  goodness  of  God.  On  this  hypothesis,  the  whole 
system  of  things  can  easily  be  justified. 

{a)  The  existing  world  is  the  best  possible  world. — To 
the  pessimist's  argument  that  the  best  possible  system  of 
things  would  be  perfect,  and  that  therefore  this  imperfect 
world  is  not  the  best  possible,  we  reply :  The  best  possi- 
ble created  system  as  an  end  in  itself,  is  a  contradiction  ;■ 
for  that  end,  however  good,  can  still  be  increased  in 
quantity,  till  it  reaches  the  infinite.  But  that  infinite  is 
God  himself.  As  a  means  to  a?i  efid,  a  created  system 
may  be  the  best  possible,  or  the  worst  possible.  All  de- 
pends upon  its  fitness  to  achieve  the  end  desired.  Now, 
if  this  world  is  a  mediate  system,  designed  for  the  moral 
perfection  of  man,  it  must  be  judged  by  its  relation  to 
this  moral  purpose.  That  it  is  so  designed,  is  the  com- 
mon belief  of  mankind.  Kant  says  :  '*  The  most  vulgar 
minds  agree  that  man  can  be  the  final  end  of  the  creation, 
only  as  a  moral  being."  But  the  rational  end  of  man  is 
not  mere  animal  pleasure.  His  true  happiness  cannot  be 
secured  apart  from  the  development,  regulation,  and  per- 
fection of  his  spiritual  nature.     Granting,  then,  that  the 


158  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

rational  purpose  of  creation  is  to  establish  imperfect  moral 
beings  in  a  voluntary  state  of  eternal  virtue,  it  is  clear  that 
the  existing  system  is  the  very  best  possible  for  that 
purpose.  But  if  it  is  not,  let  the  pessimist  propose  a 
better  than  the  present  one,  or  at  least  an  equal  to  it. 
When  he  has  done  this  it  will  be  time  enough  to  entertain 
his  senseless  quibble  about  the  best  possible  system  of 
things. 

ifi)  The  so-called  cruelty  of  nature  vanishes. — Mr.  Mill 
confronts  the  optimist  with  the  statement  that  nature  is 
cruel,  that  cosmic  forces  go  straight  to  their  end,  and 
crush  men  to  death  on  the  road.  He  quotes  Pope's 
famous  line,  "  Shall  gravitation  cease  when  you  go  by  ?  " 
and  plainly  intimates  that  if  nature,  instead  of  being  a 
cruel  demon,  were  possessed  of  common  human  morality, 
then  gravitation  would  cease  rather  than  interfere  with 
human  life.  Now  this  suggestion  would  necessitate  a 
perpetual  miracle.  For  there  are  always  some  men  who 
'are  heedless  or  reckless  enough  to  expose  themselves  to 
the  dangers  of  natural  law.  After  rejecting  Gospel  mira- 
cles, whose  evident  purpose  was  to  make  men  better,  by 
introducing  and  establishing  a  pure  and  holy  religion,  Mr. 
Mill  turns  around  and  demands  a  perpetual  miracle  whose 
operation  must  be  baleful  in  the  extreme.  Instead  of 
making  men  wise,  law-abiding,  and  self-helpful,  it  would 
dwarf  their  best  powers,  and  render  them  incompetent, 
exacting,  and  childish.  Rousseau,  applying  this  thought 
to  the  severities  of  the  famous  earthquake  at  Lisbon, 
says  :  "  What  would  such  a  privilege  signify  ?  Would  it 
not  mean  that  the  order  of  the  world  must  change 
according  to  our  caprices  ?  that  nature  is  subject  to  our 
laws?  and  that  to  forbid  an  earthquake  in  any  place,  we 
would  only  have  to  build  a  town  there  ?  "     Such  a  dispo- 


THE  GOODNESS  OF  GOD,  1 59 

sition  of  events  in  nature  would  be  lawless  indeed.  It  is 
difficult  to  conceive  a  more  unreasonable  and  inconsistent 
suggestion  than  Mr.  Mill  has  made.  Nature  is  not  cruel 
when  viewed  as  a  means  to  the  moral  renovation  and  per- 
fection of  man. 

(c)  The  entail  of  sin  is  justified. — The  law  of  heredity  is 
well  established.  Neither  its  existence  nor  its  force  need 
be  questioned.  By  this  law,  evil  is  transmitted,  as  well 
as  good.  And  why  not  ?  Ought  sin  to  be  protected 
against  itself,  and  relieved  of  its  own  entail  ?  Can  it  be 
repressed  by  coercive  enactment  ?  Is  there  any  better 
method  than  this  very  law  of  inheritance,  to  display  the 
hideousness  of  sin,  and  so  deter  men  from  it  ?  Is  it  not 
the  last  link  that  binds  many  a  man  to  virtue  ?  The  way- 
ward and  rebellious  soul  is  often  willing  to  pursue  a  life 
of  sin,  and  take  the  consequences  of  his  own  folly  ;  but 
the  last  remains  of  manhood  in  him  rise  in  revolt  against 
the  idea  of  visiting  upon  his  innocent  and  helpless  child 
the  penalties  of  his  own  transgression.  And  so  passions 
are  curbed  and  iniquity  restrained  by  the  reflex  action  of 
this  very  law. 

But  this  is  not  all.  There  is  another  and  better  side 
to  the  question.  If  this  law  gives  vice  its  own  entail,  it 
gives  virtue  its  own  also.  It  is  not  altogether  destructive, 
as  the  pessimist  would  say ;  indeed,  it  is,  on  the  whole, 
constructive  in  the  highest  and  best  sense.  It  transmits 
vastly  more  good  than  evil.  Were  it  otherwise,  the  world 
would  be  growing  worse  and  worse  every  day.  The  con- 
stant improven^ent  of  the  world  is  a  constant  vindication 
of  this  law.  And  so  shall  it  continue,  until  at  length  the 
stream  of  righteousness,  reinforced  by  gathered  ages, 
shall  roll  over  the  earth  through  the  broadening  channel 
of  this  same  beneficent  law. 


l6o  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

(d)  The  penalty  of  sin  is  likewise  justified. — The  re- 
ligious pessimist  is  wont  to  trouble  himself  about  the  final 
punishment  of  sin.  He  asks  :  ""  How  can  God  be  good,  if 
he  has  created  a  moral  being  who  he  knew  would  pass  his 
life  in  sin,  and  then  fall  into  eternal  misery  ?  "  Put  that 
way,  the  question  looks  dark  indeed.  But  turn  the  horo- 
scope and  look  the  other  way.  Let  the  pessimist  say; 
*'  God  has  made  me  a  rational  being,  and  endowed  me 
with  conscience  and  free-will.  He  has  put  his  love  upon 
me  and  offered  me  eternal  felicity,  if  I  will  only  leave  the 
ways  of  sin.  I  have  spurned  the  offer,  chosen  sin  rather 
than  holiness,  hell  rather  than  heaven,  and  thereby  delib- 
erately shut  myself  out  from  the  fellowship  of  the  blessed. 
But,  then,  God  is  to  blame  for  it  all.  He  ought  not  to 
have  given  me  freedom  at  all.  Or,  at  least,  he  ought  to 
have  made  me  a  saint,  whether  I  would  or  not.  And 
because  he  has  not  done  this,  he  is  a  demon  and  I  am 
clear."  Put  thus,  this  pessimistic  plea  looks  childish  and 
unreasonable. 

The  same  question  is  sometimes  proposed  in  a  different 
form.  "  Why  is  temptation  in  the  world  ?  Why  am  I 
frail  and  peccable  ?  Why  must  I  continually  resist  and 
struggle  ?  Why  is  not  stainless  virtue  an  inalienable  pos- 
session, rather  than  a  possible  prize  of  life?"  Now  all 
these  questions  may  be  hard  to  answer.  But  one  thing  is 
certain  ;  the  asking  of  them  betrays  the  moral  coward  and 
sluggard.  What  man,  who  is  a  man,  would  want  moral 
goodness  forced  upon  him  ?  What  would  such  goodness 
be  worth?  Indeed,  how  could  it  be  possible?  It  might 
be  the  goodness  of  the  steam-engine  or  of  an  automaton, 
but  not  of  a  man.  Virtue  cannot  be  forced  upon  a  free, 
being.  All  a  true  man  asks  is  a  fair  chance  to  struggle 
and  win  it  for  himself.     If  God  has  given  him  the  power 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  l6l 

to  struggle  and  the  will  to  decide,  that  is  enough  ;  he  asks 
no  more.  Coercive  measures  would  reduce  his  manhood, 
and  make  him  a  mere  machine  or  a  pitiful  moral  beggar. 
Character  must  be  free ;  and  sin  must  find  in  the  sinner 
its  proper  arrest  and  its  righteous  punishment. 

The  discussion  thus  far  has  proceeded  upon  the  hypoth- 
esis that  moral  evil  exists  in  the  world,  and  that  its  origin 
is  consistent  with  the  goodness  of  God.  But  the  pessimist 
justly  claims  that  this  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  without 
begging  the  main  question.  Attention  must  therefore  be 
given  to  this  point  in  the  problem  before  us.  It  consti- 
tutes the  second  stage  of  the  discussion. 

(2)   The  Origin  of  Moral  Evil. 

Although  logically  first,  I  have  placed  this  question 
chronologically  last,  because  of  its  extreme  difficulty. 
The  force  of  the  preceding  discussion  must  be  admitted, 
provided  the  fact  of  moral  evil  can  be  justified.  But 
the  objector  may  still  ask  :  "  Why  is  sin  possible  ?  Why 
should  it  ever  have  had  an  existence  in  God's  universe  ? 
If  he  be  omnipotent,  why  did  he  not  prevent  it  in  the 
beginning?"  These  questions  are  the  hardest  of  all. 
There  are  a  few  suggestions  to  be  made  in  reply  which  at 
least  give  some  light. 

{a)  God's  omnipotence  must  not  be  misunderstood. — 
It  is  not  power  to  do  the  impossible.  There  are  moral 
impossibilities  which  the  Divine  Omnipotence  cannot  de- 
stroy. Every  child,  for  example,  has,  at  some  time,  been 
puzzled  to  know  how  God  can  do  every  thing,  and  yet 
cannot  tell  a  falsehood.  But  a  man  will  scarcely  ask 
such  a  question.  For  he  has  learned  that  infinite  power 
cannot  do  all  conceivable  things,  but  only  such  things  as 
are  proper  objects  of  power.     Now  the  mentally  impos- 


l62  ~    CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

sible,  or  the  rationally  contradictory,  is  not  a  thing  of 
power.  No  amount  of  power  can  set  aside  truth  or  an- 
nihilate reason.  It  is  not  within  the  range  of  God's  om- 
nipotence to  make  two  and  two  five,  or  to  commit  any 
evil  deed.  And  yet  this  is  not  cutting  down  the  Deity  ; 
to  suppose  him  capable  of  sin,  would  be  to  reduce  him 
fatally.  Eternal  harmony  and  moral  consistency  belong 
to  his  character. 

Viewed  in  this  light,  the  famous  Epicurean  doctrine  that 
if  God  be  omnipotent  he  can  prevent  moral  evil,  must  be 
taken  with  great  allowance.  Considerations  may  be 
adduced  to  show  that  the  question  of  universal  moral 
perfection  is  not  a  question  of  power  at  all.  Before  the 
pessimist  is  entitled  to  his  conclusion,  he  must  show  that 
moral  character  is  a  thing  to  be  determined  by  mere 
power.     This  he  can  never  do. 

(^)  Mans  freedom  must  not  be  destroyed. — Sin  implies 
law.  More  than  this,  it  implies  righteous  law.  For  the 
transgression  of  any  other  would  not  be  sin.  But  a  right- 
eous law  implies  a  righteous  law-giver.  A  clean  thing  can- 
not come  out  of  an  unclean.  And  so  the  very  existence 
of  sin  in  the  creature  presupposes  righteousness  in  the 
Creator. 

Now  the  only  remaining  question  is :  "  Why  does  not 
this  righteous,  omnipotent  God  prevent  the  transgression 
of  his  righteous  law  ? "  It  is  evident  that  he  could  do 
this.  But  so  far  as  we  can  see,  he  could  do  it  in  no  other 
way  than  by  abridging  man's  freedom.  When  he  gave 
that  freedom  he  gave  the  possibility  of  sin.  This  pos- 
sibility is  necessary  to  moral  character.  For  there  can 
be  neither  virtue  in  avoiding  that  which  cannot  be  done, 
nor  vice  in  doing  that  which  must  be  done.  But  a  free 
moral  system  is  better  than  a  mechanical  one. 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD,  1 63 

Horace  Bushnell  has  forcibly  expressed  this  thought. 
**  Is  it  any  impeachment  of  God  that  he  did  not  care  to 
reign  over  an  empire  of  stones?  If  he  has  deliberately 
chosen  a  kind  of  empire  not  to  be  ruled  by  force ;  if  he 
has  deliberately  set  his  children  beyond  that  kind  of  con- 
trol, that  they  may  be  governed  by  truth,  reason,  love, 
want,  fear,  and  the  like,  acting  through  their  consent ;  if 
we  find  them  able  to  act  against  the  will  of  God,  as  stones 
and  vegetables  cannot ;  what  more  is  necessary  to  vindi- 
cate his  goodness  than  to  suggest  that  he  has  given  them, 
possibly,  a  capacity  to  break  allegiance,  in  order  that  there 
may  be  a  meaning  and  a  glory  in  allegiance,  when  they 
choose  it  ?  There  is,  then,  such  a  thing  inherent  in  the 
system  of  powers  as  a  possibility  of  wrong;  for,  given  the 
possibility  of  right,  we  have  the  possibility  of  wrong." 

The  question,  then,  is  not  one  of  freedom  and  possible 
sin  ;  but  of  creation  itself.  Was  it  better  for  the  Divine 
Being  to  make  a  world  at  all  ?  Is  its  creation  a  thing  of 
kindness  or  of  cruelty  ?  Is  the  universe  a  huge  blunder, 
which  ought  to  be  blotted  out  at  once  and  forever?  Nay, 
would  it  have  been  better  if,  from  all  eternity,  God  had 
dwelt  in  the  solitude  of  his  own  being  ? 

These  are  solemn,  earnest  questions,  and  must  not  be 
charged  with  impertinence  or  sacrilege.  They  are  the 
utmost  push  of  the  soul  at  the  hidden  arcana  of  its  own 
being.  We  can  but  sympathize  with  this  unconquerable 
desire  to  disclose  the  secret  mysteries  within.  And  yet 
the  attempt  to  do  so  may  be  altogether  unwise  and  vain. 
In  our  present  state  of  knowledge  it  may  be  impossible  to 
reach  the  last  truth  in  the  problem  of  being.  Indeed,  we 
must  suppose  that  it  is  impossible.  Our  vision  is  too 
limited  to  sweep  the  universe  and  the  two  eternities. 
Our  light  is  too  dim  to  penetrate  the  inner  depths  of  the 


164  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

Infinite  God.  Our  intellect  is  too  sluggish,  our  heart  too 
earthly,  to  reach  the  highest  planes  of  Divine  justice, 
purity,  and  wisdom. 

Any  attempt  to  question  God's  motives  in  the  creation 
of  the  universe  must  be  made  with  modesty  and  reverence. 
God  can  be  under  no  possible  obligation  to  reveal  his  in- 
most thought.  Even  if  he  should  do  so  man  could  not 
receive  the  revelation.  The  finite  cannot  hold  infinity.  It 
is  the  part  of  human  wisdom  to  read  the  truth  he  has 
written  out  for  us,  and  leave  the  rest  to  him  in  humility 
and  trust.  In  this  spirit  two  lines  of  thought  have  been 
presented  concerning  this  ultimate  problem  of  created 
being.  In  the  same  spirit  a  third  and  fourth  may  be 
distinctly  and  profitably  itemized. 

{c)  Man  does  not  believe  the  universe  to  be  a  failure. — He 
does  not  regard  his  own  life  as  such.  In  itself  it  is  a 
priceless  boon.  Although  weighted  down  with  inherited 
evils  and  with  his  own  personal  sins,  he  still  holds  it  as  his 
dearest  treasure.  He  will  not  give  it  up.  Who  would 
wish  to  be  blotted  out  of  existence  forever  ?  How  many 
men  are  there  who  have  found  life  such  an  intolerable 
evil  that  they  would  gladly  be  rid  of  it?  A  few  such 
there  are,  doubtless ;  and  they  are  the  true,  practical 
pessimists.  All  others  are  such  by  profession  only.  But 
this  class  of  true  pessimists  is  extremely  small ;  the  great 
bulk  of  humanity  is  not  in  that  list.  Suicides  are  mentally 
or  morally  deranged.  At  least  they  are  so  regarded  by 
men  in  general.  And  this  is  an  unanswerable  argument 
in  favor  of  human  life.  Nothing  is  clearer  than  that  men 
do  value  existence,  and  thus  practically  declare  the  good- 
ness of  God.  The  fact  that  this  declaration  is  not  in- 
tentional only  adds  to  its  force.  Moreover,  it  is  the 
greatest  and  the  best  among  men  and  among  the  nations. 


THE   GOODNESS  OF  GOD.  1 6$ 

who  invariably  value  human  life  most  highly.  Unless  we 
are  made  to  be  strangely  deceived,  herein  is  a  sure  token 
of  the  true  worth  and  sanctity  of  life,  and  the  essential 
goodness  of  its  Author. 

To  be  sure  it  is  always  easy  to  assert  that  God  ought  to 
make  human  life  better  than  it  is ;  but  that  is  not  pessi- 
mism. It  is  downright  impudence  that  calls  for  rebuke 
rather  than  argument. 

(^)  The  world  is  growing  better  continually, — This  is  a 
plain,  historical  fact  that  no  pessimist  can  successfully 
deny.  The  trend  of  things  is  upward.  The  stream  of 
human  events  is  clearer,  purer,  stronger,  to-day  than  ever 
before.  And  still  the  clarifying  process  goes  on.  It  may 
be  slow  and,  at  times,  uneven,  but  it  never  stops  and  is 
never  reversed.  Compare  with  one  another  the  times  of 
Zoroaster,  Nebuchadnezzar,  Alexander,  Caesar,  Charle- 
magne, Luther,  Cromwell,  and  Gladstone  ;  and  no  better 
evidence  of  the  world's  progress  need  be  desired.  Every 
thing  noble,  good,  and  worthy  among  men  has  advanced 
almost  unmeasurably  since  the  beginning  of  historic  time ; 
and  every  vile  and  ignoble  thing  has  been  correspondingly 
repressed.  War,  oppression,  tyranny,  slavery,  abject  pov- 
erty, and  systematic  cruelty  are  passing  away  from  the 
abodes  of  civilized  men.  And  civilization  is  advancing 
with  firm  and  rapid  step.  Its  present  prevailing  type  is 
incomparably  better  than  former  types  now  supplanted. 
The  people  are  happier,  society  is  better,  education  is 
cheaper,  truth  and  knowledge  are  freer,  fraternal  sym- 
pathy is  broader,  religion  is  purer,  heaven  is  nearer,  and 
earth  is  holier,  as  the  centuries  go  by.  What  lover  of 
humanity  and  truth  and  righteousness  could  wish  the 
world  set  back  a  thousand  years  ?  The  very  mention  of 
such  a  desire  serves  to  emphasize  the  fact  of  its  upward 
progress. 


1 66  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

We  are  on  the  up  grade.  There  may  be  steeps  to  climb 
ahead  of  us,  but  we  will  not  turn  back,  for  the  worst  of 
the  road  is  already  behind  us.  To  what  heights  of  in- 
tellect and  soul  we  shall  yet  be  led,  we  know  not.  But 
one  thing  is  certain  :  the  issue  of  every  struggle  hitherto 
has  been  righteousness  and  peace.  And  this  is  a  pledge 
of  the  world's  manifest  destiny.  There  is  in  it  a  "  Power 
not  ourselves  that  makes  for  righteousness."  That  power 
is  not  an  omnipotent  demon.  If  he  were,  he  would  have 
made  things  intrinsically  bad  at  the  first,  and  would  have 
sunk  them  into  lower  depths  of  iniquity  with  every  pass- 
ing year.  No,  the  Author  of  this  world  must  be  a  holy 
God,  of  infinite  justice,  purity,  and  love.  We  cannot 
fathom  his  being,  or  find  out  all  his  ways.  "  Clouds  and 
darkness  are  indeed  round  about  him  ;  but  righteousness 
and  judgment  are  still  the  habitation  of  his  throne." 

Sin  still  remains  as  a  dark  spot  in  the  universe,  but 
light  shines  all  about  it,  and  across  its  deepest  blackness 
we  begin  to  trace  the  golden  threads  of  hope  and  love. 
The  past,  indeed,  has  not  given  us  perfection  ;  but  there 
are  sure  prophecies  that  it  still  awaits  us  in  the  future. 
To  that  future  we  press,  and  into  its  clearer  light  we  bring 
our  darkest  problems  with  perfect  confidence  and  hope. 

Let  the  pessimist  go  on  proclaiming  his  dark  gospel  of 
hate  and  despair,  if  he  must.  It  is  ours  to  preach  the 
better  gospel  of  love  and  hope.  The  bow  of  promise 
spans  the  sky.  We  will  follow  the  light  of  its  radiant  arch 
till  the  morning  shall  dawn  and  the  Day-star  of  eternal 
righteousness  shall  beam  upon  the  earth. 

REFERENCES. 

Lord's  "  Natural  and  Revealed  Theology." 
Wallace's  **  Kant,"  Chapter  XIV. 
Ueberweg's  "  History  of  Philosophy." 
Janet's  "  Final  Causes." 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    UNITY    OF    GOD;     OR,    THE    MONISTIC 
ARGUMENT. 

WHEN  the  Christian  theist  speaks  of  God,  he 
means  one  Personal  Being.  The  idea  includes 
unity.  But  it  may  be  questioned  whether  this  Divine 
Unity  is  a  philosophical  necessity  in  all  Theism.  At 
least,  the  arguments  hitherto  set  forth,  may  not  be  suffi- 
cient to  prove  the  oneness  of  God.  There  may  be  in 
nature  a  single  Being,  having  intelligence,  volition,  per- 
sonality, and  goodness ;  or  there  may  be  a  thousand. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  preceding  arguments  that  abso- 
lutely forbids  a  plurality  of  divine  beings.  Take  the  case 
of  design,  for  example.  Suppose  one  hundred  instances 
of  design  in  nature  to  be  clearly  proved.  These  may  be  the 
executed  purposes  of  one  God  or  of  one  hundred  gods ; 
and  their  simple  character  as  isolated  designs  can  never 
determine  the  unity  or  diversity  of  their  origin.  The  same 
is  true  of  order-making  in  nature,  and,  to  some  extent, 
of  the  argument  for  a  super-human  Personality.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  well  to  bring  forward  special  proofs  for  the  de- 
cision of  this  question.  Is  there  one  only  God?  or  are 
there  many?  This  question  has  had  two  answers.  His- 
torically, theistic  thought  has  been  constantly  vibrating 
between  Monotheism  and  Polytheism.  For  the  estab- 
lishment of  Monotheism,  there  are  three  general  lines  of 
argument ;  namely,  the  scientific,  the  philosophic,  and  the 
religious. 

167 


1 68  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

SECTION  I. 

SCIENTIFIC  MONOTHEISM. 

A  careful  study  of  nature  has  always  led  men  to  the 
unity  of  God.  This  effect  has  followed  in  all  ages  and 
on  all  continents  alike.  India,  Egypt,  Europe,  and 
America  bear  witness  to  its  unvarying  certainty.  It  is 
an  undoubted  historical  truth.  Like  all  other  history,  it 
has  a  philosophical  principle  beneath  it.  And  this  is  the 
principle ;  the  unity  of  nature  leads  inevitably  to  the 
unity  of  God.  But  men  must  learn  to  study  nature  and 
reason  about  the  cosmos  as  a  whole,  before  they  can  be 
sure  of  the  unity  of  nature.  The  natural  facts  that  we 
see  passing  daily  before  us,  are  diverse  in  character  and, 
in  many  cases,  apparently  hostile  in  purpose.  Thus  it  is 
that  a  cursory  view  of  nature  is  quite  as  apt  to  disclose 
to  men  the  existence  of  many  gods,  as  of  one.  True, 
there  is  one  great  fact  in  nature  that  has  always  given, 
even  to  the  most  indolent  observers,  a  hint  of  its  unity. 
I  refer  to  the  sun.  Its  position,  its  apparent  motion,  its 
influence  upon  the  earth,  and  its  part  in  the  sustenance 
of  animal  and  vegetable  life — all  serve  to  suggest  the 
unity  and  interdependence  of  nature.  But  then  there 
are  the  other  heavenly  bodies,  somewhat  like  the  sun  and 
yet  evidently  diverse,  independent,  and  therefore  de- 
structive to  cosmical  unity.  It  is  only  when  men  are  so 
advanced  in  the  study  of  nature  as  to  penetrate  to  her 
inner  truths,  that  they  recognize  in  all  her  varied  forms, 
the  phenomena  of  one  immense  noumenal  unit.  Finding 
that  all  nature  is  one,  they  are  thereby  convinced  that 
the  God  of  nature  is  one.  Natural  Science,  therefore, 
tends  to  Monotheism.  The  distinctive  features  of  modern 
science  are  continually  enforcing  this  truth  more  and 
more.     Notice  a  few  of  them. 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 69 

I.     GRAVITATION. 

This  principle  has  at  length  been  shown  to  be  univer- 
sal. It  is  now  admitted  to  be  the  widest  generalization 
in  nature.  Newton's  famous  induction  traced  it  to  the 
moon,  and  thence  to  the  bounds  of  the  solar  system. 
But  its  extension  to  the  fixed  stars  was  not  demonstrated 
till  more  than  a  century  after  Newton's  death.  Indeed, 
its  establishment  beyond  any  peradventure,  dates  as  late 
as  the  middle  of  the  present  century.  This  secret  of  the 
stellar  heavens  has  been  disclosed,  without  question,  by  a 
study  of  their  binary  and  multiple  systems.  It  has  been 
demonstrated  that  the  most  distant  star  obeys  the  same 
law  that  controls  the  nearest  planet.  That  simple  but 
mysterious  force  which  brings  to  earth  the  matured  fruits 
of  autumn  and  sends  the  waters  to  the  sea,  reaches  out 
into  the  distant  sky,  and  keeps  a  million  worlds  flying 
through  its  measureless  depths.  Here,  then,  is  an  end- 
less chain  that  binds  the  universe  in  one.  The  God  of 
gravitation  cannot  be  many,  he  must  be  one ;  and  that 
one  must  be  the  God  of  all  nature.  It  must  be  one  sin- 
gle will  that  employs  this  universal  agency  in  dominating 
every  atom,  and  thereby  securing  and  preserving  the 
physical  harmonies  of  the  universe.  A  diversity  of  gods 
in  nature  would  mean  an  inevitable  and  interminable 
conflict  of  laws ;  and  this  conflict  would  issue  in  the  de- 
struction of  worlds,  the  dismemberment  of  systems,  and 
the  prevalence  of  universal  chaos.  The  unity  and  har- 
mony of  nature  are  rational  proofs  of  the  unity  of  God. 

2.    INTER-STELLAR  ETHER. 

Until  recently  the  far-reaching  depths  of  inter-stellar 
space  were  thought  to  be  absolutely  void.  Physicists 
have  now  universally  rejected  this  theory.     It  is  conceded 


I70  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

that  these  abysses  of  space  are  occupied  by  luminiferous 
ether  (so-called  for  the  sake  of  naming  it),  a  substance  of 
peculiar  character  and  wonderful  properties.  It  must  be 
material  substance,  and  yet  it  defies  the  tests  of  weight 
and  measure  ordinarily  applied  to  matter.  Its  light- 
bearing  qualities  prove  it  to  be  almost  infinitely  hard  and 
elastic ;  at  the  same  time  its  non-resistance  to  moving 
bodies  indicates  its  extreme  tenuity.  It  is  in  a  constant 
state  of  sensitive  and  tremulous  movement.  Morever, 
that  movement  is  almost  inconceivably  heterogeneous  in 
origin,  direction,  and  character.  Waves  of  light,  heat, 
actinic  power,  or  electricity  are  continually  advancing  in 
all  directions  from  millions  of  central  spheres.  The  mode 
of  their  motion  is  a  matter  of  bewildering  complexity, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  of  unerring  harmony  and  certainty. 
A  mass  of  matter  falls  into  the  sun  and  disturbs  the 
heated  currents  on  its  incandescent  surface.  Thereupon, 
a  stream  of  electricity  sets  forth  throughout  the  solar 
system.  Instantly,  sooner  than  its  mode  of  motion  can 
be  described,  or  even  the  fact  recorded,  it  has  reached  the 
earth,  convulsed  every  magnetic  needle,  disabled  every 
telegraph  office,  and  produced  all  the  well  known  phe- 
nomena of  an  electric  storm.  And  this  is  but  one  of  the 
myriad  movements  constantly  going  on  throughout  this 
luminiferous  ether.  Still  there  is  not  a  jar  nor  a  jostle. 
The  numberless  interlacing  threads  of  movement,  with 
inconceivable  speed,  and  without  disturbance  or  delay, 
are  pursuing  their  individual  ends.  They  traverse  one 
broad  highway — they  are  parts  of  one  boundless  system. 
Here,  then,  is  the  fathomless  ocean  of  physical  being. 
All  worlds  and  planets  and  stars  are  immersed  in  it ;  and 
none  can  go  beyond  it. 

The  God  who  made  it  and  filled  it  must  be  the  one  God 
over  all ;  for  it  includes  all. 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  I7I 

3.     SPECTRUM    ANALYSIS. 

To  the  spectroscope  all  nature  is  one.  The  chemical 
elements  of  the  earth  are  disclosed  in  the  lines  of  the  solar 
spectrum.  Sodium,  calcium,  magnesium,  potassium,  cad- 
mium, chromium,  iron,  cobalt,  nickel,  lead,  and  a  dozen 
other  well  known  chemical  elements  are  prominent  in  the 
atmosphere  of  the  sun,  no  less  than  in  the  structure  of 
the  earth.  Indeed,  the  spectra  of  nearly  all  terrestrial 
elements  have  been  distinctly  traced  in  the  chromosphere. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  planets,  and,  so  far  as  observations 
have  been  conducted,  of  the  farthest  fixed  stars  also.  To 
whatever  celestial  body  the  scientist  turns  his  spectro- 
scope, he  finds  the  same  unmistakable  lines  of  oxygen, 
hydrogen,  sodium,  and  iron.  As  the  new  and  wonderful 
science  of  spectrology  advances,  doubtless  other  stellar 
elements  will,  from  time  to  time,  be  identified  with  those 
of  the  earth.  Already  stars,  planets,  nebulae,  and  even 
erratic  comets  have  been  interviewed  by  this  most  persist- 
ent questioner  of  the  sky,  and  all  have  told  the  same 
story  of  their  chemical  composition.  Worlds  in  apparent 
formation,  incandescent  worlds,  worlds  partially  cooled, 
like  Jupiter  and  Saturn  ;  planets  like  the  Earth  and  Mars, 
with  cooled  atmosphere  and  solid  surface — all  yield  up  to 
the  spectroscope  the  same  chemical  secrets.  Even  the 
cold,  rigid,  and  airless  moon  tells  the  same  story — a  voice 
from  the  cosmical  tomb  declaring  the  unity  of  nature  and 
of  God. 

The  spectroscopist  has  far  outstripped  the  marvels  of 
telegraphy.  He  has  practically  annihilated  inter-stellar 
space  with  the  same  ease  with  which  the  electrician  has 
annihilated  terrestrial  space.  With  perfect  confidence  he 
sends  his  message  to  the  most  distant  star,  receives  instan- 
taneous returns  at  pleasure,  and  sits  at  his  desk  leisurely 


1/2  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

computing  the  movements  and  examining  the  chemistry 
of  celestial  bodies  billions  upon  billions  of  miles  away. 
As  the  result  of  this  cosmical  catechism,  far-reaching  and 
almost  limitless  as  it  is,  he  announces  to  us  that  the 
whole  physical  universe  is  bound  in  one,  composed  every- 
where of  the  same  elements — an  absolute  constitutional 
unit. 

4.     TERRESTRIAL    LIFE    AND    MOVEMENT. 

The  unity  of  nature  is  forcibly  displayed  in  the  develop- 
ment of  life  upon  the  earth.  The  functions  and  phases 
of  life  are  indeed  many  and  various,  but  the  life-principle 
is  the  same  in  them  all  and  through  them  all.  It  has  the 
same  uniform  physical  basis  to  start  with.  Albuminous 
compounds  are  found  in  every  organism,  high  or  low, 
simple  or  complex.  And  then  there  is  the  same  develop- 
ment and  support  of  the  life-germs.  Processes  of  selec- 
tion, appropriation,  and  assimilation  are  common  to  all 
forms  of  life.  Still  further,  the  same  life-cycle  is  disclosed 
everywhere.  Each  life  has  its  successive  periods  of 
growth,  maturity,  and  decay.  Each  life  depends  upon  a 
preceding  life,  and  in  like  manner  bequeaths  itself  to  the 
future.  The  individual  dies  that  the  species  may  live. 
The  law  of  descent  has  passed  upon  all  animate  nature. 

These  truths  have  become  so  familiar  to  modern  science 
that  their  force  is  often  lost.  But  they  do  certainly  point 
to  the  unity  of  nature  and  of  its  Author. 

The  movement  of  organism  upon  the  earth,  from  year 
to  year  and  from  age  to  age,  discloses  an  evident  unity  of 
purpose  and  end.  In  the  busy  laboratory  of  nature  all 
tends  to  the  production  of  one  final  compound.  Crass 
matter  is  first  organized  into  vegetable  growth.  Vegeta- 
ble life  is  destroyed  for  the  support  of  animal  life.  Ani- 
mals  die   that    man    may   live.     Cosmic   history   is   not 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 73 

equally  complete  at  every  moment.  It  moves  on  to  a 
certain  end.  It  is  difficult  to  doubt  that  the  earth  is 
expressly  fitted  up  for  man's  residence  upon  it.  More 
than  this.  It  is  manifestly  adapted  to  man's  development, 
growth,  and  indefinite  progress  in  intelligence  and  right- 
eousness. Under  this  one  guiding  purpose,  modern 
science  traces  cosmical  movements  all  the  way  backward, 
as  far  as  phenomena  can  carry  them.  From  the  very 
start,  man  seems  to  have  been  the  intended  outcome  of 
creation.  At  every  succeeding  age  lengthening  vistas  of 
purpose  open  to  the  view,  all  finding  alike  their  focus, 
their  explanation,  and  their  justification  in  the  final 
development  of  one  being — man. 

But  this  movement  is  by  no  means  confined  to  animal 
and  vegetable  life.  It  pervades  inanimate  nature  as  well. 
Absolute  rest  is  nowhere  to  be  found.  Every  atom  is  in 
motion.  The  more  nature  is  studied  the  more  striking 
becomes  the  fact  of  universal  and  unceasing  energy.  Mo- 
tion implies  force ;  force,  in  its  constant  activity,  implies 
an  animating  principle  that  is  both  absolute  and  eternal. 
How  shall  we  describe  this  eternal  source  of  all  phenom- 
ena ?  It  will  not  do  to  call  it  simple  force ;  considered 
apart,  there  is  no  meaning  in  that  term.  It  may  satisfy 
the  scientist  who  seeks  only  for  facts  and  laws.  It  is  use- 
ful, indeed,  as  an  abstract  symbol  by  which  to  designate 
conveniently  a  universality  of  fact.  But  it  cannot  satisfy 
the  philosopher,  whose  proper  search  is  after  the  nature 
and  causes  of  things.  Neither  can  this  source  of  phenom- 
ena be  regarded  as  in  any  wise  a  material  thing.  It  is 
the  source  of  matter,  and  therefore  cannot  be  matter 
itself.  Matter,  after  all,  is  but  the  recognized  seat  of 
external  phenomena.  But  this  eternal  source  of  things  is 
the  ultimate  reality  of  the  universe,  back  of  all  phenom- 


1/4  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

ena  and  back  of  all  matter.  What  is  it  like  ?  In  an- 
swering this  question  we  are  forced  to  the  one  only 
reality  that  every  man  knows  directly  for  himself;  and 
that  is  his  own  conscious  intellect.  His  own  selfdom  is 
the  form  of  being  and  of  knowledge  in  which  he  is  bound 
to  conceive  of  that  Eternal  Reality,  whose  manifestations 
of  power  he  sees  everywhere  throughout  the  material 
universe.  That  Being  cannot,  then,  be  material.  He 
must  be  psychical,  personal,  moral.  And  this  is  the  one 
only  eternal  and  living  God. 

On  this  subject  John  Fiske  has  expressed  his  thought 
most  beautifully :  ^'  When  from  the  dawn  of  life  we  see 
all  things  working  together  for  the  evolution  of  the  high- 
est spiritual  attributes  of  Man,  we  know,  however  the 
words  may  stumble  in  which  we  try  to  say  it,  that  God  is 
in  the  deepest  sense  a  moral  Being.  The  everlasting 
source  of  phenomena  is  none  other  than  the  infinite 
Power  that  makes  for  righteousness.  Thou  canst  not  by 
searching  find  Him  out ;  yet  put  thy  trust  in  Him,  and 
against  thee  the  gates  of  hell  shall  not  prevail ;  for  there 
is  neither  wisdom  nor  understanding  nor  counsel  against 
the  Eternal." 

SECTION  II. 

PHILOSOPHIC  MONOTHEISM. 

The  view  of  God's  eternal  unity,  as  thus  far  given, 
arises  from  a  practical  study  of  nature.  It  remains  to  be 
shown  that  pure  philosophical  inquiries  lead  to  the  same 
belief.  The  philosophic  form  of  Monotheism  is  quite  as 
prevalent  as  the  scientific.  It  is  the  belief  in  one  perfect, 
self-existent  Being.  He  is  conceived  of  as  the  ultimate, 
intelligent  cause  of  all  nature,  and  therefore  as  superior 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 75 

to  it,  yet  not  separate  from  it ;  as  the  foundation  of  its 
substance,  and  therefore  as  beneath  it,  yet  not  merged 
into  it ;  as  the  constant  source  of  its  energy,  life,  and  har- 
mony, and  therefore  as  within  it,  yet  not  restrained  by  it. 
He  is  absolute,  sovereign,  infinite.  He  is  independent  of 
creation,  and  is  removed  from  it  by  all  the  lengths  and 
depths  of  infinity ;  and  yet  he  is  bound  to  it  by  the  vol- 
untary bands  of  his  own  creative  energy.  He  is  forever 
one ;  and  yet  is  the  vital  source  of  all  existing  things. 
Nearly  all  the  great  thinkers,  of  all  ages  and  all  countries, 
have  been  led,  by  the  simple  force  of  their  philosophy,  to 
some  such  monotheistic  view  of  the  Deity. 

The  most  ancient  philosophy  in  India  taught  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  Being.  One  of  its  writers  says :  "  An 
omniscient  and  indestructible  being  is  to  be  proved  from 
the  existence  of  effects,  from  the  combination  of  atoms, 
from  the  sustained  order  of  the  universe,  and  from  the 
traditional  arts  among  men." 

The  Hindu  Vedanta  is  in  the  same  line,  declaring: 
"  Brahma  is  the  all-knowing,  all-powerful  cause,  from 
which  come  the  production,  continuance,  and  dissolution 
of  the  universe.  Every  soul  is  evolved  from  him  and 
returns  to  him.  He  consists  of  joy.  He  is  creator  and 
creature,  actor  and  act.  He  has  neither  beginning  nor 
end,  parts  nor  qualities ;  he  is  immutable,  and  the  only 
real  substance."  This  sublime  passage  certainly  has  an 
odor  of  pantheism  about  it.  But  it  teaches  monotheism,, 
beyond  any  sort  of  doubt. 

So  much  for  India.  Let  us  now  turn  to  Greece,  and  we 
shall  find  the  same  tokens  of  philosophic  monotheism  in 
the  early  history  of  that  classic  land. 

Ecphantus  taught  the  doctrine  of  an  absolute  world- 
ordering  spirit,  which  was  doubtless  developed  from  the 


176  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

famous  Pythagorean  doctrine  of  the  original  "  Mo- 
nad." 

Philolaus  believed  that  "  The  director  and  ruler  of  all 
things  is  God  ;  he  is  one  and  eternal,  enduring  and  im- 
movable, ever  like  himself,  and  different  from  all  things 
beside  him." 

Xenophanes  and  the  Eleatics  taught  that  "  God  is  eter- 
nal, one,  spherical,  neither  bounded  nor  unbounded, 
neither  moved  nor  unmoved." 

Euclid  of  Megara  declared :  "  The  good  is  one,  although 
called  by  many  names,  as  intelligence,  God,  reason.  The 
good  remains  ever  immutable  and  like  itself."  Socrates 
was  a  teleologist,  and  asserted  that  good  men  are  inspired 
by  a  supreme  and  Divine  intelligence.  Aristotle  recog- 
nized God  as  the  source  of  all  motion,  energy,  and  life. 
The  Stoics  likewise  held  to  the  unity  of  God.  They 
argued  that  force  is  inseparably  joined  with  matter;  that 
the  power  which  joins  them  is  God ;  that  the  universe  is 
a  thing  of  general  unity,  as  well  as  of  individual  variety ; 
that  its  beauty  and  adaptation  must  have  come  from  a 
thinking  mind,  and,  therefore,  prove  the  existence  of 
Deity  ;  that  it  contains  parts  endowed  with  consciousness, 
and  therefore  the  whole,  which  must  be  more  perfect  than 
any  of  its  parts,  cannot  be  unconscious ;  and  that  this 
universal  consciousness  is  the  Deity  himself.  Cleanthes 
one  of  their  number,  indites  a  beautiful  prayer  to  Jupiter, 
which  begins  thus  :  "  O  thou  who  hast  various  names,  but 
whose  essence  is  one  and  infinite!  O  Jupiter!  first  of  im- 
mortals, sovereign  of  nature,  who  governest  all,  who  sub- 
jectest  all  to  one  law,  I  salute  thee." 

But  perhaps  Plato,  who,  by  reason  of  his  continual  and 
devout  meditation  concerning  the  Deity,  has  been  called 
the  "  Divine  Plato,"  has  left  us  the  strongest  evidence  of 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 77 

non-christian,  philosophic  Monotheism.  From  often- 
quoted  passages  in  his  writings,  almost  numberless  terms 
have  been  taken,  which  describe  the  one  only  God. 
Among  them  are  these :  "  Maker  and  Father  of  the  uni- 
verse," "  God  over  all,"  *'  Creator  of  nature,"  "■  Architect 
of  the  world,"  "Cause  of  all  things,  whom  it  is  hard  to 
find  out  and  impossible  to  declare,"  "  The  first  God  who 
always  is,  and  never  was  made,"  "Always  good,  never 
evil,"  "  Who  cannot  change  for  the  better,  and  who  will 
not  change  for  the  worse." 

Thus  far  our  quotations  are  all  from  philosophers  of 
ancient  times,  and  non-christian  countries.  They  could 
not  therefore  have  been  influenced  by  the  pure  Monothe- 
ism of  Christ  and  his  Apostles.  Moreover,  scarcely  any 
two  of  them  can  be  said  to  be  of  the  same  school  of 
philosophy.  Selections  have  purposely  been  made  from 
those  who  differ  most  radically  in  their  general  philo- 
sophical doctrines.  And  yet  their  belief  in  one  Supreme 
Deity  is  wonderfully  unanimous  and  striking.  Quotations 
from  the  ancients  might  be  indefinitely  multiplied  with 
the  same  result. 

The  annals  of  modern  philosophy  disclose  the  same 
unanimity  on  this  subject,  and  that  even  more  positive 
and  striking  than  before.  Nearly  all  the  great  thinkers  of 
modern  times,  of  whatever  school  of  thought,  have  been 
forced  to  admit  the  existence  of  one  supreme,  perfect 
Being,  who  is  the  uncreated  source  of  all  things  that  exist. 
The  names  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  Kant, 
Schilling,  Fichte,  Hegel,  Locke,  Hamilton,  Darwin,  and 
Max  Muller,  will  readily  occur  in  this  connection.  Nu- 
merous quotations  from  their  works  could  be  brought 
forward  to  establish  the  fact  of  their  belief  in  one  Supreme 
Being.     The  general  reader's  familiarity  with  their  views. 


178  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

however,  renders  such  formal  quotations  unnecessar)^ 
With  remarkable  unanimity  the  philosophic  thought  of 
the  day  leads  all  thinkers  to  the  unity  of  God.  There  are 
apparently  a  few  notable  exceptions.  But  they  are  such 
in  appearance  only.  Herbert  Spencer,  for  example,  and 
the  entire  school  of  agnostics,  do  not  deny  the  existence 
of  such  a  Supreme  Being.  It  is  only  the  possibility  of 
knowing  and  characterizing  him  that  is  questioned.  In 
truth,  his  existence  is  almost  universally  conceded.  And 
every  advance  in  philosophy  serves  only  to  emphasize  the 
unalterable  conviction  of  mankind,  that  there  is  one 
supreme  and  eternal  God. 


SECTION   III. 
RELIGIOUS  MONOTHEISM. 

All  religion  refers  to  God  in  some  form.  It  is  the  bind- 
ing link  between  Deity  and  humanity.  Neither  the 
ancient  Buddhist  nor  the  modern  atheist  has  succeeded  in 
rendering  worship  without  a  God.  Man  is  compelled  by 
nature  to  seek  after  some  great,  superior  Being  above 
himself,  and  when  he  has  found  him,  to  worship  him* 
Thus  far,  religion  is  natural  to  man.  If  there  be  a  God, 
therefore,  and  he  be  one,  this  truth  addresses  man  as  a 
religious  being,  no  less  than  as  a  scientist  or  a  philosopher. 
Nay  more,  for  it  must  concern  him  more  profoundly  and 
vitally  by  far,  as  a  religious  being,  than  in  any  other 
capacity  whatever.  In  this  way,  and  in  this  only,  it  con- 
cerns him  universally.  Few  men  are  scientists  or  philoso- 
phers ;  but  all  men  are  religionists.  The  faith-faculty  is 
universal ;  and  may  be  justly  expected  to  lead  to  one 
only  God,  provided  there  be  one  only  God.     In  this  just 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD,  1 79 

expectation,  the  student  of  religious  history  is  not  disap- 
pointed. An  examination  of  the  great  religions  of  the 
earth  gives  convincing  proofs  of  monistic  tendencies  in 
nearly  all  of  them.  As  a  matter  of  fact  religious  Mono- 
theism has  been  almost  world-wide.  It  exists  in  various 
types  and  various  degrees  of  clearness,  which  may,  in 
general,  be  divided  into  two  classes  :  Pure  Monotkeism  and 
Imperfect  Monotheism, 

I.    PURE    MONOTHEISM. 

By  Pure  Monotheism  is  meant  the  worship  of  only  one 
God,  who  is  recognized  as  infinite  and  eternal,  and  as 
separated  by  this  vastness  of  infinity,  from  any  and  all 
other  beings  whatsoever.  It  is  the  worship  of  God  not 
as  a  God,  but  as  the  God — the  one  only  God.  He  is  not 
merely  one  among  many  Gods,  nor  even  the  supreme  Source 
and  Sovereign  of  Gods  ;  but  he  is  absolutely  the  only  God 
actual  or  possible.  Moreover,  he  is  an  intelligent,  personal 
Being.  Pure  religious  Monotheism  avoids  the  two  ex- 
tremes of  polytheism  and  pantheism. 

There  are  just  three  great  religions  that  teach  this  true 
unity  of  God.  They  are  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Mo- 
hammedanism. It  is  worthy  of  note  that  these  three 
monotheistic  religions,  and  these  alone,  have  laid  claim  to 
universality  among  men.  Others  are  narrow,  tribal,  ethnic, 
designed  for  one  race  or  one  country  alone.  Even  Bud- 
dhism, which  in  some  respects  seems  otherwise,  is  confined 
to  the  Mongolian  race.  These  three  alone  have  been  mis- 
sionary religions,  striving  to  be  universal — aiming  at  cath- 
olicity in  some  sort.  But  Judaism  is  but  an  arrested 
form  of  Christianity,  and  has  fallen  from  its  high  aim. 
Mohammedanism  likewise  has  failed  to  fulfil  its  early 
promise,  and  becomes  more  and  more   local.     So   that 


l80  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

Christianity  remains  the  only  consistent  cosmopolitan 
religion  upon  the  earth.  It  teaches  the  unity  and  Father- 
hood of  God,  and  the  unity  and  brotherhood  of  man. 
But  Mohammedanism  is  equally  emphatic  as  to  the  unity 
of  God.  The  Koran  repeatedly  avers  that  there  is  one 
God  only,  and  Mohammed  is  his  Prophet. 

2.    IMPERFECT    MONOTHEISM. 

It  is  quite  true  that  pure  monotheism  is  confined  to 
three  religions.  But  to  stop  with  this  statement  would 
be  to  make  a  gross  misrepresentation  of  monistic  tenden- 
cies in  the  religious  world.  By  far  the  greater  amount  and 
wider  sweep  of  this  tendency  is  to  be  found  in  what  may 
be  called  Imperfect  Monotheism.  This  term  designates 
any  and  every  adequate  recognition  of  a  Supreme  Being 
in  the  universe.  Along  with  this  idea  may  be  found  poly- 
theistic or  pantheistic  tendencies  of  every  possible  shade. 
But  through  it  all,  from  the  nature-worship  of  India  to  the 
anthropomorphism  of  Western  Europe,  runs  this  incon- 
querable  belief  in  the  existence  of  one  Supreme  God. 
Polytheism  seems  to  be  an  after-growth,  a  sort  of  religious 
makeshift.  Imperfect  men,  oppressed  by  their  own  guilt, 
and  awed  in  the  presence  of  a  pure  and  perfect  God,  are 
prone  to  find  relief  by  peopling  the  sky  with  beings  mid- 
way between  themselves  and  the  Deity.  Added  to  this 
religious  exigency  there  is  a  purely  philosophical  specula- 
tion, which  seems  not  unreasonable.  It  runs  thus.  If 
God  has  made,  upon  this  gross,  material  earth,  such  an 
exalted  spiritual  being  as  man,  why  may  he  not  have 
made,  in  the  higher  realm  of  spirits,  beings  immeasurably 
superior  to  man  ?  Indeed,  is  it  not  very  probable  that  he 
has  made  such  beings?  and  that,  too,  ages  upon  ages  be- 
fore the  first  man  stood  upon  the  earth  ?  And  if  there  are 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  l8l 

such  beings,  may  they  not  have  some  agency  in  the  lives 
and  destinies  of  men  ?  And  if  so,  is  it  not  the  dictate  of 
reason  as  well  as  of  religion,  to  propitiate  their  favor  and 
engage  their  support  by  acts  of  worship  ?  Manifestly  it  is 
but  a  short  and  easy  step  from  these  philosophic  queries, 
to  the  grossest  polytheism.  Where  monistic  religions 
stop  with  angels,  paganism  goes  on  to  heroes,  gods,  and 
demi-gods  innumerable.  This  is,  indeed,  a  grievous  mis- 
take ;  but  it  is  merely  a  natural  corruption  of  monothe- 
ism, due  to  the  weakness,  ignorance,  and  indolence  of 
men.  James  Freeman  Clarke,  in  his  book  entitled,  "  Ten 
Great  Religions,"  has  called  attention  to  the  facts  just 
recited,  and,  with  great  patience  of  scholarship,  has  trav- 
ersed the  entire  field  of  imperfect  religious  Monotheism. 

The  results  of  his  investigations  agree  substantially  with 
those  of  other  workers  in  the  same  field.  He  finds  traces 
of  Monotheism  everywhere.  This  truth  may  be  enforced 
by  selecting  from  his  list  some  religions  that  are  ancient, 
some  that  are  modern,  and  designating  them  geo- 
graphically. 

(i)  Persian  Religion. 

The  ditheism  of  the  Zend-Avesta  has  been  mentioned  in 
another  connection.  We  must  now  inquire  whether  mon- 
otheism, or  pure  dualism  is,  after  all,  the  doctrine  of  that 
sacred  book.  It  is  quite  true  that  Ormazd  and  Ahriman 
are  represented  as  coequal  and  rival  deities,  and  that  the 
presence  of  evil  in  the  world  is  thus  explained.  But  this 
is  not  the  whole  truth  of  the  matter.  We  find,  upon  fur- 
ther examination,  that  "  Infinite  Time  "  or  "  All-embra- 
cing Time  "  is  the  Creator  of  both  Ormazd  and  Ahriman  ; 
and  there  are  distinct  intimations  that,  behind  these  two 
opposing  powers  of  good  and  evil,  there  remains  the 
measureless  background  of  ultimate  being,   from  which 


1 82  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

both  have  proceeded  and  into  which  both  shall  finally 
return.  And  then  the  sovereign  restorer  or  savior,  under 
the  name  of  Sosiogh,  is  expected  by  all  devout  Parsi  to 
come  at  the  consummation  of  all  things,  accomplish  the 
resurrection,  and  introduce  a  kingdom  of  unalloyed  hap- 
piness and  peace  forever.  There  are  several  undoubted 
passages  in  the  Avesta  which  refer  to  this  coming  res- 
urrection. 

But  this  means  the  destruction  of  Ahriman  and  the 
immortal  coronation  of  Ormazd.  So  this  troublesome 
ditheism,  however  long  and  persistent,  is  not  eternal, 
after  all.  It  is  finally  dissolved  in  a  sort  of  pantheistic 
monotheism — a  belief  in  one  infinite  and  eternal  Being. 
According  to  the  Zend-Avesta  good  shall  at  last  prevail 
over  evil,  and  God  shall  be  all  in  all. 

(2)   The  Religion  of  China. 

Nearly  five  thousand  years  ago  the  Chinese,  we  are  told, 
had  associated  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being  with  that  of 
the  visible  heavens.  One  word  was  used  to  designate 
them  both.  That  word  was  Ti,  the  name  of  God  and  the 
name  of  the  sky.  Shang-ti  was  the  Supreme  God  or  the 
Supreme  Heaven. 

A  little  reflection  will  convince  any  one  of  the  eminent 
naturalness  of  this  connection.  The  contemplative  China- 
man early  recognized,  and  learned  to  worship,  the  powers 
of  nature  around  and  above  him.  But  he  perceived  that 
they  were  all  changeable,  conditioned,  and  finite.  Even 
the  all-producing  sun  suffered  the  nightly  eclipse  of  his 
glory.  But  this  vast,  unbounded  sky,  surrounding  all 
things,  containing  all  things,  conditioning  all  things,  un- 
fathomable, unbroken,  unconditioned,  unchanging,  and 
infinite — seemed  to  him  the  fittest  emblem  of  the  infinite 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD,  1 83 

and  eternal  God  ;  and  so  he  used  the  same  terms  to  indi- 
cate both.  Dr.  Legge,  a  profound  Oriental  scholar,  in 
speaking  on  this  subject  says :  **  These  characters  show  us 
that  the  religion  of  the  Chinese,  five  thousand  years  ago, 
was  a  monotheism  ;  and  these  two  names  have  kept  the 
monotheistic  element  prominent  in  the  prevailing  religion 
of  China,  down  to  the  present  time. 

(3)    The  Religion  of  Egypt 

More  than  twenty-three  centuries  ago,  Herodotus  trav- 
elled in  Egypt,  and,  according  to  his  custom  everywhere, 
studied  carefully  the  civilization  of  that  ancient  country, 
with  special  reference  to  the  habits,  customs,  character, 
and  religion  of  the  people.  As  a  result  of  his  observa- 
tions, he  declared  that  the  Egyptians  of  Thebes,  one  of 
the  oldest  and  grandest  cities,  worshipped  one  Supreme 
God  who  had  neither  beginning  nor  end  of  existence. 
Several  centuries  later,  another  writer  quotes  from  an  old 
Hermitic  book  as  follows :  "  Before  all  the  things  that 
actually  exist,  and  before  all  beginnings,  there  is  one  God, 
prior  even  to  the  first  God  and  King,  remaining  unmoved 
in  the  singleness  of  his  own  unity." 

De  Roug^,  a  distinguished  Egyptologist,  in  describing 
the  Egyptian  doctrine  of  God,  the  world,  and  man,  says : 
'*  I  said  '  God,*  not  '  The  Gods.'  The  first  characteristic 
of  the  Religion  is  the  unity  of  God, — God,  one,  sole,  and 
only,  no  others  with  him.  He  is  the  only  being — living  in 
truth.     He  has  made  every  thing." 

A  further  proof  of  ancient  Egyptian  monotheism  may 
be  found  in  their  religious  hymns  and  sacred  formulas.  In 
one  of  these  hymns,  addressed  to  Amun-Ra,  the  supreme 
God  of  Thebes,  and  said  to  have  originated  not  less  than 
five  thousand  years  ago,  we  find  the  following  words :  "  Hail 


1 84  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

to  Thee,  Amun-Ra,  Lord  of  the  thrones  of  the  earth,  the 
oldest  existence,  ancient  of  heaven,  support  of  all  things ; 
chief  of  the  gods,  father  of  the  gods,  lord  of  truth.  Thou 
art  the  one,  maker  of  all  that  is,  the  one ;  the  only  one  ; 
maker  of  gods  and  men  ;  giving  food  to  all.  Welcome  to 
thee,  father  of  the  father  of  the  gods  ;  we  worship  thy 
spirit  which  is  in  us." 

It  matters  not  if  Egypt  did  worship  lords  many  and 
gods  many ;  no  one  can  deny  that  such  a  hymn  as  this 
breathes  the  prayer  of  the  true  monotheist. 

(4)   The  Religion  of  India. 

At  first  sight  it  would  seem  that  the  original  Vedic 
religion  was  utterly  devoid  of  the  monotheistic  idea. 
There  is  no  Supreme  Deity  of  definite  name  and  nature. 
As  heretofore  noticed,  the  divine  supremacy  is  amiably 
passed  around  among  the  gods.  It  is  attributed  variously 
to  Varuna,  the  heavens  ;  Surya,  the  sun  ;  Indra,  the  atmos« 
phere  ;  Agni,  fire  ;  and  to  many  others.  This  would  seem 
to  obliterate  all  monotheism.  Two  reflections,  however^ 
will  show  that  it  does  no  such  thing. 

(a)  The  character  ascribed  in  turn  to  these  gods  is  supreme 
and  monistic, — Varuna,  for  instance,  is  described  in  the 
Rig- Veda  as  *'  universal  king,  divine,  omniscient,  who  has 
made  heaven  and  the  earth,  who  embraces  within  himself 
the  three  worlds ;  who  causes  the  sun  to  shine  and  the 
winds  to  blow  ;  who,  by  marvellous  skill,  makes  the  rivers 
to  run  forever  into  the  sea,  but  never  fill  it ;  who  is  un- 
changing and  unchangeable ;  from  whom  no  one  can 
escape,  even  if  he  flee  beyond  the  sky ;  who  can  drive 
away  evil,  and  purify  the  soul  from  sin,  preserve  life,  for- 
give transgression  and  bestow  eternal  happiness  upon  the 
good." 


THE    UNITY   OF  GOD,  185 

Now  this  is  clearly  the  description  of  one  supreme  God. 
The  only  trouble  is  that  Agni  and  Indra  and  all  the  rest 
have  the  same  attributes  bestowed  upon  them  in  turn. 
This  is  the  puzzle  ;  but  it  is  cleared  up  by  a  further  con- 
sideration.    It  is  this. 

{b)  These  gods,  though  differently  named,  were  believed  to 
be  one. — They  were  all  the  same  in  identity  and  essential 
being.  This  truth  might  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
these  various  prayers  and  sacred  hymns  were  all  contained 
in  the  same  book  ;  and,  without  the  slightest  feeling  of 
incongruity,  were  actually  used  by  the  same  worshippers. 
But  fortunately  we  are  not  left  to  mere  conjecture  in  the 
matter.  This  identity  of  being  is  expressly  stated  in  sev- 
eral passages.  Take  the  following  from  the  Rig- Veda : 
•'  They  call  him  Indra,  Mitra,  Varuna,  Agni.  Sages  name 
variously  that  which  is  but  one.  Agni  becomes  Varuna 
in  the  evening  ;  rising  in  the  morning,  he  becomes  Mitra; 
as  Savitri,  he  moves  through  the  air ;  becoming  Indra, 
he  glows  in  the  middle  of  the  sky." 

And  so  it  turns  out  that  even  these  extreme  polythe- 
istic vagaries  of  the  Vedas  have  beneath  them  the  same 
spirit  of  monotheism  which  pervades  the  religious  world 
everywhere. 

(5)   Scandinavian  Religion. 

The  Norsemen  worshipped  twelve  principal  gods.  Odin 
and  Loke  were  evident  leaders  among  them.  The  former 
embodied  the  principle  of  good,  the  latter  that  of  evil. 
Herein  there  might  seem  to  be  an  irreconcilable  dualism. 
And  yet  we  need  not  seek  far  in  the  mythological  lore  of 
their  pantheon  to  discover  traces  of  that  same  inevitable, 
underlying  monotheism  which  we  find  at  the  roots  of  so 
many  other  religions.     A  single  passage  will  be  sufficient 


1 86  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

to  establish  this  statement.  It  is  taken  from  one  of  their 
sacred  books  called  the  prose  **  Edda." 

"  *  I  must  now  ask  thee,'  said  Gangler,  *  who  are  the  gods 
that  men  are  bound  to  believe  in  ?  '  '  There  are  twelve 
gods,*  replied  Har,  '  to  whom  divine  honors  ought  to  be 
rendered.*  *  Nor  are  the  goddesses,'  added  Jafnhar,  *  less 
divine  and  mighty.'  *  The  first  and  eldest  of  the  Aesir,* 
continued  Thridi,  '  is  Odin.  He  governs  all  things,  and 
although  the  other  deities  are  powerful,  they  all  serve  and 
obey  him  as  children  do  their  father.  Frigga  is  his  wife. 
Frigga  alone  knoweth  the  destinies  of  all,  though  she 
telleth  them  never.*  "  "  Odin  is  named  Alfadir  (All-Fa- 
ther), because  he  is  the  father  of  all  gods  ;  and  also  Val- 
fadir  (Choosing  Father),  because  he  chooses  for  his  sons 
those  who  fall  in  combat.  For  their  abode  he  has  pre- 
pared Valhalla  and  Vingolf,  where  they  are  called  heroes. 
He  hath  formed  heaven  and  earth  and  the  air,  and  all 
things  thereunto  belonging." 

It  is  clear  that  this  passage  points  back  to  a  time  when 
the  Norsemen  were  monotheists.  If  Odin  was  father  of 
the  gods,  there  was  certainly  a  time  when  as  yet  none  of 
his  divine  offspring  were  born,  and  he  himself  was  the 
only  god  in  the  universe. 

(6)  Religions  among  Savages. 

The  lowest  tribes  of  savages  could  not  reasonably  be 
expected  to  rise  to  the  lofty  conception  of  one  only  and 
infinite  God.  Indeed,  it  is  boldly  asserted,  in  certain 
quarters,  that  some  of  these  tribes  have  no  religion  what- 
ever, and  never  had  any.  This  is  a  serious  mistake.  The 
statement,  heretofore  made  in  this  work,  that  religion  is 
universal,  is  capable  of  abundant  proof ;  and  this  is  the 
proper  place  to  verify  it. 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 87 

I  St.       RELIGION    IS   UNIVERSAL. 

To  prove  this  statement  it  will  be  necessary  to  show 
that  the  very  lowest  and  most  brute-like  men  are  religious 
beings.  But  here  a  difficulty  meets  us.  It  is  quite  uncer- 
tain who  are  the  lowest  types  of  men.  Specialists,  who 
have  devoted  themselves  to  ethnic  studies,  are  not  at  all 
agreed  as  to  their  estimates.  There  are  several  races, 
widely  scattered  geographically,  to  each  of  which  the 
bottom  place  has  been  assigned  by  learned  ethnologists. 
Fortunately,  this  disputed  question  need  not  be  decided 
here.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  every  one  of  these  disputed 
tribes  has  some  religion,  the  point  of  the  present  discus- 
sion will  be  gained  without  puzzling  ourselves  over  their 
relative  rank.  But  this  can  easily  be  done.  The  evidence 
is  both  abundant  and  credible. 

The  principal  tribes  to  whom  reference  has  been  made, 
together  with  the  respective  authorities  by  whom  they 
have  been  assigned  to  the  bottom  of  the  scale,  are  as 
follows : 


LOWEST  TRIBES.  AUTHORITIES. 

Australians,  Bushmen,  Hottentots,  and 

Terra  del  Fuegans 
Australians  .... 

Terra  del  Fuegans 

Bushmen 

Lapps  and  North  American  Indians 
Andaman  Islanders 


Waitz. 

D'Urville. 

Darwin  and  Wallis. 

Burchell. 

Lubbock. 

Owen. 


Now  all  these  tribes  have  been  found  to  have  religious 
ideas  both  distinct  and  positive. 

{a)  Australians. — Dr.  Lang  says  concerning  them  : 
"  They  have  nothing  whatever  of  the  character  of  religion 
or  religious   observance   to   distinguish    them    from    the 


1 88  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

beasts  that  perish."  This  is  certainly  damaging  testi- 
mony, if  true.  But  it  is  not  true.  Mr.  Ridley,  who  trav- 
elled largely  among  these  tribes,  says  that  he  found  every- 
where among  them  traditions  concerning  divine  beings ; 
and  that  in  truth  they  are  ditheists,  worshipping  two 
principal  Gods,  one  the  creator  of  the  world,  and  the 
other  the  source  of  all  evil.  Indeed,  the  learned  Dr. 
Lang  himself  has  rendered  his  own  testimony  nugatory 
by  stating  that  these  same  tribes  attribute  small-pox  to  the 
power  of  an  evil  spirit,  whom  they  propitiate  with  offer- 
ings of  honey,  and,  in  extreme  cases,  even  with  human 
sacrifices.     The  Australians  are  certainly  religionists. 

{U)  Bushmen  and  Hottentots. — Sir  John  Lubbock  thinks 
these  tribes  have  nothing  which  approaches  the  idea  of  an 
avenging  or  rewarding  deity.  But  Livingstone  was  con- 
vinced that  they  worship  a  male  and  a  female  deity. 
Waitz  declares  that  they  have  a  religion  ;  that  they 
worship  the  moon  with  dances  and  songs.  Kolb  says  that 
they  believe  in  a  divine  creator  and  ruler,  and  call  him 
*'  the  great  Captain."  The  moon  is  their  visible  God  ;  but 
they  believe  in  an  invisible  Deity  whom  they  call  "  Jouma 
Tik-quoa,"  or  ''■  God  of  Gods." 

{c)  Terra  del  Fuegans. — Mr.  Darwin  distinctly  declares 
that  these  people  have  no  religion  whatever.  Now,  Mr. 
Darwin  is  high  authority  on  questions  of  fact,  and  he 
visited  these  people  (personally.  But,  unfortunately  for  his 
testimony  in  this  regard,  he  himself  indiscreetly  mentions 
the  fact  that  these  same  people  are  accustomed  to  blow 
into  the  air,  in  order  to  keep  away  evil  spirits.  Phillips,  a 
missionary  among  them,  was  once  complaining  of  the  heat 
of  the  sun ;  whereupon  a  native  exclaimed  :  "  Do  not  say 
that ;  or  he  will  hide  himself,  and  it  will  be  cold."  Verily 
they  believe  in  the  sun-god. 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 89 

{d)  The  Lapps. — Some  authors  have  supposed  these 
tribes  to  be  entirely  without  religion.  But  Klemm,  a 
learned  writer,  declares  this  to  be  a  mistake,  and  describes 
their  religion  thus :  "  They  have  gods  of  the  sky,  of  the 
thunder,  and  other  elementary  deities.  They  also  worship 
the  sun  and  water." 

(e)  North  American  Indians. — Sir  John  Lubbock  says 
that  these  savages  "  have  no  religion,  nor  any  idea  of 
God."  It  is  worthy  of  remark,  in  passing,  that  Sir  John 
has  found  quite  a  list  of  these  non-religious  peoples.  He 
has  an  evident  relish  in  discovering  them  ;  and,  in  his  own 
opinion,  has  attained  some  success  in  such  discovery.  In 
truth,  this  distinguished  gentleman  has  either  been 
strangely  unfortunate  in  his  sources  of  information,  or 
else  strangely  obtuse  in  the  recognition  of  religious  facts. 
Certain  it  is,  at  any  rate,  that  where  other  men  see 
abundant  tokens  of  religion,  he  sees  none  at  all. 

In  regard  to  these  Indians,  it  is  certain  that  the  Esqui- 
maux and  Greenlanders  worship  spirits  of  the  sea,  spirits 
of  the  mountains,  spirits  of  the  fire,  spirits  of  the  battle, 
and  above  all  a  mighty  wind-spirit.  Even  the  "  Root- 
digger  "  Indians  have  objects  of  worship.  Missionaries 
and  United  States  Government  Agents  have  repeatedly 
testified  to  this  fact. 

(/)  The  Andaman  Islanders. — The  inhabitants  of  these 
islands  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  have  also  been  declared  to 
have  no  trace  of  religion.  They  are  said  to  be  indescriba- 
bly low  and  brutish ;  and  yet  they  have  quite  a  compli- 
cated religion.  Day  describes  it  from  personal  observation. 
He  states  that  they  worship  the  sun  and  moon,  princi- 
pally ;  and  also  genii  of  the  waters,  forests,  and  mountains 
whom  they  suppose  to  be  the  agents  of  the  deities.  They 
also  believe  in  an  evil  spirit  who  sends  the  storms,  and  in 


190  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

a  future  life.  Captain  Hockoe  gives  substantially  the 
same  report  concerning  them. 

From  this  brief  reference  to  the  very  lowest  types  of 
men  yet  discovered  on  the  earth,  it  is  manifest  that  not 
one  of  them  is  without  religion.  And  yet,  at  some  time 
or  other,  this  utter  absence  of  religion  has  been  boldly 
asserted  concerning  every  one  of  them.  Upon  better 
acquaintance  with  the  language,  character,  and  customs  of 
these  tribes,  this  assertion  has  invariably  been  shown  to  be 
false.  And  what  has  been,  in  this  respect,  doubtless  will 
continue  to  be  in  the  future.  As  new  tribes  are  discov- 
ered, some  men  will  continue  their  hasty  and  reckless 
statements,  to  the  effect  that  these  new  tribes  have  no 
religion  among  them.  But  all  such  statements,  by 
whomsoever  made,  must  hereafter  be  received  with  a 
tremendous  discount.  We  must  not  believe  them,  until 
the  most  exact  knowledge  of  the  tribes  concerned  shall 
enable  us  to  judge  intelligently  of  their  truth  or  falsity. 
In  the  light  of  that  clearer  knowledge,  they  may  justly  be 
expected  to  dissolve  and  disappear,  as  their  predecessors 
have  invariably  done. 

Meanwhile  it  is  perfectly  safe  to  assert  that  religion  is 
universal — that  man  always  and  everywhere  is  a  religious 
being.  Modern  discoveries,  instead  of  unsettling  this  belief, 
have  given  the  most  remarkable  and  unexpected  testi- 
monies in  its  favor.  But  before  leaving  this  subject  of  the 
universality  of  religion,  a  final  remark  remains  to  be  made. 

i^g)  The  highest  races  of  men  are  likewise  religious. — 
Religion  encompasses  the  earth.  Like  a  chain  with 
numberless  and  diverse  links,  it  binds  together  the  whole 
human  race.  There  are  men,  however,  who  seem  bent  on 
breaking  the  chain,  at  whatever  cost.  Having  been  com- 
pletely foiled  in   their  attempt   at  the   lower  end,   they 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD,  I9I 

have  traversed  the  entire  chain,  and  are  now  tussHng 
away  vigorously  at  the  upper  end.  Forced  to  admit  that 
the  lowest  men  have  religion,  they  now  assert  that  the 
highest  men  have  none  ;  that  religion  belongs  to  the  dark 
ages  and  the  uncivilized  types ;  that  men  outgrow  it  as 
they  do  any  other  superstition  ;  and  that  as  general 
knowledge  advances  among  men,  religion  recedes. 

Let  us  examine  this  statement.  If  it  be  true  anywhere, 
it  will  certainly  hold  in  the  United  States.  For  of  all 
countries  on  earth,  this  is  certainly  the  one  where  intelli- 
gence among  the  masses  has  been  carried  the  furthest, 
where  the  force  of  religious  traditions  is  the  weakest,  and 
where  there  is  absolute  freedom  from  all  restraint,  either 
political  or  moral,  by  any  church  establishment  whatso- 
ever. If  advancing  civilization  tends  to  repress  the 
religious  spirit,  surely  this  tendency  must  be  most 
manifest  in  a  country  like  this.  But  how  stands  the  case  ? 
In  1850  there  were  in  the  United  States,  3 8,CX)0  churches, 
with  14,000,000  sittings;  in  1870,  there  were  63,00a 
churches,  with  21,000,000  sittings.  During  these  twenty 
years,  the  value  of  church  property  increased  from  $87,- 
000,000  to  $354,000,000.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
this  immense  outlay  was  not  in  any  sense  a  tax  upon  the 
people,  but  every  dollar  of  it  was  contributed  as  a  free-will 
offering  to  the  cause  of  religion.  And  this  increase  of  400 
per  cent,  in  these  contributions,  corresponds  to  an  increase 
in  general  population  of  less  than  80  per  cent.  The  entire 
population  at  the  close  of  this  period  was  39,000,000. 
Making  proper  deduction  for  invalids,  infants,  the  aged, 
and  such  other  persons  as  could  not  attend  church,  these 
accommodations  were  amply  sufficient  for  80  per  cent,  of 
the  population.  But  again,  take  another  line  of  facts. 
The    relative    percentages    of    increase     among    church 


192  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

members  and  the  entire  population  show  steady  gains  in 
religion.  Since  1800,  this  relative  increase  has  been 
constant,  until  now  there  are  not  far  from  15,000,000 
church  members  in  this  country.  That  means  not  less 
than  40,000,000  adherents  to  the  cause  of  religion.  From 
1850  to  1880,  the  population  of  the  United  States 
increased  116  per  cent.  During  the  same  period,  church 
members  increased  226  per  cent.,  the  number  of  churches 
240  per  cent.,  and  of  ministers  241  per  cent.  Dr.  Dor- 
chester, Dr.  Strong,  and  others  have  brought  out  these 
facts  with  great  force.  And,  indeed,  there  is  no  surer 
method  of  disclosing  the  religious  condition  and  trend  of 
any  country,  than  by  an  appeal  to  just  such  facts.  Their 
testimony  is  convincing ;  and  it  gives  no  hint  of  the 
decadence  of  religion  in  this  country.  On  the  contrary,  it 
proves  its  continual  and  remarkable  growth.  And  the 
same  is  true  of  other  civilized  countries.  From  the 
highest  to  the  lowest  of  men,  religion  is  universal.  Its 
forms  may  change  ;  but  its  vital  power  remains  and  grows 
continually. 

2d.    MONOTHEISM    AMONG    SAVAGES. 

{a)  African  tribes. — Waitz  speaks  as  follows  of  the 
African  tribes :  "  The  religion  of  the  negro  is  usually 
considered  as  of  a  peculiar  crude  form  of  polytheism,  and 
marked  with  the  special  name  of  Fetichism.  A  closer 
inspection  shows  that  it  is  neither  very  peculiar  nor  excep- 
tionally crude.  A  profounder  investigation,  such  as  has 
recently  been  made  with  success  by  several  eminent  schol- 
ars, leads  to  the  surprising  result  that  several  negro  tribes, 
who  have  not  been  influenced  from  the  outside,  have  de- 
veloped their  religious  ideas  so  far  that,  if  we  do  not  call 
them  monotheists,  we  must  admit  that  they  have  come 
very  near  the  boundaries  of  true  monotheism." 


THE    UNITY  OF  GOD.  1 93 

Max  Miiller  declares  that  the  tribes  of  West  Africa 
worship  a  Supreme  God,  whom  they  believe  to  be  a  good 
being. 

Cruickshank  and  other  missionaries  give  the  same  testi- 
mony concerning  the  negroes  of  the  Gold  Coast.  These 
negroes  worship  thousands  of  fetiches,  but  they  believe  in 
a  Supreme  Being,  of  whom  they  say,  "  God  is  the  old 
one,  he  is  the  greatest,  he  sees  me." 

{U)  Central  American  tribes. — In  the  ancient  religion  of 
Central  America,  there  is  the  same  tendency  to  Monothe- 
ism. Dr.  Brinton  states  that  he  discovered  it  in  prayers 
•dedicated  to  the  great  Creator  of  the  world.  Some  of  the 
documents  recording  these  prayers,  date  back  many  cen- 
turies.   The  following  extract  is  from  a  translation  of  his. 

"  We  bring  forward  the  revelation  of  that  which  was 
hidden,  the  knowledge  sent  to  us  by  him  who  creates. 
Speak  his  name  ;  honor  your  mother  and  father ;  call  him 
Hurakany  Soul  of  the  earth,  Soul  of  the  sky,  Creator, 
Maker;  .  .  .  call  on  him  and  salute  him.  Hail!  O 
Creator,  Maker!  thou  seest  and  hearest  us.  Do  not 
leave  us,  do  not  desert  us !  " 

{c)  Other  savage  tribes. — Examples  might  be  multi- 
plied. Australians,  Polynesians,  Esquimaux,  South 
American  Indians,  and  in  fact  all  the  tribes  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  argument  for  the  universality  of  religion, 
might  be  called  upon  with  equal  success  to  testify  con- 
cerning this  widespread  and  persistent  tendency  toward 
Monotheism.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  further  on 
this  point. 

The  argument  for  the  unity  of  God  is  an  argument  of 
fact,  than  which  nothing  can  be  stronger.  It  is  a  three- 
fold cord  that  cannot  be  broken.  Science,  Philosophy, 
and  Religion,  however  discordant  on  other  subjects,  clasp 


194  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

hands  here,  and  unite  their  voices  in  proclaiming  the  one 
only  God. 

Now  if  these  three  powerful  factors  in  the  world's  his- 
tory are  actually  cooperating  in  the  interest  of  Monothe- 
ism, it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  the  aggregate  of  their 
results  should  be  great  and  constantly  increasing.  That 
such  is  the  case  is  susceptible  of  abundant  proof. 

Nearly  one  half  the  entire  population  of  the  globe  are 
to-day  under  the  control  of  pure  Monotheism.  A  glance 
at  the  religious  statistics  of  the  world  will  verify  this 
statement.  There  are  1,392,000,000  people  now  living 
upon  the  earth.  Of  these,  nearly  400,000,000  are  Christians 
and  200,000,000  Mohammedans.  But  both  these  religions 
teach  the  purest  monotheism.  Among  the  remainder, 
175,000,000  Brahmins,  340,000,000  Buddhists,  80,000,000 
Confucianists,  and  100,000,000  Pagans  or  heathen,  some 
form  of  imperfect  Monotheism  is  widely  prevalent. 

A  further  fact  must  not  be  overlooked.  Progress  in 
knowledge,  thought,  science,  culture,  and  civilization 
tends  uniformly  to  the  advancement  of  Monotheism.  As 
a  general  rule,  its  strength  is  found  among  the  foremost 
nations  of  the  earth.  Polytheism  cannot  stand  before  the 
conquering  car  of  truth  and  progress.  The  world  is 
rapidly  advancing  toward  the  universal  belief  in  one  only 
eternal  and  omnipotent  God. 

References  : 

Clarke's  "Ten  Great  Religions." 
Max  Muller's  "Science  of  Religion." 
Fiske's  "  The  Idea  of  God." 
Darwin's  "  Descent  of  Man." 
Loomis'  "Astronomy. "• 
Strong's  "  Our  Country." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

INFINITY  OF  GOD;   OR,  THE  CAUSAL 
ARGUMENT. 

SECTION  I. 

NATURE  OF  THE  INFINITE. 

CONCERNING  the  general  nature  and  the  appre- 
hension of  the  infinite,  metaphysicians  have  dis- 
puted for  forty  centuries.  Conflicting  theories  have  long 
struggled  for  the  mastery,  and  the  struggle  will  doubtless 
go  on.  It  is  no  part  of  the  present  purpose  to  enter  that 
arena.  Let  the  able  contestants  therein  fight  out  their 
own  battles.  With  one  point  in  the  conflict,  however, 
this  argument  is  vitally  concerned.  And  that  is,  the 
infinity  of  God.  Christian  Theism  has  always  insisted 
that  God  is  a  being  of  infinite  perfections.  In  maintain- 
ing this  claim,  it  will  be  necessary  to  touch  briefly  upon 
the  nature  of  the  infinite.  We  must  first  construe  to  our 
minds  as  clearly  as  possible,  what  we  mean  by  infinity. 
McCosh,  Porter,  Harris,  and  other  recent  writers,  have 
given  special  attention  to  this  subject.  A  brief  digest  of 
their  views  is  all  that  need  be  presented  here. 

I.     THE    INFINITE    CANNOT    BE    KNOWN    BY    IMAGINATION. 

The  imagination  always  forms  a  picture  of  its  object. 
But  infinity  is  an  abstraction  and  cannot  be  pictured.   No 

195 


196  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

abstraction  can.  Who  can  form  an  image,  for  example^ 
of  virtue,  love,  or  truth?  The  infinite  is  a  quality,  and, 
like  other  qualities,  is  likewise  incapable  of  being  imaged. 
Softness,  hardness,  transparency,  elasticity  can  never  be 
pictured  to  the  mind.     Neither  can  infinity. 

This  is  certainly  true,  but  it  is  not  all  the  truth  on  this 
subject.  If  it  were,  it  need  not  have  been  mentioned. 
There  is  a  peculiarity  in  the  case.  The  infinite  cannot  be 
pictured  even  in  its  object.  We  can  form  distinct  images 
of  a  hard,  soft,  or  transparent  substance  ;  but  we  can 
have  no  such  image  of  an  infinite  object.  For  whenever 
we  image  a  thing,  we  mentally  assign  to  it  some  definite 
form,  extent,  and  boundaries.  And  in  this  very  act  we 
destroy  its  infinity.  To  picture  infinite  space,  for  instance, 
is  to  give  it  limitations.  And  however  vast  the  picture 
may  be,  it  falls  far  short  of  infinity.  We  sometimes  rep- 
resent infinite  duration  by  a  right  line.  But  this  repre- 
sentation is  utterly  inadequate ;  for  any  right  line  is 
limited.  It  may  be  conceived  as  billions  upon  billions  of 
miles  in  length ;  but  still  it  is  limited  and  measurable.  It 
is  no  nearer  the  infinite  than  if  it  were  a  single  inch  in 
length.  The  infinite  can  never  be  pictured  to  the  mind^ 
either  as  an  abstraction,  an  attribute,  or  an  object.  The 
attempt  to  do  this  impossible  thing  has  led  to  numberless 
errors  in  philosophy,  among  which  may  be  mentioned 
the  antinomies  of  Kant  and  the  necessary  contradictions  of 
Hamilton. 

2.    THE   INFINITE    GIVES   NO    CONCEPT. 

The  concept  is  a  purely  mental  product — the  result  of 
certain  definite  mental  processes.  It  arises  from  the  com- 
bined action  of  analysis,  abstraction,  and  generalization. 
Now  it  is  evident  that  the  infinite  cannot  be  analyzed  ; 
for  if  so,  it  could  be  measured,  and  would  therefore  be 


INFINITY  OF  GOD. 


197 


finite.  Neither  can  we  reach  the  infinite  by  abstraction  ; 
for  that  is  a  drawing  away,  a  diminishing  process.  Infin- 
ity so  reached  would  be  a  negative  affair  indeed,  a  mere 
negation,  and  nothing  more,  as  Hobbes  puts  it.  It  is 
equally  certain  that  generalization  cannot  lead  to  the 
infinite  ;  for  generalization  merely  groups  objects  in  ac- 
cordance with  certain  known  attributes.  If,  therefore, 
there  is  no  infinity  among  the  elements  of  the  first  indi- 
viduals, there  can  be  none  in  the  general  class  at  which 
we  arrive. 

But,  again,  the  infinite  is  not  a  mental  product  arising 
from  processes  of  reasoning.  Deduction  depends  upon 
induction,  and  induction  depends  upon  the  intuitions  of 
time  and  space,  which,  in  themselves,  involve  the  infinite. 
In  other  words,  if  there  is  nothing  infinite  in  either  of  the 
premises,  there  can  be  nothing  infinite  in  the  conclusion. 
No  new  term  can  be  introduced  in  the  third  proposition. 
It  is  safe  to  conclude  that  the  infinite  is  not  derived 
from  a  process,  and  that  we  can  form  no  general  concept 
of  it. 

3.    MENTAL  APPREHENSION    INCLUDES   MORE    THAN    THE   IMAGE 
AND    THE    CONCEPT. 

In  some  cases  the  mind  is  compelled  to  believe  in  exist- 
ences beyond  either  of  these  products.  But  this  compul- 
sion is  not  universal.  The  unmeasured  is  not  necessarily 
the  infinite.  Let  us  illustrate.  The  geologist  digs  into 
the  earth  and  finds  stratum  upon  stratum,  however  far 
down  he  goes  ;  but  he  is  by  no  means  forced  to  believe 
that  mundane  stratification  is  infinite.  The  mariner  lets 
down  his  sounding-line  hundreds  of  fathoms  into  the  deep 
sea,  and  finds  no  bottom ;  but  he  never  once  dreams  that 
the  ocean  is  therefore  bottomless.     The  astronomer  first 


198  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

counts  the  visible  stars,  our  nearest  cosmical  neighbors. 
He  then  sweeps  the  sky  with  his  telescope,  and  adds 
many  thousands  to  the  list.  Finally  he  scans  the  distant 
depths  of  the  Milky  Way,  and  finds  therein  signs  of  stellar 
bodies  still  more  immensely  remote.  And  yet  he  is  by 
no  means  compelled  to  believe  that  throughout  the  meas- 
ureless void  of  infinite  space  there  must  be  star  after  star 
forever. 

But  he  is  compelled  to  believe  that  wherever  the  re- 
motest star  may  be  there  is  still  space  beyond  it ;  that 
whenever  the  first  star  was  made,  there  was  still  duration 
before  it.  And  in  general  with  all  men,  he  must  admit 
that  whatever  is  farthest  out  in  space  does  not  end  it, 
and  whatever  is  farthest  back  in  duration  does  not  begin  it. 

Whence  arises  this  belief  in  the  infinity  of  time  and 
space?  It  is  in  the  mind,  and  native  to  it.  It  must  be 
accounted  for ;  and  yet  it  brooks  no  limitations  and  sub- 
mits to  no  analysis.  There  is  no  other  conviction,  either 
to  which  we  can  reduce  it,  or  from  which  we  can  derive  it. 

This  fact  suggests  that  it  must  be  original  and  intuitive 
in  character.  Upon  examination  it  bears  the  tests  of 
intuition.  It  is  self-evident.  By  no  combination  of  argu- 
ments can  we  prove  that  space  is  infinite ;  and  yet  we 
know  it  without  proof.  It  is  necessary.  We  are  forced 
to  the  conviction,  and  cannot  successfully  resist  it.  Con- 
ceive yourself  at  the  centre  of  a  sphere  whose  radius  is  a 
billion  billion  miles,  and  there  is  still  space  beyond  it. 
Now  raise  this  number  to  the  billionth  billionth  power, 
and  upon  the  new  radius  thus  formed,  construct  another 
sphere.  And  yet  this  sphere,  however  immense,  does  not 
and  cannot  exhaust  space.  You  must  believe  that  if 
placed  on  the  surface  thereof,  you  could  still  peer  into 
the  depths  of  space  beyond,  even  as  we  do  now  from  the 


INFINITY  OF  GOD,  1 99 

surface  of  the  earth.  Moreover,  it  is  universal.  True,  it 
does  not  apply  universally.  The  conviction  of  the  infi- 
nite may  not  exist  with  equal  clearness  and  definiteness 
in  all  men.  The  child  or  the  savage  may  never  have 
thought  himself  very  far  out  into  space  ;  but  so  far  as  he 
has  gone,  he  has  still  found  the  "  infinite  beyond."  And  the 
farther  you  may  succeed  in  leading  his  thought,  the  wider 
still  becomes  to  him  the  inner  surface  of  this  infinite. 
Rightly  interpreted,  this  conviction  is  universal,  no  less 
than  self-evident  and  necessary.  It  is  therefore  an  intui- 
tion of  the  mind,  and  neither  its  existence  nor  its  charac- 
ter can  be  reasonably  questioned  or  ignored. 

4.    INFINITE    OBJECTS    ARE    INCAPABLE   OF    INCREASE. 

These  objects  are  time,  space,  and  Deity.  Of  course, 
in  dealing  with  them,  the  imagining  power  of  the  mind 
fails  us  completely.  It  is  true  that  any  attempt  to  picture 
them  does  give  an  object  that  can  be  increased.  The 
sphere  in  space,  the  line  representing  duration,  and  the 
anthropomorphic  attributes  ascribed  to  the  Deity  are  all 
of  this  character.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  all  these 
things  fall  far  short  of  the  infinite.  Space  is  larger  than 
any  sphere,  time  is  longer  than  any  line,  and  the  perfec- 
tions of  God  are  felt  to  be  infinitely  beyond  the  attributes 
of  man  or  his  powers  of  comprehension.  Nothing  what- 
ever can  in  anywise  be  added  to  them.  And  this  inability 
is  not  a  mere  negation,  arising,  as  Hamilton  insists,  from 
the  impotence  of  human  faculties.  It  is  the  rather  a 
positive  thing,  due  to  the  inherent  nature  of  the  infinite 
itself.  This  infinite  perfection  of  God  is  the  universal 
claim  of  Christian  Theism.  Nor  is  it  confined  to  Chris- 
tianity alone.  The  most  thoughtful  devotees  to  systems 
of  pagan  worship  insist  that  their  supreme  deity,  in  nearly 


200  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

every  case,  has  these  same  inimitable  and  unincreasable 
perfections.  This  is  the  universal  characteristic  of  the 
infinite,  wherever  we  perceive  it,  and  however  we  may 
attempt  to  construe  it  to  our  minds. 

5.     THE    INFINITE    IS    AN    ATTRIBUTE. 

I  have  just  spoken  of  it  as  a  quality.  But  it  must  not 
be  forgotten  that  this  quality,  like  any  other,  must  always 
belong  to  some  object.  It  has  no  separate  or  inde- 
pendent existence.  True,  it  is  an  abstraction,  but  as  such 
it  has  a  mental  existence  only.  However  we  may  think 
it  apart,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  infinity  can  actually 
be  separated  from  its  object,  any  more  than  beauty  or 
truth  or  love  can.  There  is  quite  a  tendency  among 
metaphysicians  to  overlook  this  truth,  and  to  speak  of 
infinity  as  though  it  were  an  abstraction  having  an  exist- 
ence in  the  universe,  independent  of  any  object  or  per- 
sonal being.  This  is  certainly  a  false  view.  Infinity 
exists.  That  is  not  denied.  On  the  contrary,  I  insist 
upon  its  reality.  But  it  has  that  reality  simply  and  only 
as  an  attribute  of  some  existing  object.  Theism  deals 
with  it  solely  as  an  attribute  of  a  Personal  Being  whom 
we  call  God.  There  is  here  no  occasion  to  view  it  in  any 
other  aspect.  The  infinity  of  God  is  the  theme  of  the 
present  discussion. 

SECTION  II. 

THE  INFINITE  BEING. 

A  vast  amount  of  false  philosophy  and  fruitless  specu- 
lation has  been  expended  upon  the  question  of  God's  in- 
finitude. To  avoid  this  error,  let  us  first  of  all  ask  ourselves 
what  we  mean  when  we  ascribe  infinity  to  any  being.   We 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  20I 

simply  mean  that  the  being  of  which  we  thus  speak  has 
attributes  without  limit.  When  we  affirm  the  infinity  of 
space,  for  instance,  we  mean  to  assert  that  no  bounds  can 
be  fixed  to  determine  space,  and  that  this  impossibility 
arises  not  from  any  weakness  or  defect  in  our  powers  of 
comprehension,  but  from  the  inherent  nature  of  space 
itself.  When  we  say  that  duration  is  infinite,  we  are 
affirming  not  our  inability  to  conceive  its  limits,  but  our 
conviction  that  it  has  no  limits — that  it  is  absolutely 
without  beginning  and  without  end.  When  we  assert 
that  God  is  infinite  in  power,  we  simply  mean  that  this 
attribute  of  his  is  so  great  that  it  cannot  be  increased. 
No  possible  addition  can  make  it  greater.  He  can  now  and 
always  do  all  things  which  are  proper  objects  of  power. 

God  is  likewise  infinite  in  wisdom.  He  knows  all  things, 
and  so  no  addition  can  be  made  to  his  knowledge.  More- 
over, his  use  of  that  infinite  knowledge  is  perfect ;  that  is, 
any  conceivable  change  therein  would  be  folly,  and  not 
wisdom  at  all.  And  this  is  what  is  meant  by  asserting 
the  infinity  of  God's  wisdom.  The  same  is  true  of  all  his 
attributes.  Whatever  element  exists  at  all  in  the  Divine 
Being  exists  there  not  in  degree,  but  in  illimitable  per- 
fection. It  cannot  be  measured,  analyzed,  or  increased. 
And  the  infinity  of  God  consists  in  this  infinity  of  attri- 
butes. God  is  a  being  whose  personality  involves  infinite 
perfections.  This  is  the  exact  truth  and  the  whole  truth 
that  I  mean  to  assert  and  to  maintain  on  this  vexed  ques- 
tion. God  is  not  infinite  in  the  sense  that  he  includes  in 
his  character  every  element,  actual,  possible,  or  conceiv- 
able. He  is  not  a  huge  complex  of  contradictories  and 
self-destructive  incompatibilities.  His  character  is  one  of 
unity,  harmony,  and  moral  consistency,  with  which  no 
opposite  elements  can  possibly  interfere. 


202  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

Any. other  view  of  it  involves  tYvQ  pseudo-infinite  dind  not 
the  true  infinite  at  all.  There  are  two  forms  of  this 
pseudo-infinite  which  are  quite  prevalent  among  agnostic 
and  atheistic  philosophers.  The  first  makes  the  infinite  the 
sum  of  all  things.  It  is  reached  mathematically  by  adding 
together  all  finite  beings.  The  second  views  the  infinite  as 
the  summum  genus,  the  widest  possible  concept.  It  is 
reached  logically  by  magnifying  the  extent,  and  so  mini- 
fying the  content,  of  the  concept.  Finally  a  concept  is 
developed  which  includes  all  reality  in  its  extent,  and 
thereby  excludes  all  qualities  from  its  content.  This  is 
the  zero  of  being,  rather  than  infinity. 

Many  of  the  popular  philosophical  sophisms  concerning 
the  infinity  of  God,  with  which  skeptics  are  wont  to  amuse 
themselves  and  puzzle  their  antagonists,  are  founded  on 
one  or  the  other  of  these  false  ideas  of  the  infinite.  Thus, 
starting  out  with  the  assumption  that  the  infinite  is  the 
sum  of  all  existence,  they  proceed  to  some  such  inquiries 
as  the  following : 

"  How  can  the  infinite  and  the  finite  coexist  ?  for-  the 
infinite  is  necessarily  all-embracing.  How  can  evil  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  Divine  Being  without  cancelling  his  in- 
finity ?  How  can  weakness,  folly,  and  sin  be  shut  out  of 
a  nature  that  must  include  every  thing  ?  As  Hegel  puts 
it :  *  What  kind  of  an  Absolute  Being  is  that  which  does 
not  contain  in  itself  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil  included?' 
How  can  God  ever  be  known  ?  for  to  know  is  to  distin- 
guish, and  to  distinguish  is  to  limit.  How  can  God  know 
himself  even,  or  be  self-conscious?  since  the  knowledge  of 
the  ego  depends  on  the  non-ego.  How  can  God  have  any 
positive  existence  at  all  ?  For  the  positive  must  be 
definite  and  determined,  and  therefore  limited.  The 
infinite  must  then  be  the  negative,  the  indeterminate,  the 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  203 

non-existent,  the  unknowable.  How  can  the  Deity  sus- 
tain any  relation  whatever  to  the  universe  ?  since  the 
infinite  is  the  unconditioned,  the  absolute  ;  and  the  ab- 
solute, being  the  thing  in  itself,  is  of  necessity  out  of  all 
relations  possible  or  conceivable." 

Such  foolish  and  impertinent  questions  as  these  consti- 
tute the  staple  arguments  with  which  the  average  philo- 
sophical atheist  entertains  himself  and  his  readers. 

They  all  proceed  upon  a  palpable  falsehood.  The  in- 
finite is  not  the  sum  of  all  existence.  The  finite  exists 
and  must  be  recognized  in  order  to  aflfirm  the  infinite.  It 
is  true  that  logically  the  infinite  precedes  the  finite  ;  but 
psychologically  the  converse  of  this  is  true.  In  the  realm 
of  human  consciousness  the  finite  always  antedates  the 
infinite.  Neither  is  the  infinite  all-embracing.  Time  is 
infinite,  but  it  does  not  embrace  space.  Space  is  infinite, 
but  it  by  no  means  necessitates  the  infinity  of  time.  It  is 
not  a  whit  less  infinite  for  a  single  instant  than  for  an 
eternity. 

Neither  is  the  Infinite  Being  the  sum  of  all  existence. 
Rational  intuition  does  not  require  such  a  postulate.  We 
know  that  he  is  the  source  of  all  finite  being — its  creating 
and  controlling  power.  And  that  is  enough.  We  know 
that  his  perfections  are  illimitable.  His  power,  wisdom, 
and  goodness  are  perfect.  But  the  infinity  of  these  attri- 
butes does  not  imply  the  possession  of  an  infinite  number 
of  attributes.  There  is  in  God  no  weakness,  folly,  or 
unrighteousness  whatever.  These  qualities  may  exist  in 
finite  beings,  but  not  in  the  infinite.  The  very  infinity 
of  the  opposite  qualities  just  named  excludes  them  alto- 
gether. 

The  proposition  that  the  infinite  is  negative  and  un- 
knowable depends  upon  the  same  false  assumption.    True, 


204  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

we  cannot  know  God  to  perfection.  If  we  could,  that  fact 
would  prove  either  that  God  is  finite  or  that  man  is  in- 
finite. The  finite  cannot  exhaust  infinity.  But,  in  some 
important  sense,  we  can  know  him,  for  we  can  plainly  dis- 
tinguish him  from  ourselves,  from  other  intelligences  like 
ourselves,  and  from  the  sum  of  finite  existences  in  the 
universe.  Our  knowledge  of  the  Infinite  is  certainly  not 
exhaustive  ;  but  it  is  real  and  fundamental  in  the  truest 
sense  possible.  There  is  no  philosophical  barrier  in  the 
way  of  our  knowing  God,  of  whom  we  may  continue  to 
learn  more  and  more,  if  we  will. 

The  question  of  self-consciousness  in  the  Deity  is  a 
most  profound  one,  and  should  be  approached  with  the 
greatest  modesty.  The  exact  mode  in  which  the  self- 
directive  freedom  of  the  Infinite  Being  acts  may  not  be 
comprehensible  by  the  finite.  One  thing,  however,  can 
be  stated  with  positive  assurance.  Self-consciousness  is 
not,  and  cannot  be,  in  any  being,  a  token  of  weakness, 
finiteness,  or  imperfection.  Those  who  hold  to  the  con- 
trary derive  their  doctrine  from  the  self-consciousness  of 
man,  which  they  say  is  necessarily  finite  and  imperfect. 
It  is  not  \\i^  fact  of  self-consciousness  in  man  that  makes 
him  finite,  but  rather  the  method  of  its  origin.  It  may  be 
admitted  that  the  knowledge  of  the  ego  could  never  have 
been  awakened  without  the  non-ego.  But  when  once 
awakened  it  is  thenceforth  independent  of  every  thing 
other  than  the  being  in  whom  it  exists.  I  may  never 
have  known  myself  without  the  agency  of  external 
things  ;  but,  now  that  I  know  myself,  I  would  continue 
in  that  knowledge,  even  though  the  whole  universe  be- 
sides me  were  blotted  out  forever.  And  this  law  of  self- 
consciousness  is  not  exceptional  in  the  mental  economy. 
The  same  is  true  of  all  the  intuitions  of  the  mind.     Con- 


INFINITY  OF  GOD. 


205 


tact  with  externality  served  to  awaken  every  one  of  them 
at  the  first  ;  but  once  awakened,  they  are  thenceforth  in- 
dependent of  all  externality.  Derived  consciousness  does, 
indeed,  imply  the  non-ego ;  but  because  of  this  fact  it  by 
no  means  follows  that  original  consciousness  implies  any 
such  thing.  The  evidence  is  to  the  contrary.  Be  it  re- 
membered that  it  is  the  orighiation  of  consciousness  in 
man,  and  that  alone,  that  depends  upon  externality.  Its 
subsequent  and  continuous  exercise  is  absolutely  inde- 
pendent thereof. 

Now,  God  is  an  uncreated,  self-existent  personality. 
What  he  now  is  he  always  was.  A  just  view  of  his  own 
aseity  demands  this.  God  was  never  made.  He  did  not 
make  himself.  His  personality  never  began  to  be.  His 
self-consciousness,  therefore,  unlike  that  of  man,  was  not 
originated  at  all ;  it  always  existed  even  as  now.  Hence 
it  follows  that  at  no  single  moment  of  past  eternity  could 
the  exercise  of  the  Divine  self-consciousness  have  de- 
pended upon  the  external  or  the  finite.  It  would  have 
been  as  it  now  is,  even  if  no  Cosmos  had  ever  been 
created.  And  so  this  impious  question  about  God's 
ability  to  know  himself  is  as  illogical  as  it  is  impious. 

But,  again,  God's  knowledge  of  the  finite  is  also  arrayed 
against  his  infinity.  Let  us  see  about  this.  Intuitive 
knowledge  is  the  highest,  noblest,  and  most  valuable  kind 
of  which  man  is  capable.  It  is  the  basis  of  all  other 
knowledge  whatsoever,  from  which  it  is  derived,  and 
without  which  it  would  be  impossible.  Without  the  uni- 
fying power  of  intuition,  the  manifold  of  sense  could 
never  be  aggregated  into  knowledge.  But  intuition  acts 
at  once  and  without  conscious  effort,  while  other  knowl- 
edge comes  slowly  and  by  means  of  laborious  processes. 
Can  it  be   supposed  for  a  moment  that  the  existence  of 


206  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

* 
intuitive  power  in  man  is  a  sign  of  imperfection  ?  Is  it  not 

indeed,  the  thing  in  him  that  makes  him  most  like  God  ? 

What  intuitive  knowledge  he  has,  is  perfect.     The  lack  of 

it  is  what  brings  imperfection.     Man's  knowledge  is  finite 

simply  because  his  intuitions  are  few,  and  limited  in  their 

application.       Only   remove    these   limitations,    and   we 

would  at  once  know  every  thing  by  simple  intuition,  our 

knowledge  would  become  perfect  and  infinite.     But  this 

is  precisely  what   God  does.     He  sees  the  end  from  the 

beginning.     He  never  learns,   remembers,  or  forgets  any 

thing,  in  the  human  sense  of  those  terms.     Past,  present, 

and  future  are  one  eternal  present  with  him.     All  things 

are  constantly  within  the  realm  of  his  cognition,  without 

any  effort  or  any  process  whatever. 

This  is  the  Divine  intuition,  which  includes  what  we 
call  self-consciousness.  In  what  conceivable  sense  can 
this  power  make  God  finite  ?  Would  its  absence  make 
him  any  the  more  perfect  or  infinite  ?  The  very  thought 
is  absurd  in  the  extreme. 

The  only  remaining  quibble  is  that  which  questions  the 
possibility  of  God's  sustaining  any  relation  whatever  to 
the  universe.  Upon  careful  examination  it  will  be  found 
equally  vain  and  frivolous.  It  arises  from  a  strange  en- 
tanglement of  the  unconditioned  and  the  unrelated.  The 
infinite,  being  absolute,  is  necessarily  unconditioned,  but  it 
is  not  necessarily  unrelated.  The  infinity  of  space  does  not 
prevent  its  bearing  relations  to  all  the  objects  that  exist 
within  it.  Time  is  infinite,  and  still  it  is  related  to  every 
event  that  ever  occurred.  Even  so  God  may  be  infinite, 
and  may  still  bear  to  his  creatures  the  tenderest  relations 
of  mercy,  truth,  and  love.  It  is  true  that  the  Deity  is 
absolute  and  unconditioned,  in  the  sense  of  being  utterly 
independent  of  all  things,  in  his  being,  character,  purpose. 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  20/ 

and  action.  That  means  that  his  existence  is  in  no  wise 
conditioned  upon  the  universe ;  but  it  does  not  mean 
conversely,  that  the  existence  of  the  universe  is  in  no 
wise  conditioned  upon  God.  He  may  assume  voluntary 
relations,  if  he  so  chooses.  Indeed,  his  very  absoluteness 
carries  this  possibility  with  it.  The  fact  that  he  has  so 
chosen,  in  becoming  the  Creator  and  Sustainer  of  the 
universe,  makes  nothing  whatever  against  his  indepen- 
dence or  his  infinity.  The  infinite  cannot  be  diminished 
by  the  creation  of  the  finite.  Of  his  own  choice  he  may 
have  imposed  certain  relations  and  conditions  upon  himself, 
and  certain  limitations,  if  you  please  to  put  it  so,  upon  his 
own  activity.  In  the  creation,  endowment,  and  sustenance 
of  free  moral  intelligences,  for  instance,  he  may  have 
so  conditioned  himself  as  not  in  any  way  to  abridge  their 
freedom  or  to  prevent  its  proper  exercise.  He  may  main- 
tain of  choice  the  eternal  consistency  of  his  own  acts  of 
choice.  And  yet  in  so  doing  he  has  not  abridged  his 
infinity,  independence,  or  absoluteness.  A  self-assumed 
relation  accords  with  all  these  elements.  Indeed,  the 
ability  to  assume  relations  belongs  to  his  own  free  per- 
sonality, if  not  as  well  to  his  very  infinity.  It  is  the 
mere  exercise  of  free  personal  choice.  That  would  be  a 
strange  kind  of  independence  indeed,  which  would  con- 
fine the  Deity  himself  to  a  state  of  eternal  isolation  !  It 
is  not  so.  Myriads  of  beings  may  exist  in  the  relation 
of  dependence  upon  him  ;  but  the  divine  acts  by  which 
he  creates  and  sustains  them  do  not  in  any  way  interfere 
with  his  own  independence.  On  the  contrary,  they  fall 
in  with  the  plainest  tokens  of  that  independence. 

But  it  is  further  objected  that  even  this  voluntary  exer- 
cise of  intelligence  destroys  infinity — that  intelligence 
itself  is  a  limitation — that   if  we  attribute  intelligence  to- 


208  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

the  Deity,  we  thereby  exclude  other  qualities.  This 
blunder  results  from  a  mistaken  use  of  the  disjunctive 
syllogism.  When  I  attribute  intelligence  to  God,  I  cer- 
tainly exclude  non-intelligence.  But  that  is  all  I  do  ex- 
clude. It  is  a  plain  case  of  dichotomy.  He  may  have 
also  the  qualities  of  goodness,  justice,  veracity,  power, 
and  all  others  indeed  that  are  not  logical  contradictories 
of  intelligence.  There  is  therefore  nothing  at  all  in  this 
argument  for  the  necessary  mutual  exclusion  of  infinite 
perfections  assigned  to  the  Deity. 

But  surely  it  will  not  be  soberly  asserted  that  intelli- 
gence in  itself  is  a  weakness — an  infirmity.  The  power 
to  know,  is  certainly  power,  and  not  weakness.  It  is  not 
intelligence  in  man,  but  the  lack  of  it,  that  tends  to  make 
him  imperfect.  Would  he  approach  perfection,  by  losing 
his  intelligence  ?  Is  human  perfection  to  be  found  by 
escaping  from  intelligence,  or  is  it  rather  by  escaping 
from  the  limitations  of  intelligence  ?  To  ask  these  ques- 
tions is  to  answer  them. 

Now  the  Divine  intelligence  has  no  limitations.  His 
apprehension  of  truth  is  immediate,  spontaneous,  abso- 
lute, unlimited.  To  call  such  a  power  as  this  a  limitation 
or  an  imperfection  of  being,  is  to  use  words  with  reckless 
folly,  or  to  violate  the  very  regulative  principles  of  human 
thought.  And  so  this  logical  quibble  turns  out  to  be  as 
empty  and  illogical  as  all  the  others. 

There  are  no  logical  or  philosophical  objections  of  any 
weight  against  the  existence  of  the  infinite  or  of  the  In- 
finite Being.  But  the  Infinite  Being  must  be  a  person. 
Essential  Reason,  realizing  its  ideals  in  the  Cosmos,  must 
be  absolute,  unconditioned,  and  free.  The  accidents  of 
creation  cannot  conditionate  the  essence  of  intelligent, 
all-embracing  Reason.     But  reason  and  free-will  are  ele- 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  209 

ments  of  personality.  Absolute  reason  and  absolute  free- 
will constitute  the  infinite  personality  of  God.  That  can 
account  adequately  for  the  existing  universe.  Nothing 
less  than  that  can.  If  God  be  infinite,  no  absurdity  fol- 
lows, either  as  to  his  personality  or  as  to  his  relations. 
But  is  he  infinite?  There  may  be  an  Infinite  Being;  and 
if  there  is,  nature  shows  that  he  must  be  a  personality. 
But,  does  nature  prove  that  there  must  be  an  Infinite 
Being?  This  is  still  an  open  question.  In  other  words, 
proof  may  still  be  demanded  to  show  that  God  is  actually 
infinite.     Let  us  examine  and  answer  this  demand. 


SECTION  III. 
PROOF   OF  GODS  INFINITY. 

It  has  already  been  asserted  that  the  infinite  is  appre- 
hended by  intuition,  and  that  all  intuitions  being  self- 
evident,  are  incapable  of  proof  by  any  mental  process. 
How  then  can  the  infinity  of  God  be  made  in  anywise  a 
matter  of  proof?  Is  there  not  here  a  plain  contradiction 
of  terms  ?  Let  us  see.  Observe  the  nature  of  our  intu- 
itions. We  feel  that,  so  far  as  they  go,  they  are  infalli- 
ble. What  we  know  by  intuition  we  recognize  as  certain 
truth,  and  likewise  as  necessary  truth.  It  could  not  be 
otherwise.  But,  then,  human  intuition  is  by  no  means 
unlimited  or  universal.  It  tells  us  the  truth,  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,  but  it  is  not  sworn  to  tell  us  the  whole 
truth  on  any  particular  subject.  It  gives  us  certain  ideas 
which  we  could  never  get  in  any  other  way,  but  it  does 
not,  of  necessity,  connect  these  ideas  with  every  individ- 
ual fact  and  being  to  which  they  may  be  applicable.  In 
this  way,  without  doubt,  the  idea  of  the  infinite  comes  to 


2IO  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

US.  It  is  a  quality  or  attribut.e  which  we  apprehend  by 
intuition.  It  belongs  not  in  the  sphere  of  the  physical 
senses,  the  judgment,  or  the  reason.  We  apprehend  it  di- 
rectly whenever  and  wherever  we  apprehend  it  at  all.  But 
that  is  far  from  saying  that  we  must  apprehend  it  univer- 
sally. It  does  not  necessarily  apply  to  every  object  of 
thought.  Cases  of  infinity  may  exist  without  our  knowl- 
edge. Indeed,  there  must  be  an  appropriate  occasion, 
upon  the  occurrence  of  which  we  first  apprehend  the  infi- 
nite in  regard  to  any  object.  It  is  thus,  undoubtedly, 
that  the  capacity  of  space  to  be  occupied  by  finite  bodies 
leads  originally  to  a  view  of  its  infinity.  In  the  case  of 
duration,  the  occurrence  of  known  and  remembered  events 
forms  the  like  occasion.  To  be  sure,  there  is  an  impassa- 
ble gulf  between  space  occupancy  and  events  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  infinity  of  space  and  time  on  the  other. 
The  transcendent  idea  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the 
occasion  which  it  transcends.  It  is  the  product  of  pure 
intuition.  Even  so  is  our  idea  of  God.  His  independent 
and  original  personality,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  a 
matter  of  intuition.  If  he  has  infinity,  that  likewise  is 
intuitive.  But  has  he  infinity  ?  Is  this  intuitive  idea  of 
the  infinite  applicable  to  this  Personal  Being,  of  whose 
existence  we  are  assured  upon  other  and  independent  con- 
siderations ?  If  his  infinity  is  not  involved  in  his  inde- 
pendent personality,  then  it  is  manifestly  proper  to  adduce 
further  considerations  in  favor  of  his  infinity.  And  this 
is  not  proving  the  infinite.  It  is  simply  connecting  it 
with  a  certain  object  of  thought.  It  is,  in  short,  stating 
the  occasion  upon  which  the  apprehension  of  the  infinite 
must  certainly  take  place. 

Now  this  is  what  I  shall  attempt  to  do  concerning  the 
Deity.     And  this  is  all  that  is  meant  by  proving  his  in- 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  211 

finity.  Is  our  idea  of  God  such  that  it  must  include  the 
infinite  ?     This  question  I  shall  try  to  answer. 

I  have  already  stated  that  nothing  less  than  an  Infinite 
Personality  can  adequately  account  for  the  existing  uni- 
verse. The  personality  of  this  Being  has  already  been 
discussed.  Now  let  his  infinity  be  established  and  the 
proof  will  be  complete.  For  this  purpose  I  employ  the 
Causal  argument.  And  in  doing  so  I  do  not  conceal  from 
myself  the  opinions  to  the  contrary,  expressed  by  able 
theistic  philosophers,  as  well  as  by  atheists.  They  have 
declared,  time  and  again,  that  the  infinity  of  God  cannot 
be  established  by  the  Causal  argument.  They  admit  that 
the  principle  of  causation  leads  ultimately  and  inevitably 
to  God,  but  they  deny  that  it  involves  his  infinity.  It 
may  be  hazardous  to  affirm  what  the  highest  authorities 
deny.  And  yet  I  am  constrained  to  take  the  contrary 
view,  and  to  insist  that  the  infinity  of  God  is  involved  in 
the  principle  of  causation. 

Every  event  must  have  a  cause.  This  belief  is  ulti- 
mate, simple,  intuitive.  But  it  is  universal  and  inexo- 
rable as  well  as  simple.  It  exhausts  all  the  phenomena 
we  know.  It  transcends  our  personal  knowledge,  and 
leads  us  through  all  the  numberless  and  diverse  phe- 
nomena that  are  taking  place  all  over  the  earth.  It 
carries  us  into  the  heavens  and  holds  in  its  grasp  the  stu- 
pendous action  of  suns  and  planets  and  comets  and  stars. 
It  insists  that  each  one  of  these  must  have  a  definite  and 
adequate  cause.  And  this  is  not  all.  That  is  a  false 
view  of  causation  which  restricts  it  to  the  physical  uni- 
verse. It  enters  likewise  the  realm  of  rationality,  and 
with  the  same  exactitude  requires  a  sufficient  cause  for 
every  event  that  takes  place  there.  Every  thought,  feel- 
ing, and  purpose  in  existence  must  be  explained  by  it,  as 


212  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

well  as  every  physical  fact.  It  asks  an  adequate  cause 
for  the  Iliad  and  the  Paradise  Lost,  the  Lord's  Prayer 
and  the  Vedic  Hymns  no  less  than  the  rings  of  Saturn 
and  moons  of  Jupiter.  There  is  no  discrimination  here. 
The  demand  is  universal.  It  embraces  the  utmost  sweep 
of  material  and  rational  phenomena  throughout  the  entire 
universe.  But  rational  phenomena  presuppose  the  spon- 
taneity of  free-will.  Events  are  caused  by  self-determined 
action  of  mind  quite  as  much  as  by  pre-determined  action 
of  physical  force. 

But  the  principle  of  causation  does  not  stop  even  here. 
Not  satisfied  with  present  phenomena,  it  runs  back  into 
the  past.  It  challenges  every  cosmical  change  that  ever 
occurred,  and  demands  its  cause.  If  a  preceding  phe- 
nomenon is  assigned  as  the  cause  of  the  existing  one,  it 
insists  upon  knowing  the  cause  of  that  preceding  phe- 
nomenon. And  so  on,  back  into  the  depths  of  eternity. 
There  is  and  must  be  an  everlasting  source  of  all  phenom- 
ena. That  source  of  phenomena  must  be  a  free  Personal 
Being,  for  rationality  is  involved  in  the  phenomena.  And 
that  Being  must  be  infinite  in  duration  at  least,  for  he  is 
the  source  of  the  first  phenomenon,  and  therefore  could 
not  have  been  created.  If  otherwise,  his  creation  would 
have  been  a  stupendous  event,  requiring  a  cause  for  itself, 
which  cause  must,  by  hypothesis,  reside  in  the  Being 
created.  To  intimate  such  a  thing  is  sheer  nonsense. 
God  did  not  make  himself.  Nothing  can  be  clearer  than 
that  the  ultimate  source  of  phenomena  must  be  an  un- 
created Personal  Being.  But  an  uncreated  Being  is  eter- 
nal, and  therefore  infinite  in  duration.  It  is  thus  that  the 
causal  principle  leads  directly  to  one  element  at  least,  in 
which  God  is  infinite.  This  statement  is  not  inconsistent 
with  that  made  elsewhere  (page  60)  that  design,  purpose, 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  21 3 

or  end  is  not  a  cause  of  rational  action  in  God  or  in  man. 
The  two  principles  articulate  perfectly.  Self-determined 
volition  is  the  cause  of  purely  rational  phenomena.  The 
absolute  self-determination  of  the  Divine  Will  is  the  ulti- 
mate cause  of  all  things.  The  creation  of  the  Cosmos 
was  determined  by  the  Divine  Will.  But  the  Divine  Vo- 
lition was  not  caused  by  certain  purposes,  ends,  or  motives 
set  before  it.  Otherwise  it  was  not  self-determined  or 
free.  It  is  thus  that  the  Divine  Volition  is  the  first  cause 
of  all  things.  Before  it  was  put  forth  it  remained  in  the 
infinite  realm  of  God's  potentiality.  When  put  forth,  it 
came  into  the  finite  realm  of  actual  causation,  and  like 
all  other  causes,  produced  its  inevitable  results  in  the  cre- 
ation of  the  Cosmos.  It  is  the  ultimate  rest  of  Causation 
upon  the  bosom  of  Divine  Potentiality.  But  that  rest 
demands  the  infinite  duration  of  the  Divine  Potentiality. 
And  so,  I  repeat,  the  Causal  argument  brings  us  directly 
to  one  element  of  infinity  in  God. 

Now,  it  might  be  fair  to  infer  that  if  God  be  infinite 
in  one  attribute,  he  must  be  in  all.  I  do  not  insist  on 
this  inference,  however.  If  its  fairness  is  questioned,  the 
infinity  of  other  attributes  of  the  Deity,  such  as  wisdom 
and  power,  for  example,  can  be  independently  established. 
The  same  causal  argument  compels  us  to  believe  that 
God  is  infinite  in  wisdom  and  power,  as  well  as  in  dura- 
tion. 

Let  us  take  the  attribute  of  power  in  God,  and  apply 
the  principle  of  causation  to  the  question  of  its  infinity. 
It  is  admitted  that  the  constitution  of  the  universe  is  the 
outcome  of  God's  power.  And  inasmuch  as  the  universe 
is  an  immense  affair,  its  creation  implies  the  exertion  of 
immense  power.  But  the  objector  insists  that  immensity 
is  not  infinity,  and  that  a  great  thing  is  no  nearer  the  in- 


214  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

finite  than  a  small  thing.     And  hence  he  concludes  that 
infinity  can  never  be  reached  by  causation. 

The  truth  of  these  statements  must  be  granted.  The 
immense  is  not  the  infinite.  And  yet  the  conclusion 
drawn  does  not  follow.  Its  error  arises  from  a  failure  to 
distinguish  between  the  principle  of  causation,  and  the 
law  of  causation.  The  former  is  a  subjective  thing,  ex- 
isting in  the  human  mind.  The  latter  is  objective,  and 
exists  in  the  universe  without  us.  The  former  insists 
that  every  event  must  have  a  cause.  The  latter  connects 
every  epcisting  event  with  its  own  cause.  If  existing 
events  are  all  finite,  then  the  law  of  causation  is  also  fi- 
nite. But  that  does  not  prove  that  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion is  finite.  True,  we  feel  that  of  necessity  the  fact  of 
causation  without  us  must  correspond  to  the  principle  of 
causation  within  us.  But  it  may  not  be  coextensive.  The 
principle  may  transcend  the  law.  The  last  word  has  not 
yet  been  written  concerning  this  whole  question  of  causa- 
tion. Doubtless  it  will  remain  unwritten  for  years  to 
come.  But  there  are  at  least  three  truths  in  it,  which 
those  who  deny  that  causation  leads  to  the  infinite,  seem 
to  have  overlooked. 

I.    THE  CAUSAL  EVIDENCE  OF   INFINITE  POWER  IS  AS  GREAT  AS, 
IN    THE   NATURE   OF    THE   CASE,    IT    CAN   BE. 

It  is  quite  true  that  the  universe  is  not  known  to  be 
infinite ;  and  yet  it  is  known  to  be  as  vast  as  finite  beings 
can  possibly  comprehend.  It  is  even  more  so.  It  utterly 
transcends  the  grasp  of  our  comprehension.  Between  its 
extremes  of  immeasurable  greatness  and  infinitesimal 
littleness  which  are  constantly  forced  upon  our  thought, 
there  are  stretches  of  being  quite  beyond  the  limits  of 
our  loftiest  faculties. 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  21$ 

Contrast  an  immense  star,  so  far  away  that  its  light, 
travelling  millions  of  miles  a  minute,  requires  many  years 
to  reach  us,  with  one  of  those  minute  organisms  so  small 
that  numbers  of  them  can  float  in  a  drop  of  water,  and 
then  try  to  picture  to  your  mind  the  probable  size  of  one 
of  the  immeasurable  blood-discs  in  circulation  through 
the  veins  of  each  one  of  these  microscopic  creatures,  and 
you  get  some  faint  idea  of  the  bewildering  stretch  of 
being  between  the  .extremes  of  the  created  universe.  If 
the  Author  of  all  this  is  not  infinite  in  power,  one  thing 
is  certain :  his  finiteness  is  of  such  character  and  extent 
as  to  baffle  all  finite  calculation.  Another  thing  is  equally 
certain.  He  could  give  no  more  convincing  proof  of  his 
infinity  than  he  has  given.  If  the  existing  universe  were 
multiplied  indefinitely,  we  could  never  know  that  fact. 
There  is  already  vastly  more  of  it  than  we  can  cognize. 
The  argument  for  God's  infinite  power  is  now  so  great 
that  no  addition  could  make  it  greater.  It  need  not  have 
been  so.  This  unutterable  and  inconceivable  vastness  is 
not  essential  to  the  Cosmos.  It  might  have  been  made 
of  moderate  and  measurable  proportions.  The  solar 
system,  for  example,  might  have  constituted  the  entire 
creation.  There  is  no  logical  necessity  of  its  being 
greater.  And  surely  God  could  have  stopped  the  out- 
flow of  creative  energy  at  one  point  as  well  as  an- 
other. But  he  did  not  stop  it  until  such  immeasurable 
immensities  were  reached  as  to  make  the  suggestion  of  the 
infinite  as  strong  as  a  finite  universe  could  possibly  furnish. 

2.    THE  CAUSAL  PRINCIPLE  IS  NOT  SATISFIED  WITH  THE  ACTUAL, 
IT    INCLUDES   THE    POSSIBLE    AND     THE   CONCEIVABLE. 

We  know  that  the  existing  universe  has  a  cause,  and 
that  cause  is  God.     We  know  that,  in  some  way,  it  is  an 


2l6  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

outflow  of  his  potentiality.  Now  this  universe  is  as  great 
as  possible,  or  else  it  is  not.  If  it  is  as  great  as  possible, 
its  creation  must  have  exhausted  the  Divine  potentiality. 
But  in  that  case  the  resultant  impotence  of  the  Deity 
would  have  left  the  universe  to  its  own  destruction.  That 
which  must  be  created  must  likewise  be  sustained.  The 
continued  and  constructive  existence  of  the  universe  is 
therefore  a  certain  proof  that  the  Divine  power  was  not 
exhausted  in  its  creation.  It  is  therefore  true  that  the 
universe  is  not  the  greatest  possible.  It  might  have  been 
duplicated.  Suppose  it  had  been.  That  second  copy 
must  have  had  the  same  creative  source  as  the  first.  Sup- 
pose a  dozen  or  a  million  copies  made.  Still  we  are  com- 
pelled, by  this  same  principle  of  causation  within  us,  to 
believe  that  each  one  of  these  systems  must  have  had  an 
adequate  cause,  and  that  that  cause,  then  even  as  now^ 
must  have  been  the  same  everlasting  source  of  all  phe- 
nomena. 

Now  let  this  million  of  universes  be  all  merged  into 
one,  and  let  another  be  conceived  possible,  so  much  greater 
than  this  as  the  ocean  is  greater  than  a  drop  of  water  ;  and 
yet  this  new  universe  cannot  be  conceived  as  causeless, 
it  must  still  be  the  outflow  of  the  same  Divine  poten- 
tiality. 

And  so  we  might  go  on  till  we  reach  the  limit  of  possi- 
ble finite  being.  But  still  God's  potentiality  is  not  ex- 
hausted. It  covers  all  actual  being ;  but  it  just  as  surely 
covers  all  possible  being.  Whatever  is  actual  must  have 
an  actual  cause.  Whatever  is  possible  must  have  a  pos- 
sible cause.  Nay,  more.  Whatever  is  conceivable  must 
have  a  conceivable  cause.  This  is  the  final  push  of  the 
necessary  Principle  of  Causation  within  the  human  mind. 
But  since  the  cause  of  the  actual  is  himself  absolute  and 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  217 

underived,  he  must  also  be  the  cause  of  the  possible  and 
the  conceivable.  Now,  the  power  which  creates  and  sus- 
tains, is  of  necessity  greater  than  the  thing  created.  The 
power  of  God  is  therefore  greater  than  any  creation, 
actual,  possible,  or  conceivable.  How  much,  then,  does 
that  power  lack  of  infinity  ?  Being  greater  than  any  con- 
ceivable quantity,  it  is  certainly  beyond  all  possible  in- 
crease or  interference.  It  is  absolute  and  supreme. 
Nothing  can  ever  exist  without  it.  No  other  power  can 
ever  interfere  with  it.  A  God  of  such  power  as  that  is 
strong  enough  to  satisfy  both  the  religion  and  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  Christian  Theist. 

To  this  argument  it  may  be  objected  that,  though  the 
creation  of  the  existing  Cosmos  has  not  exhausted  the 
Divine  potentiality,  yet  the  creation  of  some  small  addi- 
tion thereto,  might  so  exhaust  it. 

My  answer  still  is,  that  the  power  to  create  implies  the 
power  to  sustain,  and  so  is  necessarily  greater  than  the 
thing  created.  God's  power  is  therefore  greater  than  any 
possible  Cosmos,  however  vast  or  small  it  may  be  con- 
ceived to  be.  But  no  exhibition  of  power  not  derived 
from  him  can  ever  be  possible  ;  for  his  own  independence 
and  absoluteness  forbid  it.  Neither  can  any  addition 
ever  be  made  to  his  own  power ;  for  there  is  no  being  to 
make  it.  Whatever  potentiality  there  is,  or  ever  can  be, 
must  belong  to  him.  He  has,  then,  that  which  is  greater 
than  any  possible  finite  creation,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
that  to  which  nothing  can  be  added.  But  to  be  greater 
than  the  limits  of  the  finite,  and  to  be  incapable  of  in- 
crease, is  to  have  the  tokens  of  the  infinite.  Power  like 
that  is  certainly  beyond  all  finite  power,  and  is  all  that  the 
rational  intuition  of  the  Theist  can  demand,  either  for 
Divine  dignity  or  for  human  security. 


2l8  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

3.    THE    EXISTING    COSMOS   INVOLVES   INFINITE    POWER. 

I  have  admitted  that  if  all  existing  events  are  finite, 
then  the  law  of  causation  is  also  finite.  But  I  now  deny- 
that  all  existing  events  are  finite.  It  has  just  been  shown 
that  the  principle  of  causation  leads  to  the  infinite.  It 
remains  to  be  shown  that  the  law  of  causation  does  the 
same. 

The  existing  Cosmos  is  finite.  It  exists  in  space.  It 
must,  therefore,  be  posited  in  space  or  projected  through 
space.  But  space  is  infinite.  It  is  likewise  homogeneous. 
There  can  be  no  particular  portion  of  it  adapted  to  occu- 
pancy, any  more  than  all  other  portions.  Neither  can  the 
Cosmos  be  adapted  to  occupy  any  one  part  of  space  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  others.  If,  therefore,  one  part  of 
space  is  void,  and  at  the  same  time  another  part  is  oc- 
cupied by  the  Cosmos,  there  is  nothing  either  in  space 
itself,  or  in  the  Cosmos,  to  determine  what  part  shall  be 
void,  and  what  shall  be  filled. 

Now  if  the  Cosmos  is  posited  in  space,  some  particular 
part  has  been  filled,  and  all  the  rest  has  been  void,  ever 
since  the  creation.  But,  if  the  Cosmos  is  projected 
through  space,  some  constantly  variable  portion  has  been 
occupied,  and  the  reciprocally  varying  residue  has  been 
void,  ever  since  the  creation. 

But,  in  either  case,  the  question  of  the  location  of  the 
Cosmos  in  space,  involves  the  absolute  control,  not  only 
of  the  Cosmos,  but  also  of  space  itself.  He  who  can  put 
the  universe  into  space,  can  put  it  anywhere  in  space. 
When  he  made  it,  there  was  none  other  than  himself  to 
determine  where,  in  all  the  infinitude  of  space,  it  should 
be.  He  determined  that  question,  and  thereby  showed 
his  unlimited  control  of  unlimited  space.  If,  in  all  the 
trackless  depths   of   space,  there  is  a   single   corner   or 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  219 

cranny  over  which  the  Creator  has  no  control,  who  shall 
determine  whether  that  corner  is  to  be  occupied,  or  re- 
main void  forever?  But  that  question  must  be  deter- 
mined for  every  point  in  space,  as  much  as  for  any  point. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  determined  for  all  time,  and  for 
every  moment  of  all  time.  In  other  words,  the  constant 
restraint  of  the  finite  Cosmos  within  its  place  in  infinite 
space,  and  the  consequent  constant  determination  of 
every  point  in  infinite  space,  as  world-void  or  occupied,  is 
a  constant  event  which,  by  the  law  of  causation,  requires 
a  constant  cause.  But  this  event  involves  the  control  of 
infinite  space.  Its  Cause  must,  therefore,  be  infinite  in 
power.  Here,  then,  is  one  existing  event  that  is  not 
finite.     It  is  no  less  infinite  than  space  itself. 

But  every  existing  event  calls  for  the  law  of  causation, 
as  well  as  the  principle  of  causation.  So  that  the  one,  no 
less  than  the  other,  leads  us  of  necessity  to  the  infinite. 

There  is  only  one  conceivable  objection  to  this  argu- 
ment. It  may  be  urged  that,  after  all,  the  Creator  of 
the  finite  Cosmos  may  be  only  a  Demiurgos  of  some 
sort ;  that  he  may  have  a  certain  finite  portion  of  space 
assigned  to  him,  in  which  to  create  and  sustain  his 
universe ;  and  that  the  infinite  envelope  of  surrounding 
space  is  under  the  control  of  another  Being  superior  to 
himself. 

This  objection  involves  the  finiteness  of  the  Demiurgos, 
to  be  sure.  But  it  likewise  involves  the  infinity  of  that 
Superior  Being  who  controls  infinite  space.  It  merely 
shifts  the  question,  and  throws  it  one  step  further  back. 
That  Superior  Being  is  the  God  of  Christian  Theism. 
His  will  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  universe,  no  matter 
how  many  Demiurgi  may  be  supposed  to  figure  in  its 
development. 


220  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

Put  it  in  whatever  shape  you  may,  it  comes  to  the  same 
thing  at  last.  He  who  is  the  Cause  of  the  Cosmos  must 
dominate  infinite  space.  And  it  is  thus  that  the  existing 
Cosmos  involves  Infinite  Power. 

Herein,  then,  according  to  promise,  I  have  found  an  in- 
dependent argument  for  the  infinity  of  God's  power.  God 
is  infinite  in  duration  and  in  power.  In  like  manner,  the 
infinity  of  other  Divine  attributes,  such  as  intelligence 
and  wisdom,  can  be  established.  But  surely  it  is  not 
necessary  to  go  further  in  this  line  of  argument.  A 
Being  who  is  infinite  in  two  attributes,  is  certainly  an 
Infinite  Being.  It  is  presumed  that  no  one  will  deny  his 
infinity.  Now  the  argument  here  employed  is  purely 
causal.  But  some  one  may  say  that  it  depends  upon  the 
infinity  of  space,  which  is  an  intuitive  idea.  Grant  it. 
And  yet  the  intuition  of  an  infinite  void  does  not  involve 
the  infinite  power  of  a  Personal  Being.  It  is  only  when 
the  causal  idea,  involved  in  the  Cosmos,  is  applied  to  the 
intuitive  idea  of  infinite  space,  that  the  necessary  infinity 
of  God's  power  is  disclosed.  The  argument  is,  therefore, 
essentially  causal. 

The  Infinite  God  is  the  ultimate  rest  of  reason.  But 
he  is  equally  the  ultimate  rest  of  intuition.  Time  and 
space  are  certainly  intuitive  ideas.  But  infinite  time 
without  an  event,  and  infinite  space  devoid  of  all  being, 
are  ideas  of  a  most  unsatisfying  and  perturbing  character. 
They  lack  equipoise.  They  must  be  equilibrated  by  the 
idea  of  the  Infinite  God.  Then,  and  only  then,  they  give 
mental  rest.  He  whose  power  fills  all  space,  and  whose 
being  occupies  all  time,  is  the  ultimate  resort  of  intellect 
no  less  than  of  sentiment.  The  Infinite  God  is  the  neces- 
sary correlate  of  all  being  and  of  all  thought. 


INFINITY  OF  GOD.  221 

Unless  I  am  strangely  deceived,  we  have  reached  the 
close  of  a  legitimate  argument  for  the  being  and  character 
of  God.  The  proof  answers  to  just  such  a  Being  as  meets 
the  demands  of  Christian  Theism.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  the  Christian's  idea  of  God,  as  set  forth  at  the  outset 
of  this  work,  includes  intelligence,  volition,  personality, 
goodness,  unity,  and  infinity.  All  these  attributes  were 
to  be  established.  This  obligation  of  the  theist  has  not 
been  discharged  at  a  single  stroke.  We  could  not  reach 
God  at  one  philosophic  leap,  and  did  not  try.  That 
•could  be  done  only  by  taking  step  after  step.  These 
steps  we  have  tried  to  take  with  due  care  and  patience. 

We  have  proved  the  intelligence  of  God  by  the  existence 
of  order,  plan,  and  harmony  in  the  universe.  His  exercise 
of  volition  has  been  disclosed  in  the  widespread  purpose 
and  design  that  exist  in  nature.  His  personality  has  been 
reached  by  a  necessary  and  undeniable  intuition  of  the 
human  mind.  We  have  established  the  goodness  of  God 
from  the  history  of  the  world  and  the  evident  trend  of 
all  things  therein.  We  have  demonstrated  his  unity  by 
arguments  drawn  from  science,  philosophy,  and  religion. 
And,  finally,  the  necessary  and  universal  principle  of 
causation  has  brought  us  to  the  infinity  of  God.  This  is 
the  last  link  in  the  chain  of  theistic  proof.  It  completes 
the  cumulative  argument  for  the  being  and  character  of 
God.  And  surely  this  kind  of  argument  is  a  thing  of 
superior  strength.  One  line  of  reasoning  might  possibly 
mislead  ;  but  when  six  independent  lines  all  focalize  at 
the  same  point,  they  make  that  point  luminous  indeed. 
The  white  light  of  eternal  truth  itself  cannot  be  brighter. 
There  is  a  Personal  God,  infinite,  holy,  and  perfect  in  all 
his  attributes.     To  this  supreme  conviction  our  theistic 


222  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

arguments  have  brought  us.    With  it,  their  constructive 
work  is  done. 

There  is  a  piece  of  criticism,  however,  that  still  remains. 
Anti-theistic  errors  have  been  advanced  with  ability  and 
mental  vigor,  in  both  ancient  and  modern  times.  The 
most  important  of  these  must  be  reviewed.  The  two 
following  chapters  will  be  devoted  to  this  necessary  work. 

REFERENCES : 

Harris'  "  Philosophic  Basis  of  Theism." 
McCosh's  "  Intuitions." 
^  Bownes  "  Studies  in  Theism." 

Porter's  "Intellectual  Science." 


CHAPTER  VII. 
ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS. 

EVERY  denial  of  Theism  involves  a  positive  error. 
What  the  form  of  that  error  shall  be  depends  upon 
the  particular  standpoint  from  which  Theism  is  rejected. 
As  these  points  of  view  continually  vary,  the  resultant 
forms  of  error  continually  multiply.  Truth  is  one  ;  errors 
are  many.  Their  name  is  legion.  Theories  contradictory 
to  Theism  have  assumed  numerous  forms  and  shades  of 
belief.  They  cannot  all  be  here  discussed.  Attention 
will  be  given  to  four  of  them,  viz.:  Materialism,  Panthe- 
ism, Positivism,  and  Agnosticism.  These  four  theories 
will  be  recognized  as  the  boldest  of  all,  and  as,  in  some 
sense,  involving  all. 

SECTION  I. 

MATERIALISM. 

Materialism  is  not  a  new  form  of  philosophic  error.  It  is 
more  than  twenty-two  centuries  old.  Its  origin  can  be  dis- 
tinctly traced  to  Democritus  and  the  Atomists.  Through 
various  forms  of  hylozoism,  skepticism,  and  naturalistic 
atheism,  it  has  come  down  unimpaired  and  largely  un- 
changed to  the  present  day.  In  general,  one  distinction 
must  be  noted  between  ancient  and  modern  Materialism. 
Anciently,  matter  was  considered  as  cold,  dead,  passive, 
inert.     In   modern  times  this  view  has  given  way  to  a 

223 


224  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

general  belief  in  the  immanence  of  force  and  the  universal- 
ity of  motion.  Matter  is  now  viewed  as  instinct  with 
activity,  if  not  indeed  with  life.  With  this  single  excep- 
tion, the  doctrines  of  Materialism,  and  the  grounds  on 
which  they  rest,  are  essentially  the  same  as  in  the  days  of 
old. 

I.    MATERIALISM     STATED. 

Materialism  is  the  doctrine  that  the  mind  has  no  exist- 
ence, except  as  a  function  of  the  body;  it  is  a  mere 
product  of  the  physical  organism.  There  is  no  such  thing 
as  an  independent,  immaterial  entity.  Thought  is  not 
a  product  of  mind.  It  is  a  secretion  of  the  brain,  just  as 
tears  are  of  the  lachrymal  gland.  The  best  and  fairest 
statement  of  materialistic  doctrine  can  be  made  in  the 
words  of  its  own  distinguished  advocates. 

(i)  Greek  Materialism. 

Perhaps  no  better  representative  of  the  ancient  Greek 
school  of  materialists  can  be  taken  than  Democritus,  leader 
of  the  so-called  Atomists.  His  view,  given  substan- 
tially in  his  own  words,  is  as  follows  : 

The  cause  of  atoms  must  not  be  asked  for ;  they  are 
eternal.  Motion,  likewise,  is  primordial  and  eternal.  The 
earth  was  formed,  not  by  the  agency  of  an  overruling  In- 
telligence, but  by  means  of  certain  rotary  motions  of 
atoms,  and  in  obedience  to  a  natural  necessity.  .  .  .  Or- 
ganized beings  came  from  the  moist  earth.  .  .  .  The 
brain  is  the  seat  of  thought ;  the  heart,  of  anger ;  the 
liver,  of  desire.  The  soul  is  made  up  of  small  round 
atoms  of  fire,  which  atoms  are  inhaled  from  the  air,  and 
variously  disposed  of  throughout  the  body.  .  .  .  Thought 
results  from  symmetrical  motions  of  the  soul-atoms. 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  225 

(2)  German  Materialism. 

Quite  a  number  of  modern  German  philosophers  have 
Tevived  and  somewhat  modified  the  old  theories  of 
Materialism.  They  agree  in  rejecting  all  belief  in  a 
super-sensible  world,  profess  themselves  measurably 
satisfied  with  the  existing  world  of  sense,  and  declare, 
in  the  words  of  Carl  Vogt,  that  "  Physiology  pro- 
nounces definitely  and  categorically  against  the  idea  of 
individual  immortality,  as,  indeed,  against  all  notions 
founded  upon  that  of  the  independent  existence  of  the 
soul ;  physiology  sees  in  psychical  activities  nothing  but 
functions  of  the  brain,  the  material  substratum  of  those* 
activities."  Carl  Vogt  and  Louis  Biichner  are  perhaps 
the  foremost  champions  of  German  Materialism  in  the 
present  century.  The  former  became  distinguished  by 
his  controversial  papers  ;  the  latter  by  his  systematic  work 
entitled  **  Force  and  Matter."  Writers  of  this  school  tend 
somewhat  toward  Pantheism,  and  speak  freely  about  the 
''  world-soul,"  and  the  eternity  of  the  earth,  as  well  as 
of  all  other  astronomical  bodies  which  contain  organized 
and  psychically  endowed  beings. 

(3)  English  Materialism. 

England  and  America  have  produced  many  promi- 
nent materialistic  philosophers  within  the  present  cen- 
tury. Among  them  all  perhaps  no  one  has  developed 
more  thoroughly  the  psychological  aspects  of  Mate- 
rialism than  the  late  G.  H.  Lewes.  For  this  reason 
it  will  be  well  to  let  him  stand  as  a  representative 
of  his  English-speaking  contemporaries,  and  state  his 
theory  in  his  own  words.  He  says :  '*  We  must  set  aside 
the  traditional  conception  of  the  mind  as  an  agent  apart 
from   the  organism.     To  many  thinkers  the  contrast  of 


226  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

objective  and  subjective  seems  far  more  than  that  of 
aspects  ;  it  is  that  of  agents.  But  what  we  know  is,  that 
the  living  organism  has  among  its  manifestations  the  class 
called  sentient,  and  states  of  consciousness.  There  is  no 
evidence  to  suggest  that  one  of  these  classes  is  due  to  the 
activity  of  the  organism,  the  other  to  the  activity  of  an- 
other agent.  The  only  agent  is  the  organism.  When  we 
seek  the  agent  of  which  all  the  phenomena  are  the  actions^ 
we  get  the  organism."  "All  psychological  processes  are 
organic  processes ;  their  mechanism  may  be  expressed  in 
objective  or  subjective  terms,  at  will,  sensorial  changes 
jDeing  equivalent  to  sentient  changes."  "  A  sensation-  or 
a  thought  is  alternately  viewed  as  a  physical  change  or  as 
a  mental  change.  Mechanical  and  logical  are  only  two 
contrasted  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  fact."  "  States  of 
consciousness  are  separable  from  states  of  the  organism 
only  in  our  mode  of  apprehending  them."  "  Knowledge 
is  partly  connate,  partly  acquired,  partly  the  evolved 
product  of  the  accumulated  experiences  of  ancestors,  and 
partly  of  the  accumulated  experiences  of  the  individual. 
This  theory  maintains  that  the  individual  inherits  what 
may  be  called  a  priori  conditions  of  knowledge,  and  even 
a  priori  experiences,  which  must  determine  the  result  of 
our  a  posteriori  experiences."  "  Every  phenomenon  is  the 
product  of  two  factors,  external  and  internal,  impersonal 
and  personal,  objective  and  subjective.  Viewing  the  ex- 
ternal factor  solely  in  the  light  of  feeling,  we  may  say  that 
the  sentient  material  out  of  which  all  the  forms  of  con- 
sciousness are  evolved,  is  the  psychoplasm,  instantly 
fluctuating,  instantly  renewed.  Viewing  this  on  the 
physiological  side,  it  is  the  succession  of  neural  tremors, 
variously  combining  into  neural  groups.  But  experience 
is  the  registration  of  feeling,  and  hence  the  cosmos  which 


ANTJ-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  22/ 

arises   in  consciousness  is   a  product   of   the    individual 
organism,  as  related  to  surrounding  cosmical  forces." 

In  view  of  these  quotations,  and  such  like  others  as  may 
be  readily  gathered  from  current  materialistic  writers,  the 
following  definition  given  by  John  Fiske  may  be  accepted 
as  both  just  and  lucid  :  '*  A  materialist  is  one  who  regards 
the  story  of  the  universe  as  completely  and  satisfactorily 
told,  when  it  is  wholly  told  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion 
without  reference  to  any  ultimate  underlying  existence  of 
which  matter  and  motion  are  only  the  phenomenal 
manifestations/* 

2.    MATERIALISM    EXAMINED. 

The  theory  thus  stated  is  one  of  the  oldest,  boldest,  and 
strongest  among  the  antagonists  of  Christian  Theism.  And 
yet,  upon  examination,  it  is  found  to  contain  a  number  of 
fatal  weaknesses  which  serve  to  mark  it  as  a  form  of  false 
philosophy.  Without  stopping  to  distinguish  its  various 
phases,  let  us  note  a  few  of  the  points  at  which  all  Mate- 
rialism fails. 

(i)  //  Proceeds  upon  a  Fundamental  Error. 

All  materialists  suppose  the  mind  and  the  brain  to  be 
identical.  Certain  biological  facts  are  set  forth  to  justify 
this  belief.  We  are  told  that  the  brain  is  the  undoubted 
seat  of  mental  activity,  that  movements  in  the  tissue  of 
the  brain  correspond  to  mental  acts,  that  these  move- 
ments are  sectional,  and  that  a  paralysis  or  lesion  of  cer- 
tain portions  of  the  brain  interferes  with  the  operations  of 
certain  faculties  of  the  mind  and  of  no  others.  From  such 
facts  as  these  the  materialist  concludes  that  the  brain  and 
the  mind,  so-called,  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  This  is 
a  great  mistake.     All  that  the  facts  can  possibly  prove  is 


228  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

the  dependence  of  the  mind  upon  the  brain.  But  depen- 
dence is  not  identity.  A  king  may  depend  upon  a  cook, 
but  the  king  and  the  cook  are  not  the  same.  To  con- 
clude that  they  are  would  involve  a  logical  leap  not  a 
whit  more  dangerous  than  that  the  materialist  is  con- 
stantly making. 

This  connection  between  mind  and  brain  may,  indeed,, 
be  mysterious.  But  all  the  materialist  has  to  say  about 
"  organism,"  **  physiological  function,"  '*  brain-tissue," 
and  "  neural  tremor,"  can  neither  increase  nor  diminish 
the  mystery.  The  mere  multiplication  of  points  of  con- 
nection between  mental  and  physical  phenomena  has  no 
effect  upon  this  problem.  One  such  point  is  quite  as 
inexplicable  as  a  thousand.  The  possibiHty  of  any  con- 
nection at  all  between  mind  and  body  constitutes  the  only 
mystery  in  the  case.  And  the  materialist  does  nothing 
whatever  toward  explaining  the  mystery.  His  denial  of 
the  existence  of  mind  is  an  evasion,  not  an  explanation. 
He  might  as  well  deny  the  existence  of  brain  and  body. 
Such  a  denial  would  be  no  less  logical,  and  much  less 
at  variance  with  human  consciousness  and  universal  expe- 
rience. It  is  highly  illogical  to  deny  either.  This  rejec- 
tion of  the  reality  of  mind  is  the  basis  of  all  Materialism. 
But  it  involves  the  rejection  of  all  reality,  since  no  other 
can  give  stronger  evidence  than  that  of  mental  reality. 
Upon  this  huge  error  is  the  whole  system  of  materialistic 
philosophy  based — an  error  which  is  little  short  of  phil- 
osophic suicide. 

(2)  Materialism  Contradicts  Physical  Law. 

It  declares  that  physical  force  is  transmuted  into 
thought.  What  begins  in  organism  and  nerve-motion, 
ends  in  consciousness,  thought,  feeling.     This  is  plainly 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  22g 

against  physical  law.  What  is  once  physical  force  must 
be  always  physical  force.  Motion  is  one  thing,  thought 
another.  The  former  is  physical,  the  latter  is  not.  Mr. 
Spencer  and  others  have  attempted  to  get  the  one  out  of 
the  other,  by  noting  the  fact  that  strong  mental  activity 
induces  movements  of  blood,  which  produce  flushing  of 
the  face,  congestion  of  the  brain,  and  the  like.  But  these 
phenomena  only  serve  to  disprove  the  theory  they  are 
designed  to  prove.  For,  in  so  far  as  physical  force  is 
transmuted  into  thought,  it  ought  evidently  to  disappear 
in  its  ordinary  form  of  motion.  As  thought  increases, 
blood-movements  ought  to  diminish  ;  and  the  contrary 
facts  disprove  the  very  principle  of  Materialism  which 
they  are  brought  forward  to  establish.  Professor  Newcomb 
calls  attention  to  this  fallacy  and  says  :  "  All  experiments 
tend  to  prove  that  all  the  force  taken  into  the  body  in  the 
form  of  food  is  expended  in  the  production  of  heat  and 
muscular  action  ;  and  if  this  be  so,  there  is  nothing  left  to 
be  transformed  into  thought.  In  every  case  we  have  rea- 
son to  believe  that,  at  each  moment  the  total  amount  of 
force  which  has  been  put  into  the  body  from  all  external 
sources  whatever,  is  exactly  represented  by  the  chemical 
changes  and  molecular  motions  going  on  among  the 
molecules  of  the  body." 

These  statements  are  certainly  scientific.  All  science 
agrees  that  heat  and  motion  are  correlates  of  force.  All 
are  physical,  spatial,  measurable.  But  thought  is  not  a 
correlate  of  force.  It  is  neither  physical,  nor  spatial,  nor 
measurable.  Force,  in  every  known  form,  can  be  brought 
to  a  strict  mathematical  test.  The  materialist  assumes 
that  thought  is  a  form  of  force.  When  he  has  successfully 
submitted  thought  to  the  rules  of  mathematical  measure- 
ment, and  shown  that  physical  force  in  other  forms  does 


230  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

invariably  and  proportionately  disappear  as  thought  pro- 
ceeds, his  assumption  will  then  have  some  show  of  truth 
and  reason.  Until  then  it  must  be  rejected  as  contrary  to 
the  nature  of  physical  force  and  the  law  under  which  it 
invariably  operates.  Force  is  neither  convertible  into 
thought,  nor  deducible  from  it. 

(3)  Materialism  Fails  to  Account  for  the  Existence  of  Living 

Beings. 

We  are  told  that  the  "  organism  "  is  the  sole  agent  of  all 
the  phenomena  of  life,  whether  sensorial  or  sentient.  But 
we  are  not  told  how  life  originated  in  the  organism.  Life 
must  have  had  a  beginning.  This  is  evident  from  the  fact 
that  every  individual  life  depends  upon  a  preceding  life. 
This  is  clearly  seen  in  the  chemical  analysis  and  molecular 
structure  of  life-germs.  Professor  Newcomb  says :  '*  In 
every  thing  which  constitutes  a  material  quality  they  are 
identical.  Yet  they  differ  as  widely  as  a  clam,  an  oak  tree, 
or  a  philosopher.  Since  this  difference  does  not  consist  in 
the  arrangement  of  their  molecules,  we  may  properly  call 
it  hyper-materiair  Dr.  Harris  emphasizes  this  truth  and 
justly  concludes  that  "  Life,  then,  is  the  cause  of  organi- 
zation, not  its  product.  .  .  .  It  is  the  power  of  life  which 
organizes  matter,  and  in  and  through  the  organization  re- 
veals itself."  Manifestly  the  difference  between  organized 
and  unorganized  matter  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  one  is 
subject  to  life,  while  the  other  is  not.  Whence  comes  this 
life  ?  The  materialist  must  account  for  its  origin.  This 
he  never  has  done  and  never  can  do.  Admitting  no  life- 
giving  Creator,  he  must  introduce  life  through  some  other 
channel.  But  no  other  channel  can  be  found.  Out  of 
lifeless  matter — his  only  postulate — no  life  can  come. 
^*  Ex  nihiloy  nihil  fit.'* 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  23 1 

•(4)  Materialism  Makes  the  Origin  of  Consciousness  Impossible. 

The  materialist  begins  with  crass  matter  and  ends  with 
the  organism.  In  the  outcome  he  tries  to  show  how  the 
**  Cosmos  arises  in  consciousness."  He  overlooks  the  fact 
that  a  knowing  subject  is  presupposed  in  crass  matter, 
quite  as  much  as  in  its  organized  forms.  Schopenhauer 
says  :  "  '  No  object  without  subject,'  is  the  principle  which 
forever  renders  all  Materialism  impossible."  The  truth  is 
that  all  beginnings  are  spiritual,  not  material.  And  con- 
scious spirit  must  control  unconscious  matter.  Ulrici 
has  shown,  "  on  the  basis  of  firmly  established  facts,  that 
to  the  soul,  in  contradistinction  from  the  body,  to  spirit, 
in  contradistinction  from  nature,  not  simply  independent 
existence,  but  also  the  supremacy  belongs,  both  of  right 
and  in  fact." 

Philosophy  ought  then  to  begin  with  supreme  spirit, 
and  not  with  subordinate  matter.  But  Materialism  re- 
verses this  order,  and  proposes  to  get  consciousness  out  of 
organism.  It  cannot  be  done.  Every  attempt  to  do  this 
impossible  thing  has  plunged  materialistic  philosophy 
into  fathomless  absurdities.  Take  the  effort  of  Mr.  Lewes 
as  an  example.  He  begins  by  claiming  that  a  neural  tre- 
mor corresponds  to  every  feeling.  Then  he  proceeds  to 
assert  that  these  two  corresponding  things  are  one  and 
the  same  thing.  This  is  the  first  absurdity.  A  little  fur- 
ther on,  he  declares  that  states  of  consciousness  are  sepa- 
rable from  states  of  the  organism.  But,  according  to 
Materialism,  consciousness  itself  is  nothing  but  a  state 
of  the  organism.  We  have  here,  then,  the  states  of  the 
state  of  a  thing  separable  from  the  states  of  the  same 
thing.  A  second  absurdity.  But  these  states  are  said  to 
be  separable  only  in  our  mode  of  apprehending  them. 
Now  this  cautionary  statement  only  adds  to  the  obscurity 


232  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

of  the  former.  For  one  naturally  asks :  Mode  of  appre- 
hending what  ?  Mr.  Lewes  evidently  means  states  of 
consciousness.  But  consciousness  itself  is  the  apprehen- 
sion of  mental  states.  Now  as  states  of  consciousness 
must  evidently  exists  before  any  mode  of  apprehension 
can  be  applied  to  them,  we  have  here  a  thing  existing  and 
apprehending  itself  in  order  to  be  apprehended  by  a  mode 
of  itself.     A  third  absurdity. 

But  again,  he  is  forced  to  make  a  purely  physical  or- 
ganism perform  acts  of  feeling,  willing,  and  thinking. 
Matter,  simple  matter,  and  nothing  more,  finds  itself  some 
day  in  a  state  of  consciousness.  Yesterday  it  was  not 
conscious  ;  to-day  it  is.  And  this  remarkable  feat  has 
been  accomplished  simply  by  organism.  But  this  organ- 
ism itself  is  the  work  of  unconscious  matter.  It  seems, 
then,  that  unconscious  matter,  without  any  extraneous 
power  or  purpose,  goes  deliberately  and  patiently  to  work 
to  organize  itself  into  a  state  of  consciousness.  A  fourth 
absurdity.  Indeed,  Mr.  Lewes,  in  common  with  all 
materialists,  falls  into  fatal  errors,  by  applying  the  lan- 
guage of  physiology  to  the  facts  of  psychology,  and  sup- 
posing that  he  has  thereby  identified  the  two.  They 
cannot  be  identified.  Consciousness  and  the  organism 
are  not,  in  any  sense,  the  same  ;  and  Materialism  makes 
the  origin  of  consciousness  impossible,  and  its  plainest 
facts  inexplicable. 

(5)  Materialism  Makes  All  Knowledge  Impossible. 

Knowledge  implies  the  fact  of  a  knowing  agent.  But 
Materialism  rejects  this  implication  in  two  ways. 

{a)  It  denies  the  knowing  agent. — The  personal,  con- 
scious being  which  all  knowledge  presupposes,  is  resolved 
by  Materialism  into  an  aggregation  of  highly  organized 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  233 

material  atoms,  thrown  into  successive  and  peculiar  states 
of  motion.  But  it  is  evident  that  these  successive  states 
of  motion  can  never  know  any  thing  of  one  another. 
Neither  can  the  material  organism  connect  them  in  con- 
sciousness. There  is  no  personal  spirit  to  gather  up  and 
unify  them,  and  so  they  must  remain  forever  separated 
as  isolated  phenomena  of  the  organism.  From  such 
phenomena,  no  such  thing  as  knowledge  could  ever  re- 
sult. There  is  no  more  knowledge  in  "  neural  tremors  " 
and  "  states  of  organism,"  than  there  is  in  ocean  currents 
and  states  of  the  atmosphere.  The  materialist  cannot, 
by  any  possibility,  get  the  first  ray  of  mental  light  into 
the  darkness  of  his  bioplasmic  organism.  The  simple 
truth  is  that,  without  a  unifying  agent,  the  manifold  of 
sense  can  never  produce  any  knowledge  whatever.  Phys- 
ical organism  is  not  such  an  agent.  Materialism  denies 
any  other  agent,  and  thereby  destroys  the  very  founda- 
tion on  which  all  knowledge  rests. 

ifi)  It  impairs  every  act  of  knowledge. — This  is  done  by 
its  unthinkable  doctrine  of  inherited  experiences.  Ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Lewes,  every  individual  inherits  ''''a  priori 
conditions  of  knowledge,  and  even  a  priori  experiences 
which  must  determine  the  result  of  our  individual  a 
posteriori  experiences."  In  plain  language,  this  doctrine 
runs  thus :  My  father's  nerves,  for  some  special  and  ade- 
quate reason,  took  to  trembling  in  a  certain  way.  At 
length,  by  frequent  repetition,  a  neural  habit  was  formed 
which  resulted  in  the  "  establishment  of  definite  paths  " 
among  the  nerves.  Thereupon  neural  tremors  travelled 
more  readily  along  these  paths  and  produced  the  prevail- 
ing sensations,  feelings,  experiences  in  my  father's  life. 
Thus  far  the  theory  is  comparatively  lucid.  But  next 
comes  the  puzzle.     It  is  this  :   my  father  transmitted  to 


234  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

me,  not  only  those  peculiar  neural  pathways  of  his,  but 
actually  a  portion  of  his  feeling,  sensation,  knowledge, 
and  experience.  How  could  sensation  be  transmitted? 
Even  in  his  own  organism,  each  sensation  was  constantly 
and  irrecoverably  displaced  by  another.  How  then  could 
he  propagate  a  single  one  of  them?  But  if  he  could, 
what  became  of  it  before  the  dawn  of  personal  conscious- 
ness in  me  ?  It  must  have  been  preserved  ad  interim,  by 
some  materialistic  lotion  of  whose  nature  and  potency  I 
can  form  no  conception. 

And  then  how  can  knowledge  be  transmitted  by  inheri- 
tance ?  It  was  not  apprehended  by  me  for  years  after  I 
must  have  had  it.  But  how  can  one  have  knowledge  and 
not  know  it  ?  And,  strangest  of  all,  how  can  a  man  in- 
herit experience  ?  Certainly  it  would  be  the  last  of  all 
things  to  fall  into  a  legacy.  Notice  also  that  this  expe- 
rience is  unconscious  and  a  priori.  But  a  priori  means 
before  experience,  or  it  means  nothing.  Now  by  insisting 
that  such  impossible  experience  as  this  '*  must  determine 
the  result  of  our  individual  a  posteriori  experiences," 
Materialism  undermines  all  experience  and  makes  every 
act  of  knowledge  invalid. 

(6)  Materialism  is  Self -Destructive. 

Its  self-destructive  character  appears  from  two  consid- 
erations. 

{a)  It  reduces  itself  to  nothing. — Materialism  is  a  theory 
in  philosophy.  It  is  put  forth  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
explaining  the  existing  facts  of  the  universe.  Its  value 
depends  entirely  upon  its  ability  to  explain  admitted 
facts.  But,  by  denying  the  existence  of  mind,  it  renders 
itself  incompetent  to  explain  the  undoubted  facts  of 
human  personality,  and  the  equally  undoubted  facts  of 


ANTT-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  235 

cosmic  development.  It  thereby  stands  discredited  as  a 
nullity  in  philosophy — a  philosophic  zero. 

ib)  It  renders  itself  impossible. — According  to  Material- 
ism, thought  is  only  nerve-motion.  Every  opinion,  every 
theory  must,  therefore,  be  a  combination  of  nerve- 
motions,  nothing  more.  Who  can  say,  then,  that  one 
theory  is  right,  another  wrong,  one  true,  another  false  ? 
There  is  no  possible  standard  of  discrimination  among 
neural  motions.  It  will  not  do  to  say  that  truth  results 
from  normal,  symmetrical  movements  of  brain  tissue, 
while  error  arises  from  the  abnormal  and  unsymmetrical. 
Motion  is  motion  ;  and,  according  to  Materialism,  any 
opinion  or  judgment  concerning  the  relative  value  of 
molecular  motions  among  the  nerves,  must  itself  be  only 
a  matter  of  molecular  motions  among  those  same  nerves. 
It  can  have  no  power  to  arbitrate.  There  being  no  stand- 
ard of  truth,  there  is  no  truth.  There  being  no  truth, 
there  is  no  philosophy.  There  being  no  philosophy, 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  Materialism.  In  pulling  down 
all  philosophy  and  discrediting  all  theory.  Materialism 
has  rendered  its  own  existence  impossible.  A  more 
completely  suicidal  theory  cannot  be  imagined. 

The  truth  of  the  whole  matter  seems  to  be  that  Ma- 
terialism gets  into  trouble  by  taking  a  one-sided  view  of 
the  manifest  facts  of  human  experience.  It  is  true,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  the  body  does  influence  the  mind  in 
numerous  and  various  ways.  *'  Fatigue  dulls  the  atten- 
tion, narcotics  stupefy  the  powers  of  thought  and  emotion, 
fever  may  produce  delirium,  and  a  blow  on  the  head  may 
suspend  consciousness."  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
equally  true  that  the  mind  affects  the  physical  organism. 
And  this  influence  is  varied  and  potent,  no  less  than  the 
other.     Fear  blanches  the  face  and  convulses  the  limbs, 


236  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

modesty  mantles  the  cheek  in  crimson,  love  and  hate 
gleam  through  the  eye,  grief  opens  the  secret  fountain  of 
tears,  the  will  dominates  the  muscular  and  nervous  systems, 
and  even  the  moral  lineaments  of  the  heart  fasten  them- 
selves upon  the  face  in  characters  that  are  both  sure  and 
abiding. 

Now  Materialism,  emphasizing  this  first  truth  and 
ignoring  the  second,  falls  into  the  error  of  supposing  that 
there  is  no  mind,  but  all  is  physical.  Idealism,  on  the 
other  hand,  gazing  intently  upon  the  second  truth  and 
overlooking  the  first,  embraces  the  opposite  error,  and 
asserts  that  all  is  mind  and  there  is  no  matter.  Both  are 
manifestly  wrong.  Matter  exists  and  so  does  mind. 
Moreover  they  coexist  and  cooperate  in  all  human  ex-' 
perience.     This  is  the  only  sound  philosophy. 

SECTION  II. 

PANTHEISM. 

Pantheism  is  essentially  an  Oriental  system  of  philoso- 
phy. It  is  found  in  the  most  ancient  books  of  the  East, 
both  philosophic  and  religious.  In  the  Vedas,  Uphani- 
shads,  and  the  Taoistic  writings,  the  most  positive  pan- 
theistic doctrines  are  expressed.  Such  doctrines  have 
been  largely  dominant  in  Eastern  thought  for  forty 
centuries.  Their  growth  in  the  soil  of  Western  Europe 
is  a  thing  of  comparatively  recent  date.  It  is  only  since 
the  time  of  Spinoza  that  Pantheism  has  taken  root  in 
Europe,  England,  and  America.  Within  the  present 
century  it  has  attained  a  vigorous  growth,  and  has 
placed  itself  across  the  philosophic  path  of  Christian 
Theism.  The  intelligent  theist  must  meet  and  answer 
its  argument. 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  237 

I.    PANTHEISM    STATED. 

This  doctrine,  as  its  name  implies,  assumes  that  every- 
thing is  God  and  God  is  every  thing.  Pantheism  is  not 
Atheism,  for  it  admits  the  existence  of  the  Infinite.  It 
is  not  Deism,  for  it  asserts  the  immanence  of  God  in  the 
universe.  It  is  not  Theism,  for  it  denies  the  conscious- 
ness and  inteUigent  volition  of  God.  Among  the  many 
shades  of  pantheistic  writings,  the  doctrines  of  two  lead- 
ing schools  may  be  distinguished ;  namely,  the  Pure 
Pantheists  and  the  Ideal  Pantheists. 

(i)  Pure  Pantheism. 

Of  the  former,  Spinoza  may  be  taken  as  one  of  the 
ablest  and  most  distinguished  representatives.  He  in- 
sists that  there  is  and  can  be  but  one  substance — *'  una  et 
unica  substantia,"  and  defines  it  thus  :  "  By  substance,  I 
understand  that  which  exists  in  itself  and  is  conceived  by 
itself  ;  that  is,  that,  the  conception  of  which  is  not  due  to 
the  conception  of  any  thing  else  from  which  it  must  be 
formed."  He  further  says  :  "  One  substance  cannot  be 
produced  by  another  substance  nor  by  any  thing  else. 
Substance  must,  therefore,  be  the  cause  of  itself."  '*  All 
substance  is  necessarily  infinite."  ''God  is  the  immanent, 
but  not  the  transcendent,  cause  of  all  things."  "  God  is 
a  thinking  thing  and  an  extended  thing ;  thought  and 
extension  are  attributes  of  God."  "  The  human  mind  is 
a  part  of  the  infinite  divine  intellect."  "  The  absolutely 
infinite  is  infinite  in  respect  to  all  attributes."  But  of  all 
these  attributes  of  Deity,  Spinoza  asserts  that  we  are 
capable  of  discovering  only  two — thought  and  extension. 
Even  these  attributes  are  of  the  same  essence  and  are 
distinguishable  only  in  our  mode  of  perceiving  them.    In 


238  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

reality  there  is  an  absolute  parallelism  between  them. 
Individual  things  must  not  be  regarded  as  real  entities  ; 
they  are  but  the  passing  modes  of  that  everlasting  sub- 
stance which  is,  at  the  same  time,  both  the  one  and 
the  all. 

(2)  Ideal  Pantheism. 

This  school  is  of  a  different  order  entirely.  It  asserts 
the  existence  of  finite  spirits  and  of  an  infinite  spirit,  and 
declares 'there  is  nothing  else  besides.  The  material 
universe  is  not  an  entity  at  all ;  it  is  simply  a  mysterious 
energizing  of  the  divine,  under  the  form  of  time  and 
space. 

J.  G.  Fichte  and  Hegel  may  be  taken  as  fair  representa- 
tives of  this  school. 

The  former  begins  his  philosophy  with  the  assumption 
of  what  he  terms  "  the  universal  Ego,"  from  which  all  in- 
dividual minds,  so-called,  and  all  external  objects  flow  in 
ceaseless  round  as  mere  phenomenal  products.  This  in- 
conceivable universal  Ego,  this  ultimate  rational  Being, 
is  not  an  individual,  because  all  individuality  is  taken 
away  by  the  universal  laws  under  which  the  ego  is  de- 
veloped. He  holds  that  the  moral  order  of  the  world  is 
not  caused  by  a  personal  Being,  and  declares  that  "  The 
living  and  operative  moral  order  is  itself  God  ;  we  need 
no  other  God  and  can  comprehend  no  other." 

Hegel's  philosophy  is  absolute  Idealism.  He  begins 
with  the  absolute  Idea,  and  traces  its  development, 
through  the  varied  forms  of  nature,  to  its  culminating^ 
point  in  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  ego.  This 
development  is  reached  by  a  sort  of  self-movement  in 
three  stages :  first,  abstract  thought ;  second,  nature ; 
third,  spirit.  The  idea  emits  nature  from  itself  by  a 
species  of   self-alienation,  passing  over  into  something 


ANTl-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  239 

other  than  itself.  Nature  is  constantly  striving  to  over- 
come this  estrangement  and  restore  itself  to  its  former 
union  with  the  Idea.  This  restoration  is  accomplished 
at  the  point  of  self-consciousness  in  the  human  spirit. 
Hence  the  human  spirit  is  the  outcome  of  nature,  and 
the  ultimate  form  of  the  absolute  Idea. 

2.    PANTHEISM    EXAMINED. 

All  schools  of  Pantheism  hold  that  in  some  sense  things 
are  a  part  of  God,  that  they  are  inseparable  from  him  and 
he  is  equally  inseparable  from  them,  and  that  therefore 
the  infinite  is  the  sum-total  of  the  finite.  They  likewise 
agree  in  denying  an  act  of  creation,  the  existence  of  de- 
sign in  nature,  and  the  freedom  of  the  individual  human 
spirit.  Insomuch  as  Pantheism  involves  any  of  these 
errors,  it  is  subject  to  the  strictures  concerning  them 
which  have  been  presented  in  former  portions  of  this 
work,  and  need  not  be  here  repeated.  But  there  are 
some  special  and  fatal  weaknesses  in  pantheistic  philoso- 
phy which  must  be  carefully  noticed.  This  becomes  the 
more  necessary  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Pantheism  has 
gathered  about  it  a  certain  air  of  profound  philosophy, 
superior  wisdom,  and  absolute  truth,  which  tends  to  hide 
the  most  glaring  defects,  and  so  impose  itself  upon  the 
understanding. 

(i)  Spinoza  s  One- Substance  Theory. 

This  philosopher  professes  to  explain  the  universe  by 
a  strictly  deductive  method.  He  lays  down  definitions, 
states  axioms,  and  deduces  propositions  in  a  manner 
which  is  rigorously  logical.  His  fundamental  error  lies 
in  defining  things  that  are  ideal  and  not  real,  and  in  sup- 
posing that  by  defining  them  he  has  made  them   real,  or 


240  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

at  least  shown  their  reality.  All  that  his  logic  can 
possibly  do  is  to  prove  what  might  be  under  certain 
hypotheses ;  it  is  utterly  silent  as  to  what  actually  is. 
This  material  fallacy  betrays  him  into  many  errors. 

{a)  He  fails  to  show  that  only  one  infinite  substance 
can  exist.  Other  substances,  finite  and  dependent  in 
their  origin  and  existence,  might  be  brought  into  being, 
and,  so  long  as  they  exist,  might  be  self-active. 

{U)  Granting  that  one  single  infinite  substance  does 
exist,  he  fails  to  show  why  or  how  it  should  have  any 
modes  whatever.  A  diversity  of  modes  in  one  substance 
is  quite  as  inexplicable  as  a  diversity  of  substances. 

(c)  He  does  not  show  how,  among  an  infinite  number 
of  modes  in  this  one  infinite  substance,  the  two  modes  of 
thought  and  extension,  and  these  only,  are  discoverable. 

{d)  He  asserts  the  parallelism  of  thought  and  exten- 
sion, but  utterly  fails  to  prove  it.  On  the  contrary,  his 
own  philosophy  disproves  it.  He  accounts  for  so-called 
"  acts  of  will  "  by  effects  produced  upon  the  body  *'  from 
without,  under  mechanical  and  mathematical  laws."  But 
he  has  already  formally  renounced  the  nexus  of  cause  and 
effect.  Here  must  be  a  case,  then,  in  which  modes  of 
extension  act  upon  modes  of  thought.  Their  indepen- 
dent parellelism  is  therefore  impossible. 

(e)  Spinoza  likewise  fails  to  explain  how  this  one  in- 
divisible substance  ramifies  itself  into  an  infinite  variety 
of  forms,  embracing  suns  and  stars,  planets  and  animals, 
minds  and  bodies,  thoughts,  affections,  and  purposes. 
At  this  point,  all  Pantheism  utterly  breaks  down.  The 
theory  of  one  in  many  and  many  in  one^  is  beyond  its 
powers  of  explanation.  Having  no  self-conscious,  creat- 
ing God,  Pantheism  cannot  secure  the  unity  of  created 
things  as  Theism  can  by  their  dynamic  connection  with 


ANTr-THETSTTC  ERRORS.  24 1 

their  creative  source.  Neither  can  Pantheism  secure 
plurality  by  created  atoms,  since  its  doctrine  admits  of 
but  one  substance.  How  this  mysterious,  indeterminate, 
unconscious  unity  of  the  pantheist  could  ever  succeed 
in  dividing  itself  up  into  the  multiform  existences  of  the 
universe,  passes  all  comprehension.  And  if  it  could,  that 
would  only  be  to  cancel  unity  and  lapse  into  atheistic 
plurality.  To  assert  the  contrary  is  to  defy  both  mathe- 
matics and  philosophy,  by  saying  that  one  is  many  and 
many  are  one.  Between  this  childish  doctrine  and  blank 
atheism,  the  one-substance  theory  is  forced  to  choose. 

(2)  Ideal  Pantheism. 

This  system  is  less  revolting  than  the  one  just  con- 
sidered. Indeed  there  is  something  poetic  and  attractive 
about  it.  There  is  doubtless  a  sort  of  inspiration  to  be 
drawn  from  a  doctrine  which  brings  all  created  spirits 
into  everlasting  communion  with  the  uncreated  spirit, 
even  though  it  be  an  unconscious  communion.  Idealism 
does  not  leave  man,  as  pure  Pantheism  does,  in  a  state  of 
dreary  and  hopeless  orphanage.  Considered  from  the 
standpoint  of  sentiment,  ideal  Pantheism  has  the  decided 
advantage.  Philosophically,  however,  it  is  open  to  objec- 
tions equally  serious. 

(a)  Fichte  derives  all  our  knowledge  of  the  world  from 
our  own  self-consciousness,  without  any  empirical  basis 
whatever.  He  asserts  that  the  universal  Ego  is  alone 
truly  existent ;  and  that  he  has  by  his  own  absolute 
thought  placed  external  nature,  as  an  unreal  non-Ego, 
over  against  himself.  This  is  a  most  self-destructive 
theory.  If  there  is  no  reality  in  the  universe,  there  can 
be  neither  truth  nor  knowledge  in  it  ;  and  all  philosophy 
is  at  an  end.     There  remains  in  existence  nothing  but 


242  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

Fichte's  Universal  Ego,  which   is  helplessly  unconscious 
and  impersonal. 

{U)  Hegel's  philosophy  is  likewise  faulty.  He  attempts 
the  impossibility  of  deriving  the  Absolute  by  a  priori 
methods.  This  is  a  mistake.  The  conditioned  is  the 
evidence  of  the  Absolute  ;  the  creation  shows  forth  the 
Creator.  Ignoring  this  fact,  Hegel  quite  naturally  arrives 
at  an  Absolute,  which  is  zero.  Supposing  this  zero  to 
mean  the  content  of  universal  being,  rather  than  the 
cessation  of  human  thought — as  it  does — he  proceeds  to 
found  his  philosophy  upon  it,  and  derive  his  universe 
from  it.  In  doing  so  he  is  forced  to  posit  unconscious 
thought,  which  is  absurd  ;  to  develop  the  Idea  by  self- 
motion,  which  is  impossible  ;  and  to  make  God  the  sum 
of  all  things  (evil  included),  which  is  both  unphilosophi- 
cal  and  immoral.  By  these  and  other  questionable 
assumptions,  he  has  succeeded  in  erecting  an  ideal  uni- 
verse, without  any  actual  existence — a  sort  of  cosmical 
palace  on  paper,  fair  enough  to  look  at,  a  pretty  picture, 
but  having  existence  as  a  palace  only  in  the  brain  of  the 
architect.  However  commendable  his  work  may  be  as  a 
product  of  pure  philosophic  imagination,  whenever  he 
attempts  to  pass  it  off  as  the  only  actual  existing  uni- 
verse, all  sober  philosophy  must  seriously  demur. 

(3)   The  Identity  of  God  and  the  Universe. 

This  postulate  is,  in  some  form,  found  in  all  Pantheism 
alike.  The  fallacy  of  assuming  that  God  is  the  sum  of 
existence  has  been  shown  in  the  former  chapter.  But  it 
is  equally  fallacious  to  assume  that  God  diminished  him- 
self in  order  to  make  the  world.  Infinity  can  neither  be 
increased  nor  diminished.  The  pantheistic  emanation 
theory  is  therefore  absurd.     There  is  one  truth,  indeed. 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  243 

which  the  pantheist  properly  emphasizes.  He  insists 
that  God  is  in  the  universe,  and  not  removed  to  a  dis- 
tance from  it.  In  this  he  is  right,  and  Christian  Theism 
approves.  As  Carlyle  puts  it,  God  is  not  "  an  absentee 
God,  sitting  idle,  ever  since  the  first  Sabbath',  at  the  out- 
side of  his  universe,  and  seeing  it  go."  This  immanence 
of  God  in  nature  is  a  mystery-explaining,  God-honoring 
doctrine.  But  when  the  pantheist  goes  on  to  add  that 
God  is  not  only  in  the  universe,  but  is  confined  to  it, 
inseparable  from  it,  he  degrades  Deity,  dwarfs  infinity, 
and  becomes  a  practical  atheist. 

(4)  Pantheism  Rejects  the  Doctrine  of  Design  in  Nature. 

This  is  done  apparently  in  the  interest  of  the  Divine 
omnipotence.  The  pantheist  asserts  that  design  means 
contrivance,  contrivance  means  necessity,  necessity 
means  a  limitation  of  power.  He  reminds  us  that  man 
resorts  to  ineans  only  when  he  cannot  compass  his  ends 
otherwise  ;  that  one  will  not  employ  a  machine  to  raise 
his  arm  if  he  can  do  it  without ;  that  God  must  be  sup- 
posed to  act  in  the  same  way ;  and  that  therefore  the 
theistic  doctrine  of  design  is  destructive  of  infinite  power 
in  the  Designer.  This  specious  doctrine  is  essentially 
unsound.  The  theist  does  not  limit  God's  power,  nor 
restrict  him  to  any  method  of  creation.  He  could  have 
created  all  things  as  they  now  exist  by  a  single  fiat.  More- 
over, he  could  have  created  them  without  any  rational 
relation  of  parts,  a  mere  jumble  of  chaotic  confusion. 
But  would  that  kind  of  creation  show  any  more  power 
than  the  existing  harmonious  and  purposeful  relations 
show  ?  God's  doing  a  thing  by  the  use  of  means  does 
not  prove  that  he  could  not  do  the  same  thing  otherwise. 
This  is  not  true,  even  with  man.    The  Instructor  may  raise 


244  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

his  arm  by  mechanical  means  to  illustrate  before  his  class 
the  force  of  muscular  action.  But  that  does  not  prove 
the  paralysis  of  his  arm.  Even  so,  God  may  have,  in  the 
employment  of  design  in  nature,  some  other  and  higher 
purposes  than  the  mere  exhibition  of  power.  Among 
such  possible  purposes,  a  worthy  one  might  be  to  teach 
his  human  children  the  beautiful  and  inspiring  lesson  of 
his  own  wisdom,  truth,  and  love.  But  evidently  no  such 
lesson  of  God's  moral  attributes  could  ever  be  learned 
from  a  fiat  universe,  without  change,  progress,  or  relation 
of  parts.  To  this  undesirable  method  of  creation,  the 
pantheist  would  restrict  the  Deity,  under  the  specious 
pretence  of  preserving  his  omnipotence  against  the  attacks 
of  the  teleologists.  But  who  shall  protect  God's  volition, 
intelligence,  freedom,  and  moral  attributes  against  the 
doctrines  of  the  pantheist  ?  All  these  are  destroyed  and 
no  power  is  gained. 

(5)  Pantheism  is  Fatalistic. 

It  makes  man  either  a  passing  mode  of  an  unreal  non^ 
ego,  or  a  necessary  product  of  a  divine  energizing.  In 
either  case  he  has  no  such  personality  as  gives  him  true 
freedom  of  action.  He  is  what  he  must  be,  he  does  what 
he  must  do.  Whether  the  pantheist  asserts  with  Forberg 
that  he  needs  no  faith,  since  death  "  will  be  for  him  a 
total  end,"  or  hopes  with  Fichte  that  **  no  Ego  which  has 
become  real  shall  ever  perish,"  it  matters  not ;  for,  at  all 
events,  he  must  believe  that  his  destiny,  whatever  it  may 
be,  is  forever  fixed  and  utterly  beyond  his  own  control. 

Nothing  need  here  be  added  to  what  has  heretofore 
been  said  on  this  subject,  further  than  the  simple  state- 
ment that  fatalism  is  essentially  the  same,  whether  pan- 
theistic, atheistic,  materialistic,  or  agnostic  in  its  origin. 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  245 

It  is  everywhere  subversive  of  sound  philosophy,  pure 
religion,  and  virtuous  living. 

(6)  Pantheism  Denies  an  Act  of  Creation. 

It  declares  that  nothing  has  ever  been  made.  What- 
ever is,  always  was.  Either  matter  exists,  or  it  does  not. 
If  it  does  not,  all  the  absurdities  of  idealism  result.  If  it 
does  exist,  then  it  always  existed.  It  is  therefore  eternal, 
and  is  at  the  least  a  part  of  God.  God,  then,  is  both 
material  and  finite.  The  pantheist  must  choose  between 
these  equally  absurd  extremes  ;  for  there  is  no  other 
course  open  to  him.  He  usually  chooses  the  latter,  makes 
nature  in  some  way  synonymous  with  God,  and  inter- 
prets natural  phenomena  as  the  developments  of  Deity 
himself.  The  God  of  the  pantheist  starts  with  uncon- 
scious impersonality,  proceeds  by  a  sort  of  inconceivable 
self-motion,  through  all  the  forms  of  material  existence, 
and  finally  arrives  at  human  intelligence — the  end  of  his 
long  journey.  This  view  of  the  case  exalts  man,  but  it 
degrades  the  Deity.  It  makes  of  God  an  unconscious  force, 
until  he  secures  his  own  consciousness  in  the  developed 
consciousness  of  man.  But  human  intelligence  is  su- 
perior to  any  amount  of  mere  force.  It  therefore  follows 
either  that  man  is  superior  to  God,  or  that  he  is  very  God 
himself. 

But,  again,  Pantheism  is  forced  to  bring  something 
out  of  nothing.  It  teaches  that  there  was  a  time  when,  in 
the  whole  universe,  there  was  no  conscious  being.  Now 
there  are  millions  of  conscious  beings ;  and  yet  nothing 
was  ever  created.  The  theist  may  pertinently  ask : 
"Whence  cometh  this  consciousness?"  Unphilosophi- 
cal  and  immoral  as  these  conclusions  are,  no  pantheist 
can  avoid  them ;  for  they  are  the  logical  outcome  of  his 


246  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

doctrine.  Having  palpably  violated  the  law  of  his  own 
consciousness,  he  cannot  expect  to  escape  its  just  pen- 
alty. It  is  far  better  to  admit  the  evident  distinctions 
between  subject  and  object,  matter  and  mind,  the  finite 
and  the  infinite,  the  created  and  the  uncreated,  God  and 
the  universe.  These  distinctions  are  fundamental  in  the 
consciousness  and  intuitive  powers  of  every  man.  Pan- 
theism, in  all  its  forms,  ignores  these  plain  distinctions, 
and  thereby  involves  itself  in  fatal  errors,  for  which  no 
amount  of  profound  philosophical  speculation  can  ever 
be  able  to  atone. 

SECTION   III. 

POSITIVISM. 
I.    POSITIVISM    STATED. 

This  theory  is  the  very  opposite  of  Pantheism.  In- 
stead of  rejecting  empirical  knowledge.  Positivism  de- 
clares that  '*  experience  is  the  only  foundation  of  truth." 
Instead  of  tracing  things  from  their  beginning  as  the 
pantheist  does,  the  positivist  disclaims  all  knowledge  of 
the  beginning  or  end  of  things,  the  nature  or  essence  of 
things,  the  cause  or  connection  of  things.  He  rejects  all 
Metaphysics  and  Theology  as  absurd.  He  denies  Causa- 
tion, for  fear  it  will  lead  to  Theology.  For  the  same 
reason,  he  rejects  both  Pantheism  and  Atheism.  Indeed, 
he  may  be  termed  a  philosophical  know-nothing;  for  his 
philosophy  is  mostly  engaged  in  declaring  man's  neces- 
sary ignorance  of  all  philosophy.  He  knows  what  his 
senses  tell  him,  nothing  more.  Even  the  physical 
facts  of  the  universe  have  no  connection,  order,  or  rela- 
tion of  parts.     All  is  segregated,  isolated,  independent. 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  247 

Science  is  confined  to  the  senses.  Its  only  legitimate 
business  is  to  observe  the  phenomena  of  sense  and  to 
classify  them  under  the  authoritative  relations  of  simi- 
larity and  sequence.  All  religion  is  rejected  as  an  absurd 
delusion.  A  certain  form  of  Altruism  is  indeed  allowed 
— a  worship  of  Humanity,  a  reverence  for  the  Grand- 
Etre,  of  which  every  worshipper  is  permitted  to  recog- 
nize himself  as  a  part.  But  all  knowledge  of  any  Supe- 
rior Being  or  dependence  upon  him,  is  strictly  eliminated. 
The  constructive  part  of  this  system  depends  upon  the 
statement  that  human  thought  passes  through  three 
stages — the  theological,  the  metaphysical,  and  the  posi- 
tive,— and  that  these  stages  are  necessarily  successive. 

Such  in  brief  is  the  doctrine  of  Positivism.  Augusts 
Comte  must  be  regarded  as  the  founder  of  this  school  of 
thought.  Prominent  among  its  adherents  are  Littr^, 
Harrison,  Ferrari,  and  the  younger  Mill. 

2.    POSITIVISM    EXAMINED. 

Only  a  very  brief  review  of  this  system  need  be  made. 
No  other  is  necessary  to  show  its  essential  weakness  and 
self-contradiction. 

(i)  //  Contradicts  its  own  Principles. 

This  it  does  at  the  very  outset  by  asserting  the  rela- 
tion of  sequence.  Whence  comes  this  relation  ?  The 
senses  certainly  do  not  give  it.  That  inconceivably  short 
instant  of  duration  which  we  call  the  present,  is  all  they 
can  command.  Of  the  past  or  future,  the  senses  give 
no  knowledge.  The  positivist  must  therefore  go  beyond 
his  senses  to  get  his  first  idea  of  sequence,  or  succession 
in  time.  But  in  so  doing  he  violates  the  basal  principle 
of  his  own  philosophy,  and  so  makes  it  self-destructive. 


248  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

(2)  Positivism  Contradicts  the  Facts  of  Psychology. 
The  positivist  must  admit  the  existence  of  what  we 
call  mental  phenomena.  If  not,  he  tears  down  his  own 
doctrine,  in  the  denial.  On  his  own  principle  of  simi- 
larity, he  must  likewise  admit  that  these  phenomena  are 
distinctively  alike  in  character,  and  unlike  all  others. 
They  must  belong,  therefore,  to  an  entity  which  is  dis- 
tinct from  matter,  or  to  matter  itself.  If  he  takes  the 
former  view,  he  postulates  mind  and  ceases  to  be  a  posi- 
tivist. If  the  latter,  he  becomes  a  materialist,  and  as- 
sumes to  answer  for  all  the  doctrines  of  that  false 
system. 

(3)  Positivism  Contradicts  History. 

Its  boasted  "  historic  conception  "  is  untrue.  Human 
thought  does  not  pass  through  three  distinct  and  suc- 
cessive stages,  in  the  first  of  which  phenomena  are 
referred  to  supernatural  causes ;  in  the  second,  to  occult, 
cosmic  causes,  and  in  the  third,  to  no  causes  at  all.  Men 
have  believed  in  creative  design,  in  efficient  causation, 
and  in  the  truths  of  empirical  science,  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  greatest  thinkers 
do  now  believe  in  all  these  truths.  They  are  coordinate 
truths  growing  together.  When  the  positivist  asserts  that 
they  are  successive  and  mutually  exclusive  ideas,  he 
thereby  contradicts  the  history  of  human  thought. 

(4)  Positivism  Contradicts  Logic. 

There  is  in  it  a  vicious  specimen  of  what  the  logician 
calls  cir cuius  in  probanda.  In  the  first  place,  the  positivist 
confines  his  knowledge  to  the  testimony  of  his  senses. 
This  of  course  excludes  all  knowledge  of  himself,  except 
as  a  physical  being.  He  loses  the  ego  in  the  non-ego.  In 
the  second  place,  he  defines  a  material  object  as  an  object 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  249 

of  sense.  It  exists  only  as  a  sensation.  Its  relation  to  a 
percipient  being  is  all  there  is  of  it.  He  declares  :  **  This 
world  which  I  perceive,  is  my  perception,  and  nothing 
n)ore."  Now  he  loses  the  non-ego  in  the  ego.  So  both 
are  lost,  and  all  is  gone.  The  last  remains  of  Positivism 
have  disappeared  in  the  vortex  of  its  own  false  logic. 


SECTION  IV. 

AGNOSTICISM. 
I.    AGNOSTICISM    STATED. 

This  philosophy  is  an  ingenious  combination  and  modi- 
fication of  the  three  systems  just  considered, — Material- 
ism, Pantheism,  and  Positivism.  It  differs  from  them  all, 
indeed  ;  but  it  affiliates  more  than  it  disagrees  with  them. 
In  its  present  phase,  it  has  taken  shape  and  name  from 
the  works  of  Herbert  Spencer,  the  great  Agnostic  of 
modern  times.  Its  elements  can  be  briefly  stated  in  Mr. 
Spencer's  own  words. 

He  says :  "  What  we  are  conscious  of  as  properties  of 
matter,  even  down  to  its  weight  and  resistance,  are  but 
subjective  affections  produced  by  objective  agencies 
which  are  unknown  and  unknowable."  "  A  Power  of 
which  the  nature  remains  inconceivable,  and  to  which 
no  limits  in  time  or  space  can  be  imagined,  works  in 
us  certain  effects.  These  effects  have  certain  likenesses 
of  kind,  the  most  general  of  which  we  class  togetner 
under  the  names  of  Matter,  Motion,  and  Force.  The  in- 
terpretation of  all  phenomena  in  terms  of  Matter,  Motion, 
and  Force,  is  nothing  more  than  the  reduction  of  our 
complex  symbols  of  thought  to  the  simplest  symbols; 
and  when  the  equation  has  been  brought  to  its  lowest 


250  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

terms,  the  symbols  remain  symbols  still."  He  speaks  of 
**  the  consciousness  of  a  universal  causal  agency  which 
cannot  be  conceived,"  and  says :  "  The  connection  be- 
tween the  conditioned  forms  of  being  and  the  uncondi- 
tioned form  of  being  is  forever  inscrutable."  Concerning 
this  unconditioned  being,  he  declares  that  is  the  "  Un- 
known and  the  Unknowable,"  the  "  Infinite  and  Eternal 
Energy,"  and  the  Source  of  all  phenomena,"  and  that  the 
human  mind  must,  in  **  some  dim  mode  of  consciousness, 
posit  a  non-relative,  and  in  some  similar  dim  mode  of 
consciousness,  a  relation  between  it  and  the  relative." 
As  to  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  he  says  it  is  "  con- 
sciousness of  a  difference  transcending  all  other  differ- 
ences." "  Belief  in  the  reality  of  self,  is  a  belief  which 
no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape."  ''  The  force  by 
which  we  ourselves  produce  changes,  and  which  serves  to 
symbolize  the  cause  of  changes  in  general,  is  the  final 
disclosure  of  analysis  .  .  .  the  original  datum  of  con- 
sciousness." That  there  is  nothing  in  existence  but  the 
impressions  and  ideas  "  which  constitute  consciousness," 
is  declared  to  be  really  "  unthinkable." 

These  extracts  from  Mr.  Spencer  disclose  the  founda- 
tion elements  of  agnostic  philosophy.  If  we  combine 
with  them  a  most  universal,  exhaustive,  and  ingenious 
application  of  the  principles  of  Evolution,  we  have  a 
fair  general  idea  of  the  whole  system  of  Spencerian  Ag- 
nosticism. 

2.     AGNOSTICISM    EXAMINED. 

A  study  of  Mr.  Spencer's  works  produces  a  profound 
conviction  of  his  depth  and  patience  of  thought,  his 
breadth  and  profundity  of  scholarship,  his  fertility  of 
imagination,  and  his  frankness  and  earnestness  of  pur- 
pose.    His  admirers  are  certainly  extravagant  in  claim- 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  25  I 

ing  that  he  is  **the  greatest  analytical  philosopher  the 
world  has  ever  seen " ;  and  yet  he  is  certainly  facile 
princeps  among  anti-theistic  writers  of  the  present  day. 
But  this  opinion  does  not  require  an  adoption  of  his 
system  of  philosophy.  Neither  does  it  forbid  an  earnest 
protest  against  the  immense  and  fatal  errors  which  it 
contains.  And  it  is  scarcely  more  than  a  protest  that 
can  be  offered  here.  Any  thing  like  a  presentation  and 
discussion  of  Spencerian  philosophy  would  require  a 
volume  in  itself.  A  few  strokes  at  its  most  fundamental 
errors,  gathered  in  part  from  works  already  written,  must 
suffice  for  the  present  purpose. 

(i)  Concerning  God. 

Mr.  Spencer  everywhere  admits  the  existence  of  a  Be- 
ing above  man  and  back  of  nature.  But  there  is  great 
confusion,  not  to  say  contradiction,  in  his  statements 
concerning  this  Being. 

(a)  The  knowabletiess  of  God. — He  is  declared  to  be  the 
**  unknown  and  unknowable."  Here  is  an  inconsistency. 
That  which  is  now  unknown,  may  hereafter  become 
known.  To  declare  it  unknowable  is  to  deny  this  possi- 
bility. But  to  justify  this  denial,  two  things  at  least 
must  be  known  about  the  being  in  question,  ist.  That 
it  exists.  2d,  That  its  nature,  etc.,  cannot  be  discovered. 
Thus  much,  therefore,  Mr.  Spencer  knows  about  a  Being 
whom  he  declares  to  be  unknown.  And  much  more  ;  for 
he  describes  this  Being  as  "Absolute,"  "Infinite,"  "Per- 
sistent," "  Omnipotent,"  as  "  Cause,"  "  Power,"  as  "  Source 
of  phenomena,"  and  as  "  acting  upon  us."  He  cannot, 
then,  be  in  the  category  of  the  unknown.  It  would  be 
more  consistent  for  Mr.  Spencer  to  say :  "  God  cannot  be 
adequately  or  fully  known." 


252  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

(b)  The  absoluteness  of  God. — At  one  breath  the  ag- 
nostic calls  God  the  *'  non-relative,"  and  at  the  next  talks 
about  "  a  relation  between  him  and  the  relative."  Now 
it  may  be  proper  to  inquire :  How  can  the  non-relative 
have  any  relation  whatever  to  any  thing  whatever  ?  The 
assertion  that  any  being  is  non-relative,  is  a  self-destruc- 
tive statement.  Such  a  being  might  exist ;  but  if  Mr. 
Spencer  knows  that  fact,  his  knowledge  involves  a  rela- 
tion between  that  being  and  himself.  If  he  does  not 
know  the  fact,  he  cannot  afford  to  state  it  as  a  fact. 
There  is  certainly  a  dilemma  of  confusions  in  this  state- 
ment. 

{c)  The  moral  nature  of  God. — Mr.  Spencer  is  careful 
not  to  state  or  imply  that  "  The  Absolute  "  is  in  any 
sense  a  moral,  or  even  a  spiritual  being.  He  expressly 
states,  on  the  contrary,  that  his  doctrines  "  are  no  more 
materialistic  than  they  are  spiritualistic ;  and  no  more 
spiritualistic  than  they  are  materialistic."  And  yet  he 
declares  that  man's  religious  sentiment  will  always  con- 
tinue to  exist,  and  will  ^*  have  for  its  object  of  contem- 
plation the  Infinite  Unknowable."  Now,  this  means 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  worship  of  a  mere  Force. 
For,  while  the  "  Infinite  Unknowable  "  may  be  a  holy 
spirit,  or  may  be  a  senseless  fetich,  it  can  be  known  only 
as  Force,  and,  therefore,  worshipped  only  as  Force.  It 
would  be  just  as  rational  and  just  as  comforting  to 
worship  Gravitation  or  Electricity  or  any  other  force. 
One  might  as  well  pray  to  a  volcano,  or  offer  sacrifices 
to  a  cyclone. 

(2)    Concerning  Man. 

It  is  declared  that  "  no  hypothesis  enables  us  to  escape 
a  belief  in  the  reality  of  self."  Herein  the  agnostic 
seems  to  recognize  the  self-destructive  tendencies  of  his 


A  N  TI.  THE  IS  TIC  ERRORS.  253 

own  principles,  and  to  utter  a  positive  warning  against 
them.  It  is  of  no  use.  The  citadel  of  *'self  "  is  already 
in  ruins.  Agnostic  fires  have  had  their  full  sweep  over 
it,  and  it  is  quite  useless  now  to  gather  up  the  ashes.  No 
phoenix  need  ever  be  expected  to  arise  therefrom. 

The  agnostic  has  told  us  that  we  know  nothing  but 
symbols,  that  we  know  them  only  by  experience,  and 
that  experience  is  confined  to  consciousness.  Two  per- 
plexing results  must  follow. 

(a)  Our  personal  identity  is  destroyed. — Consciousness 
relates  only  to  the  present  moment.  I  may  remember 
the  past,  but  I  cannot  be  conscious  of  it.  If  knowledge 
is  confined  to  experience,  and  experience  is  confined  to 
consciousness,  then,  manifestly,  I  can  know  nothing  of 
the  past.  I  cannot  credit  my  own  memory.  I  cannot 
be  assured  of  my  own  past  existence.  Indeed,  I  cannot 
know  that  there  is  any  past.  If  I  trust  my  memory,  I 
transcend  experience,  and  thereby  abandon  Agnosticism. 
If  I  do  not,  I  confine  my  knowledge  of  self  to  the  feeling 
of  the  present  moment,  lose  all  idea  of  persistent  exist- 
ence, and  thereby  abandon  my  selfdom.  An  absent  sym- 
bol has  neither  significance  nor  existence  for  me. 

{b)  Our  knowledge  of  our  fellow-me?i  is  lost. — Agnosti- 
cism gives  no  adequate  ground  to  believe  in  the  existence 
or  the  rationality  of  our  fellow-men.  It  is  true,  we  daily 
observe  daily  motions  and  appearances  about  us  which 
we  are  irresistibly  prone  to  attribute  to  beings  like  our- 
selves. But  then,  this  universal  proneness  may  be  only  a 
universal  delusion.  For  these  phenomena  are  nothing 
but  symbols,  after  all.  What  they  may  symbolize,  re- 
mains forever  '*  unknown  and  unknowable."  We  may 
infer  that  they  belong  to  intelligences,  but  that  inference 
transcends  experience,  and  must  be  rejected.     According 


254  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

to  the  agnostic,  it  is  quite  as  unsafe  to  infer  the  existence 
of  intelligent  beings  about  us  whom  we  call  our  fellow- 
men,  as  it  is  to  infer  our  own  past  existence,  or  the  exist- 
ence of  an  intelligent  Creator  of  the  universe.  If  his 
philosophy  is  true,  all  such  inferences  must  be  alike 
untrue. 

(3)  Concerning  the  Universe. 

On  this  subject  Mr.  Spencer  utters  another  caveat. 
He  declares  that  to  suppose  there  is  no  existence  other 
than  our  own  consciousness,  is  "  unthinkable."  This 
term,  "  unthinkable,"  is  a  great  favorite  with  the  great 
agnostic.  It  seems  to  be  one  of  his  strongest  weapons — 
a  veritable  Medusa  head,  at  sight  of  which  he  confidently 
expects  any  troublesome  and  belligerent  proposition  to 
drop  into  utter  destruction.  For  Mr.  Spencer  to  declare 
a  thing  ''  unthinkable  "  or  *'  inconceivable  "  seems  to  him 
the  most  legitimate  and  effectual  method  of  making  a 
final  disposition  of  it. 

But  why  should  he  declare  the  non-existence  of  the 
universe  unthinkable  ?  His  philosophy  does  not  lead  to 
such  a  result.  He  expressly  and  emphatically  asserts 
that  all  we  know  or  can  know  of  the  universe  is  in  sym- 
bols. Now  symbols  may  be  of  two  kinds,  pictorial  or 
algebraic.  Pictorial  symbols  represent  the  known,  and 
bear  some  resemblance  to  it.  Algebraic  symbols  repre- 
sent the  unknown,  and  have  no  likeness  whatever  to  the 
thing  symbolized.  Of  this  latter  class  are  Mr.  Spencer's 
cosmic  symbols.  They  are  algebraic  formulas.  The 
equation  in  which  they  stand  may  be  reduced  to  its  low- 
est terms,  but  it  can  never  be  verified  in  any  conceivable 
way.     It  is  still  symbolic  language  and  nothing  more. 

Now  Mr.  Spencer  himself  must  admit  that  algebraic 
symbols  can  stand  for  any  thing  or  for  nothing.     **  X  ** 


ANTI-THEISTIC  ERRORS.  2$$ 

may  be  a  million,  or  it  may  be  zero.  To  deny  this  is  to 
destroy  its  symbolic  character.  Any  algebraic  quantity 
may  reach  its  vanishing  point.  And  so  this  mysterious 
*'  X  "  and  "  Y  "  of  consciousness  may  evidently  stand  for 
zero.  In  that  case,  Mr.  Spencer's  universe  has  vanished, 
past  all  possible  recovery. 

It  is  true  he  places  among  these  symbols  matter, 
motion,  and  force.  But  this  avails  him  nothing,  since 
these  terms  are  all  used  figuratively  without  the  least 
knowledge  of  the  realities  for  which  they  stand.  Even 
the  so-called  atoms  which  are  supposed  to  be  their  seat 
of  action,  are  themselves  past  finding  out.  These  reali- 
ties may  therefore  reduce  to  zero,  and  still  Mr.  Spencer's 
universe  is  a  possible  nonentity. 

(4)  Concerning  Knowledge. 

Agnosticism  is  a  system  of  philosophy.  But  all  phil- 
osophy implies  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  Mr.  Spen- 
cer recognizes  this  fact,  and  says  that  the  postulate  of 
Absolute  Being  '*  is  the  foundation  of  any  possible  sys- 
tem of  positive  knowledge."  Now,  since  this  founda- 
tion is  the  *'  unknown  and  unknowable,"  any  system  of 
knowledge  erected  upon  it  must  be  untrustworthy 
and  illusory.  Nay,  it  must  be  self-contradictory.  For  if 
the  agnostic  knows  nothing  of  the  Absolute,  he  can  base 
no  system  upon  it.  But  if  he  knows  any  thing  of  the 
Absolute,  then  the  Absolute  is  not  the  unknown.  If 
Agnosticism  is  true,  its  foundation  is  false.  To  say  that 
one's  knowledge  is  defective,  or  is  confined  to  phe- 
nomena, is  to  admit  that  he  has  knowledge.  Hegel  says  : 
"  No  one  is  aware  that  any  thing  is  a  limit  or  defect  until 
at  the  same  time  he  is  above  and  beyond  it."  When  the 
agnostic  declares  that  he  has  no  faculty  by  which  he  can 


256  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

know  God,  he  thereby  discloses  the  fact  that  he  does 
know  God.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  Absolute  is 
the  unknown,  the  non-relative,  it  follows  that  we  cannot 
know  the  existence  even  of  the  Absolute.  We  cannot 
know  that  it  is,  any  more  than  what  it  is.  The  agnos- 
tic, in  order  to  be  logical,  must  join  hands  with  the  pos- 
itivist,  and  disclaim  all  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
any  thing  but  phenomena.  Dr.  Harris  has  well  said  : 
*'  There  is  no  half-way  house  of  Spencerian  Agnosticism, 
between  complete  Positivism,  which  involves  complete 
Agnosticism  and  Theism." 

All  knowledge  is  impossible.  This  statement  embodies 
the  necessary  logical  outcome  of  Agnosticism.  If  the 
statement  be  true,  Agnosticism  is  impossible.  If  not 
true,  Agnosticism  is  false.  But  this  is  philosophic  sui- 
cide.    Either  horn  of  the  dilemma  is  fatal. 

Agnosticism  set  out  to  destroy  Christian  Theism.  Its 
great  Apostle  declared  that  under  his  analysis  revealed 
religion  or  scientific  theology  is  no  longer  possible. 
But  the  whole  system  proves  to  be  self-destructive.  Ha- 
man-like,  it  has  erected  a  gallows  full  "  fifty  cubits  high  "  ; 
and,  Haman-like,  it  hangs  on  its  own  gallows. 

REFERENCES. 

Wilson's  *'  Kant  and  his  English  Critics." 

Harris'  "  Philosophic  Basis  of  Theism." 

Clarke's  *'  Ten  Great  Religions." 

Fisher's  "  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief." 


CHAPTER    VIII. 
EVOLUTION    AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

TH  E  doctrine  of  Evolution  is  the  philosophic  specialty 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  But  it  is  not  a  new  doc- 
trine. For  more  than  twenty-five  centuries  it  has,  in  some 
form,  engaged  the  earnest  thought  of  philosophers.  In  an- 
cient Greece,  both  the  Ionics  and  the  Atomists  held  to  it. 
Thales,  Anaximander,  Heraclitus,  Leucippus  and  Demo- 
critus  were  evolutionists.  Among  modern  philosophers 
prior  to  the  present  century,  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  Goethe, 
Kant,  and  Lamarck,  were  inclined  to  some  phase  of  evo- 
lutionary thought.  It  is  only  recently,  however,  that  this 
theory  has  gained  extensive  recognition,  and  sought  to 
hold  in  its  grasp  the  entire  circle  of  human  thought  and 
knowledge.  Because  of  this  attempt,  which  must  involve 
Theology,  no  less  than  the  physical  and  social  sciences,  it 
becomes  proper,  if  not  indeed  necessary,  for  the  Christian 
Theist  to  examine  Evolution,  as  to  its  philosophic  charac- 
ter and  its  bearing  upon  Theism. 

SECTION   I. 
IS   EVOLUTION    TRUE? 

There  are  four  distinct  types  of  Evolution.     Only  one 
of  them,  which  may  be  called  the  Mechanical  Type,  need 

257 


258  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

be  discussed  here.  By  Mechanical  Evolution  is  meant 
that  system  of  philosophy  which  holds  that  the  existing 
universe  has  been  developed  from  primordial  star-dust 
without  any  interposition  of  extraneous  power.  It  makes 
matter,  motion,  and  force,  the  sole  agents  in  all  cosmical 
action.  Haeckel,  Huxley,  and  Spencer  hold  this  view, 
and  stand  in  the  front  among  its  able  advocates.  Their 
arguments  in  its  favor  may  be  grouped  under  six  heads : 
(i)  Spontaneous  Generation  ;  (2)  Embryology ;  (3)  Natu- 
ral Selection  and  Breeding ;  (4)  Reversions  and  Rudimen- 
tary Organs  ;  (5)  Anatomical  Resemblances ;  (6)  Geologi- 
cal Deposits.  In  examining  these  arguments,  two  cautions 
must  be  observed :  First,  a  problem  of  such  extreme 
difficulty,  on  which  great  men  differ,  must  be  approached 
with  that  candor  and  modesty  which  will  free  its  discus- 
sion from  prejudice,  self-conceit,  and  the  use  of  offensive 
epithets.  Mere  dogmatism  avails  nothing.  Second,  Evo- 
lution is  not  a  power,  but  a  process.  If  true,  it  estab- 
lishes the  fact  of  a  certain  process  in  nature ;  but  it  throws 
no  light  upon  the  ultimate  cause,  the  origin  or  the  end  of 
tha£  process. 

I.    SPONTANEOUS   GENERATION. 

Professor  Haeckel  says :  "  We  can  assume  no  super- 
natural act  of  creation  for  simplest  original  forms,  but 
only  a  coming  into  existence  by  spontaneous  generation," 
and  intimates  that  naturalists  who  believe  otherwise  must 
"  renounce  their  own  reason."  This  original  form  of  life 
he  calls  the  monern.  It  came  by  mechanical  processes, 
from  plasson  or  "primitive  slime,"  and  that,  in  turn,  from 
inorganic  carbon  combinations.  He  thinks  this  plasson 
still  lives  in  the  deep  sea,  under  the  name  of  Bathybius. 
"The  oldest  monera  originated  in  the  sea  by  spontaneous 
generation,  just  as  crystals  form  in  the  matrix." 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN   THEISM.  259 

There  are  insuperable  difficulties  in  the  way  of  this 
theory. 

(i)  As  to  This  Bathybius. 

It  has  been  chemically  tested  and  found  to  consist  of 
crystalline  substance,  with  the  d6bris  of  living  organisms, 
but  having  in  itself  no  evidence  of  life,  past  or  present. 
This  far-famed  protoplasm,  the  only  surviving  witness  to 
Professor  Haeckel's  theory,  has  failed  him,  and  left  his 
doctrine  of  pangenesis  without  support. 

(2)  Spontaneous  Generation  does  Not  Now  Take  Place. 

In  1870,  Dr.  Bastian  performed  an  experiment  by 
which  the  fact  of  spontaneous  generation  was  supposed  to 
be  established.  Some  ten  years  later.  Professor  Tyndall 
submitted  the  experiment  to  sixty  careful  tests  ;  and  as  a 
result  declared  :  "  The  evidence  in  favor  of  spontaneous 
generation  crumbles  in  the  grasp  of  the  competent  in- 
quirer." Indeed,  there  is  now  no  such  evidence  worth 
examining. 

(3)  Spontaneous  Generation  is  Contrary  to  the  Analogy  of  Nature. 

It  is  declared  to  be  the  product  of  physical  force,  act- 
ing under  physical  law.  Now  if  such  force  produced  life 
a  thousand  or  a  million  years  ago,  it  must  continue  to 
produce  life.  This  statement  cannot  be  questioned  by 
the  evolutionist,  for  his  whole  doctrine  demands  the 
eternal  persistence  of  force  without  increase  or  diminu- 
tion. But  inasmuch  as  life  now  invariably  originates 
from  an  antecedent  life,  analogy  teaches  that  it  always  so 
originated.  Those  who  think  otherwise,  have  strangely 
forgotten  their  favorite  motto :  **  The  uniformity  of 
nature." 


26o  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

(4)  Spontaneous  Generation  is  Unphilosophical  and  Unscientific. 

It  claims  that  dead  matter  made  itself  alive.  It  assigns 
no  adequate  cause  for  life,  and  tries  to  get  out  of  matter 
that  which  is  not  in  it.  This  is  unphilosophical.  Further- 
more, it  is  based  upon  a  mere  assumption — an  improbable 
guess,  without  a  fact,  an  analogy,  or  even  a  probability  in 
its  favor.  This  is  unscientific  ;  for  science  is  truth,  ob- 
served and  classified.  No  amount  of  persistent  guessing 
can  transform  assumption  into  truth. 

2.    EMBRYOLOGY. 

There  are  striking  resemblances  among  the  embryonic 
forms  of  all  animals,  and  particularly  of  all  vertebrates. 
Professor  Haeckel  forcibly  exhibits  this  fact  by  illustration,, 
in  the  plates  given  in  the  "  History  of  Creation,"  Vol.  L, 
p.  306.  From  this  fact,  evolutionists  infer  that  Ontogeny, 
or  individual  development,  is  a  recapitulation  of  Phy- 
logeny,  or  tribal  development — a  sort  of  historic  micro- 
cosm. That  is  to  say,  because,  at  certain  stages,  the  human 
embryo,  like  that  of  the  tortoise,  the  chicken,  and  the 
dog,  shows  gill-arches  and  a  tail,  it  is  inferred  that  these 
animals  must  have  a  common  ancestry,  having  all  de- 
scended from  fishes  and  from  tail-bearing  mammals. 
There  are  three  troublesome  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
this  inference. 

(i)  //  Assumes  Too  Much. 

It  claims  that  because  two  things  are  alike  in  some 
respects,  they  must  therefore  be  identical  in  origin.  This 
will  not  do.  For  the  same  things  differ  in  other  respects, 
and  thus,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  show  their  difference  of 
origin.  One  inference  is  as  rational  as  the  other.  Em- 
bryonic similarities  do  not  prove  identity  of  species  now. 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM.  26 1 

why  should  they  be  thought  to  prove  such  identity  in  the 
past  ?  The  argument  is  only  an  analogy  at  best,  and  has 
all  the  present  facts  of  Phylogeny  against  it. 

(2)   This  Inference  is  Self -Destructive. 

It  proves  too  much.  If  the  existence  of  a  tail  in  the 
human  embryo  proves  the  far-off  descent  of  man  from  a 
tailed  vertebrate,  then  the  like  appendage  in  the  embryo 
of  the  fish  and  the  tortoise  must  likewise  prove  the  far-off 
descent  of  these  animals  from  a  tailed  vertebrate.  This 
would  be  evolution  backwards.  But  if  all  embryonic 
elements  are  not  phylogenic,  there  is  no  evidence  that 
any  of  them  are. 

(3)  Even  the  Facts  from  Which  This  Inference  is  Drawn^  are 
Themselves  Questionable. 

Much  of  this  embryonic  similarity  is  such  in  appearance 
only,  and  not  at  all  in  fact.  Take  Professor  Haeckel's  far- 
famed  gill-arch  argument  as  an  example.  The  embryo  of 
man,  at  four  weeks,  shows  certain  wrinkles  or  folds  in 
front  of  the  neck;  so  does  that  of  other  animals.  At 
eight  weeks,  these  folds  have  disappeared.  Haeckel 
argues  that  these  marks,  which  in  the  fish  are  developed 
into  gills,  are  arrested  in  man,  and  show  his  descent  from 
the  fish. 

Now  this  is  one  supposition.  Let  it  be  matched  with 
another.  In  the  early  foetal  period,  from  the  form  of  the 
embryo  and  the  great  relative  weight  of  the  head,  the 
neck  is  necessarily  curved  forward.  But  nature,  intent 
on  making  man  erect,  deposits  life-cells  about  the  trunk 
symmetrically,  in  front  as  fast  as  behind.  Those  in  front 
having  less  room,  quietly  enfold  themselves  and  await 
further    development.     Later,   when    the   abdomen   and. 


262  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

lower  limbs  are  formed,  this  curvature  is  partially  re- 
lieved, the  demands  of  growth  are  largely  in  front  and 
below  the  head,  and  these  folds  are  absorbed  and  so  disap- 
pear. They  are  not  gill-arches  at  all,  and  never  were.  They 
are  simple  neck-folds.  They  are  not  historic,  pointing  to 
the  past,  but  prophetic,  pointing  to  the  future.  This  sup- 
position is  quite  as  good  as  Professor  Haeckel's.  It  is  even 
better ;  for  the  markings  in  question  are  in  front  of  the 
neck,- just  where  they  ought  to  be  if  neck-folds,  and  not 
on  the  sides,  where  they  ought  to  be  if  gill-arches.  Both 
gravitation  and  geometry  are  against  the  gill-arch  argu- 
ment. In  like  manner,  other  supposed  embryonic  like- 
nesses, such  as  chemical  identity,  the  human  tail,  etc.,  can 
be  shown  to  be  equally  illusive.  The  science  of  Embry- 
ology furnishes  no  good  evidence  of  the  animal  descent 
of  man. 

3.     NATURAL    SELECTION    AND    BREEDING. 

The  stronghold  of  philosophic  Evolution  is  Natural 
Selection.  It  bears  the  burden  of  the  entire  system.  It 
is  relied  upon  to  show  how,  by  the  most  minute  changes, 
all  present  forms  of  animal  and  vegetable  life  have  been 
developed  from  crass  matter.  Evolutionists  hold  that 
man  has  come  from  protoplasm  under  the  guidance  of 
natural  selection  and  the  law  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 

As  Mr.  Darwin  is  the  father  of  this  theory,  and  as  his 
views  have  been  largely  adopted  by  evolutionists,  it  will 
be  well  to  let  him  state  them  in  his  own  words.  He  says : 
"  Slight  individual  differences,  however,  suffice  for  the 
work,  and  are  probably  the  sole  differences  which  are 
effective  in  the  production  of  new  species."  "  Natural 
selection  acts  only  by  taking  advantage  of  slight  succes- 
sive variations ;  she  can  never  take  a  sudden  leap ;  but 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN   THEISM.  263 

must  advance  by  short  and  sure,  though  slow  steps." 
"  Some  have  imagined  that  natural  selection  induces 
variability ;  whereas  it  implies  only  the  preservation  of 
such  variations  as  arise  and  are  beneficial  to  the  being 
under  its  conditions  of  life."  "  If  it  could  be  demonstrated 
that  any  complex  organ  existed,  which  could  not  possibly 
have  been  formed  by  numerous  successive  slight  modifi- 
cations, my  theory  would  absolutely  break  down."  "  If 
it  could  be  proved  that  any  part  of  the  structure  of  any 
species  has  been  formed  for  the  exclusive  good  of  another 
species,  it  would  annihilate  my  theory." 

Professor  Haeckel  substantially  adopts  this  view  of 
natural  selection.  Only  a  single  passage  on  this  subject 
need  be  quoted  from  him.  He  says:  "  The  adaptability 
of  every  organism  is  limited  to  the  type  of  its  tribe  or 
phylum.  No  vertebrate  can  acquire  the  ventral  nerve- 
cord  of  articulate  animals.  Within  this  inalienable  type, 
adaptability  is  unlimited." 

No  one  can  study  this  Darwinian  theory  without  a  cer- 
tain feeling  of  admiration,  both  for  the  boldness  and 
beauty  of  the  theory  itself,  and  for  the  ingenuity  and 
candor  of  its  author.  And  yet,  a  careful  examination 
discloses  the  fact  that  natural  selection,  however  original 
and  beautiful,  is  utterly  unable  to  do  the  immense  work 
so  confidently  assigned  to  it  by  evolutionists. 

(i)  //  Fails  to  Account  for  Variability. 

Both  Darwin  and  Haeckel  distinctly  assert  that  natural 
selection  produces  no  changes.  It  simply  preserves  such 
of  them  as  may  be  beneficial.  Whence  arise  these 
changes?  The  evolutionist  says  it  is  from  adaptability 
to  environment.  But  how  came  any  organism  to  have 
such  adaptability?     Nay,  more,  how  came  these  changes 


UiriVERSlTV 


264  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

of  environment  even  ?  If  the  universe  was  once  an  aggre- 
gation of  homogeneous  atoms,  why  did  it  not  forever 
remain  such?  Whence  came  heterogeneity?  For  this 
great  and  wonderful  effect,  what  is  the  cause?  These 
questions,  natural  selection — as,  indeed,  all  evolutionary- 
philosophy — is  powerless  to  answer. 

(2)  Natural  Selection  is  Contrary  to  Existing  Facts. 

It  declares  that  all  genera  and  species  now  existing 
have  been  evolved  from  a  common  source  by  infinitesimal 
inherent  modifications.  But  it  neither  gives  proof  that 
this  evolution  of  species  is  now  taking  place,  nor  assigns 
any  adequate  cause  of  its  occurrence,  which  might  serve 
in  the  absence  of  empirical  proof. 

Now,  what  are  the  facts  ?  We  see  all  inorganic  ele- 
ments remaining  unchangeably  the  same.  Carbon,  oxy- 
gen, nitrogen  are  now  what  they  always  were.  Forms 
of  organic  life  seem  equally  fixed.  All  animals  seek  the 
companionship  of  their  own  kind,  and  invariably  propa- 
gate their  own  species.  This  is  nature's  universal  law  ; 
and  the  sterility  of  hybrids  is  her  continual  protest  against 
its  violation.  No  mutation  of  species  has  ever  been 
known  to  be  produced  by  nature.  The  mummy  cats  and 
ibisses  of  Egypt  are  just  the  same  as  the  cats  and  ibisses 
of  the  present  day.  Four  thousand  years  have  wrought 
no  change  in  species.  Suppose  it  were  otherwise.  Sup- 
pose nature  were  originating  new  species  before  our  eyes 
continually  and  abundantly.  Would  not  such  a  fact  be  a 
powerful  argument  for  evolution  by  natural  selection.'* 
And  is  not  the  contrary  fact  an  equally  powerful  argu- 
ment against  it  ?  Professor  Agassiz  was  not  speaking 
without  reason  when  he  said  :  "  I  cannot  admit  the  trans- 
formation of  species." 

\ 


EVOLUTION  AND    CHRISTIAN    THEISM.  26$ 

(3)  Natural  Selection  Requires  Too  Much  Time. 

This  demand  is  twofold  :  first,  to  give  a  rational  infer- 
ence of  its  existence  ;  and  second,  to  enable  it  to  do  its 
work.  During  historic  times,  it  has  given  no  evidence  of 
its  existence.  But  the  evolutionist  asserts  that  this  period 
is  too  short  to  form  a  judgment.  He  insists  that  if  we 
had  a  philosophic  microscope  of  a  million  million  diame- 
ters, we  could  catch  a  glimpse  of  some  slight  mutation  of 
species  in  a  sweep  of  a  few  thousand  years.  Not  having 
such  an  instrument,  he  protests  that  we  must  not  decide 
against  mutation,  and  solemnly  avers  that  the  evidence  is 
there,  if  we  could  only  see  it.  But  we  cannot  see  it,  and, 
by  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  never  can.  Such  an  argu- 
ment is  unworthy  of  an  earnest,  candid  truth-seeker. 
Indeed,  it  has  the  appearance  of  a  mere  makeshift. 

But,  again,  natural  selection  requires  too  much  time  to 
perform  its  work.  A  thousand  years  is  but  an  hour  in  its 
calendar.  It  must  have  taken  millions  of  years  to  pass, 
for  instance,  from  any  one  of  Professor  Haeckel's  twenty- 
one  development  steps  to  the  next  succeeding  one.  But 
astronomers  and  physicists  tell  us  that  the  habitable  period 
of  the  earth  cannot  have  exceeded  10,000,000  or  12,000,000 
years.  And  their  conclusions,  based  upon  the  earth's  in- 
ternal heat,  the  tidal  retardation,  and  the  temperature  of 
the  sun,  must  be  approximately  correct.  But  this  period 
is  far  too  short  for  natural  selection.  Physical  astronomy 
has  stubbornly  set  itself  in  the  very  pathway  of  terrestial 
evolution. 

(4)  Natural  Selection  is  Inconsistent  with  Itself. 

Darwin  and  others  insist  that  natural  selection  pre- 
serves beneficial  variations,  and  just  as  surely  *' destroys 
needless   and  injurious  variations."     Let    it   be  granted 


266  CHRISTIAN'    THEISM, 

that  natural  selection  has  the  wisdom  to  discover  and  the 
power  to  preserve  every  useful  variation, — it  matters  not 
how.  Even  then,  organic  changes  would  be  impossible. 
For  every  new  organ  would  be  a  useless  thing,  and 
natural  selection  must  promptly  strangle  it  in  its  infancy, 
when  as  yet  it  was  millions  of  years  away  from  that  stage 
of  development  which  would  enable  it  to  be  of  any  service. 
Take  the  organ  of  vision  for  example.  At  first  it  is  a 
mere  localized  chemical  disturbance.  And  then  a  faint 
sensitiveness  to  the  light,  but  giving  no  vision.  Now  such 
a  change  could  evidently  be  of  no  possible  advantage  to 
the  animal  in  which  it  might  occur.  On  the  contrary,  it 
must  tend  to  his  uneasiness  and  confusion.  Instead  of 
being  supported,  therefore,  and  preserved,  it  must  be 
aborted  at  once. 

The  incipient  wing  of  a  bird  could  not  perform  its 
function,  and  must,  on  the  same  principle,  be  promptly 
destroyed. 

The  tongue  of  the  woodpecker,  that  ingenious  contriv- 
ance which  enables  it  to  find  and  fasten  its  prey,  could 
never  have  been  developed  by  natural  selection.  Its  first 
incipient  elongation  must  have  been  checked  as  a  useless 
encumbrance.  And  the  same  is  true  of  very  many  of  the 
important  organs  which  animals  now  possess.  It  is  diffi- 
cult even  to  imagine  how  they  could  ever  have  been 
acquired  by  natural  selection.  The  doctrine  of  develop- 
ment by  this  method  is  lacking  in  coherence  and  self- 
consistency. 

(5)   Certain  Reciprocal  Organs  are  in   the    Way   of  Natural 

Selection. 

These  are  of  two  kinds:  those  found  in  the  same  organ- 
ism, and  those  in  different  organisms.     Of  the  first  class, 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM.  267 

the  poisonous  fangs  of  serpents  furnish  a  good  example. 
This  weapon  comprises  two  distinct  elements :  the  vesicle 
which  contains  the  poison,  and  the  tubular  fang  by  which 
it  is  projected  into  an  enemy.  Now,  which  element  was 
developed  first?  Whichever  it  was  must  have  been  use- 
less without  the  other,  and  so  must  have  perished. 

Perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  the  second  class  is  to  be 
found  in  the  genital  organs  of  all  bi-sexual  animals. 
These  organs  cannot  be  developed  by  use,  for  their  use 
presupposes  their  development.  Furthermore,  they  could 
not  be  evolved  for  purposes  of  individual  utility,  for  they 
exist  in  different  animals  and  are  both  useless  and  injuri- 
ous to  the  separate  organisms  which  possess  them.  Their 
only  utility  is  found  in  the  persistent  preservation  of  the 
species.  But  natural  selection,  which  makes  the  individ- 
ual every  thing  and  the  species  nothing,  cannot  develop 
them  or  even  endure  them.  Indeed,  this  whole  matter  of 
sex  is  an  element  of  weakness  to  the  individual,  and  those 
animals  in  whom  its  first  tendencies  were  developed  must, 
according  to  the  hypothesis  of  natural  selection,  have  in- 
variably gone  down  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Natural 
selection  fails  to  explain  the  universal  fact  of  sex,  or  even 
to  agree  with  it. 

(6)    The  Limit  of  Variability  is  Fatal  to  Natural  Selection. 

Professor  Haeckel's  doctrine  that  the  '*  variability  of 
the  organism  is  limited  to  the  type  of  its  phylum  or  tribe," 
is  certainly  suicidal. 

In  the  first  place,  who  established  this  ''  inalienable 
type  "  ?  And  when,  and  how  ?  Then  if  it  were  estab- 
lished, how  could  natural  selection  ever  originate  a  new 
type  ?  Surely  the  monern  was  not  so  handicapped,  or  it 
never  could  have   varied    into   a  sponge.     Nor  was  the 


268  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

sponge,  else  all  would  have  been  sponges  to  this  day.  If  the 
higher  orders  cannot  transcend  their  bounds,  neither  could 
the  lower  orders.  If  a  tree  cannot  branch  at  the  top,  neither 
could  it  branch  at  the  bottom.  If  animal  types  are  now 
inalienable,  as  Professor  Haeckel  expressly  states,  then 
they  must  always  have  be^n  inalienable.  Natural  Selection 
is  hopelessly  destroyed  by  its  own  advocates. 

(7)  Artificial  Breeding  Gives  Little  Comfort  to  Natural  Selection. 

Varieties  of  plants  and  animals  quite  distinct  from  one 
another  have  been  produced  by  mating  individuals  pe- 
culiarly developed.  Dove-cote  pigeons,  for  example,  have 
thus  been  varied  into  carriers,  fantails,  tumblers,  and 
pouters.  The  argument  is,  that  if  man  can  do  so  much 
in  a  short  time,  nature,  in  an  indefinitely  longer  period,  can 
produce  all  manner  of  new  species  imaginable.  Against 
this  inference  there  are  several  weighty  objections. 

(a)  Man  produces  his  effects  by  arbitrary  will. 

But,  according  to  mechanical  evolution,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  intelligent  will-power  in  nature. 

{U)  Artificial  Breeding  is  contrary  to  nature. 

It  operates  for  the  good,  not  of  the  varieties  bred,  but 
of  the  man  who  breeds  them.  What  the  man  gains,  the 
varied  animal  or  plant  loses.  The  natural  type  is  stronger 
and  always  prevails.  Developed  varieties  of  pigeons, 
when^reed  from  the  hand  of  man,  invariably  return  to 
the  natural  type  of  the  dove-cote.  Weeds  invariably 
choke  out  the  finest  plants  and  flowers  of  the  garden. 

{c)  The  mechanical  evolutionist  cannot  pass  from  the 
operations  of  man  to  those  of  nature./  Natural  phe- 
nomena, in  which  he  admits  nothing  but  mechanism, 
must  not  be  compared  with  the  conscious,  voluntary,  in- 
telligent action  of  man.     And  hence, 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN   THEISM.  269 

[d')  Even  if  man,  by  artificial  breeding,  should  be  able 
to  produce  hundreds  of  new  species,  that  fact  would  give 
no  proof  whatever  of  nature's  ability  to  produce  a  sin- 
gle one. 

The  entire  hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  species  by 
Natural  Selection  is  beset  with  troublesome  difficulties. 

4.    REVERSIONS    AND    RUDIMENTARY    ORGANS. 

Individual  animals  sometimes  show  exceptional  peculi- 
arities of  structure  which  belonged  to  some  ancestor 
many  generations  back.  This  fact  Mr.  Darwin  calls 
reversion,  and  attempts  to  explain  by  his  famous  *'  gem- 
mule  "  theory.  This  theory  supposes  that  free,  minute 
atoms,  called  gemmules,  remain  in  the  blood,  are  trans- 
mitted in  a  dormant  state  to  successive  generations,  and 
finally  show  themselves  in  the  production  of  reversions. 
He  states  that  this  can  be  done  after  *'  characters  have 
disappeared  during  scores  or  hundreds  or  even  thousands 
of  generations." 

This  explanation  is  not  a  good  one.  In  the  first  place 
it  depends  upon  atoms,  whose  origin,  and  whose  existence 
€ven,  are  uncertain.  Herbert  Spencer  well  says  that 
^*  the  genesis  of  an  atom  is  no  easier  to  conceive  than 
that  of  a  planet."  The  Atomic  Theory  may  do  very  well 
as  a  working  hypothesis  in  physical  science,  but  it  cannot 
furnish  an  ultimate  philosophical  explanation  of  any 
thing.  Then,  again,  these  dormant  gemmules,  unlike  all 
other  atoms,  are  points  of  passive  rest,  and  not  of 
active  force.  But,  v/orst  of  all,  they  are  expected,  in  the 
outcome,  to  do  a  work  which  is  inconceivably  great. 
Mr.  Darwin  allows  them  to  revert  after  thousands  of 
generations.  To  be  rhoderate,  assume  the  lapse  of  one 
hundred  generations  only,  and  the  gemmules  of  a  given 


270  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

ancestor,  still  remaining  in  the  organism,  would  be  one 
out  of  672,087,865,219,477,713,800,122,073,088— nearly 
seven  hundred  octillions.  It  is  simply  inconceivable  that 
one  should  overcome  such  a  multitude  of  its  equals,  and 
so  revert  to  the  ancestral  type.  It  is  far  more  probable 
that  these  so-called  reversions  are  produced  by  the  recur- 
rence of  similar  external  causes.  But  if  so,  they  furnish 
no  proof  of  evolution. 

The  argument  from  rudimentary  organs  is  scarcely  less 
doubtful.  The  evolutionist  claims  that  a  creature  pos- 
sessing such  organs  has  descended  from  ancestors  in 
whom  these  organs  were  perfect,  but  that  by  disuse  they 
were  slowly  atrophied,  and  became  rudimentary  as  we 
now  see  them.  The  theory  of  animal  descent  and  mutation 
of  species  is  supposed  to  be  thereby  established.  Against 
this  argument  two  forcible  objections  may  be  urged. 

(1)7/"  True^  It  is  Valueless. 
Let  it  be  granted  that  certain  animals  have  lost  organs 
possessed  by  their  ancestors,  and  that  this  loss  has  been 
caused  by  disuse.  This  admission  is  of  no  value  to  Evo- 
lution. The  ability  to  lose  an  organ  under  natural  pro- 
cesses by  no  means  implies  the  ability  to  gain  a  new 
organ  under  natural  processes.  Because  the  fish  of 
Mammoth  Cave  have  lost  their  eyes  in  the  darkness,  is 
no  reason  that  they  could  regain  them  in  the  light.  The 
fact  that  the  assassin  has  taken  a  man's  life  must  not  be 
urged  to  prove  that  he  can  likewise  restore  it.  Even  so 
the  degradation  or  retrogression  of  animal  organism  throws 
no  light  whatever  on  the  possibility  of  its  evolution. 

(2)  It  is  Possibly  Not  True. 
The    supposition    that    an    animal,    having  a    useful 
organ,  should  systematically  and  persistently  avoid  using 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM,  2^} 

It,  is  immensely  improbable.  That  the  boa-constrictor, 
having  a  good  pair  of  legs,  should  stubbornly  refuse  to 
use  them  until  they  are  degraded  into  spurs  ;  that  the 
three-toed  horse  should  persistently  stand  on  one  toe 
until  the  others  disappear ;  and  that  the  Greenland 
whale,  having  been  a  land  animal,  and  having  taken  to 
the  water,  should  obtusely  refuse  to  use  its  hind  legs  for 
swimming  and  keep  heroically  flourishing  its  useless  tail 
until,  after  thousands  of  generations,  the  legs  drop  off  and 
the  tail  develops  into  proportions  of  utiHty  and  strength  ; 
— these  statements,  and  such  as  these,  unsupported  by  a 
single  fact  in  proof,  are  too  improbable  either  to  induce 
belief  or  to  command  respect.  The  products  of  a  fruitful 
fancy  must  not  be  mistaken  for  the  facts  of  science  or  the 
principles  of  philosophy. 

5.    ANATOMICAL    RESEMBLANCES. 

Comparative  Anatomy  establishes  the  fact  that  the 
various  types  of  animal  structure — man  included — have 
many  and  striking  resemblances;  and  that  corresponding 
organs  in  different  types  are  modified  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  various  functions  to  be  performed.  The  evo- 
lutionist argues  that  family  likeness  proves  a  common  par- 
entage, and  that,  therefore,  this  '*  animal  affiliation  "  shows 
that  all  animals  must  have  come  originally  from  the  same 
parent  stock.  This  argument  is  based  on  fact,  is  reason- 
able, and  certainly  has  some  weight.  And  yet  it  is  not 
conclusive.  The  theist  may  grant  that  this  similarity  of 
structure  points  to  a  common  origin  ;  but  he  may  find 
that  common  origin  in  a  conscious,  intelligent  Creator, 
rather  than  an  unconscious,  material  organism.  Products 
of  the  same  mind,  whether  human  or  divine,  may  be  sup- 
posed to  be  alike.    The  masterpieces  of  Raphael,  Rubens, 


2/2  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

and  Michael  Angelo  bear  the  impress  of  their  authorship. 
Compositions  of  Mozart,  Beethoven,  and  Wagner,  and 
passages  from  Milton,  Dante,  Shakespeare,  and  Goethe, 
are  readily  distinguishable.  Even  so,  if  God  created  the 
existing  species,  either  at  once  or  successively,  he  need 
not  have  separated  them  by  an  impassable  typical  gulf. 
Probably  he  would  not  have  so  separated  them.  Certainly 
he  would  not,  if  it  was  any  part  of  his  creative  design  to 
enable  his  intelligent  creatures  to  trace,  in  animate  nature, 
the  purposeful  tokens  of  his  handiwork.  The  prevalent 
fact  of  typical  form  gives  evidence  of  an  intelligent  plan 
in  nature,  whether  executed  at  once  or  successively.  But 
this  conclusion  gives  no  aid  to  the  theory  of  Mechanical 
Evolution. 

6.     GEOLOGICAL    DEPOSITS. 

The  testimony  of  the  rocks  concerning  Evolution  is 
too  long  and  complicated  to  be  discussed,  or  even  tran- 
scribed, in  this  place.  It  may  be  said  in  general  that  the 
oldest  fossils,  found  in  the  Laurentian  and  Cambrian  sys- 
tems, are  favorable  to  Evolution.  And  later  formations 
have  many  facts  of  like  import.  But  there  are  other 
facts  to  the  contrary.  In  the  Silurian  rocks  we  find 
actinizoa  side  by  side  with  cuttle-fish,  which  are  nearly 
allied  to  the  vertebrates.  Spiders,  first  found  in  the  car- 
boniferous rocks,  ought  to  appear  much  earlier.  P'ossils, 
in  the  form  of  man,  have  a  cranial  capacity  quite  up  to 
that  of  the  human  race  to-day.  Virchow  says,  indeed,  that 
the  average  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  fossil.  Such  facts 
as  these,  of  which  there  are  many,  are  directly  opposed 
to  the  theory  of  Evolution  by  natural  selection.  But  this 
subject  must  not  be  disqiissed  without  a  passing  reference 
to    Professor    Huxley's    famous   horse   argument.      The 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM.  273 

professor  claims  to  have  shown,  upon  geological  evidence, 
that  the  horse  of  our  day  has  been  evolved  from  the 
Hipparion  of  the  Pliocene  age,  and  that  animal,  in  turn, 
from  the  Anchitherium  of  preceding  ages.  The  evolu- 
tion of  species  is  supposed  to  be  thereby  firmly  estab- 
lished. Against  the  force  of  this  argument  the  following 
objections  have  been  properly  brought : 

(i)  "There  are  remains  of  the  horse  in  the  Upper 
Miocene  period,  which  resemble  in  nearly  every  respect 
the  horse  which  to-day  runs  wild  in  Asia  and  Africa." 

(2)  "  There  are  remains  of  the  hipparion  found  in  the 
same  deposit  as  the  horse,  viz.,  in  the  Upper  Miocene." 

(3)  "  Now  this  proves  that  the  hipparion  could  not 
have  been  the  ancestor  of  the  horse.  For,  according  to 
the  hypothesis  of  evolution,  there  must  have  been  many 
intermediate  stages." 

(4)  "  The  remains  of  the  anchitherium  are  found  only 
in  the  Lower  Miocene;  so  that  there  is  a  wider  gap  be- 
tween it  and  the  hipparion  than  between  the  latter  and 
the  horse." 

Subsequent  discoveries  have  cleared  away  most  of  these 
difficulties.  But  Professor  Huxley's  announced  "demon- 
stration "  illustrates  a  strong  and  illogical  tendency  on  the 
part  of  some  naturalists  to  translate  an  inference  or  even 
an  expectation  into  the  language  of  certainty. 

All  the  arguments  in  favor  of  Mechanical  Evolution 
are  found,  upon  candid  examination,  to  be  beset  with 
obstacles  great  in  number,  and  insuperable  in  character. 

In  answer  to  the  question  at  the  head  of  this  section, 
and  in  accordance  with  the  evidence  submitted,  the  ver- 
dict must  go  against  the  Mechanical  Evolutionist.  He 
has  not  made  out  his  case. 


2/4  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

SECTION  II. 
IS  EVOLUTION  ANTI-THEISTIC? 

There  are  two  theories  concerning  God,  and  only  two, 
between  which  the  Mechanical  Evolutionist  must  choose. 
First,  he  may  hold  that  matter  and  force  are  eternal  and 
that  there  is  no  God.  This  is  atheism.  Second,  he  may 
hold  that  there  is  a  God,  that  he  created  matter  and  en- 
dowed it  at  the  beginning  with  self-moving  power  to 
evolve  the  cosmos,  and  that,  with  this  one  creative  act, 
he  retired  forever  from  the  universe.  This  is  deism.  But 
it  is  not  Theism.  It  relegates  the  Deity,  as  an  "  absentee 
God,"  to  realms  of  obscurity  and  inaction.  It  projects 
him  into  the  fathomless  abyss  of  past  eternity,  forever 
beyond  the  possible  knowledge  of  man. 

This  view,  it  is  asserted,  enhances  the  power,  wisdom, 
and  dignity  of  God.  The  mechanical  evolutionist  reminds 
us  that  a  good  watchmaker  is  not  obliged  to  keep  tinker- 
ing with  his  chronometer,  but  makes  it  so  it  will  run  itself. 
And  so  the  Creator,  in  constructing  this  immense  cosmical 
watch  we  call  the  universe,  did,  at  the  very  beginning, 
wind  up  each  individual  atom  contained  therein,  so  com- 
pletely and  so  divinely,  that  it  has  been  keeping  the  most 
accurate  time  ever  since.  Now  this  theory  of  cosmogony 
views  God  as  voluntarily  cutting  himself  off  from  all 
possible  communion  or  display  of  affection  toward  his 
human  creatures,  who  alone,  of  all  the  works  of  his  hands,  he 
knew  would  need  his  presence  and  yearn  after  his  love. 
Such  a  method  may  exhibit  a  certain  dignity  of  power, 
but  it  comports  not  with  wisdom  or  goodness.  That 
monarch  who  wantonly  neglects  the  highest  interests  of 
his  subjects,  and  that  father  who  willingly  leaves  his 
child    in    enforced  and  perpetual   ignorance  of    his  own 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN    THEISM,  275 

existence  and  paternal  regard,  may  be  powerful  indeed, 
but  must  be  fatally  lacking  in  those  moral  elements  which 
are  superior  to  any  amount  of  mere  physical  power,  even 
as  mind  is  superior  to  matter.  Deistical  philosophy, 
whatever  its  source,  can  never  commend  the  Deity  to  the 
intelligence  or  the  affection  of  humanity.  The  theist  can- 
not find  his  God  in  star-dust.  His  moral  personality  is 
gone.  But  again.  Mechanical  Evolution  destroys  the 
personality  of  man.  If  there  is  essentially  nothing  more 
in  man  than  in  primordial  atoms,  then  man  has  no  more 
personality  than  the  atoms.  A  man  of  snow,  or  of  clay, 
or  of  plaster,  has  no  personality.  If  nature  has  patiently 
and  ingeniously  fashioned  a  man-of-clay,  we  may  name 
him  Alexander,  Buddha,  or  Jesus  Christ,  but  that  does 
not  make  him  a  real  man.  He  is  only  a  lump  of  clay 
after  all.  Thus  is  man's  personality  blotted  out.  But  so 
also  is  God's  personality.  If  man  be  not  a  personal 
being,  there  is  no  evidence  that  God  is.  If  there  is 
nothing  but  forms  of  matter  in  the  created  universe,  there 
is  no  evidence  of  a  Personal  Spirit  beyond  it. 

Mechanical  Evolution,  the  type  herein  discussed,  while 
neither  atheistic  nor  anti-deistic,  is  anti-theistic  beyond  a 
doubt.  The  theist  may  safely  dismiss  it  as  a  hostile  but 
harmless  theory,  with  neither  proof  nor  probability  in  its 
favor. 

A  word  may  be  said,  however,  concerning  other  possible 
types  of  Evolution.  Nearly  all  the  objections  heretofore 
mentioned  lie,  not  so  much  against  Evolution,  as  against 
this  mechanical  form  of  it.  Nature  is  not  a  machine,  for  it 
is  plastic,  progressive,  improvable,  while  a  machine  is 
neither  of  these.  Matter  may  reveal  higher  and  still 
higher  forms  of  organism,  but  can  never  create  them. 
Matter,  motion,  and  force,  without  a  directive  idea,  can 


276  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

do  nothing  toward  explaining  a  rationally  developed  uni- 
verse. But  why  exclude  a  creative  and  directive  idea? 
Let  that  idea  be  God.  There  is  not  a  single  fact  in 
nature  against  the  existence  of  a  personal  God,  or  the 
occurrence  of  an  act  of  creation.  There  are  many  facts  in 
favor  of  both.  Why  not  admit  that  God  made  the 
world  and  sustains  it  in  being?  That  admission  would 
not  blot  out  Evolution,  but  would  view  it  as  a  possible^ 
or,  it  may  be,  probable,  method  of  God's  creative  and 
providential  work.  The  question  would  then  be,  not 
"  Evolution  versus  Creation,"  but  "  Evolution,  the  method 
of  Creation." 

The  cosmos  may  be  reasonably  viewed  as  evolving 
under  the  hand  of  Deity,  with  such  new  accretions  from 
time  to  time  as  the  evolving  forms  may  be  prepared  ta 
receive.  This  view  does  not  compel  us  to  get  life  out  of 
death,  mind  out  of  matter,  spirit  and  rationality  out  of 
instinct,  something  out  of  nothing,  as  does  the  theory 
heretofore  considered.  It  leaves  the  Deity  free  to  add 
these  elements  in  his  own  good  time.  And  it  admits 
with  equal  freedom  the  affiliation  of  material  organisms, 
the  testimony  of  the  rocks,  and  all  other  facts — of  which 
there  are  many — that  point  toward  some  manner  of 
development. 

At  the  same  time  it  admits  another  and  vastly  more 
important  class  of  facts — those  of  man's  rational,  ethical, 
and  religious  nature.  If  God  is  over  this  world  and  in  it 
and  through  it,  creating,  developing,  upholding  all,  then 
these  facts  are  easily  explained.  But  if  he  has  been  inert 
and  absent  since  the  creation  of  atoms,  these  facts  are 
utterly  inexplicable.  The  divine  origin  of  the  Bible,  the 
fall  of  man,  the  divinity  of  Christ,  miracles,  the  new  birth, 
and  the  efficacy  of  prayer,  must  all  be  rejected  from  the 


EVOLUTION  AND   CHRISTIAN   THEISM,  277 

mechanical  evolutionist's  creed,  as  mistaken  Hebrew 
myths.  More  than  this.  The  very  existence  and  uni- 
versality of  man's  religious  nature  is  a  tantalizing  puzzle 
to  him.  If  there  be  no  God,  or  if  he  be  forever  the 
Unknowable,  why  should  these  curious  and  numerous 
aggregations  of  dust  familiarly  known  as  human  souls  be 
so  persistently  and  irrationally  determined  to  find  him, 
know  him,  commune  with  him,  and  enjoy  him  forever? 

The  truth  is,  that  the  mechanical  theory  of  Evolution, 
while  recognizing  certain  important  facts  in  the  material 
world,  ignores  the  higher  and  profounder  facts  in  the 
realm  of  mind  and  spirit.  It  is  therefore  neither  sound 
philosophy  nor  true  science.  For  true  science  never 
rejects  a  fact  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

But  that  modified  kind  of  Theistic  Evolution  which 
would  seem,  from  ever>'  standpoint,  to  be  the  better 
philosophy,  can  recognize  and  interpret  all  the  facts, 
material,  organic,  rational,  and  spiritual.  The  Christian 
theist  has  no  controversy  with  Evolution  per  se,  but 
against  those  forms  of  mechanical  and  materialistic 
thought  with  which  it  is  so  often  and  so  suspiciously 
associated,  he  declares  eternal  war. 

REFERENCES : 

Schmid's  "  Theories  of  Darwin." 

Hall's  "Problem  of  Human  Life." 

"  Victoria  Institute  Pamphlets." 

McCosh's  "  First  and  Fundamental  Truths." 


CHAPTER  IX. 

IMMORTALITY. 

MAN  universally  believes  that  he  is  immortal.  This 
conviction  is  both  intellectual  and  emotional, 
both  philosophic  and  religious.  Theoretically  it  is  not 
necessary  to  Theology.  The  science  of  God  may  be  logi- 
cally complete  without  including  the  immortality  of  man. 
In  emotional  and  religious  force,  however,  the  doctrines 
of  God  must  lose  immeasurably  if  divorced  from  the  belief 
that  man  is  immortal.  If  death  ends  all  for  me,  it  mat- 
ters little  what  may  be  the  character  of  God,  or,  indeed, 
whether  there  be  any  God  at  all.  If  there  be  no  life  of 
holiness  beyond,  then  why  should  I  strive  to  learn  the 
ways  of  holiness  here?  If  on  my  purified  vision  the 
dawn  of  no  immortal  day  shall  ever  rise,  then  why  should 
I  resolutely  close  my  eyes  to  the  allurements  of  the  flesh? 
If  I  am  born  to  be  tantalized  for  a  brief  space  by  the 
animalism  beneath  me  and  the  divinity  above  me,  and 
then  to  perish  forever,  what  care  I  to  know  any  thing  of 
God  or  of  his  ways?  But,  on  the  contrary,  if  I  am  to 
survive  this  earthly  struggle,  to  fulfil  an  immortal  des- 
tiny, to  bear  the  image  of  the  Divine,  to  see  God  and 
enjoy  him  forever,  with  what  rational  delight  will  I  study 
his  character  and  hasten  to  obey  his  holy  will. 

The  doctrine  of  Immortality  being  thus  practically 
involved  in  Theism,  must  not  be  entirely  omitted  from  its 
discussion. 

278 


IMMOR  TALIT  V.  2/9 

SECTION  I. 

PRESUMPTIONS  AGAINST   IMMORTALITY. 
I.     PHYSICAL    DESTRUCTION. 

Death  destroys  the  body.  The  soul  is  not  traceable 
thereafter.  Hence  it  has  been  argued  that  all  is  destroyed 
with  the  body.     This  argument  is  not  conclusive. 

(i)  Disappearance  is  Not  Destruction. 

A  thing  may  exist  and  not  be  manifest.  It  may  cease 
to  be  manifest  without  being  destroyed.  Latent  heat  is 
just  as  much  heat  when  latent  as  when  manifest.  Even  so 
death  may  interrupt  the  visible  manifestations  of  the 
human  spirit,  but  its  destruction  must  not  be  thence 
inferred. 

{2)  Bodily  Mutilation  Affects  Not  the  Soul. 

Limbs  may  be  amputated,  physical  functions  cut  off, 
and  senses  suspended,  and  still  the  operations  of  the  soul 
may  proceed  with  unabated  regularity,  and  even  with 
increased  vigor.  If  the  partial  destruction  of  the  body 
does  not  affect  the  soul,  its  total  destruction  may  not. 

(3)  The  Soul  may  Not  be  Divisible. 
The  body  is.  It  can  be  returned  to  its  original  ele- 
ments— carbon,  nitrogen,  hydrogen,  iron,  and  the  like. 
Hence  its  mortality  ;  it  can  die.  But  there  is  no  evidence 
that  the  human  spirit  is  composed  of  parts,  or  is  in  any 
wise  divisible.  Possibly  Bishop  Butler  may  go  too  far  in 
arguing  its  absolute  indiscerptibility  ;  and  yet  the  unity 
of  the  human  spirit  is  accredited  both  by  universal  con- 
sciousness and  by  profound  metaphysical  research.  Until 
the  soul  can  be  analyzed  as  the  body  can,  it  will  not  do  to 
infer  the  destruction  of  the  one  from  the  decomposition 
of  the  other. 


28o  CHRISTIAN    THEISM, 

2.    PHYSICAL    DEPENDENCE. 

It  is  claimed  that  the  soul  is  born  with  the  body,  de- 
veloped with  it,  manifested  through  it,  limited  by  it, 
dependent  upon  it,  inseparable  from  it ;  and  hence  the 
soul  must  perish  with  the  body.  Against  this  argument 
there  are  two  objections. 

( I )  //  is  Contrary  to  Analogy. 

It  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that  the  present 
fleshly  environment  of  the  soul  is  its  only  possible  habitat. 
But  the  analogies  of  nature  are  against  this  view.  The 
caterpillar,  chrysalis,  and  butterfly  are  marvellously  unlike 
in  development,  mode  of  life,  and  relationship  ;  and  yet 
they  are  one  and  the  same  being.  So  the  life  of  the  dis> 
embodied  human  spirit  may  be  totally  unlike  that  in  its 
earthly  tabernacle,  even  as  the  butterfly  transcends  the 
worm. 

(2)   The  Soul  is  Not  Essentially  Dependent  on  the  Body. 

For  certain  of  its  functions  in  sense-perception,  it 
doubtless  is.  But  for  other  and  higher  functions,  such  as. 
memory,  imagination,  thought,  and  reason,  the  soul  acts 
of  itself  without  the  body.  These  processes  would  ix)t 
cease,  even  though  the  senses  were  paralyzed,  and  all 
communication  with  the  material  world  suspended. 

3.    EMPIRICISM. 

The  empiricist  argues  that,  since  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  is  utterly  beyond  our  experience,  and  since  no  disem- 
bodied spirit  has  ever  appeared  or  testified  to  its  truth, 
we  have  a  right  to  infer  that  the  soul  is  not  immortaL 
This  position  is  not  well  taken. 

(i)  It  is  Unreasonable. 

It  demands  physical  proof  of  a  spiritual  fact.  And 
because  of  the  absence  of  such  proof,  it  denies  the  exist- 
ence of  the  fact. 


IMMORTALITY.  28 1 

(2)  //  Goes  Too  Far. 
If  our  lack  of  experience  concerning  disembodied  human 
spirits  forms  a  presumption  against  their  existence,  it  must 
go  equally  against  that  of  other  spirits.  The  same  argu- 
ment that  would  disprove  immortality  would  likewise 
blot  out  God,  angels,  and  devils.  But  in  blotting  out  God 
it  renders  the  first  existence  of  human  spirits  impossible, 
and  thus  merges  itself  into  materialism.  Experience  is 
not  the  only  avenue  of  conviction.  If  we  know  the  soul 
to  be  superior  to  the  body,  even  while  connected  with  it, 
why  may  not  that  superior  existence  continue  when  the 
body  shall  have  been  dissolved  ? 


SECTION  II. 
ARGUMENTS  FROM  THE  HUMAN  SIDE. 

All  reasonable  presumptions  against  immortality  may 
be  readily  and  fairly  answered.  But  this  is  not  enough. 
Positive  arguments  in  its  favor  must  be  adduced.  There 
are  many  such  arguments.  A  goodly  number  of  them 
may  be  drawn  from  the  very  character  of  the  human 
constitution. 

Before  discussing  them,  a  single  caution  must  be  ob- 
served. It  is  this.  Physical  science  has  nothing  to  say 
concerning  the  immortal  life.  It  deals  with  the  life  of  the 
flesh,  and  with  that  alone.  It  gives  conclusive  testimony 
concerning  the  embodied  spirit.  But  of  its  disembodied 
state,  if  it  have  such  a  state,  physical  science  has  no  testi- 
mony to  give.  Its  operations  are  properly  confined  to 
material  phenomena.  If  this  evident  truth  be  borne  in 
mind,  it  will  guard  us  against  two  possible  errors  : 

First.  It  will  prevent  us  from  asking  or  expecting  physi- 
cal science  to  furnish  any  proof  of  the  soul's  immortality. 
Manifestly  every  such  expectation  is  unreasonable. 


282  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

Second.  If  physical  science  should  forget  herself,  and 
assert  that,  inasmuch  as  she  finds  no  evidence  of  the  future 
life,  therefore  there  can  be  no  future  life,  then  this  reasona- 
ble caution  will  prevent  an  over-estimate  of  such  a  state- 
ment. It  will  assure  us  that  all  such  assertions  are  mere 
assumptions,  that  in  making  them  science  is  leaving  her 
own  appropriate  sphere  of  knowledge,  and  assuming  to 
speak  where  she  knows  nothing,  and  that  any  utterances 
she  may  be  pleased  to  volunteer  on  this  subject  cannot, 
by  the  nature  of  the  case,  have  any  possible  weight  in 
determining  the  question  of  immortality.  Let  these 
truths  be  kept  in  view  while  arguments  for  the  future  life 
are  being  drawn  from  the  constitution  of  man. 

I.    THE  HUMAN  ORGANISM  AFFORDS  A  PRESUMPTIVE  ARGUMENT. 

Man  is  the  highest  of  a  progressive  series  of  organic 
forms.  The  simpler  the  form,  the  more  evanescent  is  its 
life.  With  few  organs,  an  animal  form  has  little  corre- 
spondence to  its  environment,  and  hence  little  ability  to 
adapt  itself  thereto.  With  a  multiplication  of  organs, 
this  ability  increases,  and  the  period  of  individual  life  is 
correspondingly  lengthened.  A  man  may  outlive  a  thou- 
sand generations  of  the  simpler  organisms.  This  relation 
of  organism  to  environment  has  been  emphasized  by  the 
scientific  philosopher.  Herbert  Spencer  says  :  '*  Perfect 
correspondence  would  be  perfect  life.  Were  there  no 
changes  in  the  environment  but  such  as  the  organism  had 
adapted  changes  to  meet,  and  were  it  never  to  fail  in  the 
efficiency  with  which  it  met  them,  there  would  be  eternal 
existence  and  universal  knowledge."  Now  here  is  a  dis- 
tinct intimation  of  immortality,  from  a  purely  scientific 
standpoint.  For  its  realization,  only  two  things  are  need- 
ful :  a  perfect  environment  and  a  perfectly  adaptable  or- 


IMMORTALITY.  283 

ganism.  Apply  this  test  to  the  human  spirit.  It  is  not  a 
physical  organism  indeed ;  but  it  has  that  '*  unity  in 
complexity  "  which  involves  at  once  the  highest  possible 
unity  and  the  greatest  possible  complexity.  Nor  is  it 
perfect  ;  and  yet  it  approaches  a  state  of  perfection  which 
it  seems  plainly  capable  of  attaining.  If  such  perfection 
shall  be  attained  in  a  perfect  spirit-world  with  which  the 
disembodied  human  spirit  is  in  perfect  harmony,  and  in 
which,  by  reason  of  its  perfection,  no  harmful  changes  or 
'*  methanical  actions  "  can  ever  interrupt  the  processes  of 
the  finite  spirit,  then  Mr.  Spencer's  scientific  conditions 
of  immortality  will  be  fully  met. 

That  this  perfection  may  be  so  attained,  is  manifestly 
possible,  if  not  probable.  But  one  thing  seems  certain. 
The  human  organism  itself,  with  its  relative  complexity, 
adaptability,  and  longevity,  as  compared  with  lower  types 
on  the  one  side,  and  with  the  human  spirit  on  the  other, 
furnishes  a  strong  presumption,  at  least,  in  favor  of  the 
future  life  of  the  spirit. 

2.    THE  PRESENT  LIFE  IS  ONE  OF  PURPOSELESS  IMMATURITY. 

If  this  life  be  all,  there  is  nothing  in  it  to  justify  its 
existence,  its  growth,  or  its  trend.  The  soul  is  scarcely 
ready  for  its  fruitage  when  death  cuts  it  off.  If  there  be 
no  harvest  beyond,  then  all  is  fruitless  and  vain.  Death 
is  an  untimely  frost,  that  cuts  down  and  destroys  forever 
the  whole  garden  of  God.  There  is  nothing  left  to  the 
mind  but  the  burden  of  disappointing  toil,  nor  to  the 
heart  but  the  shock  of  broken  hopes. 

Neither  can  we  solace  ourselves  with  the  thought  of 
the  perpetuity  of  the  human  race.  The  race  is  nothing 
more  than  the  men  and  women  composing  it.  The 
boasted  '*  Grand-Etre  "  of  humanity  is  a  myth.     If  every 


284  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

individual  soul  is  to  go  out  in  darkness  and  death,  the 
mere  continuance  of  the  race  can  bring  no  relief.  On  the 
contrary,  it  adds  to  the  general  disaster.  Every  additional 
soul  but  increases  the  disappointing  vanity  of  life.  And 
so  the  very  multiplication  of  souls  becomes  a  huge  and 
horrifying  iniquity. 

Nor  can  we  find  comfort  in  the  intellectual  and  spiritual 
advancement  of  the  race.  The  grander  and  better  human 
life  becomes,  the  stronger  will  be  the  argument  for  its 
continuance,  and  the  keener  the  disappointment  in  its 
untimely  cutting  off.  If  such  a  life,  with  its  increased 
powers  and  hopes,  with  its  demonstrated  capacity  for  in- 
definite progress  in  virtue  and  happiness,  is  to  be  throttled 
at  the  very  birthplace  of  its  rational  existence  and  laid 
away  forever  in  the  grave,  surely  it  must  be  a  cruel 
Demon  who  presides  over  the  advancing  destinies  of  the 
race,  only  to  increase  the  poignancy  of  the  direful  disaster 
at  the  last.  If  the  toils  and  hopes  of  this  life  are  ever  to 
ripen  into  a  fruitful  harvest  for  the  soul,  that  harvest  must 
come  in  another  life  beyond.     It  is  not  garnered  here. 

3.    THE    MORAL    LAW    ARGUES    A    FUTURE    LIFE. 

By  moral  law  is  meant  that  code  of  ethics  which  is 
written,  in  ineffaceable  characters,  upon  the  tablet  of 
every  man's  heart.  It  is  that  law  which  binds  him  to  do 
good  and  eschew  evil ;  to  restrain  his  passions  and  malevo- 
lent desires,  and  cultivate  his  conscience  and  his  judgment ; 
to  sacrifice  pleasure  to  duty,  the  present  gratification  to  the 
future  good. 

Now  this  universal  law  means  a  universal  and  life-long 
struggle.  If  this  struggle  is  to  be  followed  by  enduring 
peace,  in  a  state  of  unalloyed  bliss  and  confirmed  virtue, 
then  the  struggle  itself  is  amply  justified  ;  for  surely  such 


I  MM  OR  TA  LITY.  28  5 

a  peace  is  worth  conquering  at  any  cost.  But  if  the 
struggle  is  to  end  in  utter  extinction,  it  is  worse  than 
vain  and  useless.  It  imposes  unmeaning  and  burdensome 
restraints,  it  carries  too  vast  a  sweep,  it  deceives  us  with 
lofty  promises  and  empty  threats.  It  vainly  attempts  the 
impossible  and  falsely  hides  its  own  failure.  If  death  ends 
all,  all  is  lost ;  and  the  moral  law  itself  is  the  most  ill- 
timed,  deceptive,  immoral  enactment  possible.  If  this 
prolonged  struggle  we  call  human  life  is  to  issue  in  eternal 
defeat,  then  it  is  immeasurably  worse  than  failure.  The 
unthinking  life  of  the  mere  animal  is  better.  And  this  is 
not  a  concession  to  animalism.  The  spiritual  life  is  in- 
deed superior  to  the  animal  life  ;  but  it  maintains  its 
superiority  by  virtue  of  its  hold  on  the  future,  in  which 
alone  its  vastness  of  sweep  and  fruition  are  to  be  found. 
If  that  is  gone,  all  is  gone.  If  there  be  no  future  life, 
then  it  were  tyranny  to  establish  the  moral  law,  and  moral 
madness  to  obey  it. 

4.  DEATH  DOES  NOT  EXHAUST  THE  POWERS  OF  THE  SOUL. 

It  does  exhaust  the  physical  life.  But  there  is  a 
spirit  in  man  which  outgrows  the  body  and  keeps  on  ex- 
panding and  strengthening,  even  after  the  physical  pow- 
ers begin  to  decay.  And  this  expansion  is  felt  to  be  but 
the  beginning.  When  the  body  dies,  the  spirit  is  just 
ready  to  live.  Its  highest  forces  take  hold  on  the  future. 
The  old  man  is  just  prepared  for  the  life  of  the  spirit. 
By  a  period  of  discipline  he  has  matured  his  faculties, 
subdued  his  passions,  enlarged  his  sympathies,  refined  his 
taste,  broadened  his  knowledge,  deepened  his  thought, 
purified  his  affections,  and  elevated  his  desires.  By  all 
these  things  is  the  human  spirit  brought  to  its  true  equi- 
poise  of  virtuous  attainment,  and  fitted  for  an  unending 


286  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

life  of  noble  activity  and  of  enduring  peace.  And  shall 
we  suppose  that  all  this  preparation  for  life  is  but  an 
empty  prelude  to  death,  that  all  this  gathered  light  is  to 
be  put  out  in  the  grave,  that  this  lofty  endeavor  after  the 
high  and  the  holy  is  to  be  lost  in  final  dissolution,  that 
the  ineffable  and  unconquerable  hope  of  an  immortal  life 
is  to  be  quenched  forever  in  the  tomb?  Shall  the  ani- 
mals even  have  time  to  round  out  their  lives  to  satiety, 
and  shall  man  alone  die  unsatisfied  ?  Shall  the  lower 
powers  be  nicely  adjusted  to  their  ends,  and  the  higher 
powers  never  find  adjustment  ?  Shall  intelligence  and 
spirituality,  with  their  longing  after  a  future  life  and  their 
conscious  ability  to  improve  and  enjoy  it  forever,  prove 
at  last  to  be  a  delusion  and  a  cheat  ?  Surely  these  pow- 
ers of  the  soul  in  their  present  development  do  not  indi- 
cate any  such  pitiful  future  of  oblivion  and  death.  The 
rather  do  they  point  to  that  broader  and  freer  life  where- 
in the  spirit,  having  finally  outrun  the  flesh,  shall  reach 
its  goal  and  wear  its  deathless  crown. 

5.    BELIEF   IN   IMMORTALITY  IS  UNIVERSAL  AMONG    SPIRITUALLY 
MINDED    MEN. 

The  best  thinkers,  though  they  may,  like  the  gifted 
Goethe,  be  without  any  realizing  religious  faith,  still 
agree  with  him  as  to  a  future  life.  Hear  what  he  says : 
"  I  should  be  the  very  last  man  to  be  willing  to  dispense 
with  faith  in  a  future  life.  Nay,  I  would  say,  with  Lo- 
renzo di  Medici,  that  all  those  are  dead,  even  for  the 
present  life,  who  do  not  believe  in  another.  I  have  a 
firm  conviction  that  our  soul  is  an  existence  of  an  inde- 
structible nature.  It  is  like  the  sun,  which  seems  indeed 
to  set,  but  really  never  sets,  shining  on  in  unchangeable 
splendor.** 


IMMOR  TA  LITY.  28/ 

This  is  the  common  conviction  of  all  men.  To  this 
statement  there  are  two  apparent  exceptions.  The  Hindu 
belief  in  Nirvana  forms  the  most  noteworthy  case.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  millions  of  devout  Hindu  worshippers 
have  included  in  their  religious  faith  the  belief  and  hope 
that  they  shall  finally  be  absorbed  in  Deity.  To  them, 
however,  this  thought  comes  not  as  the  stroke  of  annihi- 
lation, but  rather  as  the  gift  of  immortality.  Other 
men  cannot  so  regard  it ;  and  even  the  possibility  of  their 
doing  so  is  a  mystery  to  Western  thought.  Its  explana- 
tion, however,  is  to  be  found  in  their  imperfect  views  of 
personality,  both  human  and  Divine,  and  not  at  all  in 
their  denial  of  immortality. 

The  other  exception  is  found,  in  rare  cases,  among 
gifted  men,  who  in  all  ages  have  denied  or  doubted  the 
reality  of  the  future  life.  This  fact  will  be  explained 
under  the  next  topic.  Meanwhile  it  may  be  asserted  that 
the  belief  in  immortality  is  quite  as  universal  as  any 
other  belief  among  men.  Moreover,  it  is  among  the 
strongest  and  most  persistent  of  human  convictions. 
But  the  objector  may  ask  "■  What  of  that  ?  Are  the 
universality  and  strength  of  a  belief  to  be  taken  as  an 
argument  for  its  truth  ?  "  Certainly  they  are ;  and  if  not, 
then  the  most  fundamental  convictions  of  men  must  be 
rejected.  When  John  Stuart  Mill  intimates,  for  in- 
stance, that,  in  some  other  world,  two  and  two  may  not 
make  four,  the  best  and  only  answer  is  to  be  found  in  the 
universal  and  necessary  conviction  of  mankind  to  the 
contrary.  Even  so  man  believes  in  his  own  immortality, 
by  a  necessity  of  his  nature.  He  cannot  divest  himself  of 
this  conviction.  The  fact  that  he  exists  now,  is  all  the 
proof  he  asks  that  he  shall  always  exist.  He  cannot 
believe  in  his  own   non-existence  any  more  than  he  can 


288  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

believe  that  somewhere  two  and  two  might  make  five 
instead  of  four.  Now  this  universal  and  inexpugnable 
belief  is  a  fact  to  be  accounted  for.  It  is  best  explained 
when  taken  as  a  sure  token  of  the  reality  of  the  future 
life.  Otherwise,  our  most  profound  and  intimate  con- 
victions are  utterly  untrustworthy. 

6.     THE    VERY    REJECTION     OF     IMMORTALITY     BY    GIFTED    MEN 
IS    SOMETIMES    AN    ARGUMENT    IN    ITS    FAVOR. 

This  Statement  may  seem  contradictory.  Let  it  be 
explained.  The  fact  of  rejecting  a  belief  can,  in  no  wise, 
constitute  an  argument  in  favor  of  that  belief.  The 
exception  cannot  possibly  prove  the  rule, — a  silly  proverb 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  It  is  not  the  fact  of 
rejection,  but  the  manner  thereof,  that  furnishes  an 
argument  for  immortality.  If  great  and  good  men,  in  a 
few  cases,  have  given  up  this  belief,  their  concession  results 
from  one  of  two  causes:  either  an  abnormal  defect  in 
the  religious  nature,  or  the  adoption  of  some  false  system 
of  philosophy.  In  the  latter  case,  the  immortal  life  is 
yielded  with  the  greatest  reluctance,  and  only  at  the 
relentless  demand  of  empiricism,  agnosticism,  material- 
ism, or  some  other  one-sided  philosophy.  But  in  either 
case  the  man  who  denies  immortality  does  so  in  plain 
violation  of  his  better  nature,  and  thereby  gives  an  unin- 
tentional argument  in  favor  of  the  very  truth  he  denies. 

Perhaps  the  correctness  of  this  statement  cannot  be 
better  enforced  than  by  quoting  from  a  gifted  agnostic 
philosopher  of  modern  times.  After  concluding  from  the 
force  of  his  philosophy  that  there  is  no  adequate  evidence 
of  God  or  of  immortality,  he  closes  his  treatise  in  the 
following  words : 

"  And  now,  in  conclusion,  I  feel  it  desirable  to  state 


IMMORTALITY.  289 

that  any  antecedent  bias  with  regard  to  Theism  which  I 
individually  possess  is  unquestionably  on  the  side  of 
traditional  beliefs.  It  is  therefore  with  the  utmost 
sorrow  that  I  find  myself  compelled  to  accept  the  con- 
clusions here  worked  out  ;  and  nothing  could  have  in- 
duced me  to  publish  them  save  the  strength  of  my 
Conviction  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every  member  of 
society  to  give  his  fellows  the  benefit  of  his  labors  for 
whatever  they  may  be  worth.  Just  as  I  am  confident 
that  truth  must  in  the  end  be  most  profitable  for  the 
race,  so  I  am  persuaded  that  every  individual  endeavor 
to  attain  it,  provided  only  that  such  endeavor  is  unbiassed 
and  sincere,  ought,  without  hesitation,  to  be  made  the 
common  property  of  all  men,  no  matter  in  what  direction 
the  results  of  its  promulgation  may  appear  to  tend.  And 
so  far  as  the  ruination  of  individual  happiness  is  con- 
cerned, no  one  can  have  a  more  lively  perception  than 
myself  of  the  possibly  disastrous  tendency  of  my  work. 
So  far  as  I  am  individually  concerned,  the  result  of  this 
analysis  has  been  to  show  that,  whether  I  regard  the 
problem  of  Theism  on  the  lower  plane  of  strictly  relative 
probability,  or  on  the  higher  plane  of  purely  formal  con- 
siderations, it  equally  becomes  my  obvious  duty  to  stifle 
all  belief  of  the  kind  which  I  conceive  to  be  the  noblest, 
and  to  discipline  my  intellect  with  regard  to  this  matter 
into  an  attitude  of  the  purest  scepticism.  And  forasmuch 
as  I  am  far  from  being  able  to  agree  with  those  who 
affirm  that  the  twilight  doctrine  of  the  *  new  faith  '  is  a 
desirable  substitute  for  the  waning  splendor  of  '  the  old,' 
I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess  that  with  this  virtual  nega- 
tion of  God  the  universe  to  me  has  lost  its  soul  of  loveli- 
ness ;  and  although  from  henceforth  the  precept  to  *  work 
while  it  is  day'  will  doubtless  but  gain  an  intensified  force 


290  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

from  the  terribly  intensified  meaning  of  the  words  that 
*  the  night  cometh  when  no  man  can  work/  yet  when  at 
times  I  think,  as  think  at  times  I  must,  of  the  appalHng 
contrast  between  the  hallowed  glory  of  that  creed  which 
once  was  mine  and  the  lonely  mystery  of  existence  as  now 
I  find  it, — at  such  times  I  shall  ever  feel  it  impossible  to 
avoid  the  sharpest  pang  of  which  my  nature  is  susceptible. 
For  whether  it  be  due  to  my  intelligence  not  being  suffi- 
ciently advanced  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  age,  or 
whether  it  be  due  to  the  memory  of  those  sacred  associa- 
tions which  to  me  at  least  were  the  sweetest  that  life  has 
given,  I  cannot  but  feel  that  for  me,  and  for  others  who 
think  as  I  do,  there  is  a  dreadful  truth  in  those  words  of 
Hamilton — Philosophy  having  become  a  meditation  not 
merely  of  death,  but  of  annihilation,  the  precept  know 
thyself  \i^s  become  transformed  into  the  terrific  oracle  to 
CEdipus — '  Mayest  thou  ne'er  know  the  truth  of  what 
thou  art.'  " 

These  are  the  words  of  an  honest  doubter — the  piteous 
wail  of  a  soul  ruined  by  false  philosophy.  But  the  very 
greatness  of  the  ruin  they  disclose  only  serves  to  empha- 
size the  folly  of  rejecting  that  fundamental  belief  which 
binds  all  men  to  the  future  life. 

7.     IMMORTALITY    IS    THE     LAST     ARTICLE     IN     THE    NECESSARY 
RELIGIOUS    FAITH     OF    MANKIND. 

The  faith-faculty  insists  upon  the  existence  of  human 
spirits  and  a  Divine  Spirit.  But  this  creed  is  incomplete 
and  disappointing  without  a  third  article — the  immortal 
fellowship  of  spirits.  It  is  thus  that  faith,  the  highest 
possible  function  of  the  mind  and  heart,  gathers  the  best 
that  is  in  us  about  the  future  life  as  the  only  living  centre 
of  its  inspiration.     From  that  immortal  clime  the  clearest 


IMMORTALITY,  29I 

voices  of  duty  and  the  sweetest  voices  of  love  come 
thronging  into  our  hearts.  Heeding  their  kindly  words 
of  admonition,  comfort,  and  hope,  and  lifting  the  eye  of 
faith  above  the  horizon  of  sordid  sense  to  the  regions 
of  purity  beyond,  we  are  made  conscious  of  the  highest 
and  the  holiest  that  is  within  us,  and  are  filled  with  an 
unutterable  longing  to  become  meet  for  the  exalted  in- 
heritance to  which  we  are  called. 

Henry  Drummond,  speaking  on  this  subject,  and  argu- 
ing the  necessary  correspondence  of  the  soul  with  its 
future  environment,  says  :  "  The  quality  of  the  Eternal 
Life  alone  makes  the  heaven  ;  mere  everlastingness  might 
be  no  boon.  Even  the  brief  span  of  the  temporal  life  is 
too  long  for  those  who  spend  its  years  in  sorrow.  Many 
besides  Schopenhauer  have  secretly  regarded  conscious- 
ness as  the  hideous  mistake  and  malady  of  Nature. 
Therefore  we  must  not  only  have  quantity  of  years,  to 
speak  in  the  language  of  the  present,  but  quality  of 
correspondence.  When  we  leave  science  behind,  this 
correspondence  also  receives  a  higher  name.  It  becomes 
communion.  Other  names  there  are  for  it — religious  and 
theological.  It  may  be  included  in  a  general  expression, 
Faith ;  or  we  may  call  it  by  a  personal  or  specific  term, 
Love.  For  the  knowing  of  a  Whole  so  great  involves  the 
cooperation  of  many  parts." 

Eternal  communion  with  God — this  is  the  culmination 
and  resting-place  of  all  truly  spiritual  philosophy.  It 
may  not  be  uttered  in  the  measured  phrase  of  exact 
science ;  but  it  transcends  science,  and  speaks  to  the 
heart  in  the  clearest  possible  language  of  truth  and  duty 
and  love.  It  leads  to  the  noblest  life,  the  loftiest  thought 
and  feeling,  the  most  heroic  endeavor,  the  strongest  faith, 
and  the  purest  hope.     It  contradicts  not  a  single  fact  of 


292  CHRISTIAN   THEISM. 

material  science,  but  it  interprets,  harmonizes,  and  justi- 
fies the  otherwise  inexplicable  facts  of  human  life  and 
the  human  spirit.  It  unites  the  sublimest  thought  of  the 
mind  with  the  purest  sentiment  of  the  heart,  and  lays 
upon  both  the  enduring  blessing  of  Heaven.  Immortality 
is  the  final  leverage  in  the  grand  up-lift  of  the  human 
spirit. 

SECTION  III. 
ARGUMENTS  FROM  THE  DIVINE  SIDE. 

The  preceding  arguments  find  their  warrant  in  the  con- 
stitution of  man.  Bnt  they  are  not  the  only  possible 
proofs  of  immortality.  Another  and  entirely  distinct 
system  of  arguments  may  be  drawn  from  the  nature  of 
God.  Doubtless  the  best  argument  for  immortality  from 
the  God-ward  side  is  to  be  found  in  the  Word  and  work  of 
Jesus  Christ.  Natural  Theism  cannot  use  this  argument, 
however,  since  its  validity  plainly  depends  upon  the  fact 
of  a  Revelation.  And  yet,  without  opening  any  Book  of 
Revelation,  it  may  be  seen  that  the  Divine  Being  posses- 
ses attributes  which  demand  an  immortal  life  for  man. 
A  brief  compend  of  this  argument  for  immortality  from 
the  Divine  side,  as  usually  presented  by  theistic  writers, 
is  all  that  need  be  given  here. 

I.    THE    WISDOM    OF    GOD    REQUIRES   IT. 

If  we  believe  in  God  at  all,  we  must  believe  him  to  be 
a  Being  of  infinite  wisdom.  And  if  so,  all  he  does  must 
be  perfectly  wise.  Now,  the  creation  of  man  in  his  pres- 
ent environment  and  with  his  present  constitution,  is 
evidently  an  act  of  God,  no  matter  how  it  may  have  been 
done.     It  must  therefore  be  perfectly  wise.     But  its  wis- 


IMMOR  TALIT  Y.  293 

dom  can  never  be  vindicated  by  the  experience  of  man  as 
a  mere  denizen  of  the  earth.  If  there  be  no  future  for 
him,  he  would  far  better  never  have  been.  It  is  no  irrev- 
erence to  say  that  while  the  wisdom  of  his  creation  can 
be  clearly  seen  in  the  light  of  immortality,  it  cannot  be 
seen  at  all  without  that  light.  This  world  is  a  scene 
of  perpetual  moral  disorder  and  confusion.  If  there  be 
any  wise  purpose  in  it,  or  any  moral  harmony  to  result 
from  it,  the  future  alone  can  disclose  that  fact.  If  this 
momentary  life  of  the  flesh  is  the  prelude  to  an  eternal 
life  of  the  spirit,  then  the  present  confusion  appears  as 
only  the  marshalling  of  those  moral  forces  within  the  soul 
which  are  to  carry  it,  in  harmony  and  victory,  into  its 
native  domain  of  enduring  peace.  But  if  there  be  no  life 
of  the  spirit,  if  the  forces  are  perpetually  mustering  with- 
out plan  or  purpose,  and  never  engaging  for  the  crown  of 
immortal  victory,  then  the  present  life  is  but  the  merest 
by-play — a  childish  farce,  a  comedy  of  errors  with  a  tragic 
end.  Surely  the  creation  of  such  a  being,  and  his  endow- 
ment with  such  a  life,  could  reflect  no  credit  upon  the 
wisdom  of  the  Creator. 

2.      THE    GOODNESS   OF    GOD    IS   A    PLEDGE   OF    IMMORTALITY. 

The  infinite  goodness  of  God  calls  for  the  goodness  and 
happiness  of  his  moral  intelligences.  Man,  one  of  these 
intelligences,  is  evidently  fitting  in  this  life  for  a  state  of 
goodness  and  happiness  beyond.  His  spirit  is  manifestly 
capable  of  such  a  beatific  state  of  being.  In  his  best  and 
supremest  moments  he  longs  for  it  more  than  for  all 
things  else,  and  gives  himself  up  to  the  all-absorbing 
desire.  This  desire  is  high  and  holy.  Its  gratification 
would  honor  the  Creator  and  bless  the  creature.  It  is 
therefore  the   dictate   of  infinite  love.     But  God's  love 


294  CHRISTIAN   THEISM, 

must  be  infinite,  like  himself ;  and  must  continue  its  out- 
flow to  the  human  soul,  so  long  as  the  human  soul  is 
capable  of  receiving  it.  He  will  not  then  create  that  soul 
only  to  destroy  it  at  the  very  moment  when  it  is  best 
fitted  to  receive  his  own  love.  The  rather  will  He  mani- 
fest the  Divine  strength  of  that  love  more  and  more  in 
the  perpetual  enlargements  of  an  immortal  life. 

3.    THE    VERACITY    OF    GOD    CALLS    FOR    IMMORTALITY. 

Man  has  been  universally  endowed  with  what  Max 
Miiller  calls  the  faith-faculty.  By  the  nature  of  this 
faculty  he  is  constrained  to  believe  in  the  truthfulness  of 
God.  He  feels  sure  that  God  will  not  and  cannot 
deceive  him.  But  man  likewise  finds  within  him  a  uni- 
versal hope  of  immortality,  and  a  continual  longing  for  it. 
He  also  recognizes  in  his  own  being  powers  and  possibili- 
ties that  promise  a  future  life.  By  this  promise  he  is 
lifted  to  the  highest  hope  and  urged  to  the  strongest 
endeavor.  If,  therefore,  there  be  no  future  life,  then  the 
very  constitution  of  man  must  be  a  perpetual  delusion, 
and  the  God  who  made  him  thus  must  be  an  arch- 
deceiver  from  the  beginning.  But  this  cannot  be.  A 
wise  and  truthful  parent  will  not  raise  in  the  bosom  of  his 
child  an  ardent  and  all-absorbing  hope  which  he  knows 
can  never  be  realized.  Neither  will  he  permit  such  a 
hope  to  be  awakened  by  another  if  he  have  power  to  pre- 
vent it.  But  the  Infinite  Father  of  us  all  has  allowed  this 
fervid  hope  of  immortality  to  glow  incessantly  in  the 
hearts  of  his  human  children ;  nay,  more,  He  has  kindled 
it  there  with  his  own  creative  hand.  And  will  he  permit 
it  to  go  out  in  unutterable  despair?  Has  he  formed  us 
but  to  deceive  us  ?  to  toy  with  our  affections,  make  grim 
sport  of  our  hopes,  and  then  turn  us  into  nothingness 


IMMORTALITY.  295 

forever?     Surely  not;  his  wisdom  and  truthfulness  forbid 
it.     Both  are  pledged  to  fulfil  every  promise  of  his  hand. 

4.    THE    FELLOWSHIP    OF    GOD   IMPLIES   IMMORTALITY. 

Men  have  always  believed  in  the  fellowship  of  God. 
The  communion  of  the  Infinite  Spirit  with  the  purest 
spirits  of  earth  has,  in  all  ages,  been  held  as  a  possibility 
and  a  sacred  fact.  That  the  Divine  is  in  some  way  com- 
municable to  the  human,  is  a  cardinal  doctrine  of  Chris- 
tian Theism.  Sufficient  proofs  of  its  truth  have  already 
been  given.  God  evidently  can  hold  communion  with 
man ;  or  rather,  to  speak  more  exactly,  man  has  been 
made  capable  of  communing  with  God.  And  if  so,  God 
will  surely  bring  him  into  fellowship  with  himself.  His 
goodness  and  love  demand  it.  It  is  the  very  nature  of 
love  to  communicate  itself.  All  true  love  gives  itself  to 
its  object.  If  God  loves  man  he  will  not  shut  himself  up 
in  perpetual  isolation;  he  will  find  means  to  manifest  his 
love.  There  will  be  a  communion  of  spirits.  But  the 
very  existence  of  such  love  argues  its  continuance.  Love 
cannot  die  ;  true  affection  can  never  cease.  And  surely  the 
infinite  and  loving  God  will  not  bestow  his  love  in  order 
to  recall  it.  He  will  not  awaken  human  love  in  order  to 
disappoint  it.  That  same  Divine  affection  which  has 
made  fellowship  with  man  both  possible  and  necessary, 
will  also  make  it  eternal.  The  immortal  fellowship  of  all 
good  spirits  is  as  sure  as  the  immortality  of  God  himself; 
its  pledge  is  written  in  his  infinite  being. 

5.    THE    VERY    EXISTENCE    OF    GOD    IS    AN    ARGUMENT    FOR 
IMMORTALITY. 

Theoretically  and  logically,  as  has  been  before  stated, 
there  may  be  no  necessary  connection  between  the  being 


296  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

and  character  of  God,  and  the  immortal  life  of  man.  A 
tolerable  system  of  Theism  might  possibly  be  constructed 
without  reference  to  a  future  state.  There  would  doubt- 
less be  many  obscure  places  in  it,  but  the  possibility  of  its 
construction  need  not  be  denied.  One  thing,  however,  is 
very  certain.  No  such  system  could  have  any  practical 
power  over  the  lives  and  consciences  of  men.  It  would 
be  essentially  cold  and  valueless.  Every  realizing,  inspir- 
ing, vivifying  view  of  God's  being  includes  immortality. 
It  is  quite  true  that  men  have  sometimes  lost  their  hold 
on  immortality,  but  it  is  because  they  have  first  lost  their 
hold  on  God. 

He  who  lives  with  God  now,  confidently  hopes  to  live 
with  him  forever ;  but  he  who  expects  to  pass  the  period 
of  his  earth-life  and  then  lie  down  and  perish  like  a  beast, 
has  never  been  touched  by  the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty. 
He  is  spiritually  dead  already  ;  there  is  no  light  in  him. 
He  is  without  hope  because  he  is  without  God  in  the 
world. 

Now  these  arguments  for  the  future  life  are  neither 
exact  nor  demonstrative ;  and  yet  they  are  rational  and 
convincing,  unless  one  bars  his  mind  against  them  and 
prefers  the  thrall  of  death  to  the  thrift  of  life. 

For  such  a  one,  life  has  no  joy,  no  peace,  no  hope.  It 
is  but  an  empty  chaos  of  blackness ;  the  soul-sickening 
shadow  of  the  tomb  is  over  it  all.  The  light  has  faded 
from  the  sky,  and  the  soul  that  has  once  tasted  the  delu- 
sive sweets  of  life  must  be  filled  at  last  with  the  bitter- 
ness of  death.  Every  avenue  before  it  leads  at  last  to  a 
dark  and  lonely  pathway.  Of  its  entrance  upon  that 
solitary  journey,  there  is  a  lifetime  of  agonizing  dread, 
but  not  a  single  moment  of  friendly  warning.  The  whole 
earth  is  one  vast  charnel-house  of  departed  spirits.     The 


IMMOR  TALITY.  297 

voices  of  vanished  hopes  break  into  one  dirge-like  wail  of 
despair,  and  the  doomed  spirit  is  hurried  away  into  the 
dread  silence  of  eternal  dissolution.  There  is  an  inex- 
pressible sadness  in  the  orphanage  of  such  a  soul.  It 
has  lost  its  God,  its  Heaven,  itself.  The  spell  of  the 
destroyer  has  come  upon  it  and  covered  all  with  the 
ashen  hue  of  death. 

There  is  but  one  voice  that  can  avail  to  break  the 
spell  and  set  the  spirit  free.  That  voice  is  the  pledge  of 
immortality.  It  is  the  final  utterance  of  a  true  spiritual 
philosophy.  It  restores  the  faded  light,  revives  the  van- 
ished hopes,  relights  the  quenchless  fires  of  life,  proclaims 
eternal  victory  over  death,  and  crowns  the  purified  spirit 
with  an  immortal  diadem  of  fellowship  with  God. 


CONCLUSION. 


In  concluding  this  system  of  theistic  studies,  three 
reflections  present  themselves  : 

I.  The  personality  of  man,  the  being,  eternity,  and 
sovereignty  of  God,  the  moral  character  and  responsibil- 
ity of  human  acts,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the 
enduring  rewards  and  retributions  of  the  future  life  are 
basal  truths  of  human  belief.  They  are  firmly  and  inerad- 
icably  implanted  in  the  heart.  No  circumstance,  environ- 
ment, or  system  of  thought  has  ever  been  able  to  remove 
them  or  destroy  their  force.  Either  they  are  received  in 
their  simplicity  and  purity,  or  else  they  are  distorted  into 
monstrous  beliefs,  which,  by  their  very  enormity,  demon- 
strate their  necessity.  Man  can  neither  rid  himself  of 
them  nor  render  himself  indifferent  to  them.  He  is  born 
to  them,  bred  in  them,  fed  on  them,  buried  with  them. 
What  he  is,  they  make  him  ;  what  he  has,  they  give  him ; 
what  he  hopes,  they  pledge  to  him.  They  voice  his  deep- 
est thoughts,  control  his  purest  sentiments,  inspire  his 
noblest  deeds.  To  renounce  them  is  to  reject  one's  spir- 
itual birthright  in  the  impossible  attempt  to  feed  the 
hungry  soul  on  the  sodden  pottage  of  materialism.  To 
cherish  them  and  live  by  them  is  to  make  the  most  of  life 
and  character  and  destiny.  It  is  to  choose,  in  the  supreme 
election  of  life,  that  spiritual  philosophy  which  alone  is 
both  rational  and  satisfying. 

298 


CONCLUSION,  299 

2.  In  their  last  analysis  all  these  truths  depend  upon 
the  faith-faculty.  Religious  faith,  so  called,  is  that  in  man 
which  construes  and  justifies  the  basal  truths  of  Christian 
Theism.  All  its  arguments  must  finally  be  brought  to 
this  test.  Faith  in  testimony  justifies  all  historical  proofs. 
Faith  in  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  the  ultimate  ground 
on  which  all  inductive  and  deductive  arguments  must  rest. 
Faith  in  the  necessary  intuitive  truths  of  the  mind  gives 
all  their  force  to  the  intuitional  and  causal  proofs  therein 
employed.  And  this  is  no  disparagement  to  the  proofs 
themselves.  They  are  rational,  and  their  convincing  force 
is  irresistible.  And  yet  it  must  never  be  denied  or  doubted 
that  without  faith  it  is  impossible,  not  only  to  please  God, 
but  even  to  know  his  being,  recognize  his  hand,  or  read 
his  words  wherever  written,  in  nature,  providence,  or  grace. 

3.  This  resort  to  faith  is  not  a  mere  weakness  or  reli- 
gious makeshift.  It  is  the  ultimate  resort  in  all  things,  the 
crucial  test  of  human  knowledge,  the  very  citadel  of  truth 
itself.  Without  faith  it  is  indeed  impossible  to  know 
God.  Be  it  so.  The  theist  makes  no  apology ;  for,  if 
this  analysis  is  just,  it  is  equally  impossible  to  know  man 
or  earth  or  ocean  or  star  or  sky.  All  objects  of  knowledge 
are  on  precisely  the  same  footing  in  this  regard.  There 
is  no  department  of  truth,  physical,  philosophical,  social, 
or  historical,  which,  at  the  last  thrust,  rests  not  on  this 
same  basis  of  universal  faith.  More  than  this.  There  is 
not  a  single  truth  established  in  any  field  of  human 
thought  which  can  be  proved  without  an  ultimate  resort 
to  some  principle  of  simple  belief.  Let  this  statement  be 
tested  by  the  fundamental  truths  of  science,  of  mathe- 
matics, of  philosophy,  or  of  common  life,  and  it  will  be 
found  universally  and  intensely  true.  Even  the  most 
rigorous  demonstrations  of   logic  depend    at   last    upon 


300  CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 

propositions  which,  though  universally  believed,  can  never 
be  proved.  And  yet  this  truth  is  by  no  means  irrational. 
On  the  contrary,  faith  is  the  very  groundwork  of  all  rea- 
son. He  who  will  believe  only  what  he  can  prove  must 
believe  nothing.  But  he  who  believes  nothing  can  prove 
nothing,  and  therefore  knows  nothing.  There  is  no  ra- 
tional stopping-place  between  faith  and  blank  agnosticism. 
The  science  of  God  is  based  on  faith.  But  this  is 
neither  surprising  nor  alarming.  For  all  science  is  equally 
based  on  faith,  and  all  true  science  recognizes  faith  as  its 
only  firm  foundation.  Upon  this  foundation  let  it  con- 
tinue to  build.  Let  the  structure  rise  into  a  beautiful 
and  sacred  temple  of  truth.  Let  the  truth-seeker,  of  every 
name  and  purpose,  come  hither  to  worship.  Let  the 
deepest  thought  of  the  mind  and  the  holiest  sentiment  of 
the  heart  be  offered  upon  its  pure  shrine  together.  Then 
shall  the  myriad  forms  of  error  disappear.  Then  shall  the 
triumph  of  truth  be  complete,  and  the  whole  earth  be 
filled  with  the  knowledge  and  glory  of  God. 


INDEX. 


Abuse  of  teleology,  105-108. 
Adaptation,  78. 
Advanced  Christianity,  19. 
Agassiz,  264. 
Agnosticism,  249-256, 
Ahriman,  147,  181. 
Ahura,  7. 
Albumen,  40. 
Amun-Ra,  183. 
Anaximander,  257. 
Andaman  islanders,  189. 
Anthropomorphism,  128-136. 
Anti-theistic  errors,  223-256. 
A  priori  experience,  233. 
Arnold,  Matthew,  11. 
Aseity  of  God,  205. 
Athanasius,  129. 
Atomic  theory,  269. 
Atomists,  257. 
Augustine,  St.,  129,  147. 
Australians,  187. 
Automatism,  loi. 

Bacon,  177. 
Bastian,  Dr.,  259. 
Bathybius,  259. 
Being  of  God,  25. 
Bernardin,  St.  Pierre,  106. 
Boldness  of  Christianity,  3,  4. 
Bowne,  Prof.,  ii8,  122. 
Brahma,  147,  175. 
Brahmin,  117. 
Breeding,  268. 
Bridaine,  75. 
Brinton,  Dr.,  193. 
BUchner,  Louis,  225. 
Buckland,  107. 
Buddha,  48,  148. 
Burchell,  187, 


Bushmen  and  Hottentots,  188. 
Bushnell,  Horace,  163. 
Butler,  Bishop,  22,  279. 

Canon  of  Scripture,  12. 
Carbon,  36. 
Carlyle,  Thomas,  243. 
Carnivora,  151. 
Causation,  48,  211-213. 
Chalmers,  50. 

Chance  combinations,  92-94. 
Chemical  symbols,  35. 
Chinese,  129,  183. 
Cicero,  70. 
Clarke,  J.  F..  181. 
Cleanthes,  176. 
Clifford,  Prof.,  119. 
Color,  39. 

Comte,  Auguste,  247. 
Cosmos,  42,  215. 
Crimina^rial,  48,  49. 
Cruickshank,  193. 
Crystalline  humor,  83. 
Crystallography,  36. 

Darwin,  Charles,  177,  187,  188,  262. 

Day,  189. 

Deism,  132. 

Demiurgos,  219. 

Democritus,  224,  257. 

Demonstrating  Jehovah,  22,  23. 

Derham,  Wm.,  27. 

De  Rouge,  183. 

Descartes,  177,  257. 

Design,  59,  61-65. 

Discipline,  140. 

Ditheism,  146-148. 

Divine  volition,  60. 

Doctrines,  2. 


301 


302 


CHRISTIAN    THEISM. 


Dorchester,  Dr.,  192. 
Drummond,  Henry,  391. 
D'Urville,  187, 
Dyaus  Pilar,  7. 

ECPHANTUS,  175, 

Eleatics,  176. 
Electric  storms,  170. 
Embryology,  260-262. 
Empedocles,  147. 
Epicureans,  127,  162. 
Epicurus,  149. 
Eternity  of  matter,  51,  102. 
Euclid,  176. 
Euler,  J06. 
Eutaxiology,  24-55. 
Evolution,  257-277. 
Eye,  80,  81. 

FfiNELON,  106. 

Ferrari,  247. 

Fetichism,  192. 

Fichte,  II,  177,  238,  241,  244. 

Final  cause,  59,  60. 

Fiske,  John,  129,  134,  174,  227. 

Focus  of  vision,  83,  84. 

Forberg,  244. 

Functional  adaptations,  84,  85. 

Functions,  79,  85. 

Galen,  70. 

Gemmules,  269. 

Generatrix,  38. 

Geological  deposits,  272,  273. 

German  language,  20. 

Goethe,  257,  272,  286. 

Goodness  of  God,  137-166. 

Grand-Etre,  247,  283. 

Gravitation,  42,  43,  44,  50,  169,  253. 

Greeks,  129,  131. 

Habit,  16. 

Haeckel,  259-263,  267. 

Hamilton,  177,  196. 

Harris,  Dr.,  230,  256. 

Harrison,  Frederick,  117,  136,  247. 

Hartmann,  148. 

Harvey,  84. 

Hegel,  II,  103,  177,  202,  238,  242. 

Heraclitus,  257. 

Heredity,  145,  159. 

Herodotus,  183. 


Hindus,  129. 

Hindu  Vedanta^  175. 

Hockoe,  190. 

Human  face,  41,  42. 

Hume,  David,  119. 

Huxley,  Prof.,  117,  119,258,  272,  273. 

Hydrogen,  236. 

ICONOCLASM,   53. 
Immanent  design,  103-105. 
Immortality,  278-297. 
Indians,  189. 
Infinite  being,  200,  208. 
Infinite  power,  213,  218. 
Infinity  of  God,  195-222. 
Instincts,  86-89. 
Intelligence  in  nature,  24-55. 
Inter-stellar  ether,  169. 
Intuition,  110-115,  205,  206. 
Ionics,  257. 

Janet,  Paul,  60,  64,  75,  107. 
Jupiter,  7, 171, 176. 


'57.  i77»  196,  257* 


Kant,  11,  51, 112, 126, 
Kepler's  laws,  44. 
Klemm,  189. 
Kolb,  188. 
Koran,  181. 


Man,  a  part  of  nature,  74. 

Maclaurin,  88. 

Mani,  147. 

Mansion,  69. 

Maraldi,  86. 

Mars,  98,  171. 

Materialism,  223-236. 

Max  Miiller,  133,  177,  193,  294. 

McCosh,  Dr.,66,  III. 

Mechanism,  94-103. 

Meteoric  agglomeration,  99. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  119,  122, 148,  158,  247,  287^ 

Milton,  272. 

Miracle-plays,  129. 

Monera,  258. 

Monotheism,  168,  174,  178,  179,  180. 

Moral  evil,  145,  157-166. 

Moral  law,  284. 

More,  Henry,  27. 

Mormon,  book  of,  133. 

Morphology,  28,  29. 

Mozart,  272. 


INDEX. 


303 


Napoleon,  45.  ■ 
Natural  selection,  262-269 
Nebular  hypothesis,  96-99. 
Necessity  in  nature,  50. 
Neptune,  98. 

Newcomb,  Prof.,  98,  229,  230. 
Newton,  70,  169. 
Nirvana,  48,  117,  287. 
Nitrogen  series,  36. 

Odin,  147,  185,  186. 

Omnipotence,  161. 

Optimism,  150-165. 

Order,  mark  of  intelligence,  32,  33. 

Origin  of  evil,  i6i. 

Ormazd,  147,  181. 

Osiris,  147. 

Owen,  187. 

Oxygen,  36,  90. 

Pa  LEV,  70. 

Pantheism,  236-246. 

Pentagons  on  moon,  33. 

Perfections  of  Deity,  10. 

Personality  of  God,  109. 

Pessimism,  148-150. 

Phillips,  188. 

Philolaus,  176. 

Phyllotaxy,  37. 

Physical  dependence,  280. 

Physical  destruction,  270. 

Physical  suffering,  142-143,  151-156. 

Physico-teleology,  92. 

Plato,  176. 

Positivism,  246-249. 

Pseudo-infinite,  202. 

Pythagoras,  148,  176. 

Raphael,  271. 

Rationality  in  instinct,  89. 

Religion,  in  U.  S.,  191;  in  world,  194. 

Religious  ecstasy,  15. 

Reversions  and  rudimentary  organs,  269- 

271. 
Rhudra,  147. 

Rig-Veda,  5,  7,  147,  184,  185. 
Romans,  129. 
Rousseau,  138,  158. 
Rowley,  Dr.,  106. 

Saturn,  171. 
Schilling,  177. 


Schopenhauer,  148,  231,  291. 

Self-consciousness,  118. 

Self-determination,  120. 

Sex,  267. 

Shooting  stars,  62. 

Sin,  145,  162. 

Social  evil,  143. 

Sociology,  143. 

Socrates,  176. 

Solar  system,  conditions,  50. 

Sosio9h,  182. 

Spectrum  analysis,  171. 

Spencer,  H.,  11,  12,  119,  121,  178,  229,  249, 

252-256,  258,  282. 
Spinoza,  92,  122,  177,  237,  239-241. 
Spontaneous  generation,  258-360. 
Stoics,  176. 
Strong,  Dr.,  193. 
Sufficient  reason,  law  of,  48. 
Suicides,  164. 
Sun,  98. 

Supra-conscious  intelligence,  46. 
Supra-human  elements  in  God,  135. 
Syllogism,  eutax.,  29-45;  teleol.,  67-92. 

Teleology,  56-108. 

Terra  del  Fuegans,  j88. 

Terrestrial  life  and  movement,  179. 

Tides,  90. 

Tutelage  of  world,  139. 

Tyndall,  Prof.,  122,  259. 

Typhon,  147. 

Ulrici,  231, 

Unity  of  God,  167-194. 

Universality,  of  order,  52;  of  religion,  8, 187.. 

Variety  of  arguments,  26. 
Varuna,  184. 
Vision,  79-84. 
Vogt,  Carl,  225. 
Volcano,  62,  63,  252. 
Volition  in  nature,  56-108. 
Voltaire,  107. 

Waitz,  187, 188,  192, 
War,  144,  156,  165. 

Xenophanes,  176, 

Zend-Avesta,  147,  181. 
Zeus,  7. 

Zulus,  129. 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

THE  SCRIPTURES, 

HEBREW  AND   CHRISTIAN. 

ARRANGED  AND  EDITED  AS  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE 
STUDY  OF  THE  BIBLE. 

Rev.  EDWARD  T.  BARTLETT,  D.D., 
Dean  of  the  Divinity  School  of  the  P.  E.  Church  in  Philadel- 
phia, and  Mary  Wolfe,  Prof,  of  Ecclesiastical  History. 

Rev.  JOHN  P.  PETERS,  Ph.D.,  ^  Editors. 

Professor  of  Old  Testament  Literature  and  Language  in  the 
Divinity  School  of  the  P.  E.  Church  in  Philadelphia,  and 
Professor  of  Hebrew  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

The  work  is  to  be  completed  in  three  volumes,  containing  each  about 
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Vol.  I.  includes  Hebrew  story  from  the  Creation  to  the  time  of  Nehe- 
miah,  as  in  the  Hebrew  canon. 

Vol.  II.  is  devoted  to  Hebrew  poetry  and  prophecy. 

Vol.  III.  will  contain  the  selections  from  the  Christian  Scriptures. 

The  volumes  are  handsomely  printed  in  i2mo  form,  and  with  an  open, 
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sense  of  the  narrative. 

Each  volume  is  complete  in  itself,  and  will  be  sold  separately  at  $1.50. 

The  editors  say  in  their  announcement :  "Our  object  is  to  remove  stones 
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plan  involves  some  re-arrangements  and  omissions,  before  which  we  have 
not  hesitated,  inasmuch  as  our  proposed  work  will  not  claim  to  be  the  Bible, 
but  an  introduction  to  it.  That  we  may  avoid  imposing  our  own  interper- 
tation  upon  Holy  Writ,  it  will  be  our  endeavor  to  make  Scripture  serve  as 
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Part  I. — Hebrew  Story,  from  the  Beginning  to  the  Time  of  Saul. 
"    II. — The  Kingdom  of  all  Israel, 
"  III. — Samaria,  or  the  Northern  Kingdom. 
"    IV. — Judah,  from  Rehoboam  to  the  Exile. 


PUBLICATIONS  OF  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

The  second  volume  comprises  : 
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"    II. — Hebrew  Legislation. 
"  III. — Hebrew  Tales. 
"   IV. — Hebrew  Prophecy. 
"     V. — Hebrew  Poetry. 
"  VI. — Hebrew  Wisdom. 

The  third  volume  will  comprise  the  selections  from  the  New  Testament^ 
arranged  as  follows : 

I. — The  Gospel  according  to  St.  Mark,  Presenting  the  Evan- 
gelical Story  in  its  Simplest  Form  ;  Supplemented  by 
Selections  from  St.  Matthew  and  St.  Luke. 
II. — The  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  with  some  Indication  of  the 

Probable  Place  of  the  Epistles  in  the  Narrative. 
III. — The  Epistles  of  St.  James  and  the  First  Epistle  of  St.  Petkr. 
IV. — The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul. 
V. — The  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews. 
VI. — The  Revelation  of  St.  John  (A  Portion). 
VII. — The  First  Epistle  of  St.  John. 
VIII. — The  Gospel  of  St.  John. 

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The  Story  of  the   Nations. 


Messrs.  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS  take  pleasure  in 
announcing  that  they  have  in  course  of  publication  a 
series  of  historical  studies,  intended  to  present  in  a 
graphic  manner  the  stories  of  the  different  nations  that 
have  attained  prominence  in  history. 

In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  national  life  will 
be  distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and  noteworthy 
periods  and  episodes  will  be  presented  for  the  reader  in 
their  philosophical  relation  to  each  other  as  well  as  to 
universal  history. 

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enter  into  the  real  life  of  the  peoples,  and  to  bring  them 
before  the  reader  as  they  actually  lived,  labored,  and 
struggled — as  they  studied  and  wrote,  and  as  they  amused 
themselves.  In  carrying  out  this  plan,  the  myths,  with 
which  the  history  of  all  lands  begins,  will  not  be  over- 
looked, though  these  will  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
the  actual  history,  so  far  as  the  labors  of  the  accepted 
historical  authorities  have  resulted  in  definite  conclusions. 

The  subjects  of  the  different  volumes  will  be  planned 
to  cover  connecting  and,  as  far  as  possible,  consecutive 
epochs  or  periods,  so  that  the  set  when  completed  will 
present  in  a  comprehensive  narrative  the  chief  events  in 
the  great  Story  OF  THE  NATIONS ;  but  it  will,  of  course 


not  always  prove  practicable  to  issue  the  several  volumes 
in  their  chronological  order. 

The  "  Stories  "  are  printed  in  good  readable  type,  and 
in  handsome  i2mo  form.  They  are  adequately  illustrated 
and  furnished  with  maps  and  indexes.  They  are  sold 
separately  at  a  price  of  $1.50  each. 

The  following  is  a  partial  list  of  the  subjects  thus  far 

determined  upon  : 

THE  STORY  OF  *ANCIENT  EGYPT.     Prof.  George  Rawlinson. 

"  *CHALDEA.     Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

"  *GREECE.     Prof.  James  A.  Harrison, 

Washington  and  Lee  University. 

"  *ROME.     Arthur  Gilman. 

"  *THE  JEWS.     Prof.  James  K.  IIosmer, 

Washington  University  of  St.  Louis. 

"  *CARTHAGE.     Prof.  Alfred  J.  Church, 

University  College,  London. 

"  BYZANTIUM. 

"  *TIIE  GOTHS.     Henry  Bradley. 

"  *T HE  NORMANS.     Sarah  O.  Jewett. 

"  *PERSIA.     S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 

•'  *SPA1N.     Rev.  E.  E.  and  Susan  Hale. 

"  *GERMANY.     S.  Barinc.-Gould. 

••  THE  ITALIAN  REPUBLICS. 

"  *IIOLLAND.     Prof.  C.  E.  Thorold  Rogers. 

•'  *N0RWAY.     Hjalmar  II.  Buyesen. 

"  *THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN.    Stanley  Lane-Poolk. 

"  *HUNGARY.     Prof.  A.  VAmh^ry. 

"  THE  ITALIAN  KINGDOM.     W.  L.  Alden. 

'•  *xMEDI/EVAL  FRANCE.     Prof.  Gustavr  Masson. 

'•  *ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE.     Prof.  J.  P.  Mahaffy. 
"      THE   HANSE  TOWNS.     Helen  Zimmern. 

"  *ASSYRIA.     Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

"  *THE  SARACENS.     Arthur  Oilman. 

"  *TURKEY.     Stanley  Lane-Poole. 

"  PORTUGAL.     H.  Morse  Stephens. 

"  *MEXIC0.     Susan  Hale. 

'♦  *I  RE  LAND.     Hon.  Emily  Lawless. 

"  PHOENICIA. 

"  SWITZERLAND. 
"       RUSSIA. 

"  WALES. 
**      SCOTLAND. 

"  *MEDIA,  BABYLON,  AND  PERSIA. 

Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

•  (The  volumes  starred  are  now  ready,  November,  1888.) 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


New  York 

•7  AKD  »9  West  Twkntv-Third  Strkkt 


London 

27  King  William  Street,  Stramd 


